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This research explores from the perspective of new institutional economics the 
role played by local governments in the Chinese urbanization process.
In conventional wisdom of city planning and economics, government is often 
considered as the opposite of the market: the public goods can only be supplied 
in special ways, different from that of the common goods. Institutions, planned 
economy or market economy, are often labeled by how much the government 
intervenes in its economy. However, theories based on such paradigms can 
hardly explain the behaviors of governments in the real world.
This research argues that government is a part of the market mechanism, but 
not the opposite of market. A city government is in nature an enterprise that 
sells its products and services within its territory. Correspondingly, a city is in 
nature a place to trade public services, which makes the key institutional 
difference between a city and a village.
In light of this argument, the theoretical debate on public goods is first 
examined. Then the behaviors of Chinese local governments are investigated 
and explained with a new framework, which cannot be achieved with traditional 
theory. Case studies in China demonstrate that the rapid growth of Chinese 
cities in recent years results mainly from the success of the business model of 
Chinese local governments. Lastly the inadequacies and mistakes of traditional 
urban planning theories in the Chinese context are analyzed and suggestions 
are made to transfer planning theory to the new paradigm, which is based 
mainly on the assumption that the behaviors of governments is to maximize 
their surplus.
In the appendix a new pricing theory is formulated to extend the theoretical 
ground of this research. With this theory, the public goods can be supplied on a 
competitive market without substantial distinction from other goods.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Urban planning is a tool to organize spatial collective action.1 Government is a 
key organizer for spatial collective action, playing a role like a buyer of urban 
planning. Although the academic discipline of urban planning has a long history in 
the 20th century of extending its scope to the representation and management of the 
public interest and disadvantaged groups (Susskind 1989, Amstein 1969), the idea 
that the urban planner is a representative for public interest has not necessarily been 
widely recognized in practice.3 Planner have interpreted this professional mandate in 
the context of the more general mandate of urban governmental. But the actions and 
motivation of government has been quite misunderstood by the urban planning field.
Urban planners, especially those in China, have typically assumed government to 
be a substitute for the market or a mechanism to fix market failure. This 
misunderstanding has led the urban planning discipline along a rugged road. Urban 
dynamics and the interaction of planning interventions with urban processes have 
been poorly understood and poorly analyzed. Planners have not generally understood 
the city from an angle of ‘spatial production’, nor have sufficiently precisely generally 
distinguished who the producers and consumers of a city are. Foundational urban
1 Although professional planners also serve individual proprietors, I still put them into the category o f 
architects. To distinguish architects from planners, we need to see whether there are transaction costs 
induced by collective action or not.
2 This is determined by the definition o f government. Although individuals and collectives also 
organize collective action, I define them as government in a broad sense. This point will be further 
illustrated in the section The Origin o f Government in the second chapter. For an NIE analysis o f 
government as buyer o f planning services, see Webster C (2008) Are some planning transactions 
intrinsically sovereign? Journal o f Planning Education and Research (in press at time o f thesis 
submission)
3 Rather, those amateurs o f urban planning —  journalists (Jane Jacobs), teachers, etc. —  become the 
spokesmen o f public interests.
1
theories regard the city as a natural phenomenon arising from human interactions 
analogues to natural phenomena of physics (Christaller 1933, Burgess 1925, Hoyt 
1939, Ullman 1945, Losch 1940, Krugman 1977, Fujita and Krugman et al. 2000). In 
this context, urban government is regarded as an impersonal agency promoting the 
public interest.
Under this implicit assumption, the role of government in the formation of cities 
tends to be underplayed or ignored and the professional role of urban planners 
becomes confusing. A false theoretical tool leads to a false framework for analysis and 
action. When government in fact does not fit the ideals of planners, planners have not 
generally reflected and adjusted their assumptions. Instead, they have tended to set out 
to correct the reality. This takes urban planning and urban studies further from the real 
world. Planning theories have increasingly become self-entertaining exercises within 
academia’s ivory tower. The complicated theoretical models have become an art o f  
dragon killing: increasingly inscrutable, having no use at all. What planners claim 
(planning theories) is increasingly irrelevant to what they do (planning practices).
The fierceness of competition between urban governments in China would hardly 
be believed by most government practitioners in developed countries.4 Official 
corruption via blackmailing developers may happen from time to time, yet what 
happens all the time is that Chinese government woos investors by offering whatever 
they have. Government is deeply involved in economic competition. Facing such 
governmental behavior that planning theory generally fails to acknowledge or explain,
4 In Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta where there is fierce urban competition, there is a very 
popular story going round: an investor was negotiating an important investment project with the local 
government, while the representative o f another city waited nearby the scene o f the negotiation and got 
hold o f the concluding conditions o f their negotiation. With that, he offered more favourable conditions 
to the investor and simply took away the already-settled project to his own city. Competition among 
cities has become bread and butter in significant programs like the site selection o f Disneyland, Shell 
Petroleum and so on. Now competition like this among cities has spread to the interior o f cities. It is no 
secret that Haidian District and Chaoyang District o f  Beijing contended with each other for crucial 
programs such as relocation o f CCTV, Zhongguancun against CBD and alike. In Xiamen, the urban 
government has established “operation centers” to attract enterprises in the surrounding areas to set up 
their headquarters in Xiamen so as to broaden the city’s tax sources, which has been widely criticized 
by other cities in Fujian Province. Even among the districts, there are explicit competitions for projects. 
These districts successively grant the operation centers under their jurisdiction various premium 
“subsidies”.
2
planners are left weakly making moral judgments against local governmental leaders. 
Planning has generally failed to figure out the real motives of governmental behavior 
and the nature of the ‘business’ of government, not to mention how to define its own 
role in that business.5
This is quite similar to the economics profession half a century ago. In 1957, 
Anthony Downs criticized government theory in economics in his famous piece An 
Economic Theory o f  Democracy, arguing that this very theory divorced economics 
from the real world. He commented right at the beginning of the paper:
Throughout the world, governments dominate the economic scene. Their spending 
determines whether fu ll employment prevails; their taxes influence countless 
decisions; their policies control international trade; and their domestic 
regulations extend into almost every economic act. (p. 3 )
In the fifteenth chapter of Comment on the Economic Theory o f  Governmental 
Behavior, he further noted:
Attempts to treat government as an endogenous variable in general equilibrium 
theory are extremely scarce, because most theorists have followed the classical 
tradition o f  considering government as a disturbing influence upon the 
self-regulating private economy. Therefore they regarded it as an exogenous 
datum rather than an intrinsic part o f  the division o f  labor. (p. 280)
Citing a series of descriptions of governmental criteria, Downs summarized:
Behind all o f  the prescriptions quoted lurks a single conception o f government: 
government is that agency in the division o f  the labor which has as its proper 
function the maximization o f social welfare. However, because this conception is 
almost never formulated quite so explicitly, some o f  its implications have 
remained unrecognized. In particular, government is rarely treated as an integral 
part o f  the division o f  labor. The classical tendency to regard it as outside the
5 Planners who cooperate with the government are typically viewed as reprobates who betray their 
own professional morality and are criticized by their craft brothers who possess discourse rights.
3
system being analyzed persists even when the analyst recognizes that government 
has a specific function in the economy (p.282)
Downs argued that this mistake in traditional economic studies is caused by a 
confusion of the motives of governmental behaviour with its social function. To 
illustrate this, Downs quoted several times the well-known inference in Schumpeter’s 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1950):
But it does not follow that the social meaning o f a type o f activity will necessarily 
provide the motive power, hence the explanation o f  the latter. I f  it does not, a 
theory that contents itself with an analysis o f  the social end, or need to be served, 
cannot be accepted as an adequate account o f  the activities that serve it. (p.282)
From the viewpoint of Downs, we should study both the social functions of 
government and the motivations that drive the delivery of those functions. 
Government needs to be understood as a public agent of private interests:
In general, men undertake economic activity primarily to further their own 
private aims and only secondarily to provide benefits for society (i.e., fo r other 
men). From the angle o f  society, the object o f  each man s action is to fulfill his 
social function. But from his own point o f  view, he acts to achieve his own private 
ends, which are often unrelated, per se, to his social function, (p.282)
But economists tended (in the neoclassical paradigm) to take the social function 
as government’s motive. Downs’ criticism of economics half century ago is still good 
for today’s urban planning although its taste may bitter.
The economists who commit this error are rarely guilty o f  describing reality 
inaccurately, because most o f their statements are normative, not descriptive. 
Probably not one o f  them would contend that governments in the real world 
actually maximize social welfare. Nevertheless, they make policy prescriptions 
which assume governments should maximize welfare. But there is little point in 
advising governments to do so, or forming recommendations o f  action based on 
the supposition that they might, unless there is more reason to believe that they
4
will. Otherwise the economists ’ advice may very well be as useless as telling a 
profit-maximizing monopolist to sell his product at marginal cost so as to benefit 
society, (p.282)
Downs criticized the logic of those economists who confused the motive of 
government with its inherent function as being groundless. They assume that all the 
choices of individuals are self-interested except those of people in government. This 
point of view is “inconsistent with the axioms that explain how all other economic 
person in society operate.” (p.262). He suggested that “failure to consider government 
motivation has led to a false generality in the theory of governmental 
decision-making.” (p261).
The study of governmental behavior in economics entered a brand-new phase 
after Downs’ onslaught. Olson’s study of collective action and the rise of states (Olson 
1965, 1982); North’s study of the evolutionary history of institutions (North and 
Thomas 1973, North 1981); Tiebout’s study of the local government (Tiebout 1956); 
and Barzel’s state theory all viewed government as an organization with independent 
motives and composed of self-interested individuals.6 They have been inadequately 
explored as a basis for understanding the motivation (behaviour) and social function 
of planners (and the distinction between the two).
Since the last two decades, many geographers have also started to rethink the 
market role of local governments. In 1989, David Harvey found that the 
transformation of urban governance from “managerially to entrepreneurialism” in late 
capitalism. Andrew Walder (1995) noticed that the local governments in China 
organized as industrial firm. More recently, Fulong Wu (2002), also took notice of the 
market-oriented tendency in urban governance in China.
The progress of economic theory provides a significant set of reference points for 
urban planning theory. I attempt to rethink governmental behaviour and the role of 
planners by applying insights from institutional economics. In so doing, I attempt to
6 The idea that the government is the representative o f class interests originally proposed by Marx has 
returned to the mainstream o f economics studies in another way.
5
provide a planning theory focus that moves from the abstract to the concrete.
1.2 On the market role of Government
1.2.1 Invisible hand and market failure
From the day economics came into existence as a distinct field of study, the role 
of government has been disputed. In 1776, Adam Smith expressed great doubts about 
the function of state and the motive of government in his epoch-making The Wealth o f  
Nations. In the fourth chapter On the System of Political Economics, Smith analyzed 
in detail the theory and practice of mercantilism and physiocracy and concluded that:
All systems either o f  preference or o f restraint, therefore, being thus completely 
taken away, the obvious and simple system o f  natural liberty establishes itself o f  
its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws o f justice, is 
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his 
industry and capital into competition with those o f  any other man, or order o f  
men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to 
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the 
proper performance o f  which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be 
sufficient; the duty o f  superintending the industry o f  private people, and o f  
directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest o f  the society.
(Cited from internet: http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-index.htm)
After rejecting governmental intervention in markets, Smith imposed further 
restrictions on governmental functions:
According to the system o f  natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to 
attend to; three duties o f great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to 
common understandings: first, the duty o f  protecting the society from violence 
and invasion o f  other independent societies; secondly, the duty o f  protecting, as 
fa r as possible, every member o f  the society from the injustice or oppression o f  
every other member o f  it, or the duty o f  establishing an exact administration o f
6
justice; and, thirdly, the duty o f  erecting and maintaining certain public works 
and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest o f  any 
individual, or small number o f  individuals, to erect and maintain; because the 
profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number o f  
individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great 
society. (Cited from internet: http://www. adamsmith. org/smith/won-index. htm )
For Smith, the income of a government should be acquired only for the purpose 
of fulfilling these functions. He continued to put forward three factors for a free 
system, which were selfish motive, private enterprise and competitive market; and 
argued that the best way to constantly increase the wealth of a nation was to give total 
freedom to economic activities. All social economic activities were governed by an 
invisible hand while the government was only a night-watchman of a society.
Although Adam Smith regarded government and sovereign as self-interested 
individuals, the idea quickly emerged of government as a third party providing public 
goods (such as providing property assurance). This idea exerted profound influence 
on succeeding economics. Later, classical economists such as Marx viewed 
government as a tool to provide public services for special classes mostly because he 
accepted that the government was a ‘machine’ to maximize social welfare (Downs 
1957).7
As the neoclassical paradigm became the mainstream of economics, the idea was 
enhanced by theorization. In the neoclassical paradigm, since the market was 
presumed to be a system that bore no transaction cost and could maintain balance 
automatically, the government became a system redundancy in this ideal market. As a
7 As for why “Most theories in normative economics tacitly assume that government will in fact 
maximize welfare once it knows how to do so.”, Downs (1957) gave his explanation (see Section One, 
Chapter 15, Chinese version, page 260): firstly, economists would rather leave this question to 
politicians; secondly, influenced by Rousseau, It amounts to assuming that governments are not 
institutions run by men, but are depersonalized, frictionless machines which operate according to 
mathematical rules; e.g., they carry out the “ will o f the majority”. Being machines, they have no 
private motives; for instance, they represented the wills o f most people. As machines, there are 
individual motives inside the governments; thirdly, economists have been unable to agree either about 
what social welfare is or about how to determine what it is. Therefore they have concentrated their 
analysis upon the nature o f the social welfare function .i.e., the rule for converting individual 
preferences into social action., (page 261)
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result, products and services for collective production and consumption became a 
special kind of goods - public goods - which the market could not price. For 
products and services that cannot be offered by the market -  those subject to so-called 
market failure - government became an alternative to complement market defects 
(Musgrave 1939, Samuelson 1954). But because governments tend to possess 
monopolistic privileges, it was argued that they should be only a forced choice. 
Government should be strictly confined within the non-market fields of public goods 
and its decision-making process should be democratic to secure public good 
production in line with the collective preferences of the majority. In other words, 
mainstream economics argued that government should retreat from whatever the 
market can provide and be limited to a certain minimum sphere.
However, in contrast to this theoretical expectation, governmental intervention in 
the economy has been reinforced rather than weakened in nearly all market-oriented 
economies. Public expenditures rapidly took up larger and larger proportions in 
overall social expenditure. America’s governmental expenditures was less than 10% 
of GDP on the eve of WWI and only 11% in 1930, but reached over 1/3 of GDP in the 
1990s. Even so, America’s ratio was the lowest in the major industrialized countries. 
Public expenditure in France, Germany and Italy accounted for over 50% of GDP 
(Stiglitz 1998).
1.2.2 The market provision of public goods
The traditional paradigm of government and public goods was re-examined in the 
intellectual world most notably by Ronald Coase. In The Lighthouse in Economics, 
Coase (1974) re-examined a well-known example of market failure: lighthouses. After 
tracing the evolutionary history of England's lighthouse system, Coase found that the 
lighthouse was not what orthodox economists (such as Mill 1848, Sidgwick 1909, 
Pigou 1933 and Samuelson 1964) assumed. They had variously argued that lighthouse 
could not be priced in a market and should be provided by government. However, in 
the seventeenth century, individuals had commenced building lighthouses that were 
charged for. By 1820, more than 3/4 of the country’s lighthouses were constructed by
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individuals. Trinity House -  a ‘private organization bearing public responsibility’ in 
Coase’s words - provided basically all navigation services while maintenance 
expenditure on lighthouses depended on charging ship owners. Lighthouses were 
financed, constructed and run by private owners and as private goods, they were sold 
and passed within families. Coase thus challenged the view that government should 
be the provider of public goods; turning the example into one that illustrated that the 
market is able to both provide and price shared goods.
Following Coase’s example, fables of market failure were rewritten one after 
another, such as toll roads (Klein 1990), apiarists and fruit growers (Cheung 1973, 
Spulber 2003). Numerous experimental studies have demonstrated that markets need 
not fail in supplying collective goods. But still, these falsifying examples have not 
been sufficient to shake the basis of the neoclassical paradigm. After the convincing 
analysis of the lighthouse case, Coase’s did not ask for an abandonment of 
neoclassical economics, but suggested that economists propose more convincing 
examples8.
A notable experiment conducted by Michelson Morley denied the existence of 
ether, but was not sufficient to refute the paradigm of Newtonian Mechanics. 
Similarly, economics must develop a new paradigm (like Relativity in physics) to 
explain the facts that are not explained by the old. The facts in this case are evidences 
that public goods are not necessarily provided by government. Much theoretical 
innovation has, however, moved little from Smith’s assumption of an invisible hand 
with support for the idea that government intervention in the economy should be 
reduced to a minimum. Government is still considered to be non-market oriented.
If we turn back to the tradition of Adam Smith regarding government as a 
common and self-interested organization, we will find that in Coase's lighthouse case,
8 Similarly, after clarifying, with demonstrations, the theoretical dilemma proposed by Meade (Meade 
1952) that bee keepers and fruit growers couldn’t fix the price o f mutually beneficial actions, Steven N 
S Cheung (1973) pointed out that he was not against Meade and other economists who followed the 
Pigou tradition because they used the example o f bees to demonstrate a theoretical opinion. He was just 
criticizing that they used the method which didn’t probe into the real world situation and got the policy 
implication by pure imagination.
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Trinity House is just a certain type of ‘government’. Coase reveals that public goods 
are not an exceptional commodity/service that cannot be priced. Instead, public goods 
can be provided by government through a market-oriented approach.
1.2.3 Greedy hand
Institutional economists developed the study of public goods provision through a 
government with a market, or market-like role, developing the idea of government as 
a self-interested market agent. This type of market agent aimed at acquiring potential 
profits from division of labor through organizing collective action in 
consumption/production. Its primary method is institution (or mechanism) design. 
Important works include M. Olson (1965, 1982, 1992, 1993), A. Downs (1965), D. 
North (1978, 1983, 1991, 1994), D. North and R. Thomas (1973), Y. Barzel (2002) 
and Tiebout (1956). In effect, they replaced the assumption of an invisible benevolent 
hand with the greedy hand of government -  like any other market agent (Olson 1993).
Like Downs, Olson was one of the trailblazing economists who insisted that 
government is a group dominated by self-interested individuals. In his famous work 
The Logic o f  Collective Action, Olson sets out the premise of the group comprising 
self-interested individuals:
The view that groups act to serve their interests presumably is based upon the
assumption that individuals in groups act out o f  self-interest.  Such altruism,
is, however, considered exceptional, at least when economic issues are at
stake; ...... , The idea that groups tend to act in support o f  their group
interests ...follows logically from this widely accepted premise o f rational, 
self-interested behavior. (p. 1)
Later, the economic history school developed a behavioral analysis using the 
assumption of self-interested government. North wrote in the fourth chapter (‘A 
Framework for Analyzing Economic Organization in History’) in Structure and 
Change in Economic History that:
To account analytically for economic organization we must combine transaction
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cost theory with state theory. Transaction cost theory is necessary under this 
condition: competition caused by ubiquitous scarcity results in that less efficient
forms o f  economic organization are replaced by the more efficient under ceteris 
paribus conditions. And state will only aim at the goal o f  maximizing the wealth 
o f state agency to encourage and regulate an efficient property rights system. 
(p.33)
Extending this hypothesis to economic analysis of constitutional theories, J. M. 
Buchanan (1989) deemed that:
Only individuals choose and act. Collectivities as such neither choose nor act, 
and analysis that proceeds as i f  they do is not within the accepted scientific canon. 
Social aggregates are considered only as the results o f  choices made and actions 
taken by individuals, (p.61)
Borrowing words from Hume, Buchanan said:
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system o f  
government, and fixing several check and controls o f  the constitution, every man 
ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than 
private interest, (p. 64, from Hume 1985, p. 42)
It was a significant progress in economic history to put government into the 
market to be analyzed as a common self-interested organization. The traditional 
assumption treating government as an impersonalized ‘machine’ with an independent 
will to automatically pursue maximization of social welfare has now been shaken 
thoroughly. The assumption that government is composed of self-interested subjects 
and acts according to its selfish leaders opened up an academic paradigm that permits 
analysis of governmental behavior in the provision of public goods. Governments, 
from this point of view, are similar to other organizations such as an enterprise or 
family9. Although this paradigm is far from replacing the paradigm of market failure
9 In his book, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development (Olson, 1993), Olson explains this 
hypothesis:
Since human nature is profoundly complex and individuals rarely act out o f unmixed motives, the
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in mainstream economics, it has made substantial progress -  and is at the centre of a 
lively and widely accepted body of heterodox economic theories that I shall use 
throughout this thesis.
1.2.4 Dilemmas of collective action
The idea that government is an active economic person (or and active economic 
agent) is distinct from the liberal idea the market can optimise economic decisions 
spontaneously without government intervention. Rather, it focuses directly on why the 
market needs government; how government presents itself as a market institution; and 
how it evolves and competes. The study of government starts from collective action, 
and Olson’s theories offer important insights.
In classical economics, collective action was taken as a fundamental 
characteristic of human society and received wide and in-depth study. Adam Smith 
opened his The Wealth o f  Nations (1776) with an insightful study of collective 
production activity and social division. In Marx’s Capital, mass-production of 
industrialization dominated his entire study. From the viewpoint of classical 
economists, collective action based on professionalized division of labor is the core of 
modem production. After Adam Smith examined various cases of division of labor in 
the first chapter ‘On Division’, he wrote:
i f  we examine, I  say, all these things, and consider what a variety o f  labour is 
employed about each o f  them, we shall be sensible that, without the assistance 
and co-operation o f  many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilised 
country could not be provided, even according to what we very falsely imagine 
the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly accommodated. (This is 
cited from internet: http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-index.htm )
Olson extended the scope of collective action analysis to include collective
assumption of rational self-interest that 1 have been using to develop this theory is obviously much 
too simple to do justice to reality fairly. But the caricature assumption that I have been using has not 
only simplified a forbiddingly complex reality but also introduced an element o f impartiality: the 
same motivation was assumed in all regimes. The results are probably also robust enough to hold 
under richer and more realistic behavioural assumption, (p547)
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consumption such as the acquisition of collective interests like security, fire control, 
class interest, industry protection and, more generally, the consumption of public 
goods. But with the assumption of a self-interested and rational person, Olson 
discovered that collective rationality could not voluntarily arise from individual 
rationality as had been assumed by Adam Smith. Olson commented in his milestone 
work The Logic o f Collective Action that:
Indeed, unless the number o f  individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there 
is coercion or some other special device, individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interest. Rational and self-interested individuals will not take 
actions to realize their mutual interests or the interests o f  the group.
In other words, even i f  all o f  the individuals in a large group are rational and 
self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common 
interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or 
group interest, (p. 2)
This is because organizing collective actions has a cost. When the cost is large 
and individuals share a small fraction of the benefit, no single rational individual will 
voluntarily shoulder the cost of the action alone. With strict and precise logic, Olson 
completely overruled, in his famed paper, the assumption that public goods could be 
automatically supplied by organizations or groups. He divided groups by scale:
In a small group in which a member gets such a large fraction o f  the total benefit 
that he would be better o ff i f  he paid the entire cost himself, rather than go 
without the good, there is some presumption that the collective good will be
provide By contrast, in a large group in which no single individual’s
contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole, or the burden 
or benefit o f  any single member o f the group, it is certain that a collective good 
will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducements that 
will lead the members o f  the large group to action in their common interest.10
10 Olson made a clearer statement o f this issue in “Foreword to Collective action”(1992):
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(p.44)
In the Preface written for Todd Sandler’s Collective Action (1992), Olson 
summarized Adam Smith’s invisible hand as the first law o f economics: “when each 
individual considers only his or her interests, a collectively rational outcome emerges 
automatically.” Then he put forward the second law o f  economics', “no matter how 
intelligently each individual pursues his or her interest, no socially rational outcome 
can emerge spontaneously” (or the original statement of Sandler quoted by Olson 
“individual rationality is not sufficient for collective rationality”).
Olson suggested the first law o f economics may only be applied to the field of 
personal products. Once in the field of collective products, it would probably fail even 
if there were only two individuals in a collective. He listed the famous prisoner’s 
dilemma - in any game, one player’s dominant strategy is a betrayal to the other 
player - as an example to demonstrate that “even if there are only two people, 
collective action is bound to fail.”
Then how can we escape Olson’s Dilemma of collective action? The appearance 
of mandatory organizations - government is one of them - is a necessity to acquire the 
potential profit of collective action. Institutional economist Barzel (2002) regarded 
government a professional organization aiming at reducing transaction cost (such as 
the third party providing reliable legal and contracting services) of collective action. 
Olson described the appearance of government as the first bliss bestowed by the 
invisible hand and the providers of collective goods who were driven by selfish and 
rational motives and exerted mandatory forces as violent entrepreneurs.n In Olson’s
In a sufficiently large or “latent" group of individuals with no single member who gets more than a 
minuscule share o f the benefits of a collective good, the incentive for strategic interaction—and 
even the incentive to bargain with other potential beneficiaries o f the collective good— disappears. 
If no two members, or no other small subset o f the members o f the group ofpotential beneficiaries 
of a collective good, would, in the aggregate, gain from bearing the costs ofproviding some amount 
of the collective good, then there is no incentive for individuals to interact strategically or even to 
bear the costs o f communicating and bargaining with each other about how to remedy the lack of 
the collective good..(Olsonp.358)
11 To give the name “entrepreneur” to dictatorial government owner shows exactly the market role of 
the government. In the following chapters, I will develop this metaphor into a simple proposition: 
“government is an enterprise that manages space”. Because space is the way to define the lowest 
transaction cost o f most public goods, more and more public goods are supplied by government, which
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opinion:
Thus government for groups larger than tribes normally arises, not because o f  
social contracts or voluntary transactions o f any kind, but rather because o f  
rational self-interest among those who can organize the greatest capacity for
violence Autocrats o f  all kinds usually claim that their subjects want them to
rule and thereby nourish the unhistorical assumption that government arose out 
o f some kind o f  voluntary choice, (p. 568)
Once mandatory governments are established, they do not collapse easily. As had 
been depicted by Hobbes, public goods become coercive services to buyers. This 
solves the free riding problem caused by the non-exclusiveness of public goods, but 
introduces a possibility of opportunism for mandatory government (especially 
dictatorial government). According to Barzel’s definition (2002), power means 
capacity to impose cost on others. Dictatorial governments may confiscate private 
property to reinforce their power as well as having the capacity of imposing costs on 
others (Wang 2002).
There are two economic schools of thought concerning the opportunism of
government. One school led by Olsen, North and Barzel argues for binding the
protector's hand in order to transform a natural state into a legislative state via 
10democracy. The other school, led by Tieboutian scholars, argues that voting by foot
1 ^can induce competition among governments via liberalism.
The democratic approach is the dominant approach in today’s world. Democracy 
is believed to offer universal and unconditional advantages in keeping coercive
turns the government into the number one supplier o f public goods. However, this is not to say that 
only the government can provide public goods. The government gets to provide more and more public 
goods because it can be highly efficient. Actually, “space” is the domain o f planners and this is why 
public goods and the career o f planners are unusually connected.
12 This wording comes from the title o f the eighth chapter in Barzel’s A Theory o f the State (2002): 
“Tying the protector’s hand: the agreement between subjects and protector”.
13 With the pricing model advanced in the fourth chapter, this means to transform consumer (citizen) 
competition into producer (government) competition. If these competitions are sufficient, the 
democracy, which is used to prevent the opportunistic behaviours o f the government —  transaction and 
institution cost —  will be greatly saved. One o f the aims o f my study is to illustrate the essence o f  
democracy —  it is not indispensable but the supplement to the deficiency o f freedom.
government in check. Selection of a governance regime has become an ideology and 
an implicit criterion for judgment of political correctness. However, Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem indicates that even though democracy may bind the grabbing 
hand, it does not necessarily lead to an optimal quantity of public services - voting by 
hand will not result in proper sorting of preferences for public goods in terms of 
quantity or variety. Democracy is not necessarily an efficient institution with regard to 
the provision of public goods.
The alternative approach - voting-by-foot -  implies the possibility of alternative 
institutions to democracy where technical transaction cost (cost of flows of people, 
goods, information, and capital) are low. A significant difference between 
voting-by-foot and voting-by-hand is that the former is not based on one single ideal 
form of government but acknowledges various forms of government coexisting and 
competing with one another. This presumption applies better to the real world where 
the transaction radius extends to cross administrative borders. In the globalizing 
market, free flows of productive factors result in competition between governments, 
which has become a non-democratic approach to restrain state opportunism. My study 
follows this approach to analyze how non-democratic urban government manages to 
provide public goods with high efficiency.
1.2.5 Competition among monopolistic governments
As illustrated above, mainstream economics inherited one of the basic 
assumptions of Adam Smith - government is solitary and there is no competition 
among governments. In this world, government always has the possibility and motive 
to seek expediency through institutional design and changes in rules. Therefore, all 
liberalist economists trust that the only way to limit state opportunism is checks and 
balances formed by constitutionalism (Yang 2002).
Tiebout (1956) published his classical paper A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure 
examining the role of government in a market economy from a pioneering perspective. 
Before Tiebout, discussions about the role of government assumed a single universal
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form of government that possessed the privilege of intervening in economic activities 
and was thus a threat to free exchange. In addition, because of lack of competition, the 
government was not necessarily motivated to improve its efficiency. In an ideal 
economy, the government was bound to have a high degree of redundancy and 
effective supervision seemed impossible. Democracy can only provide a very partial 
supervision to prevent government from rent seeking with its privilege. It is not very 
efficient at discovering fine tuned improvements in efficiency
Tiebout’s study explored a world in which government was not solitary. On levels 
from the local to the national, there exist in parallel, many organizations similar to 
government. As long as economic factors (investment, population, etc.) and resources 
could move freely among different communities covered by these organizations, there 
would be competition among governments to force them to improve efficiency -  as in 
any other economic organization. In a Tieboutian world, voting by foot can, in 
principle, force governments to enhance their services far better than can nominal 
democracy. Using another analogy from the logic of the market, competition between 
governing organizations forces them to invest in meeting customer needs, what would 
otherwise be taken as ‘profit’. Once the government enters a competitive market, the 
idea of so-called public goods loses its original meaning. In a Tieboutian environment, 
a local government is no different from a common corporation and the public goods 
of a city are also no different to the public goods of a corporation except the level of 
publicness.
Yang Xiaokai (1994) once made a wonderful description of American federalism:
(Since) the Constitution granted legislative power and tax-collecting power to 
the states and prohibited the states from levying taxes on inter-state trade, the 50 
states were like 50 economically warring nations but without warfare or taxation 
among one another. People voted by foot because they would ‘immigrate ’ to the 
state that provided the best tax system and public facilities. ” As a result each state 
would spare no efforts in developing high-level public facilities, but not daring to 
impose high taxes. This was called the ‘market o f  governmental services ’ by
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American economist Tiebout. This kind o f  market enabled America to become a 
country that had set up the most developed systems and public infrastructures at 
the minimum cost. Information distortion caused by external effect, as specified in 
traditional economics, has been partially internalized by this federal market 
served by the government in America, (p. 144-145)
Based on empirical studies, Qian, Wingast and Roland (Qian and Wingast 1994, 
Qian and Roland 1994) demonstrated that so long as the system (specifically, the 
structure of residual rights) is designed reasonably, competition among decentralized 
local governments will make a local government operate like an enterprise in a market 
economy.
Before the 1980s, China’s governments, from the central to the local, were all in 
the world of Adam Smith without any competitors.14 Urban assets were basically 
state-owned and urban development had nothing to do with other cities. However, 
several significant reforms changed the role of local governments (especially urban 
governments) thoroughly. China’s urban governments shifted from Smith’s world into 
Tiebout's world. And because of Tiebout's world, efficient and competitive urban 
management has become both necessary and possible.
Qian and Wingast analyzed regional decentralization in China and pointed out 
that China has developed a federalism with Chinese characteristics: financial 
decentralization accompanied by personnel centralization. Yang Xiaokai argued that 
this financial federalism has led to local reforms15 (Yang 1994). The local 
governments have rapidly switched their roles from administration to development.
In a Tieboutian world, a city would not develop automatically without good 
management. Only those urban governments capable of managing their cities can 
survive in the competitive economy. By the same token, a mayor is more like an
14 When the central government faces directly the competitions from other countries, in a certain sense, 
it is also in a Tiebout’s world.
15 But Yang Xiaokai insisted on the necessity o f institutional reform o f the central government. The 
latest research o f Qian Yingyi and others (Wang Yijiang, Bai Chong’en, Li Daokui, Qian Yingyi 2000) 
discovered that, after the entrance into WTO, global competition may encourage the central 
government to keep its promises.
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entrepreneur than a judge or night-watchman, and the organization and behavior of an 
urban government is similar to an enterprise.
In the orthodox political economy, a government’s promise is not trustworthy 
unless it is checked and balanced by democracy (Hayek 1944, Yang 2002, Barzel 
2002). Without checks and balances private property is not protected and it is not 
possible to develop a private economy because government would own infinite 
taxation rights, monopolize all resources, and play the role both of referees and 
players. Furthermore, because people believe the government would abuse its public 
power for private interests, they will resist tax collection. To solve this taxation 
problem, taxation in England was decided by Parliament, which initiated 
decentralized constitutionalism (Pipe 1999) and democratic election system in 
western nations and thereby created safe and reliable space for the economy based on 
private property rights. According to the traditional economics, the economy would 
not develop successfully without political reforms of this nature, because a market 
economy could not exist without protection of private property (Yang 2001).
But Tiebout’s theory challenges this common sense. In Tiebout’s world, there is 
not one single government. On the contrary, the market is characterized by 
governmental competition. This very competition forces the governments to make 
trustworthy promises and credible commitments. This viewpoint has been evidenced 
by practices such as the institutional changes in early Europe observed by North 
(1998) and Schumpeter (1918)16 and the rapid growth of Asia’s Four Little Dragons 
(Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and Japan in its early developmental 
stage lacking standard democracy. China provides its own evidence. China has gone
16 According to the observation o f North, fierce competitions existed among small but independent 
free cities in early Europe. This competition forced administrators to improve the institution so as to 
provide safe and cheap institutional environment for free trade. China, on the other hand, had long been 
unified as a whole, so there was no competition whatsoever to exert pressure on institutional reform. 
The competition in early Europe gave birth to western capitalism while China went downhill. Joseph 
Schumpeter’s (Joseph Alois Schumpeter 1918) Diekrisedes Steuerstaats describes the process o f this 
competition: in late Middle Ages, with the increase in war expenditures, rulers had to give up some 
rights to the parliament for taxes. This change drew people’s attention to the national economy and 
voters began to demand free management o f the economy. However, in countries that didn’t fulfil 
institutional transformations like Spain, this kind o f fight resulted in constant bankruptcy, arbitrary 
confiscation o f property and a depression which lasted for three centuries. (Douglass North 1998)
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through fast economic growth in the past twenty years in contrast to the standard 
democratic countries such as India and Philippines and therefore challenged the 
orthodox view of the universalism of democracy.
One of the reasons that traditional economics is failing is that the world today is 
getting to be more like Tiebout’s world rather than Smith’s. In this world, 
authoritarian states are motivated and capable of providing trustworthy promises as 
competition forces them to follow rules rather than do whatever they like.17 I argue a 
new pricing mechanism of public goods in the following chapters. In my opinion, the 
state’s monopoly on public goods can be considered a kind of consumer competition. 
Democracy is needed to prevent state opportunism in cases of supply shortage, in 
which the public has little choice so they need to be empowered to monitor the 
government via democracy. On the other hand, when public goods are provided by 
governmental competition, the state’s monopoly on public goods turns to be producer 
competition, in which oversupply happens and the public has various options of 
substitute products {Hayek Products). In this case, democracy is not really necessary 
since the competitive states will maximize public interest automatically.
Since the reform and opening up of China, decentralization has resulted in 
resource allocation via markets in stead of the central government. Also, tax sharing 
system helps local government share a large portion of financial surplus. The 
interaction of the decentralization and tax sharing system has resulted in increasingly 
violent competition among regions and cities. In order to attract investors, urban 
governments compete to improve urban governance (such as tax reduction and 
exemption) and environment (such as infrastructures, landscape and natural 
environment). The state of economically warring nations has been taking shape.
This perspective of institutional analysis is of great importance because it
17 Later, I will try to show that democracy and decentralization gained trust at the cost o f efficiency. 
Therefore, it is not hard to explain that even in the so-called “democratic countries”, organizations 
(army, enterprise), to whom efficiency was o f great importance, were not completely managed under 
democratic systems. People never worried that the leaders would abuse their rights because their 
adversaries would force them to self-consciously improve efficiency. Under this circumstance, 
competition was a more effective check than internal supervision.
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indicates the essence of city operation and helps us understand the direction of 
institutional design. Moreover, it helps us learn from enterprises and shortens the path 
of learning and development in the evolution of urban management. Ignoring local 
government’s role as an agent in the market leaves us without explanatory power with 
respect to China’s rapid growth and prevents an adequate analysis of problems and 
policy. Tiebout’s model is close to China’s reality and I use the idea of the competitive 
government ‘firm’ to explore what roles Chinese urban government and urban 
planners have played and should play in the shaping the countries cities.
1.3 Methodological considerations
1.3.1 Evolution of planning theories
The field of urban planning changed dramatically after Word War II. Nigel Taylor 
(1998) divided the changes into two phases:
The first o f  these occurred in the 1960s, with the shift from the urban design 
tradition to the systems and rational process views. The second change occurred 
during the 1970s and 1980s, and represented a shift in view o f  the planner’s role. 
In particular, there was a shift from a view o f  facilitator’, drawing in other 
people’s views and skills to the business o f making planning judgments...A 
significant change in the history o f western thought occurred from what has been 
called “modernism” to “postmodernism”.(p. 158-159)
Although Taylor repeatedly stressed that the term paradigm should be used with 
precaution, he still named these changes fundamental changes o f  planning theories. 
He wrote of the first paradigm shift in planning theory:
Hence the systems and rational process views o f  planning which burst on to the 
scene in the 1960s represented a rupture with tradition—a change in planning 
thought which can be seen as a paradigm shift in the most fundamental, Kuhnian
sense The shift was so significant that it was profoundly unsettling to many
planers and planning students reared in the design tradition o f  town planning.
Suddenly, town planners who had seen themselves as “artistic ” urban designers 
were being told by a new generation o f planning theorists that their former 
conception o f  town planning was inappropriate and that they should see 
themselves as “scientific” systems analysts, (p. 159-160)
In my opinion, Taylor is only half correct, if he is correct at all, because the old 
paradigm was cast into doubt but no new paradigm was really constructed. Planners 
still subconsciously viewed themselves as the real city shaper, like mechanical 
engineers assembling machineries and architects designing building forms. In most 
western countries - in the English tradition in the extreme -  planners, or at least 
planning theorists, rejected a designer role but did not find a suitable alternative role. 
Where regulative powers were strong, the role of bureaucratic administrator or 
planner regulator readily was easily taken up. But the reality did not match the 
theoretical idea of systems controller. And in the post-modern phase, where planners 
see themselves as facilitative spatial planners, city shapers and place makers, their 
view still lives awkwardly with their modus operandi -  their skills and the instruments 
available to them.
Planners have in all periods of their theory, by and large, struggled to find a 
satisfactory decision-making rationalization and theorization that matches their 
intentions with reality. There is a deep irony in the urban planning profession: it is 
apparently a social function of great importance; but that function always seems to 
remain elusive. Planners have always lived with a good deal of illusion about what 
they can do. Perhaps there has also been illusion about what they should do, but it is 
less easy to label a normative assertion as illusionary. Certainly looking back over the 
second half of the twentieth century, it is tempting to say that the normative project of 
planners was indeed frequently illusionary.
One of the reasons why urban planning lags behind in establishing a more 
satisfactory new paradigm is a failure to bring together appropriate knowledge from 
different intellectual fields -  and possibly an ideological predisposition that inhibits 
the search for appropriate knowledge. The contributors to mainstream western
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planning theory have tended to be distrustful of markets. The idea that markets are 
institutions of decentralised decision making is a strange one to them. For most 
planning theorists, decision making tends to mean collective decision making and 
there is a preference for political solutions to the collective action problems of urban 
society. Therefore to place themselves (planners) and their own activities within a 
market framework is as deeply disturbing to most as was the idea of systems control 
to the designer planners of the 1950s.
But unless we wake up from the illusions planners and their theorists live with 
and more explicitly and honestly articulate the actual part they play in market 
processes, a more satisfactory paradigm will not emerge and nor will the old 
paradigms be satisfactorily tom down.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop knowledge and build theory. Its main 
contribution is in the construction of ideas that shed light on the economic and social 
role of urban planners and, more generally, urban government. Its method can be 
described very simply. First, it reviews a set of ideas necessary for the constmction of 
a theory of public spatial planners as market agents. This was started in an 
introductory fashion in the preamble of this chapter. These ideas are elaborated in the 
theoretical part of the thesis. The discussion in chapters 2 to 4 go beyond a traditional 
literature review. They review but they also develop building blocks of theory at the 
same time. In the empirical part of the thesis I use case studies from Chinese cities -  
principally Xiamen -  to both illustrate these theoretical ideas and to test them. It is not 
a formal test, of course, because these are case studies not scientific experiments. In 
the course of testing the ideas I develop them further. Many of the ideas have been 
already exposed to public discussion through publication in the academic and 
practitioner Chinese planning journals. They are controversial and have generated 
heated debate. But that may be expected if a new and more powerful paradigm was 
struggling to emerge against old paradigms that are held partly for ideological
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reasons.18
In conducting the empirical studies I have made use of published documents, 
many from local government sources, and also personal tacit knowledge acquired as 
Director of Planning in Xiamen, a city with a population that has grown from 0.327 
million19 in 1980 to 1.95 million in 200720 and a built-up area that has increased 
from 20 square kilometers into 225 square kilometers during the same period.
1.3.2 Structure of the urban planning discipline
Since the thesis is principally concerned with theory building, it is appropriate to 
be methodical in specifying this task. An improved theoretical framework might 
consist of the following building blocks, phrased as questions:
1. Is the city a spontaneously accidental process or a product of conscious 
human design?
2. If it is consciously produced, who is the consumer and who is the 
producer?
3. Are consumers and producers driven altruistically or self-interestedly?
x*See:
1. Zhao Yanjing, Zhuang Shuting(2008) Explanation o f Government Behaviors Based on Tax 
System, City Planning Review, 2008[4]
2. Zhao Yanjing(2007) Revising the Price Theory on the Basis o f  Coase Theorem, Journal o f  
Xiamen University(Arts & Social Sciences) 2007[1]
3. Zhao Yanjing(2002) From Urban Administration Towards Urban Management, City Planning 
Review, 11, 2002
4. Zhao Yanjing(2005):Urban Planning in the Perspective o f New Institutional Economics, 
City Planning Review, 2005[6][7]
5. Zhao Yanjing (2006) ‘Tax Policy Insufficiency Distorts Local Government Behavio'r’, China 
Macroeconomics Information Network, date: 09:52, 19th, October 2006.
6. Zhao Yanjing (2008):Economic Thoughts on Urban Planning, Public Management Review, 
Beijing, forthcoming.
7. Liu Zhaoying, Zhao Yanjing (2006): Restructuring Land Property Rights in China's 
Land-expropriation-urbanization:Xiamen Model, World Regional Studies, 2007 Voll6[3] 
51-58
19 There is 1980 city population. The total population was 934 thousand and urbanization level lower than 20%
20 reference: Xiamen stat. Bureau: Xiamen statistical yearbook 2007
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4. If they are self-interested, what are the behavioral law governing 
consumption and production? For example, do they follow profit 
maximization or utility maximization? What can be said about this under 
certain ideal assumptions?
5. What can be said about city building behaviour by relaxing ideal 
assumptions?
A theory built around these questions should be able to abstract from practical 
problems and develop a set of useful models that deliver testable hypotheses. It should 
be capable of define laws of action of various subjects in an ideal state (similar to the 
state of zero gravity or zero friction in physics). Pricing -  pricing by whom, under 
what behaviour and with what outcome? - is the central theory of economics. 
Behaviour in response to incentives is also fundamental for an understanding of 
planning.
In stage (5) a series of analytical tools would need to be developed, which can be 
used to examine and illustrate practical urban problems by modifying certain 
assumptions of the ideal model. For instance, we may add some institutional factors to 
observe and elucidate the characteristics and possible outcomes of various 
interventions. We may propose or observe alternative systems of property rights to 
compare the efficiency of collective actions and propose efficiency improvements. We 
may modify assumptions about profit-seeking behaviour of governments to better 
understand the impact of institutional structure. We may generalize urban planning 
and its related field into some basic input-output relations and make assumptions 
about fixed and variable cost of city production. This would allow us to incorporate 
traditional planning domains (professional skills such as urban design, functional 
division, public participation, interest coordination, art, transportation, infrastructure, 
etc.) into an integrated analytical framework (e.g. the analysis of input-output 
relations in the context of competition).
The purpose of such theory would therefore be to link the divers and often
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unrelated planning fields in a unified analytical scheme. The ideal would be that every 
planning concept or rule can be falsified. Every change of assumption at some basic 
level would yield changes at higher levels of reasoning, permitting more systematic 
progress of the discipline.
This is an ambitious project. The thesis takes on an important part of the agenda 
by focusing on the role of government. I attempt to develop a unified theoretical 
framework for understanding planning and urban government in terms of motives, 
behaviour and pricing. Then I present empirical analysis of urban government 
operating in business model in order to test the theoretical reliability of the model and 
its practical feasibility and usefulness. To avoid deviating from this core purpose, I 
limit the depth of certain discussions (such as price theory) to a certain range that 
enables applications to be made to urban planning and governance. This admittedly 
leaves some parts of the theoretical argument insufficiently developed in terms of 
more general economic reasoning.
1.4 Dissertation structure and summary of core ideas presented
1.4.1 Institutional role of government
In chapter 2 and 3, I apply recent insights from the economic theory of 
government to develop the idea that government is not the counterpart to the market 
but an integral part of it. New-institutional economics is taken as my fundamental 
analytical tool. From one viewpoint in classical and New-institutional economics, 
institutions are human-designed with a purpose rather than the fruit of unconscious, 
random activities. On the other hand, there is an extreme school of thought in 
institutional economics that sees institutions emerging and evolving unguided by any 
conscious human design. The truth must lie between the extremes. There are no doubt 
some institutions -  certain customary practices and conventions and certain elements 
of common law for example -  that are truly emergent, being discovered locally and 
spreading as efficacious practices. But even many of these types of institution will 
have been designed to some degree. For example, a local practice in some early
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economy of moving from bartering to the use of some generally valued commodity 
such as rare seashells or silver, that eventually leads to the institution of money, will 
first have been institutionalised locally somewhere at some time. It is the spread of an 
institution that is characterized by spontaneous processes and this happens as a 
process of social discovery. The spontaneous development of an institution is not 
generally an accidental consequence of social activities; rather, it is a selection 
process that happens by competition -  a kind of market competition for rules that 
achieve certain social ends, but without conscious social organisation. Only in the 
case of revolutionary constitutions do whole rafts of social institutions tend to get 
drafted by design. This has been relatively rare in the history of civilization. Generally, 
institutions are not designed by a few institutional designers. Their basic form might 
be shaped by a few innovators locally, but they then get shaped through competitive 
and destructive testing, in the mode of Schumpeterian destructive and creative 
competition. Separation of institutional design and selection helps to clarify individual 
roles in the institutional development. By understanding the motivation and behaviour 
of different types of individual, we can analyze the driving force and direction of 
institution design.
The motives of individuals involved in the making of cities therefore need to be 
clarified. Why are individuals motivated to provide public goods? I choose the 
viewpoint of the historical school in institutional economics - that collective goods are 
supplied by self-interested individuals. Mancur Olson’s study of the mode of 
provision of public security - roving bandid gangs turn into resident bandit gangs -  
explains how from selfish beginnings, so called public government institutions 
emerge to obtain collective interests. Through experimenting with property right 
structures, humans have experimented with various forms of state (dictatorial, 
collective, and democratic) in order to reduce the transaction cost of acquiring 
collective goods - mainly the type of transaction cost related to securing credible 
promises.
Now we come to the next logical question: what is the criterion of market
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selection in the search for better institutions? What kind of institution can triumph 
among so many players? Or in other words, what kind of institution will be 
abandoned by markets and according to what criteria? This question is readily 
resolved by a proposition about government’s enterprise nature: profit maximization 
is the criterion for institution selection. The thesis peruses this in the special case of 
Chinese local government and planning, but there is a more general case that I explore 
as the argument develops.
The ultimate purpose of government catering for pubic preferences, improving 
public services and offering new infrastructure and services is to respond to or defeat 
challenges from other players (and institutions) in the market. Once one institution is 
far more efficient than others at providing collective goods, it will ultimately replace 
other institutions and be selected by society. But because public demand is very 
diverse, the market will not offer a single type of institution: they will tend to multiply 
as knowledge, entrepreneurship, social demand and capital supply all deepen. In 
particular institutions will tend to diversify as the demand for public goods, and with 
it, congestion of such goods, increases. As all this happens, an increase of social 
surplus will tend to lead to an increase of scale and scope of governments (and of 
governance institutions more generally).
The premise of enterprise-like government creates a challenge for the traditional 
logic of urban planning. One of the most important challenges is in respect of the role 
of democracy. My discussion on this sensitive topic leads to an analysis of the 
trade-offs between democratic decentralization and monopolistic competition and I 
explore what roles planners would play under the different paradigms. This is done in 
order to illustrate that the theoretical mode chosen by planners implicitly or explicitly 
influences their actual performed roles.
1.4.2 Operation mode of Chinese local governments
Based on above the ideas introduced in the previous sections, in chapter 4 I go on 
to further explore the nature of government. Taking Chinese local government as the
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case, I explain how the change of business model affects the efficiency of local 
government behavior and thus illustrate the importance of mechanism design.
The proposition that government is a self-interested subject, or more accurately, 
an organization and set of institutions manipulated by self-interested subjects, 
profoundly challenges the discipline of urban planning as well as the role of urban 
planners. According to Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution (1962), whether a new 
paradigm is more powerful at explanation determines whether it can contend with 
traditional paradigms and finally replace them. In chapter III I consider urban 
government as a self-interested enterprise to explain governmental behavior that is 
poorly explained by the traditional paradigm of market failure. I take Xiamen 
Municipal Government as an instance to illustrate my proposition.
In doing this, I depict the behavior of the various actors in terms of input-output 
relations. Thus, in effect, creates a new production function for government (and 
planning) based on the idea of profit maximization in classical economics, which 
helps explain governmental behavior via an analysis of input-output relations. I 
analyze the business model of China’s local states and reveal their elaborate on their 
enterprise nature. The so-called business model is the profit making mechanism of 
enterprises. The best way to analyze business model of an enterprise is to examine its 
input-output flows.
According to the production function device I introduce, public good producer 
factors are composed of fixed cost, variable cost and profit. Producers seek positive 
profits. They are motivated by profit maximization. In terms of this principle, the 
biggest problem all producers face is how to handle the unbalanced input-output 
relations caused by dynamic situations between lump-sum input of fixed cost and 
long-term output or between regular input and lump-sum output. As capital 
investment, fixed cost is at the core of organizing production and obtaining scale 
economies.
This approach can be applied to analyze the emergence and growth of a city. All
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long-term inputs into infrastructure may be regarded as sunk fixed cost, whereas daily 
maintenance and public services may be taken as variable cost. Whether a city can 
provide infrastructure depends entirely on whether it can create a business model to 
gain reasonable returns. Free riding (or income leakage from investors) is the biggest 
problem in devising a business model for public goods. The less the benefits spill over 
and leak, the more is the net benefit (income or profit), and the better the product that 
is provided. The key to the institutional design, I suggest, is for urban government to 
create efficient profit making business modalities.
Staying with the perspective of profit making, I analyze the institutional 
revolution of China’s cities since the reform and opening and rethink the reasons for 
the rapid growth of Chinese cities and the behavior of local government. My study 
reveals that the exceptional rapid urbanization of China has benefited from a highly 
efficient business model shaped in the past twenty years. With institutional 
innovations like tax sharing system and land leasing, especially government’s 
monopoly of the primary land market, the base input of urban government has 
generated huge returns. Rapid urbanization has thus become the primary mainstay of 
China’s fast economic growth in recent years.
This perspective helps reveal the specific institutional problems in China’s cities. 
It also helps elucidate the phenomena that traditional planning theories fail to explain. 
For Chinese local government, the gap in return between lump-sum input of 
infrastructure investment and long-term regular output of tax revenue cannot be 
complemented by loans. This constraint forces local governments to create financing 
from land leasing income. In addition, because of lack of a stable tax resource, 
especially property tax, local government has to use land leasing income to subsidize 
industrialization to gain long-term regular business taxes to pay expenditures of urban 
maintenance. In this way, urban government’s financial circulation is characterised by 
(a) subsidizing land cost to compete for industrial investor’s business tax to pay urban 
maintenance expenditure and (b) maximizing commercial and residential land prices 
to gain lump-sum land leasing income for industrial subsidization.
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1.4.3 Empirical studies
In chapter 4, I rethink the present debate about Chinese local governmental 
behavior in monopolizing the primary land market. Governmental behavior should be 
analyzed in a specific institutional context rather than independently. Chinese urban 
government is, in fact, an evolving institutional model rather than a model that is 
totally strange to traditional economics. The special business model of Chinese urban 
government challenges the existing paradigm of government characterized by 
property tax and service orientation in the western world. The Chinese way reveals 
that urban government can also provide public facilities and services efficiently 
through competition even though it is not democratic. Quite obviously, competition 
can work as effectively as (or even more effectively than) democracy in restricting 
state opportunism.
I reject the marginal analysis of neoclassical welfare economics and instead adopt 
Coase’s paradigm as my analytical tool to study microeconomic behavior. I discuss 
the monopoly of government in the primary land market in terms of models of the 
optimal allocation of land property rights - a typically Coasean approach. My study 
shows that complete land property rights do not exist. The bundle of land property 
rights is distributed between land owners (landlords) and territorial managers 
(governments) from the beginning. The typical line taken in the economic theory of 
property rights deems that the more complete the rights, the more efficient the 
allocation of resources. I challenge this, however, posing a more subtle and 
sophisticated argument. There should be different optimal distributions of property 
rights, (optimal structures of residual rights in economic terminology), at different 
stages of economic developmental. The criterion of an optimal structure of residual 
rights is the well known Coasean optimum - maximization of total social surplus. My 
argument is that this is time and stage of development dependent, when considering 
the optimal allocation of primary land rights.
Coase’s method smoothly introduce institution into the center of economic 
activities and is thus crucial in the analysis of urban land issues. The issue of optimal
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resource allocation in traditional microeconomics can then be allowed to quietly 
retreat. My study shows that surplus maximization is a more practical criterion than 
utility maximization in determining optimal system of land property rights -  and it 
does this by applying a Coasean method. Specifically, transaction costs fundamentally 
influence economic efficiency and institutions determine (moderate) transaction costs. 
Therefore, institutional design becomes the most important means for urban 
government to improve efficiency. As urban planning is expected to play an 
influential role in decision making relating to urban policies, urban planning has to 
transform itself from a “consumer” of institutions to a participant in institutional 
design. Urban planning needs to be jointly concerned with physical and institutional 
design. Yet, success in this challenging role relies on whether urban planning field can 
develop an appropriate theory and analytical tools. In many ways, this is the core 
intellectual goal of my thesis.
Considering government a self-interested enterprise therefore creates a new 
perspective from which to deal with the urban questions that traditional planning 
theories cannot explain. The study, as I have said, is specifically of Chinese urban 
government, but I suggest that it has wider and more general explanatory power. The 
new paradigm can be further generalized to more widely explain urban governmental 
behavior; to examine pricing issue relating to public goods; and provide a powerful 
tool for urban policy mechanism design.
Chapters 5 and 6 take Xiamen Municipal Government as an example to verify the 
propositions about the profit mode of urban government and the allocation mode of 
land income. In chapter 5, I describe the observed behaviour of a typical 
profit-seeking Chinese urban government, through analysis of the input-output 
structure of Xiamen Municipal Government. The process includes four steps. First, 
urban government expropriates village land at the price of agricultural use and 
provides urban infrastructures. Second, the government obtains lump-sum income by 
leasing commercial and residential land to balance the infrastructure investment. 
Third, the government leases industrial land to enterprises at a very low price to create
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employment and local consumption. Finally, the government gains business tax and 
income tax from industrialization and further provides regular public services. The 
government may or may not be aware of this process -  or view it as a process -  yet 
any reforms digressing from this order have typically sooner or later reverted to the 
old order. When this happens, the government is blamed for “unreasonable inertia” in 
resisting reforms. In fact, the response of government to the reforms is not 
unreasonable - they are just following the existing institutional order. Failure of such 
reforms is cause by ignorance of government’s profit mode and the reforms are, in 
this sense, badly designed institutional realignments. To work, an institutional 
adjustment to the process of municipal government and planning has to explicitly 
articulate with the profit mode of local government. Partially transplanting institutions 
from developed economies will not enhance government’s efficiency but instead 
create obstacles to existing institutions and increase the operational cost of cities.
In order to further exemplify the enterprise nature of government, decision 
making processes and implementation mechanisms of government are also analyzed 
at the project level in this chapter. Although no urban government would admit to a 
profit purpose of governance as explicitly theorized in this thesis, (they publicly 
pursue many traditional public welfare goals), they quite obviously play the role of an 
enterprise when individual projects are examined. What government declares and 
thinks is not necessarily what they actually do.
Institutions are the rules that determine a player’s actions. Even though the 
institution may violate the will of all decision makers, it still determines their behavior 
- like an invisible hand. When we put aside the annual Report of Works of a Local 
Government and directly observe decisions at the project level, we find the enterprise 
urban government - they are constrained by budget and seek surplus maximization as 
a first priority as a means to achieve more general proclaimed public service goals.
The projects I have examined in the work behind this thesis reveal that a 
government’s ability at urban management is determined by its ability at financing. In 
this sense, the project level is the best strategic position for urban planning
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intervention in pursuit of economic goals. A good planner, with a profound 
understanding and sharp intuition of the urban economy, can enhance project benefit 
by organizing productive factors spatially (location) and temporally (priority). 
Government behavior can be seen as an aggregation of individual projects, all of 
which, even the so-called commonwealth projects, have to take income and output 
into account directly or indirectly.
In chapter 6 I take land expropriation in Xiamen as an example with which to 
analyze the distribution of land value between government and landlords using a 
Coasean method. The purpose of this chapter is to respond to the debate of land 
surplus distribution - allocating land appreciation between state and ‘landlords’. The 
debate has so far tended to focus on fairness. But in practice, the economic efficiency 
of residual rights structure may be more important. The case of Xiamen shows that if 
residual rights are designated to landlords, there will be less transaction cost but also 
less social surplus created by those landlords. On the other hand, in the case that 
residual rights are designated to government, economic efficiency and surplus will be 
raised but there will be higher transaction costs of land expropriation. Whether the 
more efficient producers can obtain property rights of land depends on the level of 
transaction costs. In reality, land appreciation is neither completely distributed to the 
state nor to the landlords; rather, the portions they share change according to marginal 
institutional change.
Xiamen Municipal Government is capable of creating net surplus in spite of high 
transaction cost of land expropriation, so it ends up getting the residual rights. The 
government becomes the dominant entrepreneur who acquires the right and role of 
developing the city. In Nanhai, village collectives obtain residual rights of land in 
order to save transaction costs and the collective landlord therefore became the 
entrepreneur21 that develops the city. Both models are found to have their strengths
21 It needs to be pointed out that the Nanhai model is based upon collective land ownership in rural 
areas, which is different from completely private land (such as in India). The village collective is like a 
mini government and can greatly reduce transaction costs induced by the dispersion o f landlords. 
Therefore, the Nanhai model cannot be simply described by “profit from increase in price belongs to 
the farmers”. The correct way to put it should be “profit from increase in price belongs to the
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but their long-term economic efficiency remains to be seen. However, they can both 
be explained by the same rule: the Coasean Optimum: to maximize net social surplus.
1.4.4 Theory extension
In the last chapter of this dissertation, I point out the contribution of the 
dissertation to the theorization of urban planning by responding to selected current 
academic debates in planning and directing the extension of my theory to future 
studies.
First of all, is the issue of the market role of government. Through tracing the 
origin of government, I address the proposition that government is a self-interested 
enterprise of spatial operation seeking surplus maximization and accordingly I define 
the market role of planners. Second, is the issue of the spatial operation mode of 
government. Based on the first proposition, I address the resolution of problems of 
uncertainty, risk and credit caused by the gap between lump-sum fixed cost and 
long-term regular income - the core of an enterprise’s production organization. It 
follows that in a profit-mode of public goods supply an organization will and should 
focus on how to reduce income leakage caused by free riders. Finally, and 
generalizing about governmental behavior and its business model, I speculatively 
apply my new price theory to the following studies.
First, it can be used to redefine the function of urban planning and the market role 
of planning professionals. The bias in the academic field of planning is highlighted by 
the definition of government as an enterprise of spatial operation. Here I give an 
opinion on why the urban planning field is characterized by academic chaos; lags 
behind other domains of knowledge; and fail to develop theory that is of much use to 
practice. It is fundamentally because planners recognize the role of government in a 
wrong way. This ingrained mistake leads to the split between theory and practice of 
urban planning. Once planners locate their professional function correctly, not only 
can they reclaim their academic discourse rights and comprehend more profoundly
collective”.
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the essence of urban planning policies, but should also be able to develop a series of 
planning tools that place urban planning at the center of urban studies and practices.
Second, the definition of government’s market role can be applied to reassess the 
controversial issue of governmental competition. From my point of view, competition 
and democracy share the same goal - to limit the opportunism of self-interested 
government. Yet, the planning field emphasizes the importance of democracy (such as 
public participation) on the one hand, but unfairly holds an unfavorable opinion 
towards governmental competitions on the other. The planning theorists consciously 
ignore the cost of democracy (low efficiency) but over emphasize the cost of 
competition (such as the throat-cut competition). I argue for a rethink of the economic 
essence of urban competition and public participation to correct the paradoxical 
academic consensus. My argument is that the best way to protect consumers is to 
transform consumer competition into producer competition. Only if consumers are 
unable to freely choose among different producers is there is no alternative to 
democracy in urban planning (and more generally, in urban governance).
Third, considering the blind faith of planning theorists in democracy, I discuss 
public participation from the viewpoint of enterprise-like government in order to 
rethink the differences in the meaning of democracy between China and the 
developed countries. I argue that the market role of competition-constrained 
government is completely different from that of democracy-constrained government. 
Democracy implies (time specific) monopolistic government while competition 
implies authoritarian government. As long as competition exists, authoritarianism 
should not threaten private property security. On the contrary, once competition 
disappears, the monopolistic privilege of government will turn producer competition 
into consumer competition. In this case, in order to protect private property, 
democracy becomes an institutional necessity. Once there is a misplaced combination, 
such as democracy under competition or authoritarianism under monopoly, the 
institutions become inefficient.
1.4.5 Theorization of institutional analysis
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The Appendices in the thesis aim at theoretically extending the analysis of public 
goods used in the main part of the thesis. It uses insights from the analysis of land, 
planning and urban governance to challenge the one of the foundations of economics: 
price theory. It is a speculative and highly unorthodox endeavor, but is included in this 
thesis because, for the interested reader it opens up new paths of thought and analysis. 
In developing this new theory of pricing, I generalize many of the public goods issues 
addressed in the thesis by modifying the basic analytical tools of micro economics to 
apply to a broader set of economic phenomena. My approach is to rethink the origin 
of institutional economics to uncover its implicit pricing rules; explore its differences 
from neoclassical economics; and further extend its pricing rules to processes of 
supply-demand and production-consumption.
In the appendixes, I develop a new analytical tool for understanding price in order 
to put a sounder comer stone in place for my study. The reason why public goods are 
regarded as a special product and urban government is considered an exceptional (non 
enterprise) organization lies in the inability of existing theories at analyzing the 
pricing of collective goods. The market rules and pricing mechanisms presented by 
mainstream economics fail completely in characterizing genuine enterprise behavior. 
However, when some problem manifests in the foundation of economic analysis, 
economics responds by relaxing its original assumptions (e.g. information asymmetry, 
transaction cost, wage rigidity, exogenous technological progress and so on). The 
result is the emergence of exceptions and academic branching (institutional 
economics, developmental economics, macroeconomics, microeconomics, etc). A 
good theory should be compatible to explain various economic phenomena in a 
broader range. I do not attempt to provide a specific tool for analyzing the provision 
of public goods; instead, I attempt to generalize a price theory of public goods as a 
common analytical tool for all economic phenomena.
The new pricing rules I derive are based on two fundamental assumptions: 
economic person and rational person. In order to simplify demand analysis and avoid 
difficulties of aggregation and comparison of utilities, each transaction of a natural
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individual is regarded as equivalent to a consumption event with an independent 
preference. The unit of analysis therefore becomes not the individual but the 
individual transaction. The aggregation of these preferences is seen a continuum for 
mathematical convenience. In addition, the assumption of the rational person implies 
the pursuit of surplus maximization. Consumers maximize consumer surplus (a 
budget and utility concern), producers maximize producer surplus (a profit concern), 
and surplus should not be a negative value.
Based on the two assumptions, I propose a different assumption from neoclassical 
price theory since Marshall: there is, I contend, no stable equilibrium of price and 
quantity between supply and demand. There are only two types of relations between 
supply and demand: either oversupply or underproduction, within which the 
price-quantity equilibrium is determined by different types of competition.
In an underproduction situation, competition exists only among consumers. Price 
will depend on the marginal consumer. In an oversupply situation, competition 
emerges between the optimal and the second optimal producer, which I call 
Schumpeter Competition. The market price is determined by the optimal producer and 
second optimal producer. While the market can accommodate several producers, the 
price is determined by the marginal producers
According to the assumptions above, preferences of economic person (individual 
transactions) differ from one another. In this sense, theoretically any product can only 
satisfy one consumption (economic person). The growth of market scale and surplus 
creates the possibility of new products. Price reduction (or an equivalent income 
increase) will lead to the presence of new products but not further expansion of the
22 As for whether a rational production agent abides by utility maximization or surplus maximization, I 
choose the latter. This is not only because utility is difficult to handle technically (compare, aggregate, 
measure) and thus is unpredictable, but also because countless cases in reality show that even though 
the income of a rational agent far exceeds the amount required to satisfy his welfare, he will still strive 
for higher profit and even sacrifice his own welfare as long as he is part o f market competition. Once in 
economic competition, he must win because there is no room for individual utility. This is similar to 
economic games, where the athletes keep sacrificing their welfare (exercise assiduously) to strive for 
better results even though they have reached fairly high athletic levels. If we assume the athletes pursue 
utility maximization, their behavior cannot be predicted. It is the same with a rational economic person 
(not consumer). As long as utility is positive, they will seek for surplus maximization rather than utility 
maximization.
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scale of demand. A Hayek Product creates a new competition: variety competition 
(Hayek Competition) which exists alongside quantity competition of any single 
variety. To realize profit maximization, producers of one variety will maximize the 
amount of their products. This means fierce Hayek Competition will still develop 
among similar products even if a certain product is monopolized. Unless there is no 
similar substitute, competition will not cease because of monopoly.
Under the pricing rules I abstract in this chapter, institution can be analyzed in a 
generalized framework. Institution (including customs, taboos, canons, family 
discipline, and clan rules in a broad sense) can be taken as part of the social fixed cost 
or assets. All of my arguments illustrate my proposition - government is an enterprise 
profiting from the provision of public services - and can be successfully analyzed 
using this new framework. Competition among governments is not abnormal but a 
precondition of the maximization of public interest.
In Appendix 2, I illustrate further the relationship between transaction 
cost/Auction theory and consumer competition in my theory through revisiting Coase 
and Vickrey.
1.5 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to make use of recent developments in
economics to redefine the role of government and reveal the actual process of city
production -  the city being the biggest of all public goods -  and thence to clarify the
professional function of urban planning. I do not deal with all of the problems urban
planning faces; rather, I focus on a fundamental question of the discipline that is
singularly the cause of much intellectual and professional confusion - the market role
and motives of urban government. If the fundamental perspective is wrongly placed,
planning theories based upon it will remain as they are - built on shifting sand and
unable to establish a platform for meaningful communication in common language.
23 Generally speaking, the shortage o f kindred Hayek products will only be temporary (e.g. through 
buying out the technical patent o f kindred products). With the development o f technologies, certain 
entrepreneurs will finally invent this product.
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The best way to study theories of the real world is to generalize the real behavior 
in practice into simple analytical models. The rules in these models should be 
confined to the very basic and relate to the observed motives and behaviour of the 
actors. Whether these basic assumptions are true or false determines how far the gap 
is between the models and the real world. I attempt to illustrate a very basic 
assumption: whatever governmental behavior appears to be, or are imagined to be by 
academics, they are, in fact, motivated by self-interest like any other economic agent 
(or economic person). On this basis, public goods are like any other goods and can be 
priced by market mechanism -  provided that the territorial governing agent supplying 
those goods can control leakage and provided that competition between territorial 
governments is sufficient to induce governments to accurately and without 
opportunism, discover and provide to the demands of individuals within their territory. 
In these circumstances, there is neither market failure nor public goods that must be 
provided by non-market mechanisms. Government is a market players.
In sum, starting from a general but partial question of economics - the provision 
of public goods -  the thesis analyses the birth of a city and government; advances an 
assumption of the role of urban government; applies the assumption to examine the 
real world (China’s urban government) in order to verify its explanative power; and 
finally generalize the model of public goods provision to a more general economic 
analysis.
As a caveat, it needs to be pointed out that the thesis focuses on the urban 
governments of China’s coastal area, whose formation and operation differ greatly 
from the standard modes in developed countries (and even the modes of other 
developing countries). The conclusions and policy suggestions made in this 
dissertation should be understood in this context. They are not explicitly presented as 
an analysis of urban governments in other countries, nor indeed of all local 
governments in China. Nevertheless, it will already be clear that I believe the 
perspective taken and theory developed, is of more general use. The test of this I leave 
to other scholars and practitioners.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the nature of territorial government and in 
particular reflect on its relationship to private firms. In the case studies in Chapters 4 
and 5 I present evidence that is consistent with the idea that the government is just 
like a firm. This is particularly the case in China where the government owns the land. 
However the argument may be applied more generally.
In the current chapter I review this and related ideas. The chapter ends with an 
explicit model of the urban government as a firm. To arrive at this, however, other 
important ideas from the literature are discussed. Section 2 reviews the place of 
institutions in economic analysis. Neo-classical economics has traditionally ignored 
institutions. This is tantamount to placing government outside of the market economy. 
The role of government is a residual and special one: to correct the failure of the 
market. Section 3 reviews new institutional economic theory, particularly focusing on 
the analytical role of transaction costs. By replacing the neo-classical assumption of 
costless transactions with one of positive transaction costs, instututions suddenly 
matter in economic analysis. The nature of prevailing institutions shapes the way 
property rights are assigned, resource allocation is negotiated and in the end, the 
efficiency of a resource allocation. In this model, governance is brought inside 
economic analysis. We cannot analyse the efficiency of a resource allocation without 
understanding the governance structure.
Section 4 and 5 take this further. Drawing on ideas of government like the ‘settled 
bandid baron’, they examine the idea that governments are territorial firms. This also 
leads to a discussion of the role of democracy in urban planning. The ideas are
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elaborated beyond the arguments found in the existing literature, drawing on the 
innovative price theory developed in the Appendix of this thesis. It also forms the 
basis for the case studies analysed in the remaining chapters. Throughout the chapter, 
there is a tension between generalising and making the analysis specific to China. The 
principal thrust and purpose is to create a critique of urban planning in China and to 
re-fashion the concepts with which planning in that country is understood and 
understands itself. However, there are many points that are more genrally applied to 
urban governance and planning. I do not pursue these far, however, since that would 
require an engagement with a far broader literature and take more time and space than 
I have in writing this thesis.
Institutional analysis has a long history in economics. In the eyes of the great 
classical economists, institutions are both the basis and objects of analysis. In Adam 
Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nation, Book I - Of 
the Causes of Improvement in the Productive Powers of Labour, And of the Order 
according to which its Produce is Naturally Distributed among the Different Ranks of 
the People - focused on the processes that deliver an emergent spontaneous social 
order and inevitably therefore focuses on institutions. The analysis of national 
institutions - structures of rules and laws - and the institutions governing transactions 
is deeply embedded in almost all chapters of Smith’s book.
The capital theory of Karl Marx is based upon the idea of surplus value and its 
distribution. Changes in institutions, especially property ownership, are the core of 
Marx’s theoretical perspective and method.
The classical economists never succeeded, however, in establishing their own 
microscopic analytical approaches. This was true of their analysis of transactions and 
of the rules that govern them. Their institutional analysis was therefore carried out at a 
macroscopic scale.
tliThe marginal revolution of the 18 century provided the basis for developing a 
microscopic method in economics. Modem price theory based on Marshall’s analysis
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of demand and supply, has become the foundation for analysis in orthodox economics 
- the model of today’s so-called Neoclassic Economics. Marginal analysis permited 
the reduction of economic principles to mathematical equations. When Arrow-Debreu 
developed a method for modelling general equilibrium with strict mathematical proof, 
economic modelling and to a large extent economic analysis as a whole, became an 
independent system. The cost of achieving this was loss of institutional focus. The 
reason was that to represent systems of exchange by systems of equations, 
assumptions had to be made about the institutions that govern exchange. For a long 
time - most of the twentieth century in fact - mainstream economic analysis made the 
simplifying assumption of a single and homogeneous institutional form, the perfectly 
competitive market. It was not until the last quarter of the twentieth century that 
earnest intellectual endeavour was applied to extending economics’ rigour to models 
that relaxed this assumption. A so called New Institutional Economcs (NIE) emerged 
as an heteredox ideas, many of them reviving insights from classical economists and 
those who, at the end of the 19th century and start of the 20th century specifically 
focused their attention on institutional form -  the so called Old Institutional 
Economics, led by John Commons, Thorstein Veblen, Wesley C. Mitchell and 
Clarence Ayres.
NIE, which began to develop as a self-conscious movement in the 1970s, traces 
its origins to Coase’s analysis of the firm and social cost (Coase 1937, 1959, 1960), 
Hayek’s work on knowledge (Hayek 1937, 1945) and Chandler’s writing on the 
history of industrial enterprise (Chandler 1962), along with contributions by Simon 
(1947), Arrow (1963), Davis and North (1971), Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985), 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Macneil (1978), Holmstrom (1979) and others.
However, NIE has not yet achieved acceptability in mainstream economics. This 
seems to be due in part to its lack of stringent analytical tools. This is not an entirely 
fair explanation, however, although it is a common perception. There are in fact two 
branches of NIE. The one attempts to apply and extend the methods developed in 
neoclassical economics to the study of institutions. Authors include Eccleson and Hart;
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the latter, for example, developing equilibrium models of contracts in order to analyse 
the efficiency of ex-anti contractual arrangement in governing ex-post contract 
hazards. The other branch either find it unnecessary to develop models, or are 
ideologically predisposed against them. The latter position is influenced by Von Mises 
and his disciple Von Hayek of the Austrian Economics School, which generally 
emphasised the subjective nature of economic knowledge.
What can be said about institutional economics new and old, is that it is a source 
of creative and in-depth big ideas about how individuals interact economically under 
different rules and organisational contexts -  work flag-shipped, for example, by 
Commons, Veblen, Mitchell, Galbraith, Coase, Williamson and others (a good review 
is by Brue 2000). NIE represents a movement to put the political back into economics. 
The change from Political Economics to pure Economics was a product of the
i L
neoclassical project of the 20 century. The approach taken by the classical 
economists was something that today would be seen as interdisciplinary. Ekland and 
Heber (2000) note that to Smith, Bentham and others, the noun and adjective in
th‘political economy’ had equal importance. The formalisation of economics in the 19 
and 20 century led to the subject becoming a branch of mathematics and a narrowing 
of its reearch scope. NIE revives many of the big ideas and big questions of an older 
political economy that was really a quest to understand the nature of social 
cooperation.
  tVi
The seeds of an institutionalist revival actually emerged in the mid 20 century at 
the height of the modemist-reductionist movement that supported the development of 
the neoclassical paradigm. The Constitutional Economics of Buchanan (1986 Nobel 
Prize laureate in economics); the New Economic History School of Douglass North 
and Robert Fogel (1993 Nobel Prize laureate in economics); the ballot-casting, 
constitutional and public choice theories of Arrow, Bowen, Tiebout, Turrock and Sen 
(Nobel lauriate in 1998); the transaction costs economics of the followers of Ronald 
Coase (Nobel lauriate in 1993) and the related Chicago schools; the neo-Austrian 
followers of Hayek (Nobel lauriate in 1974) all contributed to the re-emergent
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political and institutional analysis of economic processes and patterns. Their analysis 
is political because they all in their differing ways acknowledge the importance of 
property rights or entitlements in the analysis of economic efficiency. It is 
instituitional because they all recognise the role of rules, formal and informal, in 
assigning those rights.
One of the most important of these contributions was Coase’s well-known thesis 
developed in his 1960 paper The Problem of Social Costs. Coase received his Nobel 
prize for two papers -  a remarkable achievement, all the more so since the ideas 
developed in the earliest paper were drafted when he was still an undergraduate 
almost 60 years ealier. In the 1960 paper, he effectively creates an analystical device 
capable of standardising the analysis of institutional factors. He introduced the 
concept of transaction costs. Because he used the conceptual mechanisms of 
neoclassic economics, his critique (of the neoclassical Pigovian -  after Arhur Pigou - 
analysis of social costs) generated a much bigger impact in mainstream economics 
than did the earlier transaction costs emphasis of John Commons.
Coase’s thesis provided a common basis for much of the new institutional 
economics. His contribution in his 1960 paper was two fold. First, he posed what 
became known as the Coase Theorem, named afterwards by Stigler. This recognised 
the importance of property rights in the analysis of economic efficiency. By showing, 
in an artfully simple way, that with full information, the allocation of entitlement 
rights does not influence allocative efficiency (because bargaining will take place with 
compensation flowing one way or the other), he demonstrated that in the real world of 
incomplete information, property rights do actually matter in the allocation of 
resources. Implicitly this also amounted to saying that institutions matter in economic 
analysis, since instututions allocate property rights. Second, developing the thesis in 
his 1937 paper ‘The nature of the firm’, he re-introduced Commons’ notion of 
transaction cost. With zero transaction costs (the flip-side and equivalent assumption 
to full information) bargaining between generator and consumer of social costs will 
lead to the same equilibrium allocation whoever holds the initial property rights.
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Since the costs of making economic transactions are in fact not zero in the real world, 
then in reality, transaction costs will influence the efficiency of resource allocation. 
Transaction costs matter. This was mutely denied by neoclassical orthodoxy, which 
assumed that resources costlessly flowed from lower to higher productive uses.
In the next section, I look at the market with positive transaction cost as Coase 
does in his article, The Problem of Social Cost.
2.2 Institutional analysis: a world having transaction cost
Transaction costs are most generally defined as the costs of making transaction. 
Some authors limit this to the costs of using markets. This distinguishes them from 
costs of production, which are the costs of technical transformation of reources. 
However, there are also costs of transacting outside the market (costs of governance) 
and the concept is readily extendible to the world of planned order, as Coase 
demonstrated clearly in his 1937 paper.
Transaction cost may be divided into two categories. One is technical transaction 
cost like transportation that can be reduced via advances in technology. The other is 
institutional transaction cost, brought about by information asymmetry and credibility 
of commitment problems that can be reduced by institutional design24. These are the 
costs of defining property rights and making and policing contracts. Institutions and 
the second category of transaction cost are logically interrelated in economic analysis: 
institutions (rules) are redundant in a world with zero transaction cost.
The extent of instutional analysis in economics is therefore linked to transaction 
cost. The idea that all transactions are costly has been the key to the success of 
Coase’s framework. This is nowhere better captured than in his basic thesis in The 
Nature of the Firm. Firms (governments) form when the cost of transacting in the 
market become too costly. Organised transactions within a firm replace spontaneous 
transactions in the market place. But the costs of organising transactions are not zero
24 New technical progress sometimes can also help to reduce this type o f transaction costs, for example, 
automatic monitoring technology.
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and rise with the size of the firm. At some stage, organisational costs may outweigh 
the savings on market-based transactions and the firm becomes too large. At that stage, 
reorganisation will occur and some transactions will be removed from the firm to the 
market. Transactions costs therefore provides an analytical device for exploring the 
dividing line between planned and market economy and between state and market.
Consider in more detail the role of transaction cost in planned and market based 
systems of exchange and coordination. In a market system, property rights are 
privately owned. This means that transaction cost is innevitable since owners can be 
expected to act in their own interest, including withholding information, pre and post 
contract. Socialist theorists believe that this kind of transaction cost can be avoided if 
the transaction is carried out by the state in a planned manner. The idea is not 
intrinsically socialist, however, as The Nature of the Firm demonstrates. Firms form 
to reduce transaction cost. The analogy to government is more than an analogy. 
Governments can be said to form to avoid costs of interaction in the market place. 
Planned economies were designed just for that purpose.
The practices of socialist countries, however, have shown that planned economies 
produce a less efficient division of labour than market economies. In the Coasian 
model, collectives of individuals form spontaneously in pursuit of lower cost forms of 
coordination. Socialist governments may be said to arise by spontaneous social and
• thpolitical processes but not by spontaneous economic processes. At the start of the 20 
century they were perceived as being lower-cost forms of economic cooperation but 
practice proved the perception wrong. Transaction cost is unavoidable with any 
division of labour, be it centrally coordinated or decentrally. Marx tried to eradicate 
private ownership to solve the problem once and for all. However, practices have 
shown that the eradication of private ownership inevitably leads to the degeneration of 
market functions in a society (at least where social accumulation and surplus is not 
sufficiently high). This is due to the incentive problem. Take away ownership and you 
take away incentive to invest in and use resources. Nowhere is this more true than 
with labour, which is a kind of property as Zhou Qiren succinctly describes, drawing
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on Yorum Barzel’s economic theory of propert rights:
A person is born to be a human resource that is totally different from a 
non-human resource. Human resources are termed by Barzel as “active 
resources ” and their owners, or individuals, are fully master o f their utilization. 
Therefore, when part o f  the proprietorship o f a human resource is restricted or 
deleted, the owner o f  the human resource may shut o ff the corresponding part o f  
the human resource so that it seems to be nonexistent at all. What is even more 
special is that this restricted or deleted part o f  human resource can never be 
collectively owned by other masters for the same utilization. One confiscated plot 
can be transferred to a new owner with the same area and fertility; however, a 
“confiscated” person may be defiant even i f  he is under the control o f a slave 
owner. To put it simply, the defects o f a human resource may substantially dwarf 
its economic value. (Zhou 1996: 71-72)
The intrinsic private nature of labour makes all or most collective ownership 
arrangements something of a fantasy (voluntary religious communities being a 
possible exception) and determines the universality of transaction cost in respect to 
the coordination of labour.
The discussion so far demonstrates the universality of transaction cost and the 
universality of social structures designed to reduce such costs (the family being the 
most primative form perhaps). It also demonstrates the dynamics of these structures 
and shows that a lack of understanding that transaction cost is ubiquitous - existing in 
and out of organised structures - leads to poorly designed instutions. The socialist 
states of the 20th century are the most extreme example. So long as we interpret 
economic problems in terms of property rights, transactions of those rights and the 
costs of making those transactions, we have a tool for bringing institutions into the 
analysis of resource scarcity (a defmtion of economics).
So far, I have been talking about the positive analysis of instutitions. The Coasian 
model of the firm states that corporate institutions will emerge to lower transactions
49
costs. North’s model of economic history states that the rules of government will 
emerge to give a country a competitive advantage.
This naturally leads to a normative question: is it possible to design an efficient 
institution? There are two very different answers, found orginally in classical 
philosophy. Some have chosen to believe that successful institutions are or must be 
the result of purposeful human activities. For instance, the Greek philosopher Plato; 
the English philosopher Hobbes; the Chinese masters before the Qing Dynasty and 
later Mao Zedong; and the German philosopher Marx. All were preoccupied with the 
prospect of designing more reasonable (fair, efficient, workable) institutions. The 
planned economy was a Herculian experiment in institutional design. Modem urban 
planning attempts to design institutions that will bring about the fairer and more 
efficient allocation of land resources. Urban plans and the laws that attempt to make 
them work are institutions that in the end are put in place to reduce the costs of 
coordination in the development and use of land.
Others have argued that successful institutions are the outcome of numerous 
spontaneous human interactions not of purposeful design. The Scottish enlightenment 
political economists were of this persuasion (Adam Smith’s invisible hand) and 
followed a long history of ideas related to spontaneous order stretching back to the 
medieval economist-theologians in Spain and elsewhere. In this paradigm, human 
beings are passive institution takers. The institution is like the price in neoclassic 
theory. It is determined by an invisible and impersonal mechanism. Nobody can 
‘design’ a tmly efficient institution (Yang 1997): they have to be discovered. Hayek 
developed this viewpoint further than anyone else, in many ways summarising, 
abstracting from and synthesising 500 years of European thought on spontaneous 
order (Hayekl996).
In his work Principles o f a Liberal Social Order (1966), Hayek develops the 
thesis that liberty and the institutions that deliver it, evolve by trial and error and is 
not and cannot be designed. He argues the same in respect to the division of labour 
and the division of knowledge (in Road to Serfdom (1944) and the Dispersal o f
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Knowledge (1937, 1945, 1946)).
The disagreement over the possibility of designing efficient institutions naturally 
became the focus of dispute between socialists and liberals (Hayek 1948). It underlies 
modem discourses by critical social theorists attacking so called neo-liberal 
government policies. In matters relating to the governance of urban growth and 
development, it underlies challenges to accepted practices of land regulation and the 
discussion about more market-oriented instruments to governing land transactions 
(Zhou 2003, Webster and Lai 2003).
With the worldwide failure of the planned economy, there is a sense in which the 
Hayekian view has emerged as superior. However, this is not the whole story. An 
exreme passive view is not very helpful when it comes to addressing practical 
problems that require consciously applied collective action. To deem institutions 
non-designable is to settle for a long, slow and painful journey of social discovery. 
More helpful is to see the process of institutional design itself as a process of trial and 
error and to believe that over time, with sufficient information and feedback, society 
is capable of improving on its institutional designs. Webster (2005) gives and account 
of the evolution of urban planning institutions in the UK using this essentially 
Popperian version of Hayek.
Here I return to Coase’s Theory of the Firm (1936). Another perspective on this 
thesis is that firms (or governments) are institutional inventions. They are the product 
of purposeful design - by their owners, employees, lawyers and other advisors. The 
creation of a new firm is a conscious, purposeful experiment at designing a new form 
of social order for a particular nexus of production-oriented exchanges. In this 
framework, institutional formation and growth feature scale economies and increasing 
returns. Just as machines are invented to undertake a large amount of repeated work, 
instituitions are invented to reduce the costs of repeated transactions associated with a 
particular division of labour.
The repeated use of a machine means that scale economies can be realized by
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amortization of fixed costs. In the same way, an institution is a capital product that 
can be used repeatedly to reduce repeated transaction cost. In other words, an 
institution is a tool for governing transactions. A good institution will help to complete 
a transaction in a way that would not have been possible in its absence. Many or most 
institutions in the modem world, like machines, are designed. Also like machines, 
they are risky investments. They may work or they may not. They are tested by trial 
and error as they are put to the test. In this sense we can say that while institutions 
tend to be the product of design, good institutions are discovered.
The economic reason for the emergence and evolution of institutions (the visible 
hand that shapes the invisible one) lies in the increasing scale of the economy. The 
institions of corporate structures permit less costly productive cooperation with 
greater combinations of knowledge and greater volumes of output from those 
combinations. The more complicated the division of labour and the larger the scale of 
production, the more complicated the institutions and the greater the saving of 
transaction cost.
However, it is not always better to have more complicated institution. An 
institution should should fit in exactly with the resource allocation issues to be settled. 
This is the point of the classical theorists such as the English Jurist Hayle, who argued 
that good law is discovered law (as in the English Common law system). An eight 
lane elevated highway is not necessarily better than a simpler traffic management 
system (although the former may be more advanced). To put it in term of Marx’s 
theory, the economic base determines the superstructure (institutions) and the 
superstructure determined the economic base. An institution’s success may be guaged 
by whether it can provide more surplus than others. Institutional and productive 
relations evolve hand in hand. They co-evolve. If improvements in the allocation of 
production or consumption related resources are hindered by existing institutions, new 
rules will be demanded. This is a Hayekian and Northian view. Its application to the 
evolution of the order the governs cities and more generally urbanisation, is explored 
at some length in Webster and Lai (2003). However, a better institution will not
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necessarily replace the original one as such a replacement imposes costs as well. This 
is a Coasian view and also one expressed in the organisational theory of the
Berkely-based leading contemporary transaction cost economics proponent Oliver
Williamson. Only when the better institution brings more surplus than the 
replacement costs will such replacement finally take place. The inevitability of 
institutional progress is dependent on processes of political and administrative 
feedback. And of course, institutions benefit certain groups over others. The path to 
greater social efficiency is not a singular and monotonic one therefore. There are 
many paths and there are cul-de-sacs.
From this discussion we can draw some conclusions about the efficacy of 
designing institutions.
1. Although, as North, Hayek and others have shown, there are many institutions 
in society that have emerged over long periods of time with no or little 
conscious design, most of the institutions that address modem problems of
coordination are the fruit of the active design and invention.
2. An institution may be invented by a single designer, such as a lawer or 
constitution drafter or it may be fashioned by drawing on the practice of 
numerous human beings, as when statutory law is formalised from common 
law.
3. All institutions are tested in competition. It was not so much their planned 
institutions that led to the failure of planned economies - after all the U.S. and 
French constitutions were planned. Their failure was due to their practice of 
restricting institutional creation and testing -  the elimination of fair 
competition among different institutions.
4. In the case of free competition among different institutions, the winning social 
institution is the one that creates the best net social surplus after the deduction 
of replacement costs. So-called civilized society is a society where there is a 
huge variety of institutions. Applied to the problems of governing land and the
development of cities, the challenge is first, to make sure the instruments of 
governance and control are appropriate to the tasks at hand and second, to 
make sure that there is sufficient space in the governance regime for new and 
better institutions to emerge, succeed and replace less effective institutions.
The Coasian analysis of institutions based on the idea of scale economy is a great 
discovery. It provides a paradigm for researching institutional design. The growth of a 
firm follows economies of scale in the institutions of internal governance. At some 
point diseconomies set in and institutional growth is bounded. In the world of zero 
transaction cost within an organisation, an instutition would be unbounded. In its field 
of competence it would, in principle, dominate all transactions. In the extreme, the 
economy would be organised by one firm and firm and government would merge into 
one single organisation. The government as a firm, the firm as a government. But 
organisation costs are positive and firms and governments both grow to a size that 
reduces the social product.
In the framework, which will be presented in the Appendix, I further Coase’s 
thought on the matter. Differing from Coase’s proposition that organisation cost must 
increase faster than the increase of income, in my framework, the size of an 
organisation (firm, government) may also be confined by competition from its 
neighbours, so called Hayek Producers, who supply similar products in overlapping 
market. Since every consumer has different preferences, the accumulated surplus 
causes the bifurcation of demand and the enterprise will give birth to new products 
inevitably. That means that even if there is unexhausted scale economies (without 
increasing internal organisation cost) the bounds of the market or the size of firm is 
also potentially confined by its competitors. The economy, in that case, will never be 
dominated by single monoplistic government or firm .
25 I introduce this digression into the price theory developed in the Appendix at this point partly to show that the 
theoretical exploration in that chapter arises from the main enquiry of the thesis and partly because in my view, the 
review of Coase’s theory o f the firm would be incomplete without pointing out this alternative direction of analysis. 
The reader should be able to grasp the basic point being made at this stage and is invited to consider the more 
details arguments in the later chapter.
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2.3 The market role of government
A major function of urban planning is that it defines different proprietors in the 
planning and development process. It defines the original or an initial allocation of 
property rights. It attempts to provide institutions to reduce the transaction cost 
associated with exchanges of land, buildings and infrastructure. It aims to improve or 
to maximize the utilization of private and social resources. This is not a triditional 
view of urban planning. It requires redefinition of the roles of stakeholders in urban 
planning and shifts the attention of planners from the search for the moral roles of 
planning (e.g. redistributing benefit from stronger to weaker groups) to the search for 
optimal rights allocation. In this re-conceptualisation, it is essential to redefine the 
role of government since in reality, it is the most important consumer of the product of 
urban planning. If governmental behaviour is non-economic, economic tools of 
analysis will be useless in understanding urban planning. This is not the case, however. 
Governments of all types act with economic motives. Their roles can be understood 
with economic analysis, therefore, and without it, we end up with only a partial 
understanding of the planning and development process.
In order to make an institutional analysis of urban planning, the starting point is 
to identify the economic agents (government, developer, citizen, etc) and to assume 
that each seeks to maximise (or optmise) some kind of gain. Traditional urban 
planning theory based on neoclassic economics regards government merely as a 
solution to market failure. Non-economic theories of planning also tend to ignore the 
motives of government as agents. In mainstream theories of urban planning, market 
participants are all self-interested (profit-oriented in the case of land consumers and 
suppliers and special-interest oriented in the case of lobby group) except government. 
Government is seen as a guardian of public interests and a nonprofit organization 
whose responsibility is to serve social justice. Also in the eyes of classical economists, 
government is a fair judge regardless of its own interests. However, such an ideal 
government does not exist in reality.
26 Or ‘consumer equivalents’
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In universities, planning and urban design students are taught that the location of 
parks, and roads is reasonable if it fits certain design criteria, regardless of the 
institutional and governance context. When students of economics learn how to infer 
a general or partial equilibrium solution, the nature of governance is similarly an 
irrelevancy. When the planning schemes of urban planner or of the economic planner 
do not fit with the real world, they tend to focus attention on how to change (or at 
least criticize) the real world. They both implicitly assume a world with zero 
transaction cost in which government implicitly is a redundancy.
In his paper, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, Coase (1988) criticizes the 
economists’ preference for the logically perfect but impractical Pigouvia tax as 
follows:
In my youth it was said that what was too silly to be said may be sung, In mordern
economics it may be put into mathematics, (p. 185)
The criticism may also be laid at the door of the physical planner working in the 
tradition of urban design: in modem urban planning, silly schemes may be rendered in 
computer drawings.
When new institutional economics adopts the standardized analysis of transaction 
cost, the government is no longer an institutional redundancy. Coase points out at the 
end of his 1960 paper that “we must consider the operating costs of various
onarrangements (whether market institutions or government organs)” . In other words, 
the crucial variable becomes the cost of an institution in relation to its purpose. The 
analytical focus becomes designing institutions that cost effectively produce a desired 
change in resource allocation.
The analytical breakthrough comes when the government (or government 
controller) is no longer conceptualised as being a non-profit agent but a
27 Although this statement still features the wrong ideal that a “government organ” is not a “market 
mechanism”, this is a big progress considering the definition o f market mechanism in traditional 
economics.
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profit-oriented economic agent . The historic analysis school established by Douglas 
North and the collective action theory of Mancur Olson are most striking in this 
respect. North (1981) points out that we have to apply a transaction cost theory 
combined with a state theory in order to define an economic organization analytically. 
In order to establish such a framework, he assumed that the state will only set up a 
property rights regime that is effective if managers of the state can maximize their 
own fortunes (however ‘fortunes’ are defined) (Sheng 2003: 294). In many ways this 
idea is a more general successor to the more limited (and discredited) Marxian view 
of the state as a tool of class oppression. The state is not inert or benign. It is an 
instrument through which certain individuals seek their own benefit.
Taking this idea further, it will be useful to review Olson’s famous article 
Dictatorship, Democracy and Development (1993). In it he conducts an in-depth 
analysis of the nature of government. His thesis probes the economic causes of a 
government arising out of anarchy and then makes a comparison of democratic and 
autocratic institutions from the perspective of institutional economics.
He first makes an analysis of an anarchic society, saying that anarchy robs 
individuals of the incentive to produce and robs society, therefore, of productive 
capacity. Violence prevails and people are at constant risk of loss - material and 
personal. He then asks why and how most of the heavily populated societies in history 
have managed to avoid the state of anarchy. His answer is not arbitrary or based on 
conjecture but based on an analyses of China in the 1920s. Olson (1993) discribes it 
as follows:
In the 1920s, China was in large part under the control o f  verious warlords. The 
were men who led some armed band with which they conquered some territory. 
They taxed the population heavily and pocketed much o f  the proceeds. The 
woarlord Feng Yu-hsiang was noted for suppressing bandits and for his defeat o f  
the relatively substantial army o f  the roving bandit. White Wolf. Apparently most 
people in Feng’s domain found him much preferable to the roving bandit, (p. 568)
28 Or consumer equivalent
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Olson (1993) developed this into an analysis of the difference between settled 
bandids gangs and roving bandid gangs. Why do victims regard warlords, or the 
settled bandids gangs who repeatedly steal, as better than roving bandid gangs who 
rob then leave? The reason, he posed, is that if a roving bandid gang settles down to 
make a business out of stealing (demanding regular payments) and maintains a 
monopoly position in the territory, then victims will regain the incentive to produce. 
They will no longer have to worry about the unpredictable mobile thieves. They will 
know exactly what residual wealth will be left for them after paying tax. They get to 
keep a predictable proportion of earned or accumulated capital after the bandit’s 
takings and thus have the incentive to invest. Investment increases both revenues and 
taxes in the future. That, in turn, gives an incentive to the settled bandid to keep the 
tax stable, or even to adjust it downwards in order to increase longer term gains 
through protecting his victims’ investments. Anarchy therefore ends when theft 
becomes monopolised. As a by-product, subjects (victims) of production taxes receive 
protection since the autocratic ruler has the incentive to protect his subjects which will 
increase the long term returns within his territory.
In this way, Olson comes up with his shocking conclusion:
Thus governemnt for groups larger than tribes normally arises, not because o f  
social contracts or voluntary transactions o f any kind, but rather because o f  
rational self-interest among those who can organize the greatest capacity for 
violence. These violent entrepreneurs naturally do not call themselves bandits but, 
on the contrary, give themselves and their descendants exalted titles. They 
sometimes even claim to rule by divine right. Since history is written by the 
winners, the origins o f ruling dynasties are, o f course, conventionally explained 
in terms o f  lofty motives rather than by self-interest. Autocrats o f  all kinds usually 
claim that their subjects want them to to rule and thereby nourish the unhistorical 
assumption that government arose out o f  some kind o f voluntary choice, (p. 568)
This is a theory of government based on individual behaviour. It is a theory of the 
origins of government couched in terms of a situation that does not hold today.
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However, its logic is no less compelling for its historic setting.
It contrasts with arguments held by other renowned institutional economists such 
as Barzel and North who attribute the emergence of various governments partially or 
fully to willing deeds aimed at reducing the transaction cost of social cooperation. The 
two views are not necessarily contradictory, however. Olson’s contribution is to 
analyse the motivation for the origins of government or the prototypical choice 
between anarchy and government. Barzel’s and North’s idea that governments 
(collectively supported institutions) emerge to avoid the costs of wasteful competition 
does not necessarily preclude the Olson mechanism. It is open to any motivational 
mechanism, that being just one.
Olson goes further to analyse the difference between an autocratic (private) 
government and a democratic (public) government. As a part of his logic, he assumes 
that the political leader of a democratic regime is as selfish as the bandit gangs, 
making every effort to acquire majority support. He rejects the viewpoint that regards 
a dictator as a “predator”, believing that the metaphor obscures the fact that the settled 
bandidss are more efficient than anarchy and underestimates the advancement of 
civilization that results from this symbiotic relationship. From this viewpoint, the 
more common idea of a selfless democratic government is problematic.
In developing this idea, Olson poses the situation in which two candidates 
compete for presidency or two parties compete for the right to form a government. 
The candidate, or party, will try to purchase the support of a majority by shifting or 
proposing to shift the incomes from the general public to the anticipated majority via 
taxation and targeted spending. The cost of doing this is to damage incentives among 
both parties -  those redistributed from and those in receipts of redistribution - and to 
reduce aggregate social output. This has the same effect as when a dictator 
redistributes incomes to himself. Olson details this argument in The Logic o f  
Collective Action, suggesting that while tax rates in a regime of majority control tend 
to be lower, the majority rule tax system will favour special interests with virtually no 
incentive to consider the social costs of the redistribution. It may be wrong, therefore,
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to infer that a democratic regime will always feature less redistribution than a 
dictatorship.29
Why then, might a democratic nation be thought better than an autocratic one? 
Olson’s answer does not attempt to claim that a dictatorship is less efficient than a 
democratic government in terms of the dead-weight loss of arbitrary (as opposed to 
efficiency-related) redistribution. The argument is that a democratic government will 
provide longer-term protection of property than a dictatorship. This may be explained 
with reference to investment rates. When an economy develops to a certain level, a 
high investment rate is necessary to sustain and grow the standard of living. A dictator 
needs his subjects to believe that their property (investments) will be permanently 
protected from both theft by others and arbitrary expropriation by the dictator himself. 
If his subjects are fearful of either such loss they will not invest.
In order to deliver this security, a society needs a fair and reliable system of 
ownership documentation -  in the form of long-term title deeds over property, loans 
and other forms of contract. Long term and stable growth requires a long term 
institutional structure to encourage long term commitment to investments. The 
country also needs a stable currency to make this possible.
So society demands a settled bandids, who is forward-looking and willing to 
invest in his territory -  including investing in liberalising institutions. The only way a 
dictator can guarantee long term security of this nature is to make sure he is not 
deposed or does not die. Dictators do in fact tend to attempt to secure a full and 
extended lifespan, typically also rationalising their pretensions to immortality in terms 
of a desire to serve their subjects. It is a pretension, however, and a dictator cannot 
credibly supply the long-term security required to sustain ongoing voluntary 
investment of private resources (including labour). No individual leader is able to 
ensure the credibility of his commitment. There will therefore be an inevitable move 
to transform government from one based on individual leadership to an abstract and
29 Yang (1997) finds that a democratic regime has even higher tax rates than an autocratic regime in his 
comparison o f Britain after constitutional revolution and other European countries.
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impersonal agency. Following this line of Olson’s reasoning, a democratic 
government is better than a dictatorship because it ensures property safety and 
commitment credibility both in space and in time.
The expansion of an economy involves an expansion of individual market 
transactions over both of these dimensions -  time and space. Economic history shows 
that the costs of ensuring commitment credibility (or credit), is the highest transaction 
cost in a market economy. It must surely be much higher than the universally 
recognized spatial transaction cost (transportation cost). Advancements in 
transportation technology reduce spatial transaction cost and promote economic 
development. Advancements of legal technology reduces the costs of contracting. The 
longer the term of the contract (and the larger its value), the greater the transaction 
cost. The adminisrative costs of taking out a house mortgage are high because of the 
thoroughness of credit and income checks and checks on the value of the property vis 
a vis the loan and so on. Such contracting is made much less risky - indeed, is made 
possible at all - by the presence of impersonal governmental institutions. This offers 
an explanation for the emergence of all levels and types of governance. Impersonal 
companies replace individuals’ personal relationships as economic agents. Barzel 
develops this argument (1998), suggesting that ultimately it is the ability to capitalise 
or underwrite a contract that gives the firm (emergence of corporate government) its 
justification (he relates this to the costs of contracting).
This leads to the proposition that more stable governments have longer life spans, 
provide longer term security and pemit longer periods of economic growth.
Now consider an interesting extension to this line of reasoning: the trade-off 
between democracy and freedom of exit from a government’s rule. If people can 
freely flow among competitive governments, an extension to the standard Tiebout 
world (Tiebout 1957), those governments no longer need the expensive democratic 
institution to maintain their credibility as a guarantor of contracts. The democratic 
institution becomes unnecessary. Democracy, in other words, is a compensation for 
the loss of freedom to exit. This is a version of Hirchman’s ‘exit versus voice’ formula
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(Hirchman 1970). Or to put it another way, the increase of freedom is a substitute for 
democracy. Therefore, we can increase transaction credibility by providing either 
more democracy or more freedom.
The same rule applies at the level of the individual transaction. Interpret freedom 
as freedom to enjoy the benefts of a property right purchased in a specific contract 
(freedom from ‘hold-up’).
In a transaction, the more risk to freedom (the easier it is to be held up), the more 
important it is to have an agreed governance arrangement governing post-contract 
opportunism. This is an idea found in the works of transaction cost economists Oliver 
Williamson and property rights theorist Oliver Hart (Williamson 2001, Hart 1988, 
Hart and Moore 1990, Grossman and Hart 1998). If there is little risk to post-contract 
opportunism, transacting parties can be said to be free to enjoy the anticipated rewards 
from the contract (or transaction).
One implication of this line of reasoning is that a society where most citizens own 
private property demands far more democracy than a society without private property. 
Another is that inter-state competition can lead non-democratic governments to act in 
the interests of ctizens. This is an extension to the closed city model of neoclassical 
land economics. There will be a greater internal pressure for democracy the more 
closed is a territory (movement away is not easy). A small and open state (like 
Singapore for example) can be expected to act benignly towards its citizens even with 
high degree of autocracy.
Developing further the idea that geography affects institutions, consider the 
following. In a world with increasing returns and scale economy, broader spaces and 
longer time span (increase in spatial and temporal scale) create more surplus . 
Government is an enterprise that manages space and prices its services within its 
administrative boundary.
In a paper (Zhao 2003), I showed that the concept of “public product” is created
30 I review this idea in (Zhao, 2003).
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due to the absence of the concept of “space” in economics. In standard economics, the 
spatial transaction cost of economic factors is assumed as zero [Krugman (1997) once 
quoted Walter Isard (1949, 1956) to criticize economic analysis as occurring in a 
“wonderland with no spatial dimensions”]. However, the public product defined by 
Samuelson is no longer a special product but an ordinary commodity that is 
“exclusive” and “congested” in space if we introduce spatial factors. The government 
prices its services (security) by way of “tax” and excludes non-taxpayers by spatial 
means (boundaries) to avoid the congestion caused by free riding. Similarly, the 
government that provides the so-called “public product” is just an ordinary enterprise 
that prices its products and services using spatial means in the market.
Political institutions emerge to overcome transaction credibility problems caused 
by time and space. In particular they lower the transaction cost caused by the lack of 
credibility in the time dimension but space impacts on this too as I have argued. All 
this means that a democratic institution is not a pure product of moral improvement, 
but an institutional creation for the purpose of transaction cost reduction, particularly 
during a time of economic expansion in the time dimension. Evidently, different 
economic scales require different optimal institutions. An institution will tend to 
survive only when the transaction cost it saves exceed its running costs.
Under this conception of government, the abstract ideas of democracy and 
freedom are not universally applicable to all economies. A superior institution can 
emerge only when the economic scale is large enough to lead to transaction cost 
savings in excess of the high costs of institutional creation and maintenance. Arguably, 
this inequality was not achieve in India, perhaps until its recent economic boom. 
Democracy and economic development may not always coexist in the long run from 
this perspective, because of high institutional costs but low economic necessity.
Summarising some of the points already made and applying them to urban 
planning we can say the following. The proposition that government is an enterprise 
paves the way for an institutional analysis of urban planning. Many economic 
phenomena unaccountable with an ‘irrelevant government’ model can more readily be
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reasonably explained in institutional economics (e.g. the social justice objective in 
planning can be understood as a social necessity to lower the costs of transacting, or 
more generally, cooperation between divided and specialised labour).
The governmental urban planning function is an enterprise (Zhao 2002). This 
mean first, that the planning agency is a rational but selfish organ and second, that it 
is not an opponent of the market, but a part of it31. This conception of the 
governmental role is of paramount importance to introduce institutional economics 
into urban planning. Otherwise, the institutional environment that urban planning 
relies on cannot be explained in a proper manner and we will not be able to predict 
reasonable government behaviour.
This analysis challenges the orthodoxy economic perception of the government 
planning agency as an outsider to the market economy (the provider of public goods 
and protector of weaker groups). It is merely one of the market participants and both 
its motives and behaviour bear similarities to other enterprises. Its behaviour also 
respects the rules of the market (profit maximization, variously defined). The 
naturally endowed monopoly of government, including its monopoly over land and/or 
land regulation, makes it unaccountable in the perception of traditional economics. 
However, government behaviour becomes understandable when we apply 
monopolistic competition theory to government. The government is merely an 
enterprise that charges for its spatial services. The competition among governments is 
little different in principle from that among enterprises. Competition among 
governments is wasteful and inefficient in the eyes of traditional economists and 
urban analysts since it allegedly produces no benefits and wastes taxpayers’ money. 
However, seen in the cotext of a spatial market in competitive territorial ‘firms’, the 
competition is not only beneficial but also essential and it can save resources by way 
of institutional innovation .
31 Some Chinese scholars have termed my viewpoints as “neoliberalist” and attempted to carry out 
moral criticism on my viewpoint on such a basis. The basic viewpoint o f neoliberalism, however, is its 
emphasis on the effects o f the “invisible hand” and its opposition to the government’s interference in 
economic life. This runs against my views on the market role o f the government.
32 For instance, adjustment o f administrative limits, establishment o f city alliances, “North America
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The definition of government as an enterprise leads also to a conclusion that the 
private sector may also play the role of a government33. In urban planning, this means 
that private firms and government should both be seen as the planners, shapers and 
governors of territory. In recent years, the residential communities in Chinese cities 
have expanded in scale and many residential projects are as big as small cities. These 
big projects have all the functional facilities of a city including primary and secondary 
schools, kindergartens, hospitals, shops and markets. Many real estate developers 
regard themselves as an urban operator. Very few urban planning theories can explain 
or happily accommodate this phenomenon. However, in the eyes of institutional 
economics, this is merely a fulfilment of the lost functionality of civilian government 
by a settled bandids gang24. Alternatively it is simply and extension of the Coasian 
idea of the emergence of territorial firms, led by contemporary business entrepreneurs 
rather by political entrpreneurs.
In China, public services cannot be priced because the government of a city does 
not levy a property tax. As a result, municipal governments are not sufficiently 
financed to provide the civic public goods that the market will allegedly undersupply 
or fail to supply. So developers of large real estate projects, having the capital that 
government does not, emerge to produce not only houses but complete 
neighbourhoods and cities, including contractual urban governance and management. 
Property management fees become equivalent to property tax and fund public services 
for residents. In practice, many public services provided by civilians are not worse 
than those provided by the government and sometimes even better (see Glasze,
Free-trade Zone” and “Euro Zone”, etc. Even forced annexation o f territory may be regarded as an 
approach for “illicit” property right transfer. The approach that features the lowest transaction cost will 
be the best one.
33 As a matter o f fact, it is even unnecessary for us to distinguish a “private” government and a 
“public” government. A “public” government is only a club made up of many individuals. The 
transition from a private government to a public one o f the same nature as the vertical integration of 
enterprises because both aim to prevent either transacting party being held up and to guarantee the 
credibility o f transaction commitments.
34 The rise o f mafia in many places is due to the absence o f government functions. Once a government 
is not able to provide security, the mafia that collects protection fees will emerge in place o f the 
government. The reason why some mafias even enjoy sympathy from the residents is that the legal 
“policemen” sometimes are more like a “roving bandid gang”, i.e. they provide no protection and 
sometimes even plunder directly although they do not charge.
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Webster and Frantz 2006 for a set of international examples including China).
The phenomenon of communal or private government replacing political 
government in providing public services is universally present in developed countries. 
As incomes increase, so demand for public goods diversifies and developers in higher 
income countries in which this model is permitted will then strive to provide 
communities with exclusive functions oriented towards a specific niche market. This 
is the case with the universally popular Common Interest Developments (so called 
gated communities) in developed countries, especially North America. It is also 
becoming true of the middle and high income commodity housing belts in Chinese 
cities. Developers are increasingly building micro territories, differentiated not only in 
their design specification and price of homes but in their governance too.
2.4 Public participation and collective decision
Now we move to the issues of public participation and direct democratic decision 
making that are emphasized so strongly by urban planners. There is a long standing 
literature on public participation in western planning going back to the 1960s and 70s, 
such as the seminal work, A ladder of Citizen Participation, by Sherry Amstein 
(Amstein 1969), and many others (Davidoff 1965, Susskind, 1989, Friedmann, 1979, 
1987). Orthodoxy in urban planning ideology views democratic planning procedures 
as unconditional, i.e. the more the better if possible. Planners are merely 
intermediaries for communications and collaboration between different interest 
groups. This is a strong line of thought in western planning theory and has been since 
the 1970s. Most of the literature assumes that public participation is always good 
without conditions. Some of it criticises participation failures (Forster, 1987, 1989, 
Amstein 1969, Fischer 1990, Dluhy 1990, Fagence 1977, Thomas 1988, Friedmann 
1979, 1987); some make unfair comparisons with ideal democracy that could never 
work in practice. More recently (Healey 2006) there has been an emphasis on 
conceptualising planning as a collaborative and deliberative activity and on designing 
approaches to capture this sense of purpose. Few have commented on the costs of
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participation in relation to the results and fewer still have commented on the 
underlying paradox of group decision making.
In 1951, the US economist Arrow (1972 Nobel Prize laureate) made an analysis 
of the ballot institution, the foundation of democratic institutions, in a mathematic 
way. He was surprised to find that it is impossible under any circumstances to come 
up with the preferential sequence of a group by integrating the preferences of all 
individuals. To be more exact, the Arrow Theorem cannot be satisfied when there are 
at least three candidates and two electorates, which is his famous impossibility 
theorem (Arrow 1951). This conclusion means that there is no approach through 
which society can jointly express its preferences or through which collective public 
decisions can be made by scientific procedure even under perfect and reasonable 
conditions35.
Arrow’s discovery threatened the foundation of the ballot-casting democracy and 
aroused much attention in western academia and criticism from staunch supporters of 
democracy. Arrow’s basic viewpoints remain tenaciously unchanged, although Sen 
(1998 Nobel Prize laureate) partially modifies Arrow’s conclusion by imposing 
additional conditions. Arrow’s discovery shows that there is no institution that can 
pave the way from individual preferences to collective choice. For urban planners, 
whose job it is to design and shape cities according to some kind of social optimum, 
this is a great challenge. The public interest does not exist. Individuals have different 
preferences. The impossibility theorem proves that even the sequencing of preferences 
is impossible. Public participation of whatever kind cannot lead to a uniform, 
unambiguous and optimal result whatever approach is adopted. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that public participation is typically problematic even though it is strongly 
advocated by planners.
In response to this, there is a risk that planners go to the other extreme, making 
autocratic and elite decisions. This is as detectable among the urban design
35 For example, the electorates have definite and stable preferences and nothing is present to mislead or 
coerce the voters to vote against their will
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community, even in democratic countries where the public participation ethos is 
deeply embedded. The paradoxical stance is probably a reflection of the underlying 
realisation that when all views and opinions are collected, someone has to make the 
plan. The tension is only resolved by truly participatory approaches, such as so called 
planning for real. These community design workshops have very high transaction cost 
and cannot produce unambiguous aggregation of individual preferences for the 
reasons enumerated by Arrow. The best that can be said of them is that they expose 
new solutions and that in the discovery of these, some preferences can converge. So 
they are preference forming, changing and converging devices (Sager 2005).
Mostly, especially in countries where planning is close to architecture and 
predominately a design activity, planners thus bestow themselves with the privilege of 
distinguishing between options. In countries with a strong democratic tradition, this 
includes distinguishing between the strong and the weak and being champions of 
justice. Planners become the final arbitrators in the allocation of scarce land-related 
resources. They attach moral standards to their democracy in order to find correct 
moral solutions to the problem of urban public goods allocation. As moral agents they 
offer their self-defined truths to the governing authorities. In the planning academy at 
least, the realisation that the real world often does not recognize this self-appointed 
moral role, planners become indignant and prone to critical reflection on the evils of 
the market and colluding governments.
The role of public participation in the mind set of practicing and academic 
planners shows a lack of appreciation of the dynamic and underlying rationale for 
democracy based on collective choice. Institutional economics tells us that the real 
function of ballot-casting democracy is not to acquire collective preferences - because 
the abstract public interests never exist. In essence, democracy is not for moral justice, 
but is an institution for ensuring the distribution of property rights in a way that 
restricts the possibility of opportunism in transacting. Democracy’s great role -  and 
the reason for its great evolutionary success as a social institution -  is to ensure the 
credibility of commitment during future transaction where credit is absent.
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With this understanding, we can have a different discussion about public 
participation and direct democratic decision making - one that has transaction costs in 
focus. A democracy will be reasonable if the increase of transaction costs is lower 
than the potential loss brought about by the absence of credibility and the ensuing 
transaction failures. Otherwise, democracy will become a kind of social institutional 
redundancy. The optimal democracy will maximize the surplus of its transaction after 
its running costs are deducted. According to this criterion, democracy is unnecessary 
if credit is ensured during transaction. But it is rational for society to tend to chose 
democratic institutions if the majority sense the possibility of hold up in their 
transactions and view the commitments of transacting parties as unreliable.
More democracy is not necessarily better, however. The degree of democracy 
needs to fit the potential risks of property loss (the opportunity cost of lost 
democracy). After all, as individuals, we exercise this discretion in all kinds of 
choices. In some matters we accept the authority of an expert. In others we seek the 
council of many. There are decisions that we insist, if we can, on being involved in 
and there are others we are happy to cede to others. In each situation we weigh the 
costs of direct involvement against the benefits (perhaps not explicitly, but in 
principle). More democracy means greater running costs for social decisions. 
Spending too much democratic energy on the protection of a property with low value 
suggests the dissipation of social and individual welfare . Therefore, democracy is 
only one yardstick with which to gauge an institution. Different institutions feature 
different degrees of democracy and the evaluation of a democratic institution depend 
on the institutional environment as well as the value of the resources in question. This 
is affected, among other things by the level of a country’s economic development.
Clearly, democracy (at least high-level democracy) is redundant when a society 
has very few properties or the transaction is completed on the spot (which means that 
both parties can freely enter or quit the transaction as the Tiebout model describes).
36 It also shows that we can ensure the safety and credibility o f property rights transaction via 
institutional design and therefore democratic costs can be saved.
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The recent institutional progress in China is a good example. Before China’s 
economic reforms, public ownership prevailed with very few private properties and 
thus democracy was merely a form (sometimes not even a form). From the 
perspective of new institutional economics, the lack of democracy was efficient in this 
period.
In fact, the goal of socialist public ownership was to reduce the transaction cost 
that is unavoidable under private ownership. Marx has the most in-depth 
understanding of the economic impact of institutions among all classical economists. 
His thoughts transcended those of most other economists in the past and today and he 
became the first thinker to regard the optimal institution free of transaction cost as the 
foundation of economics. His communism actually aimed to eradicate transaction cost 
once and for all and to realize the optimal distribution of social resources by 
eliminating private ownership. Coase discovered a similar thought several years later. 
The difference, of course, is that the solution put forward by new institutional 
economics does not aim to radically eradicate private ownership (as this would also 
get rid of the market and the wealth-enhancing division of labour). Instead, it aims to 
study how to lower transaction cost37 by improving institutions under private 
ownership.
China’s reforms have in essence involved the reestablishment of private 
proprietorship. Ever since the economic reforms, especially the establishment of 
household responsibility system in rural area and urban housing commercialization 
policies, Chinese citizens’ private property has increased by leaps and bounds. This 
has imposed a high demand for the protection of private property. As a result, many
37 With this understanding, we can compare the advantages and disadvantages o f different economic 
institutions. Planned economy features weak incentive for production and low transaction cost; market 
economy features strong incentive for production but high transaction cost. The difference in efficiency 
of different economic institutions is determined by the surplus o f total social output minus total social 
costs. As Marx says, the superstructure must fit in with its economic foundation. There is no good or 
bad superstructure (e.g. democratic institutions); the key point is the superstructure’s conformity to the 
economic foundation (productivity). The failure o f the planned economy shows that the eradication of 
private ownership results in lower efficiency than market economy. Unless we hope to eradicate the 
division of labor and get back to the primitive age, we will have to accept transaction costs, the 
institutional friction brought about by private ownership.
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urban planners have started to advocate western democratic style public participation 
in urban planning. It is not necessarily wrong to do this, but copying western 
democracy without changes may bring some problems because the public at the 
current stage does not refer to consumers of cities in the same sense as in the West. 
From the perspective of institutional economics, democracy must take place among 
different transacting parties. But in China at present, there is a fundamental sense in 
which the public and government are not in a transacting relationship, as I explain in 
the following.
In China, the general public does not pay tax to city managers, i.e. the 
government, and urban management does not impact the fortunes of consumers 
directly. Since the public is not the direct consumer of cities, it is senseless for the 
public to demand democracy directly from the government. In China today, the 
consumption of urban services consists of two transaction forms and three transacting 
parties. The direct supplier of most urban services is the government and the direct
n o
consumers are companies, not the public . The government obtains taxes and rentals 
from companies and the public acquires salaries and products from the companies but 
pays no direct taxes to the government. In these two transaction forms, companies 
have high mobility and can choose different cities to investment in while the city 
government must create a sound investment environment. If the government breaks its 
promise after a transaction, its credibility will be damaged it will find difficulty in 
attracting additional investment and companies. As a result, the transaction between 
the government and companies are basically credible. Even though there is no 
democracy as such. The government also has the motive to improve its services. In 
this way, the relationships between the government, residents and developers are 
similar to those among a television station, its viewers and advertisers. Any 
opportunism on the part of any transacting party will be restricted by another and the 
credibility of all parties is generally guaranteed.
38 As I have already implied, at the neighbourhood scale, this is changing as private developers and property 
management companies progressively carve out a contractual neighbourhood governance market.
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The general public of a city, on the other hand, have very low mobility and 
cannot choose among different cities. They can, however, choose different companies 
(e.g. real estate developers). As a result, the general public is actually the indirect 
consumer of the city through its transaction with the developers who must flatter the 
general public to sell their products. However, the developers feature high mobility 
while the public features low mobility. The general public actually buys a service that 
flows within the life span of a purchased property. In other words, a real estate 
transaction will be completed 70 years later and any price increase or nonconfirming 
service quality on the part of the property management company must be endured by 
the general public who finds it hard to get away and refuse what it dislikes.
In this circumstance, relevant democracy is needed as a guarantee. As a result, the 
actual public participation in Chinese cities, unlike the one between government and 
foreign investors, is between residents and property management companies and 
between residents and resident committees after housing commercialization.
Since residents are not the direct consumers of a city, Chinese citizens and 
western citizens are not alike: the former are not taxpayers in a real sense. Although 
we have seen a substantial increase of income tax in recent years, it still remains 
nominal, both for the government and for individuals. As a result, we can predict that 
the democracy between the government and the public will remain immaterial until 
China starts to levy real estate property taxes. Because the public does not have to pay 
any cost during public decision-making, it will support any public expenditure to its 
benefit40. In such a circumstance, ostensibly democratic institutions like public 
participation in planning are likely to be useless and may even be harmful41. Any
39 Similarly, if this analysis is right, we may foresee that urban residents become the direct consumers 
of the city and the relations between the government and citizens will gradually resemble western 
democracy with the increase o f individual wealth and the levy o f real property tax by the government. 
The final result is a combination o f “democracies” among different transacting parties with different 
deeds.
40 In a contentious article (Zhao, 2002), I state an example o f the planning scheme o f downtown 
Zhangzhou. The choice o f location o f Xiamen Library is also similar. Five location alternatives were 
given for determination by citizens, o f which the most easily accessible location was chosen without 
doubt. The result could also be obtained without this democratic process so long as the goal is interest 
maximization and government expenditure has nothing to do with individuals.
41 We can imagine that no new passenger will be allowed if his boarding is to be determined by all
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democracy is a kind of property right transfer aimed at maximizing aggregate social 
surplus. Any arbitrary application of western public participation that transcends the 
economic development stage will only hamper instead of promoting efforts at more 
efficient planning42.
The absence of democracy may not necessarily slow down the growth of an 
economy if consumers can enjoy the freedom of choice through mechanism design. 
This is like the TV system in China. In this system, TV stations do not collect money 
from the public; they are funded by the advertising market. The preference of 
consumers can apparently be captured through the advertisement market. Therefore a 
consumer of TV doesn’t have to participate directly in the decision making process of 
TV production.
Similarly, in the recent development of Chinese cities, the investors played a 
major third party role in City planning, so that a resident of a city does not have to 
participate in the policy making process of the city. The municipal governments 
improved their infrastructure and services mainly because they wanted to attract more 
investors. This system was not founded on any payments by resident to the urban 
government. The practice demonstrates that the urban economy can grow fast without 
standard democracy.
Since 1997 the base of this system has been changed due to the housing system 
reformation. Most residents in Chinese cities have bought their own properties, which 
means a step towards a different model, in which they buy government service 
directly. Therefore the voice of citizen participation has naturally been getting louder 
and louder.
In a word, the absence of cost signals in the citizen-govemment transaction runs
passengers on board in a democratic way. Of course, no bus company will award this right to its 
passengers. Similarly, Shenzhen would never expand as it is today if  it allowed its residents to 
determine the acceptability o f additional new residents in a democratic manner. Such a democratic 
choice is unfair for new residents actually.
42 This is why the public participation organized by most city governments today seems like a show. 
This ostensible public participation merely adds transaction costs and honors those political leaders 
with few substantive benefits.
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the risk of inefficient supply of territorial goods. In principle, it may slow down 
economic growth and if this happens in a way that doesn’t give equivalent social gain 
then inefficiencies will prevail. When footloose land developers and industrial 
investors provided the cost signals, in a period of intense inter-regional and inter-city 
competition in China, consumers had a measure of protection and their lack of direct 
ability to signal preferences was arguably not an impediment to growing efficient 
cities. It remains to be seen whether the new wave of home ownership will lead to 
more direct financial-political transaction between residents and city government or 
whether private property management companies (PMCs) and proprietary 
neighbourhood-owning firms will play a new form of governance intermediation. 
Competitive PMCs and land-owning firms could play a similar role to competitive 
investing industrial firms, offering credible governing promises, under the discipline 
of a competitive PMC market.
It is worth broadening the idea of credibility and credit. The credibility of 
transaction is a hot topic in economics today. The loss of credit will bring far more 
transaction difficulties than information asymmetry does (although research on the 
latter has contributed to the emergence of many Nobel Prize winners in economics). 
Similar to transportation cost in the space dimension, the insufficiency of credit may 
be regarded as the “transportation cost” in the time dimension. The so-called civilized 
world is actually one with a huge collection of institutions that have emerged or been 
designed to increase social credit. These have become permanent in the form of social 
customs, taboos, practices and religion.
In western civilization, religion has traditionally -  and is still does residually -  
provide for the accumulated of ‘credit’ in large quantities. Therefore, many modem 
societies established their initial credit institution on the basis of religion43. In eastern 
civilization, Confucianism (benevolence, justice, courtesy, intelligence and credibility) 
prevails over the whole society where social credit mainly relies on strong kinship
43 For example, Webb notices the relations between protestantism and industrialization, and the Jew’s 
long-term aptitude in business has always been regarded as unaccountable by economics.
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(like families). This leads to the so-called differential sequences termed by Fei 
(1947(1998)), i.e. social relations among individuals, families, clans, confraternities, 
friends and town fellows through which social credit and trust is established. As a 
result, the corporate institutions within Eastern countries are oriented towards the 
concentration of credibility and the reforms oriented in this direction have achieved 
notable success.
For example, the household responsibility system in the rural areas of China in 
the early years is now recognized widely to be key to the success of Deng’s reform. 
Through simply cancelling the collective system and relocating land to the household, 
the productivity of agricultural industry increased dramatically and saved the Chinese 
economy from the edge of bankruptcy. As a more specific example, the cluster of 
family enterprises in Wenzhou city gave rise to more vigour and vitality than any 
single state-owned enterprise in Qingdao (Zhong 2005). This can also explain the 
reason why most successful firms in oriental states are family owned—it is simply 
because there is more credit within a household than that in a collective or state 
owned organisation.
In his work, Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation o f Prosperity, Fukuyama 
(1996) noticed the importance of social credit in reducing the costs of transaction. He 
(2000) takes trust as a kind of social capital. It is equivalent to the idea of the 
institution in NIE or to the idea of the fixed cost in urban institutions that I develop 
later in the thesis. Many studies of institutional reform fail to consider the background 
of different civilizations. Instead they simply compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate institutions in various countries and distinguish them 
as advanced or backward arbitrarily. Chinese institutional designers of planning laws 
and procedures need to understand the purpose, limitations and dynamics of public 
participation devices. It is all too easy to reify democratic-looking institutions without 
considering their costs and benefits in the particular context proposed.
The nature of government as firm gives us a new angle to understand public 
participation. Like any consumer, it is not necessary for a resident to participate in the
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process of policy-making. Government offers public services (security, education, fire 
fighting, etc.) and residents pay tax for these. For those whom do not pay tax, such as 
residents under a planned economy, democracy is functionally meaningless (it may of 
course have some ideological value independent of its functional value).
To summarise: in what circumstances do people need democracy? The answer is: 
(i) when they lose the freedom to choose to the contract—if they cannot vote with 
their feet, they need vote with their hand; and (ii) when they become the shareholder 
of a firm—if they buy the fixed property of a city, it means they become the 
stockholder of the city.
Democracy is a compensation for the loss of freedom. Once consumers are 
constrained to a certain territory, the local government has a motive to change the 
contract -  to offer less service and levy higher taxes. The residents, as consumers of 
public services, will then want more voice in policy-making. Where residents buy 
fixed property, this means they have a long term demand for long-term service and 
their lack of mobility makes them vulnerable to hold-up by governments and their 
agencies. Governments will seek to change the rules of levy and the level of service 
after residents buy the real property. To avoid opportunist behaviour in government, 
residents will therefore wants to be ‘shareholders’ of the city so as to protect their 
property. This happens through the emergence of democratic system. It can happen 
with municipal democratisation and it can also happen with incorporation -  for 
example Shenzhen’s joint stock company urban villages. Either is like the vertical 
integration of a firm in which customers are brought into the firm in order to avoid 
hold up problems and to raise the aggregate social value of the contract between 
customer and supplier (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart O. 1988, Yang and Ng 1993).
This section has attempted to show that if we take the government as a firm, the 
behaviour of citizen participation can be understood and explained within the 
framework of firm theory. Democracy is simply a mechanism to protect the credibility 
of a trust-lacking contract. Like any kind of democracy, public participation is 
expensive. It generates huge transaction cost. Therefore, only if the contract could
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bring enough surplus, is public participation necessary. It is not surprising that the 
movement of citizen participation was initiated in developed countries where citizens 
generally own their real property.
Public participation is only one institution for reducing transactions costs in urban 
planning. It may not in fact do that -  at least not in all situations. Indirect contracts 
between citizens and a municipal government may also reduce transaction costs and 
help to keep the freedom of contractual choice. Social capital shaped through 
long-term repeated games in history, such as the customs of culture, the taboos of 
religion, and rules of organisation (family, race, fraternity or language), can also help 
to add the credibility to contracts.
2.5 Conclusion
This dissertation aims to restructure the analytical categories of the science of 
urban planning from the perspective of institutional economics and establish a 
common academic language among planners. This will help oil the conversations 
needed to reform practical urban planning in China. According to traditional planning 
theories, good urban spatial layout means building spatial layouts by technical 
principles; based on ideas about the “reasonable” division of land and road structure. 
A “good” plan will not become “bad” due to a different institutional context. However, 
practice has shown that usually a technically “good” plan cannot be implemented. For 
one thing, there is a transaction cost incurred in changing an ‘unreasonable’ layout to 
a ‘reasonable’ one. The cost will not be zero if the selection of optimal space requires 
the transaction of property rights in the real world and the optimal spatial layout will 
not, in fact, materialise. In other words, the technically optimal spatial layout scheme 
will not be the actually optimal one so long as the transaction cost is higher than the 
benefits brought by spatial layout. The Coasian world with zero transaction cost in 
traditional urban planning theories is actually only theoretical, like the ideal physical 
world where there is no friction.
When an architect designs a building (or a community), there is only one single
77
proprietor and thus no transaction cost involved in the optimal layout. What matters is 
whether the design techniques are optimal. However, an existing city (like a building 
or residential area that has been sold to multiple different users) consists of multiple 
proprietors and any modification to the existing proprietorship will create transaction 
cost. This is the biggest difference between a planner’s world and an architect’s world 
and also between planners in a planned economy and a market economy. Chinese 
urban planning senses the tension but has not, by and large, shifted mode.
In the new mode, planning consists of both design analysis and institutional 
analysis. A planner must take two steps when considering any spatial layout: the first 
step uses spatial analysis and design criteria in assessing the technical optimality of a 
scheme (planning theory is far from mature in this regard). The second step is an 
institutional analysis, where the interests of different proprietors are considered in the 
design of an institutional approach. This is aimed at compensating the losing parties 
so that the optimal scheme can be implemented -  and indeed, so that the 
compensation can be factored into the optimal plan. It is equivalent to the economist 
designing instruments to secure the optimal structure of property rights.
In practice, most planners in China are not professionally trained to carry out the 
second step and thus regard a city as a building and themselves as the architects of the 
city. With the frustration that their ambitious ideas cannot be implemented in the real 
world, they have moved in two directions. Some retreat further back into to world and 
mind-set of physical planning, searching for what can be done as architect-planners 
and retreating from what cannot. This inevitably leads to a focus on the fine-grained 
scale of urban design. Others look for inspiration in the west and dabble in the niceties 
of democratic-oriented process-style planning.
Both directions contain misleading illusions, however, and tend to leave the 
problems of coordinating Chinese urban development un-resolved. Mere physical 
urban design can only solve coordination problems where there is unitary ownership. 
Looking to public participation as a solution is likely to be as empty a search, for 
reasons discussed in this chapter. Actually, public participation is only one possible
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institutional design for reassigning property rights. As I have argued, it can have high 
transaction cost with few benefits.
The way the Chinese planner must go is to learn new techniques of institutional 
design. This takes their knowledge domain into the world of the economist, political 
scientist and organisational theorist. Knowledge about incentives, contract design and 
risk will help find the really optimal spatial prescriptions. The guiding criterion is the 
reduction of transaction cost. Planners have been trained for years to optimise along a 
single transaction cost dimension -  distance. Hence, for example, the urban designer’s 
preoccupation with lines of sight, shortest path, straight-line access and permeability. 
Hence, also, the regional planner’s preoccupation with Christaller Geometry44. Take 
these preoccupations into a world of non-zero non-transport transaction cost, 
including the costs of government and other costs of coordination and you have a 
profession that designs in physical space, in time and in institutional (relational-legal) 
space.
What implications for urban planning flow from the idea of the Chinese 
municipal government as a firm? Several points may be made.
First, there is no westem-style political democracy in China at the moment - such 
as municipal elections. But if there were, the municipality might be viewed as a public
44 During the stage o f booming urban growth, planners play the major role o f “city architect” who 
determines the layout and orientation o f roads, bridges and large-scale basic infrastructures. At this 
moment, the urban property rights are relatively simple and urban functionality and spaces are 
“designable” to a large extent. With the formation o f “city buildings”, the planners will be confronted 
with the major task o f distributing existing spaces to more efficient users. Planners must design the 
rules to enable the effective circulation o f urban resources to accommodate the needs o f economic 
development. This is the major reason why “institutional designer” will gradually replace “architects” 
as the major function o f a planner. The planners not capable o f institutional design will finally be 
eliminated in the market.
Refusing to adjust their tools according to the changing world is the fundamental reason why the 
profession o f planner has deteriorated in developed countries. The planners refuse to learn new things, 
turn a blind eye to institutional design that is playing is more and more important role in urban 
planning and finally have to get back to academic study and render their arena to surveyors and 
economists. Now they find that even academic study is impossible for them if they keep on shunning 
away from the reality. Despite efforts by such masters as Friedrich to raise the proposal that the 
Euclidian planning shall be turned into post-Euclidian planning, urban planning is still unavoidably 
deteriorating from its glory down to the bottom. It is pitiful that many planners are still trying to adopt 
the overseas “advanced planning concept” and many overseas students mistakenly regard themselves 
as superiors and transfer back to China the wrong and fatal viewpoints o f planners in developed 
countries.
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corporation, owned by the tax-paying citizenry. Not only is there no ballot-based 
representative government but neither is there local property taxes. So the municipal 
firm is definitely not a publicly-owned corporation. This is similar to the early stage 
of industrialisation in other countries, where only a chosen few had the right to vote 
and the real right of policy making was in the hands of few people or families. 
Alternatively, cities are like private firms -  in the hands of cadres who inherited them 
from the cadres of the pre-reform era. Or to be more precise, the Chinese city is more 
like a collective corporation owned by a monopolistic group (the communist party).
In western countries, the various professional manager groups compete with each 
other in a municipal election and the public chose the one that seems to meet their 
preferences best. In China, the competition takes place inside the monopolistic group 
(communist party), where professional managers compete with each other at the local 
level, and higher rank manager select the winners to run the municipality. At the top 
of the hierarchy, national leaders in China face a kind of competition from foreign 
professional groups, doing an equivalent job in other countries.
Urban residents have until recently been the labour in the Chinese city firm. They 
have not traditionally cared much about the problems of management. The urban 
planner’s role has been to prescribe future land use allocations that optimise the firm’s 
objective function. For the past two decades or so this has meant maximising local 
economic growth and/or maximising revenue from land.
Since the end of last century, the reform of the housing supply system has 
changed this dramatically, however. Residents are not only the labours, working for 
and renting homes from the companies that pay tax to and demand infrastructure from 
local governments. Residents have bought real property and become the stockholders 
of the city firm. The voice to participate the management of the city consequently gets 
louder, notably so at the community level. The observation supports the hypothesis 
that the state of ownership in society shapes the demand for democracy, not the other 
way around.
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Second, planners have to find instruments appropriate to this political economic 
context - instruments that acknowledge the nature of the firm they work for. Public 
participation is unconstrained in this context because of the lack of any financial 
liability built into the preferences expressed by the public. With public participation 
they may demand more and more but without any direct financial discipline in the 
form of a tax bill.
Of course, public participation might be a route to changing the nature of the 
municipal firm, but that is another discussion. I concern my self with the status quo 
for the present analysis - trying to point a sensible and pragmatic way out of the urban 
planner’s present impasse. Their room for manoeuvre is to work more smartly with 
the market to achieve both good physical planning and the economic goals of the 
municipal firm. This means taking a more proactive coordinating role that looks for 
opportunities to add value to private land by the enhancement of the public realm. 
This means using the planning language of the real estate developer but thinking 
bigger. It means entrepreneurially tying in diverse interests into schemes that provide 
mutually beneficial gains. The envisioning language will be only partly visual. Plans 
and maps help interested parties - the municipal firm, venture capitalists, community 
groups such as village committees and home owner associations -  buy into a vision. 
But the language also has to be institutional - legal, organisational and financial, since 
when it comes down to it, interested parties have to know what they will get out of a 
project and what they must put into it. Planners are like contract designers therefore, 
shaping agreements that create new built environmental futures. Their plans bring 
people to the table and offer shared gain for a price. The gains and the price will be 
different for different interests and this has to be respected in the ‘contract’ - the 
allocation of reward, responsibility and liability. For the contract (plan) to have a 
chance of materialising, the relative power and relative capitalisation of the different 
parties have to be recognised.
Third, in this role, government urban planners and planner-architects working for 
private developers are less different than in democratic states. They work to some
81
extent at different spatial scales, although in China this is not necessarily the case 
since private firms plan, build and manage very large projects (see for example the 
for-profit company town of 200,000 people discussed in Webster, Wu and Zhao, 
2006). Government planners in China do not have a constitutional role to discover the 
land-used needs of the people. They are not bureaucratic agents to the elected 
representative principals. They are employed technical servants of the private ‘family’ 
owners of the municipal firm just as planners employed by private development firms 
are employed servants of the owners of those firms.
I finish the chapter with a speculative set of thoughts on the relationships between 
different types of territorial firms, their boundaries and the role of spatial planning 
within them. In doing so, I make links with ideas developed in subsequent chapters.
First, consider a neoclassical model in which all public goods are provided within 
territorial firms -  which are many, homogenous and perfectly competitive. In this 
imaginary world, scale economies would mean one big firm and so an assumption is 
made (in the neoclassical analysis) that there are no scale economies. Firm size is 
bounded only by the relative rate of increase in costs and profits as a firm grows in 
size. A neo-classical model of society governed by private territorial firms would be 
one of many competitor micro-territorial private governments delivering a uniform 
product in which local public goods are internalised and paid for either by bundling 
their cost into property price or by fee. The size of the territory and the local public 
goods supplied are arbitrary in the model since there is no mechanism for expanding 
scale within the analytical framework. There might be a model for small territorial 
firms providing only a single shared street and a model for large firms providing a full 
range of shared facilities and services. The neoclassical framework allows only for the 
entry and exit into this spatial economy, its spatial spread as new firms join and, 
following Von Thunen, its sorting into bands or rings of firms of different size or 
value if the model makes the initial assumption that there are, in fact, different types 
of territorial firm (like the different crops in Thunen’s Model). It is also similar to 
Christaller’s settlement model, where (to interpret Christaller as a public goods rather
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than the orginal private goods model), the territories are determined by distance decay 
of demand for local public goods and services. Beyond this distance, another 
entrepreneurial ‘settled bandid’ will have a chance to develop another spatial 
monopoly.
In this artificial world, the only role for the spatial planner is in helping 
entrepreneurs design the territorial units -  including differentiating them if there are 
several types. This may be a purely physical design role or it may also involve 
institutional design - making the intra-urban or city-scale ‘clubs’ work by various 
organisational, financial and legal specifications. But outside the firm, there is no 
need for spatial planning in the sense of specifying optimal land use arrangement. The 
perfectly competitive market will do the job on its own. Jostling for land, the 
territorial firms will bid away profit in bid rents and neatly arrange themselves in a 
pattern that optimises costs and benefits. The planner’s optimal city layout would be 
the same as the market outcome so his role is superfluous.
Second, consider a neoclassical model with collective action problems - such that 
public goods are not supplied or under-supplied and externalities are over supplied. 
Here, the planner has a bigger role - to shape the accessibility and value landscape of 
the city by designing infrastructure systems and imposing regulations including land 
use zones to separate non-conforming uses and reduce externalities. This supposes 
another territorial firm exists - one that makes money out of supplying strategic 
infrastructure and institutions. There are two kinds of planner therefore, those 
working for the strategic firm and those who shape the land controlled by the micro 
territorial firms. The boundary of individual firms cannot be changed by planners 
since these are fixed by assumption. But the boundary of the strategic firm can be 
controlled if it chooses to prohibit growth by regulation. The geographical shape of 
the strategic firm can also be changed by the planner through the choice of 
infrastructure and regulatory zones.
Third, imagine a city made up of Buchanan-style clubs. Here the boundaries of 
individual territorial firms can change by physical and institutional design. If the firm
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invests in more local public goods, then it can sustain more members. The tessellated 
geometry of this type of ideal city might be constantly changing as entrepreneurial 
club owners compete by investing. There are economies of scale in Buchanan clubs -  
up to the point at which net gains from cost sharing are exceeded by net losses from 
congestion. But new investment can increase capacity and in principle, allow a firm to 
expand without limit. The role of the planner at the micro-level is more crucial for the 
city’s development here than in the neo-classical model. This is a city that evolves 
more spontaneously than the second and less predictably than the first (the first model 
evolves spontaneously but in an entirely predictable way). If a planner invents a new 
way of designing and organising a territorial firm capable of growing limitlessly 
through continual investment, one firm could eventually take over the city. This is a 
bit like a spatial variant of the settled bandid-baron model. The territorial firm works 
out a winning way of making money out of territorial services rendered. If the market 
is perfectly competitive then there is no robbery going on. But the greater the size of 
the firm and territory the more its monopoly power (by virtue of both the lower 
number of competitors and the greater degree of spatial monopoly) and the more it 
can transfer consumer surplus to itself. The planner may be the agent of the robber 
baron therefore, but this is not to say that s/he works against the people. The 
monopolistic city firm, as in China, needs to keep hold of its ownership. Take too 
much consumer surplus and it risks being deposed by a potential competitor. So the 
planner working for this kind of municipal firm balances the interest of the firm with 
the interests of the people in order to find an optimal (sustainable) level of monopoly 
rent for his employer. This is the condition of the government planner in China.
However, returning to the Buchanan city model, it is unlikely that a single 
territorial firm will keep ownership of the innovation that gives it such potential 
success. Other firms are likely to copy and there will be increasing differentiation as 
competitive, or perhaps collusive sub markets emerge offering specialist territories to 
different niches.
Fourth, imagine a Tieboutian city made up of micro local governments all
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offering different bundles of local public goods for different a tax price. This is not 
very different to the Buchanan city (there is a very blurred boundary between the 
economic literatures on clubs and local public goods). If the population is 
heterogeneous then people will sort themselves into preference-homogeneous 
jurisdictions just as they will sort themselves into different clubs. The only real 
difference between the two models is that entrepreneurs organise Buchanan clubs 
while political parties (implicitly) organise Tieboutian clubs. The role of the planner 
in both is to give competitive advantage to the locality/club/territory and to share the 
gains judiciously between the principal (entrepreneur or political government) and the 
people in such as way that makes the spatial order sustainable. It matters not, really, 
whether China’s municipalities are viewed as monopolistic Tieboutian clubs or 
Buchanan clubs. Since they do not charge a tax price (at least to individuals) then they 
may perhaps be more appropriately thought of as entrepreneurial clubs. As such, they 
tell us something about how a Buchanan-style urban model might develop. Few 
municipalities in China exercise pure monopoly power. Most take part in a 
monopolistic competitive market for economic activity (as I have already noted, it has 
been mostly firms rather than residents that have voted with their feet between 
competing municipal areas). So the boundary of the monopolistically competitive 
municipal club-firm is bounded by the uniqueness of its territory and that of its 
neighbours. In this, the planner has an exceedingly important role - and this largely 
accounts for the elevated position of the urban planner in China at the moment.
Fifth, imagine a city made up of Coasian territorial firms, bounded by transaction 
cost at the margin. This has a subtly different dynamic to the other models. The 
business of the territorial firms is to make money from public goods. They are robber 
barons competing for dominance. There business is essentially to organise 
coordination between residents. To find out what shared goods and services they need 
and to organise the collection of payment and to organise supply. All these 
organisations are costly. As the size of the territory increases, so too will the 
organisational costs. At some point, these costs may exceed the savings made by
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organising public goods outside of the market. At some point, it becomes so costly to 
obtain the education and environmental services that you want via the firm (by 
lobbying, voting etc) that you go outside the firm and purchase directly from a 
specialist supplier. Perhaps you group together with others to obtain economies of 
scale in demand. Entrepreneurs arise to challenge the monopoly provision of the 
settled bandid baron firm and thus the organisational landscape of the city changes as 
a result of transaction cost. This is a good description of the rise of the private 
neighbourhood market in China’s cities. The transaction cost of organising 
well-serviced neighbourhoods of houses and shared environmental goods are too high. 
The cost of creating a property tax system capable of funding this is too high and the 
cost of lobbying the government to try and do so is too high. Altogether, the means 
are not in place to allow municipal governments to successfully deliver good quality 
neighbourhoods. And so residents buy them from private entrepreneurs. This has 
created a huge demand for the services of urban planners - to create attractive liveable 
environments that can be sold to increasingly discerning home buyers, industrial and 
commercial interests. This model highlights a role for urban planners that I have 
emphasised throughout this chapter - the design of institutions as well as physical 
space. The principal to which the planner is an agent is the entrepreneurial 
neighbourhood developer and the business of the principal, as I have said, is 
providing ready-made environments within which individuals can happily and 
relatively costlessly interact, coordinate and transact with each other. The successful 
planner will need to understand the dynamics and economics of the coordination that 
her physical plan facilitates and will therefore make sure those designs are matched 
by an organisational and institutional specification that make them work.
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CHPTER 3
A BUSINESS MODEL OF CITY GOVERNMENT
3.1 Introduction
Most economists know very well that actual entrepreneurial behavior has little to 
do with marginal theory and general equilibrium. Enterprise theory in mainstream 
economics is an economist’s enterprise theory rather than an entrepreneurs’ enterprise 
theory.
Since the publication of Coase’s pioneering paper in 1936, enterprise theory has 
gradually become the primary concern of mainstream economics. It has developed 
there via critiques of neoclassical economic’s black box approach to organizations and 
by efforts to incorporate enterprise behavior into equilibrium models. It tends to focus 
on aspects that economic tools are able to handle, such as enterprise’s nature and 
boundaries, its capital structure, separation of ownership and control rights, the 
internal configuration of its hierarchical organization and so on (Qian 1989). But from 
the viewpoint of entrepreneurs, the enterprise theories of economics have hardly 
initiated anything new and useful. What economists have been interested in is to make 
their models more realistic rather than develop new models uncomplicated by 
equilibriating systems.
In this chapter I further elaborate the arguments made in the last chapter about the 
government being an economic agent. I view government as a territorial enterprise 
and examine its business model. As a method for taking this further I will create a 
hypothetic Tiebout circumstance: 1) there are many governments competing in 
markets; 2) the mode of government competition is similar to what happens between 
common enterprises45. I propose that studies conducted from this angle may bear
45 It is more vivid to compare governments to shops that sell different services and contend with one
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some meaningful relationship to the real professional world of planning and be 
capable of providing a useful theoretical platform for the development of practical 
planning tools.
While conventional enterprise theory tends to study enterprise efficiency under a 
given institution, I suppose that institutions can be designed and attempt to observe 
how institutions influence government behaviors from a viewpoint of the entrepreneur. 
Rather than the optimal allocation of factors of production, the most important task of 
an entrepreneur (or an enterprise) is to locate (or more precisely to design) the optimal 
way to make profit, which I call a business model. The zero economic profit, identical 
marginal rate of substitution and general equilibrium presumed in perfect competition 
are perhaps one natural outcome of entrepreneurial behavior, but in reality, an 
entrepreneur will never notice these fabricated economic concepts. And in any case, 
continual discovery and pursuit of profit opportunities are likely to move an economic 
system quickly out of equilibrium if it ever got there. For the entrepreneur, the idea of 
opportunity cost has much less meaning than is presumed in much of economics. His 
knowledge, technology and equipment will only be used to manufacture a specific 
product. Neither will he waste his energy monitoring marginal rates of substitution 
while fixing a price. In all business models, profit is the main concern of 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs designs institution, fixes price, and allocates factors, all 
with the aim of maximizing total surplus. The success of an entrepreneur relies first of 
all on the success of his business model.
In the remainder of this chapter I argue that the taxation system - government's
O
input-output mode - determines government’s behaviors . Analysis of administrative 
efficiency and the effects of government should not depend on empty claims for lofty 
aims and moral ideals, but on the study of its profit-making mode as an enterprise. 
Similarly, government behavior will not be changed by attacking its motives. 
Governance reforms should be carried out via the fundamentals of taxation systems.
I analyze the changes in profit-making modes of China’s local governments and
another for customers (taxpayers-residents, developers, enterprises, etc.).
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the emergence of urban competition in the second section of the chapter. In the third 
section, I explore the fundamental problem that city governments face: contradiction 
between lump-sum investment in urban infrastructures (fixed assets of cities) and 
long-term urban services. The fourth section argues how China’s city governments 
overcome the contradiction through transforming lump-sum land leasing revenue to 
long-term regular taxes under an absence of property taxes. Finally, I develop the 
point that the business model of city governments is the driving force of China’s rapid 
urbanization beginning from the 1990s.
3.2 A business model of city government
The term business model came into existence as early as the 1950s but was not 
widely recognized until the 1990s when e-commerce began to develop. Osterwalder 
(2004: 43) advanced a widely cited reference model containing nine elements:
1. Value Proposition: Value provision o f a company via products and services. 
Value proposition asserts the utility o f  a company to consumers.
2. Target Customer Segments: the customer segments a company targets have 
common characteristics with which the company creates value (by focusing on 
those common characteristics). The process o f classifying customer segments 
is also called market segmentation.
3. Distribution Channels: the various means o f the company to contact its 
customers. This describes how a company expands its market. It involves the 
company's marketing and distribution strategies.
4. Customer Relationships: the links a company establishes between itself and 
customer segments. It is related to the task o f customer relationship 
management.
5. Value Configurations: the configuration o f activities and resources.
6. Core Capabilities: the capability and competence necessary to execute the
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company's business model.
7. Partner Network: The cooperative network with other companies to efficiently 
offer and commercialize value. This also describes the scope o f business 
alliances.
8. Cost Structure: the monetary description o f the means employed in the 
business model.
9. Revenue Model: the way a company makes wealth through a variety o f  
revenue flows.
There are many elaborations of these basic themes and elements, for example, 
Timmers (1998) and Rappa (2003). The noun ‘business model’ is now very widely 
used in a technical and more general sense, but there is still no consensus as to its 
definition (Radovilsky 2005). But these various descriptions and definitions are very 
poorly linked with relevant concepts in economics and thus it is very difficult to 
include them in the normative analysis of economics. In this chapter, I define business 
model as:
The input-outnut model designed by entrepreneurs to transform potential market 
demands into profitable methods of supply.46
In other words, the business model is an elaborated institute designed by 
entrepreneur to price his/her product or service on Mrket. There are many potential 
demands in the market and the primary task of entrepreneurs is to develop profitable 
models to satisfy these demands, or these demands will remain forever potential 
demands. This definition draws a clear boundary between entrepreneurs and inventors. 
Inventors create the latest technology while entrepreneurs integrate the technology 
with existing factors of production to create a profitable production. This is similar to 
Schumpeter’s definition of the entrepreneurial role.
Filthy communities indicate demand for cleaning services, but it will remain a
46 Maybe “invent” is a better verb than “design”. But since the idea o f a business model allows for 
imitation and learning, I will still use “design” to describe the behavior o f entrepreneurs.
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potential demand unless an entrepreneur finds a way to charge for the services. The 
delivery of letters is an underlying market demand, but it was only extensively 
available through market channels after the postage stamp system was invented. TV 
technologies and the invention of the Internet meet the demand of large-scale 
information transfer but technologies alone are far from enough. Only after the birth 
of a mechanism designed to obtain sufficient income through advertising markets, 
could the transfer of public information advance at the tremendous pace that it has 
using these technologies. The standard food of MacDonald, the direct marketing of 
Amway and the customized service of Dell are all distinct business models that 
distinguish these companies from other producers of similar products.
Business models designed by entrepreneurs consist of input and output parts 
since they need to generate positive business profit through minimum input and 
maximum output. I deal with each in turn in the following.
Input (minimum cost). Factors of production of entrepreneurs are composed of 
fixed costs and variable costs. An important way to reduce costs and obtain increase 
returns is continuous production. Entrepreneurs put lump-sum capital input into 
reusable tools like machines, institution and knowledge and carry out mass production 
and thereby lower the average cost of products through reuse (of equipment, 
technology and institution). Since the input of fixed cost may only be recovered over 
time, operation risk becomes an indispensable part of the business model of 
entrepreneurs, whose success lies largely in whether they can lower that risk, reduce 
the demand for credit and acquire enough lump-sum capital. It is very clear that 
financial capital plays a key role in the continuous production of entrepreneurs.
Output (maximum income). Entrepreneurs have to pay for returns from their 
services or products. Every entrepreneur faces a crucial question of pricing her 
products. In reality, no entrepreneur will price her products according to their 
marginal productivity or marginal cost - what she is more concerned with is how to 
maximize net surplus. Take roads and bridges for example. As they are provided 
through charging toll fees, a high price will lead to a decrease in scale of operation
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and result in a decline in total surplus, but a low price will generate less return and 
result in decrease in total surplus too. If the total surplus can be maximized, there may 
be room for a second construction projects based on market segmentation. After 
weighing these factors, entrepreneurs will price their products to seek the 
maximization of aggregate surplus47.
With regard to the input part of a business model, it is essential to handle the risk 
and financing problems caused by lump-sum input and long-term production. As for 
output, it is important to prevent income leakage caused by the opportunistic behavior 
(free riding) of consumers. Most of the goods and services provided by urban 
governments are so called public goods - products and services for which it is 
extremely difficult to eliminate free riders by normal means of exclusion, or products 
and services which may only be effectively priced and kept from income leakage 
through territorial supply mechanisms. Since government is regarded as an enterprise 
that possesses territorial property rights and profits by managing its territory, all 
government policies should center on how to design business models for public goods. 
And at the heart if the institutional design problem is the prevention of income 
leakage. Reliable returns will greatly reduce the risk of long-term investment and 
financing difficulties and help ensure sustainable supply of public facilities.
National defense, judicial protection and fire control are typical examples of 
public goods. Since it is extremely hard to display the real preference of consumers, a 
taxation system helps to establish supply-demand relations between-govemments 
(producers) and residents (consumers) and effective returns. Urban infrastructure is 
another type of product the government may provide at higher efficiency than private 
corporations. Although toll systems makes the private sector a possible supplier of 
urban infrastructure, difficult to charge for infrastructure selective free of charge 
services can enhance the profitability of a territory. There is therefore a business case 
for the indirect recovery of costs by taxation on real estate. Providing selected public 
goods and services for free will engender benefit spillover, which raises the value of
47 I will discuss optimal pricing in a more general sense in Chapter 5.
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real estate generally in a city. Therefore, public goods and services may be priced on 
the basis of taxes imposed according to the market value of real estate.
Efficiency is the key factor in deciding whether a product or service should be 
provided by a territorial enterprise (government) or a non-territorial enterprise. If 
government taxation is more efficient at recovering the investment and produces less 
leakage, territorial enterprise (government) will become the main agent providing 
such infrastructures. On the other hand, non-territorial enterprise will be the dominant 
supplier of infrastructure and services where benefits are less leaky within the 
territory and an individual cost-recovering price can therefore be efficiently charged . 
The boundary between public goods and non-public goods is not static. When 
technological progress makes exclusive consumption possible (such as charged CATV) 
or institutional design makes indirect pricing possible (such as TV or network media 
supported by advertising), non-territorial enterprises will accordingly become more 
efficient at recovering their investment. They will tend to replace territorial 
enterprises (government) by competition for the services once provided by the latter. 
In this sense, public service is just a special business model, not fundamental market 
failure49. In the context of perfect competition,50 the wax and wane of the proportion 
of territorial and non-territorial enterprises in the field of public services is an 
outcome of market competition rather than an indicator of the level of marketization.
China’s rapid economic growth, especially its fast urban expansion, resulted from 
fundamental institutional evolution over the last thirty years. Especially important 
have been institutional changes that allowed China’s city governments to gradually 
develop a highly efficient input-output business model. China’s fiscal revenue totaled 
350 billion yuan in 1992, to which the central government contributed 100 billion
48 Strictly speaking, it is not accurate to divide market subjects into government and private enterprise. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, organizations managing territory may also be privately-owned (many 
urban governments in history were effectively private-owned).
49 According to this argument, we may elucidate various urban phenomena including walled or gated 
communities - the essence o f all exclusive communities is a business model aimed at preventing 
income leakage and providing a public service to satisfy special demand.
50 Full competition is not the perfect competition o f neo-classical economics. There are alternative 
choices in full competition and the transaction parties may withdraw freely.
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yuan and local governments, 250 billion yuan. The fiscal expenditure of the central 
government reached over 200 billion yuan, resulting in a deficit as high as 100 billion 
yuan, most of which was borrowed from banks51. In 2006, the fiscal revenue of the 
central government amounted to over 2 trillion yuan and the total taxes at national 
level reached 3.76 trillion Yuan. These figures only include so called budget revenue, 
and do not include other revenues such as land leasing income. The fiscal revenue 
increased 16.5% annually on average from 1990 to 2004 and 19.9% in 2005. If we 
consider fiscal revenue as a source of profit for the government, we can see how 
successfully China’s enterprise governments have managed their businesses.
3.3 Changing government roles
If we compare enterprises to vegetation, institutions will be their habitats. 
However, a difference between the environments of enterprises and natural habitats is 
that the environment of enterprises can be designed and chosen purposefully. In a 
broader sense, the selection of institutions determines the emergence, growth and 
decline of enterprises in different ways. Taxation systems are the core of all 
governmental systems. In The Fiscal Crisis o f the State (1918), Schumpeter pointed 
out that taxation is so closely related to the idea of the modem state that the modem 
state should be called the fiscal state. The revenue mode of government determines 
governmental behavior to a large extent. In the following, I review the evolution of 
the financial system in China’s local governments - the key to explaining the rapid 
urban-based economic growth since China’s reform and opening up.
Before reform, China’s local governments did not have genuinely independent 
finance. Their performance almost totally depended on support from the central 
government in allocating funds derived from state-owned industrial enterprises, which
51 Finance had to borrow money from vice premier Zhu Rongji who was also in charge o f banks. 
Rather than agree to the request, Zhu initiated tax distribution reform which proved to have played a 
significant role in China’s economic development. (Zhao Yining, 2003)
52 In 2007, the number o f people registered for civil servant recruitment examination soared as high as 
640 thousand, an increase o f 21% over the previous year and the enrollment rate reached 1:60 while 
just ten years ago, foreign enterprises were the most favored choice o f career.
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were the main source of the central finance. The performance of a local government in 
public services lay almost solely on its ability to secure projects from its superior level 
of government.
After reform, the central government began to split profits with local 
governments through a so called contract system. A taxation system reform in 1994 in 
particular symbolized the beginning of a period of ‘dining in respective pots’ -  a more 
independent financial arrangement for local governments. Local governments became 
a genuine economic entity that bore its own profits and losses. The wealth and 
administrative efficiency of local governments increased significantly accordingly and 
fierce competition commenced. In the taxation system reform, there were three chief 
reforms.
The first was the reform of the urban real estate system. Before 1990, property 
rights of urban land and houses were not assigned to private owners (in other words, 
they were all state-owned). The real estate market reforms carried out successively in 
the 1990s turned urban immovable estates into products that could be priced and 
traded in the market. Through the Land Act and the Urban-Country Planning Act, 
local governments, especially city governments, were authorized to allocate and 
charge for land use. Thus, city governments were allowed to possess their own goods 
to operate for the first time. If we regarded tax revenue as a sort of land rent in a broad 
sense, the primary aim of the operation of city government became to obtain 
maximum income from the land it owned.
The second reform would be the tax-sharing system in 1994 that made local 
government gain residual right for the first time. Through this institutional 
arrangement, distinctive boundaries of financial rights were erected between the 
central and local as well as inter-local governments. Local governments could operate 
freely within their boundaries and were made responsible for their financial 
operations. Local governments no longer had to worry if the central or other local 
governments would take their land resources away through administrative power; 
neither could they shirk the responsibility of their land, infrastructure and other
' - - v -
financial investments and operations.
The third crucial reform caused by globalization starting from the 1980s and 
reached its peak in the 1990s. Due to the so called ‘opening up’, city governments 
acquired their first group of customers - foreign direct investment. These customers 
bargained land price down and led to a competitive land market. They were footloose. 
They would vote by foot between competing city governments. City governments had 
to promote their cities to the customers through competition. This was totally different 
to the traditional way of distributing resources by political power and relationship in 
the command economy. Local governments could no longer reap profits through 
exploitation of enterprises. On the contrary, to contend with other cities, they had to 
contrive various favors for these enterprises. Once this business model was 
established with FDI, the target of urban competition expanded further to include 
domestic enterprises and footloose population (after the liberalization of property 
rights over homes). Cities in the area of Pearl River Delta proposed to ‘retain the rich’, 
and conducted intense competition to attract residents from Hong Kong. Recently in 
Shanghai, up to one fourth of the demands for real estate came from non-residents. 
With the increase of the mobility of economic factors, more and more resources were 
bound to be involved in the competition among cities.
Among the fiscal reforms, the tax-sharing system was the most important 
institutional innovation14. The financial decentralization between the central and local 
governments in 1994 was a huge milestone. This decentralization had three features. 
First of all, most public services (general education, medical treatment, transportation, 
etc.) were transferred to local governments. Second, taxation emphasized the
14 In the 80s and 90s o f the twentieth century, the proportion o f central finance to total finance was so 
low that the central government had to borrow money from local governments and the authority of the 
central government was affected. Therefore, in 1994, tax distribution reform was carried out and 
value-added tax, the biggest tax source, was divided between central and local governments at a ratio 
of 75:25. What’s more, its accumulative and sequential mechanism drove more financial power 
towards the central government; some local taxes such as enterprise income tax, personal income tax 
and so on were first collected by local government, later shared by central and local governments and 
later on central government’s proportion in shared taxes increased again. With regard only to the 
mechanisms o f central and local taxation structure design, central financial concentration tended to get 
stronger and stronger. At present, local financial revenue takes up about 45%, decreasing from the 
highest o f 85%, while the affairs local governments shoulder increased from 40% to about 75%.
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industrial sector as the principal tax base, in which the central government shared a 
major part (75%) of added value tax. Finally, land revenue was informally assigned to 
local government53. Together these changes meant that land revenue became the main 
financial source for local government54.
It was this great set of reforms that transformed local government to a genuinely 
independent financial entity so that initiatives of local governments were brought into 
full play. China’s economy now is driven by both central and local governments. 
There is no longer only one engine - central government -  but many. As a result 
regional economic differences became one of the most noticeable economic 
phenomena in China in the past decade.
Due to the principle of dining in respective pots, local governments are now in 
possession of more and more financial interests. The policy game between central and 
local governments has become an intrinsic part of the national economy. Blame on 
Local governments for their ‘unwillingness to be summoned’; for ‘being anxious 
about political achievement of projects’; for ‘excessive investor attraction’; and for 
Tack of rational attitude to development’ has become all too common. These are 
explanations of their disobedience to the central government’s orders and fronts on 
which central and local governments fight.55 In this context -  with multiple 
semi-independent urban-based motors of growth -  it is easy and natural to blame local 
governments for fluctuation in the macro economy.
The new conflicts between central and local governments are not so much about 
the monopolistic practices of the latter, as about their entrepreneurial behaviour. This 
is an interesting state of affairs. From the viewpoint of mainstream economics, when
53 Increase in tax income from real estate related developments.
54 Scholars (eg. Zhou Tianyong 2007) have noticed that since the local government has to shoulder 
75% of the affairs with 45% of budgeted finance, it has to obtain financial income through selling land 
and thus to balance the financial gap. Generally speaking, in areas in the east o f China, profit from 
selling land takes up a higher proportion o f local finance, about 1/3 estimated by Zhou Tianyong. The 
total income from selling land in 2006 in China was estimated to be RMB 700 billion, a large part of 
which was not accounted for in the budget.
55 There are so many similar views that it is unnecessary to quote more. In 2006, the cover article of 
one issue o f ‘Outlook Weekly’, the most celebrated political periodical in China, was “Central-Local 
Game”.
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governments behave as profit-making entities, they will exclude potential competitors 
by their monopolistic power. Social surplus will be reduced since government lacks 
the motive to improve its products and services. However, the practice of China’s 
reform and opening challenge this orthodoxy. The large-scale intervention of 
government brought about large numbers of competitive cities rather than degrading 
the quality of urban performance. With breathtaking levels of infrastructure 
investment and low levels of taxation, China attracted direct foreign investors from 
across the world and cheap and fine products made in China have swept over the 
worldwide markets. A crucial element of this story is the unusual and fierce 
competition between local governments at all scales.
China’s reform and opening did not start by weakening governmental power and 
large-scale privatization. One of the impetuses of China’s economic growth stems 
from the transformation of local governments after decentralization into 
profit-maximising organisations56 (Yang 1994). Competition among governments 
conveyed a message from the market to government and compelled local 
governments to open the market, lower costs, improve facilities and enhance 
efficiency. As a result, within a short period of twenty years, China’s local 
governments have erected vast quantities of urban infrastructure comparable to that of 
developed countries.
Looking at countries like India and Latin American, countries where local 
governments compete for votes rather than investors, it is obvious that profit-making 
governments like China’s are more capable of promoting economic growth and
56 In his article “Recent Study o f China’s Economy by Western Economic Circles”, Yang Xiaokai 
(1994) gave a vivid descriptions o f American federalism: The Constitution gives the states legislative 
and taxation powers and forbids the states from levying taxes on inter-state trade, which makes the 50 
states 50 economically warring nations, but without fighting with or imposing taxes on one another. 
The people vote by foot and will “immigrate” to whichever state that can provide the best taxation 
system and infrastructures. This forces the states to try hard to develop high-class public facilities while 
daring not to impose high taxes. This government-serviced market, the name given by American 
economist Tiebout, has enabled America to establish the most developed systems and public 
infrastructure at lowest cost.
Yang Xiaokai conferred through this that, “financial federalism” formed by China’s tax 
distribution system was the real motive for reform at a time when China had not yet realized 
privatization. (See Yang Xiaokai, Modern Economics and Economy o f China, China Social Sciences 
Press 1997.)
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eventually provide better investing environment and welfare both for enterprises and 
local residents. In other words, this violent competition forced Chinese local 
governments to rapidly raise their administrative efficiency and infrastructure quality 
to a level at which they now have the advantage in competing with other economies. 
(Zhao 2002)
The practices of a market-oriented economy mean that nonprofit organizations do 
not necessarily serve public interests better than profit-seeking enterprises. Enterprises 
that encounter fierce competition have stronger motives to improve their services than 
organizations grounding on moral willingness. Likewise, a so-called people-elected 
government is not likely to offer better public services than profit-chasing 
non-people-elected government. So long as market competition exists, government 
will invest its profit in pursuit of the interests of its customers (tax payers - enterprises 
or residents), with the single-mindedness and efficiency of a common enterprise.
Many examples may be used to illustrate the fact that democratic governments 
focused on pleasing electors cannot possibly participate in international competition 
for capital and technology as efficiently as the Chinese government. By the same 
token, highly competitive local governments are not a drain on the national interest; 
rather, they are the real fundamental driving forces behind China’s international 
competitiveness in a condition of extreme shortage of technology and capital.
From a perspective of globalization, the central government is itself like a 
competitive local government in the world, confronting competition from other 
countries all the time.19 So far, most of the explanations of China’s economic growth 
have centered on reform without much concern about the influences of opening. 
Actually, ‘opening’ has been as important as internal reform. Thanks to opening up, 
China’s central government has to face competitions from other countries so that the 
central command economy, which had once run the whole show, has effectively been 
overthrown. I one sense, this result was due to the competitive pressures of foreign
19 Only for the local government, consumers do not move so much. But the flow o f capital and goods 
can as well cause competitions among central governments, although not as fierce as that among local 
governments, where there is much less hindrance to the flow of economic factors.
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governments.
In today’s globalized economy, government is not so much the monopolistic 
organization as depicted by modem economics. As an economic entity, to compete, it 
must improve its services and boost its efficiency like other common enterprises. If it 
does not, factors of production (labor, capital) will drift away to better areas through 
voting by foot.
3.4 Business model of Chinese city government
In ‘operating’ its territory, Chinese local government obtains profits in two main 
ways: one is to impose taxes on economic activities; the other is to lease land that is 
equipped with infrastructure.
In general, tax revenue is mainly spent on regular payments for public services 
like the judicial system, public security, education, fire control, maintenance of 
infrastructures and so on. Lump-sum land revenue, on the other hand, is largely spent 
on the construction cost of infrastructure. Both are integral parts of the governmental 
financial model. When one source of the revenue is in shortage, the other will be 
provided as a supplement. Whether coming from regular taxation or lump-sum land 
ieasing, the government’s revenue is basically a pricing mechanism for their services.
In China, the urban economy works generally like this. First of all, government 
obtains rural land at a comparatively low price (at the opportunity cost of the original 
use) through land expropriation. Second, government constructs urban infrastructures 
(such as urban roads, municipal pipelines and ground leveling) according to the 
requirements of enterprises - manufacturers at the beginning of the modem growth 
period, service providers later on. The third step is to attract investors, overseas 
enterprises at first, local enterprises later on. Before this step, what local government 
has done is to invest heavily. Enterprises get land or standard factories at a very low 
price due to government subsidies. Once the enterprises start producing, they will pay
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taxes and provide employment.
A problem -  or management challenge - with this economic chain lies in the 
contradiction between lump-sum investment in infrastructure and long-term returns. 
By law, China’s local governments are prohibited from carrying debts, so the start-up 
phase will always experience a capital bottleneck. At an early stage of the reform, 
construction contractors were sometimes asked to pay money in advance to cover 
infrastructure costs and reimbursed with urbanized land. However, this did not work 
well and led to numerous triangular debts due to difficulties in land liquidation.
The land market was initiated starting from a basic land reform in 1990 and 
housing reform in 1998. This has offered a new source of finance for local 
governments. Industrialization led to derived land demand from commercial and 
service industries and to employment, which led to a buoyant commercial real estate 
market. This drew local governments into active market participation, using their 
primary land monopoly to get lump-sum land leasing revenue. This is the fourth step 
in the urban economic chain. Yet, a new problem arose, which was the opposite one to 
the previous phase. Due to lack of property tax, government was in possession of 
large amounts of cash but was short of a sustainable cash flow. Therefore, government 
had to throw more and more cash into infrastructure and draw more enterprises in to 
gain sustainable tax revenues for new public services (middle and elementary schools, 
hospitals, public security, urban landscape and sanitation, transportation and so on). 
The circulation of this economic chain has accelerated China’s urbanization in recent 
years.58
Any step in the chain is indispensable. It is vital to resolve the contradictions 
between lump-sum input and long-term output at the industrialization stage, and 
lump-sum revenue and long-term service expenditure at the urbanization stage. By
57 Foreign enterprises enjoyed tax favors for a period of time.
58 This analysis also reveals the reason why housing system reform, started in 1998, has become the 
engine o f recent economic growth. With regard to the urban economy, the formation o f a real estate 
market makes it possible for the government to obtain capital in large amounts through land. Thus local 
government can avoid inefficient and nonstandard actions like uncultivated land mortgage and so on, 
overcome the restriction that local government can’t run up debts, and solve the contradiction between 
lump-sum infrastructures investment and long-term regular income.
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integrating these two phases, China’s city government has built up a capital 
circulation and overcome financial problems caused by financing difficulties and 
property tax shortage.
Two competitions exist in this economic circulation. One is competition among 
local governments for investors; the other is land competition among developers. If 
we consider a city as a market of location and a local government an enterprise that 
produces location, according to my analytical framework in Chapter 1, the first 
competition can be classified as producer competition where few investors face many 
urban governments. The second is like consumer competition where many developers 
contend for limited land.
In the first type of competition, investors are consumers and they can vote with 
their feet among different city governments. This tended to result in over-supply of 
urban infrastructure. The investors were thus in a position to accrue consumer surplus. 
Investors would tend to get the location at the price at which the most competitive 
local government succeeded in outbidding the second most competitive. Here the 
efficiency of producer (government) is a key factor in determining land price.
The production function of entrepreneurs is not composed of factors of 
production as described by a conventional Cobb-Douglas function. In reality, the costs 
incurred by producers (city governments) are made up of fixed cost and variable cost. 
Fixed cost refers to urban infrastructures involving lump-sum investment. Variable 
cost means regular expenditures spent by stages.
In the first competition of urban economic circulation, investor attraction, 
government must above all, provide a high-specification of infrastructures. Then local 
governments compete by fixing the initial land price extremely low, sometimes even 
zero, to reduce the risk of the investors. If the initial land price is not competitive, 
enterprises will move to other cities that offer preferential land prices. Under this 
condition, the city can only recoup its investment in the future through taxation and 
local consumption both from enterprises and their employees. Tax exemption may
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accompany artificially low land price as an inducement to enterprises. This makes the 
financial link between lump-sum investment and long-term return even harder to 
resolve.
To prevent opportunism in local government in the form of overdrawing its credit 
at the expense of the central government, China’s law forbade local governments from 
issuing bonds. This greatly restricted the investment of local government in 
infrastructures. Before the 1990s, infrastructure in Chinese cities ran up huge amounts 
of debt and certain measures, such as urban population limits, had to be taken to 
lighten the pressure on infrastructure budgets.
The so called ‘user-pay policy’ of land development provided a new financing 
channel for urban government. An amendment to the Constitution (1988) ratified a 
bundle of land property rights, in which use right was separated from ownership and 
could be legally leased. In May 1990, the State Council Promulgated the Interim 
Regulations o f the People's Republic o f China Concerning the Assignment and 
Transfer o f the Right to the Use o f the State-Owned Land in the Urban Areas (the 
famous Decree No. 55) and the Interim Measures for the Administration o f the 
Foreign-invested Development and Management o f Tracts o f Land. With these tools, a 
user-pays policy of land development turned local government into millionaires in 
one swift institutional move.
By 1995 they had collected 245 billion Yuan of land leasing revenue. In order to 
lease land, the governments had to firstly invest large sum of money to transform 
rural land with little facilities to urbanized land equipped with various supporting 
facilities. However, at that time city governments didn’t have the substantive capital 
needed for infrastructure construction and were forbidden by the original financial 
regulations to raise loans. Faced with that conundrum, the local governments 
monopolized the primary land market and, through what was effectively a disguised 
land mortgage, acquired the capital needed for lump-sum infrastructure investment.
Usually, the local governments would assign part of the rural land to construction
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companies, who paid in advance for the construction of infrastructure. Afterwards, 
land equipped with infrastructure would be leased to foreign investors. If 
governmental revenue was not sufficient to pay back the expenses of infrastructure, 
construction companies could take this appreciated land to the market for cash. The 
Lending General Provisions law, implemented in 1996 further loosened the 
restrictions on indirect loan raising activities such as land mortgage of the local 
governments. According to Lending General Provisions, borrowers must be legal 
persons, economic organizations, individual industrialists or merchants or natural 
persons. It did not include local government, but local governments could easily 
bypass this restriction. First of all, local governments set up land reserve institutes as 
a legal corporation that could raise loans through mortgaging or pawning the use right 
of state-owned land. Second, the local governments provided financial guarantee. 
This made it possible for the local governments to raise loans indirectly through the 
land reserve system.
Through these methods, China commenced its first large-scale constructions of 
urban infrastructures in the early 1990s and consequently drove China’s economic 
growth at a two-digit rate for several years. Starting from specially designated 
developmental zones, new towns expanded at an amazing speed, gradually spreading 
throughout the old cities. This was the first peak of urbanization since China’s reform 
and opening. During this period, land functioned like money and local governments 
released land on a large scale and continuously, at the same time as the banks kept 
easing money. As a result, the scale of credit throughout Chinese society swelled 
rapidly. From the end of 1991 to 1992, the number of real estate development 
companies rose radically to more than 12,400 from 3,700 and real estate turnover 
reached 52.9 billion Yuan, with 700 million Yuan of foreign capital. This trend gained 
a sharp increase in momentum in 1993. In the first half year, investment in 
development actually increased 143.5% over the same period of 1992. Although the 
central government carried out macro regulation policies, the annual increase in 1993 
was still as high as 124.9%. The formation of a land market had released a huge
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amount of stock wealth and stimulated independent economic growth, which to a 
large extent counteracted the impact of western countries’ economic blockade 
following the Tian’anmen Square Protest in 1989. International pressure failed to 
produce any real influence on China’s economy. In this way, China established a solid 
basis for its move to the center of the world economy later in the 2000s.59
However, this land-based business model also brought a series of problems. Quite 
a number of companies and individuals who had acquired land were speculators 
without access to buyers. They held land but could not find enough demand because 
real estate demand was not released at sufficient scale until housing reforms in the late 
1990s. Sufficient currency supply caused a large quantity of capital to flow into the 
land market and boosted land prices. Lots of people became rich overnight by 
speculating on land. After 1994, the central government began macro economic 
regulation designed to tighten money markets and currency devaluation. This broke 
the capital chain of land speculation. A lot of projects without actual demand were 
abandoned. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis broke out but China was spared the 
crisis because of the internal problem just described. Nevertheless, the construction of 
infrastructure in Chinese cities slowed down for a while.
After the 1997 financial crisis, the central government implemented expansionary 
financial policies. The central government raised loans for its public works such as 
freeways, and for lending to local governments for urban infrastructure projects. But 
the loans or money lent were far from enough to balance the decrease in local 
governmental investments. The second high tide of China’s urban infrastructure 
construction was switched on by competition among developers, the second 
competition in urban economic circulation.
The so-called developer competition refers to the competitions among real estate
developers for the possession of urbanized land. Although commercial real estate
59 See Zhao Yanjing (2000) “China’s Urbanization under the International Strategic Situation”, Urban 
Planning Forum, 2000, (1), p6-12, Zhao Yanjing (2001) “The Institutional Change, Small Town 
Development and Urbanization in China.”, City Planning Review, 2001, (8), p47-57; Zhao Yanjing 
(2002) “The Judgment on the Situation o f Current Urban Development in China”, City Planning 
Review, 2002 (3), p8-17
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supply emerged almost at the same time as the user-pays policy of land was launched, 
there was no extensive demand because the traditional welfare-oriented public 
housing system was still in operation. In 1998, the central government decided to 
suspend the welfare-oriented public housing system and initiated a market-oriented 
housing supply, which spurred the birth of an unprecedented real estate market almost 
overnight. It was this huge demand that aided China through the enduring Asian 
financial crisis and promoted a new round of high-speed economic growth from 2000 
onwards.60
The government’s monopoly in the primary land market has played a key role in 
this business model. The land system has prevented free-riding by developers during 
the process of urbanization, ensuring the rapid increase public services. The cost of 
public service consists of two parts—fixed cost and variable cost. The fixed cost is the 
direct investment on infrastructure, such as roads, pipelines, bridges, etc. The 
variable cost includes long term maintenance and services, such as security, gardening, 
and education. Generally speaking, the price of land covers the direct cost of 
infrastructure and property tax covers the over-head cost of public services. The main 
problem for public service delivery is free-riding - neighboring property owners enjoy 
the benefit of public service freely. ‘Positive-extemality’ is another term referring to 
the leakage of public service suppliers’ profits. Obviously, the more externalities, the 
more leakage and the harder to recover the investment. Therefore, the most important 
task of local government is to invent a business model to reduce the leakage of the 
interest created by public investment.
The monopoly in the primary land market, designed to reduce positive externality 
loss, has proved to be a highly successful institutional design. By law, Chinese local 
government is the exclusive agent that can expropriate rural land, turn it into 
urbanized land and lease it to developers. No farmer is allowed to convert her or his 
land into non-agriculture use. All developers, at least theoretically, have to buy
60 See Zhao Yanjing (2004) “Real estate: an explanation to the key thread of the current economic 
phenomena”, Urban Development Study, 2004,(4), p i4-19
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primary development land from the government. Since there is no property tax in 
China, the price of first-hand land consists of direct costs (of land conversion) and the 
costs of urban services (estimated for the next 70 years61). This monopoly position 
provides local governments with a legal financing channel that replaced the disguised 
land mortgage. It resolved the problem of finding massive amounts of capital for 
lump-sum investment in infrastructure construction. In this new market, local 
government is the supplier of urbanized land while developers are the consumers. 
However, in contrast to the competition among producers (governments) for investors, 
the competition in the real estate market takes place among consumer-developers.
The fixed cost here refers to the costs of land expropriation (compensation) and 
of rural land conversion. Government obtains rural land by means of land 
expropriation. Compensation for land expropriation is based on the expected income 
of future from the original land use and is determined according to the bargaining 
power of land owners. Having expropriated land, through the planning system, the 
government alters land use and intensity with its legal power and invests to equip the 
land with infrastructure appropriate to its planned new use.
Variable cost refers to the continuous public services after this land is leased. The 
public services can be supplied by different agents, such as government, private or 
company, at different levels. Since spatial territory is the most efficient way to supply 
public services and get the investment return, public services are generally supplied 
by different levels of government. In my study, the term ‘government’ is generally 
used to refer to those agents who supply public services based on income collected 
within a legally defined spatial territory. At the state level, it is central government, 
while at the neighborhood level it could be a condominium organization of property 
owners. Like the supplier of any product, government may be privately owned as well 
as public owned. It could be based on either a dictatorship or democracy.
The different types of government have different business models — the 
mechanism of converting inputs to outputs. In a planned economy, government owns
61 This helps to explain why land prices in some Chinese cities are even higher than developed cities.
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all factors - land, labor and capital - and takes the profit from enterprises directly. In a 
market economy, governments supply public goods to and levy tax on people in its 
territory. The tax system is the core of the business model. Different models have 
different transaction costs. The main difference between China and other market 
economies is the lack of the property tax. Copying the system from Hong Kong, the 
main way for government to get an investment return on infrastructure is to sell its 
land on the primary land market. Note that the lack of property tax implies that the 
residents could get free public services for subsequent years . After the expropriated 
rural land has been converted to urbanized commercial or residential land, the 
government auctions the highly appreciated use-rights for 70 years to the developer 
that offers the highest bid. During the subsequent seventy years of lease duration, the 
government is responsible for public service like public security, fire control, 
education, medical treatment and so on.
This is typical consumer competition: large numbers of demanders compete for 
small numbers of supplies. The market price relies on consumers (developers) 
bidding. According to the Coase-Vickrey pricing rule, supplier auctions limit the 
amount of land in the market, and the demander offering the highest bid gets the land 
at a price that happens to be low enough to exclude the second competitor. The base 
price should be higher than the cost to the producer, including lump-sum expenditure 
of land compensation and infrastructure construction. In the absence of property tax, 
the land price in a 70 year lease, should also include the cost of public service for the 
next 70 years. The next question is how to transfer the lump-sum land income into 
sustainable long-term income. If a local government fails to do this it would be hard 
to supply long-term public services.
62 This explains why colonial government did not adopt the same system as Britain. It is because that colonial 
government will not stay forever. Leaving public services to future governments could maximise the income of the 
colonial government. This can also explain the high price of land. It is simply because the price of land consists of 
the income of future government.
63 In Chapter 7 I give a more general theoretical analysis o f the production function o f entrepreneurs 
and competition between consumers and producers.
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In a common developed country, fixed cost and variable cost are respectively 
practiced by two different subjects. The lump-sum development can be carried out by 
non-governmental corporations and then projects that are developed are sold to 
residents on a freehold basis. Government charges property tax and provides public 
services for the residents. But in China, due to the lack of property tax, government 
has to charge for both fixed and variable cost once and for all. This induces an 
opposite problem to the previous form of competition: government acquires large 
amounts of lump-sum income while the services it provides are long-term and durable. 
City government has to transform part of the income from land lease into sustainable 
cash flow - tax revenue.
The basic function of urban government lies with combining two independent 
sectors into one comprehensive process to satisfy respectively lump-sum input of 
fixed cost and long-term output of variable cost. In China this means acquiring 
lump-sum capital for infrastructure by leasing at an above-cost price, primary land 
market and transferring it to enterprises capable of yielding tax revenues. Industrial 
prosperity creates a demand for commercial real estate. In this input-output chain, two 
different markets interact with each other to meet different needs. This financing 
model provides a reasonable explanation for why China’s local governments 
emphasize both development and services rather than being a solely service-oriented 
government. Chinese local government combines the two independent financial flows 
into an integrated circulation in order to afford lump-sum fixed investment and 
long-term variable expenditure. Via commercial and residential land auction, the 
government gains lump-sum capital for lump-sum investment in infrastructure. Via 
industrial land leasing at very low price to attract manufacturing enterprises, the 
government gains long-term taxes.
To clarify the above discussion, imagine a presumed city with size of one square 
kilometer. The cost of buying land from farmers is 1,000 Yuan. The land occupied by 
public goods, such as school, road, garden etc. is 20 hectare (ha.). The direct cost of 
that infrastructure is 1,000 Yuan. Presuming the overhead cost to maintain those
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public services is 100 Yuan per year. The total cost of 70 years is 700 Yuan. The 
government/developer could charge more than 2,000 Yuan for the land and 100 Yuan 
property tax per year. If there is no property tax, theoretically, the government must 
charge more than 9,000 Yuan and transfer 7000 Yuan of it to the next 70 years.
The way to transfer the 7000 Yuan to the next 70 years is to attract industry and 
commerce and collect tax from them every year. To do this, the government should 
give part of the land to industry. Presume the industry tax is 20 Yuan every year per 
hectare and the industries do not have to pay for their land. To cover the cost of public 
services, at least 50 hectares have to give to industries. Therefore the rest of the 30 
hectares must charge at least 2,000 Yuan. That means the total income of government 
must be higher than 9,000 Yuan. In China, industry land is not totally free. The price 
of industry land depends on the price of residential land. The higher the residential 
land price, the more government can subsidise industry, and so the lower the price of 
industry land. This model suggests that the rational behavior of local governments in 
China is to attract industries rather than satisfy the demands of property owners.
In addition, industrialization brings demand of commercial and residential real 
estate. Therefore, the municipal government has built up an integrated input-output 
circulation consisting of industrial and commercial land markets. This explains why 
the feature of Chinese municipal governments has to be development-oriented and 
public service-oriented at the same time. It is not reasonable for them to simply turn to 
the latter under the present institutional constraints.
The difference between lump-sum investment costs and lump-sum land income is 
the capital available to pay for the cost of future services. Since the service level in 
the future will not remain the same as at the time of sale but will increase, future 
services would be in the red if this capital could not yield profit. After investment 
capital is deducted from lump-sum land income, the remainder has therefore to be 
reinvested. The income that a government acquires from land cannot satisfy the 
requirements of future services. Otherwise it would be adequate to just evenly 
distribute this land income over time to future governments without investing it.
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In China, governmental deposits do not earn interest. To sit on its capital reserves 
therefore means disinvesting in future services. Non-interest bearing reserves do not 
even keep base with average social capital gains and inflation. Governments therefore 
have no choice but to reinvest in land in order to create more and more tax sources. 
This has meant investing in land generally for industry at first, and then for tertiary 
uses that stem from industrial activity. The investment in tax-yielding land is typically 
achieved by attracting manufacturing enterprises with subsidies. Tax income from 
manufacturing industries, together with tax income from the tertiary sector, sustains 
the increasing demand for public services. Profits from the local government business 
are whatever is left after the payments of fixed cost and variable cost.
3.5 The land system and leakage of revenue
Economic studies show that the biggest problem with the provision of public 
goods is their non-excludability, which makes it difficult to avoid opportunism. Free 
riding consumers will lead to considerable income leakage and the government will 
obtain less share of net surplus and consequently reduce the scale and quantity of the 
provision of public goods. Once the share of surplus acquired is less than the cost, the 
provision of public goods will be impossible (without relying on transfers from higher 
levels of government). Therefore, reducing income leakage becomes the primary 
concern of all business models of organizations seeking to supply jointly consumed 
goods.
The success of Chinese city governments lies basically in their business models, 
which as I have shown, is based on a strong monopoly of the primary land market. 
This system distinguishes the city governments of China from those of most other 
developing countries. In particular, governments face less revenue leakage and 
spillover of public goods and greater guaranteed recovery of investment costs.
This is much like a patent system for inventions or a trademark system for brand 
management. Technology invention and the establishment of commodity credit are 
achieved at a cost but may be easily imitated or copied. A technology invention is
i l l
unlikely to become a product if there is no business model to recover the cost of the 
invention. The formation of a patent system prevents income leakage from the 
technology inventor caused by imitation. The effect of a patent system is to secure the 
incentives necessary for continued research, invention and commercialisation.
In advanced capitalist countries, the public services provided by the government 
may be recouped through various taxes including property tax. For instance, the 
investments of a government to reduce fire and security risks in its administrative 
jurisdiction will enhance the value of individual property (especially real estate). This 
in turn increases property tax revenue of the government. Broadly speaking, local 
governments balance infrastructure and service costs with tax revenues, a significant 
part of which is raised from real property in their jurisdiction. A government’s 
investment in education, open spaces, landscape and infrastructures will tend to add to 
the total tax revenue of the city. Other soft investments like planning regulations, 
nuisance laws and environmental health regulations may also contribute to property 
value and raise the aggregate tax return. With a property tax, most of the services 
invested in by the governments will not suffer from revenue leakage from free riders. 
By and large, resident house-holders and businesses pay for what they get. Because 
services are, with the possible exception of that portion consumed by visitors, 
delivered to the same population covered by the property tax base, leakage is avoided. 
A tourist tax closes the free-riding loop whole.
The better the business model of local government, the less the revenue leakage 
and the better incentives it will be to invest and continue investing in life and 
business-enhancing infrastructure. But for most developing countries, setting up 
water-tight taxation systems involves huge costs. Deficient laws and weak 
compulsory execution either makes taxation systems nominal and unexcitable or incur 
substantial administration cost that eats into the income recovered.
A poor taxation capability will affect a local government’s credit rating and 
reputation so that banks dare not grant it long-term and large-scale loans, something 
almost fatal to massive and sustained infrastructure investment and city building.
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Developing countries relying on property taxation, therefore, often find it difficult 
to prevent government investment leaking away. Direct stakeholders such as owners 
of land near to accessibility-enhancing infrastructure free ride; reaping windfall land 
value and land rent. If there is so much income leakage that investment and service 
costs cannot be compensated, the city will become impoverished in respect of urban 
services and facilities.
China approach based on local government’s monopoly of the primary land market is 
an alternative model. Having described the basic business model, I elaborate on the 
details in the remainder of this section, including the role of land use planning.
The so-called primary land market refers to changes in land usage use, especially 
the change from rural land to urbanized land. There are two types of land ownership 
in China: state-owned and collective-owned. The 1982 Constitution regulated that 
“land in the cities is owned by the State” (Article 10) and the Land Administration 
Law issued in 2004 reaffirmed that “land in urban districts is owned by the State” 
(Article 8). Although this article was widely disputed, the Real Right Law 
promulgated in 2007 still prescribed that “land in cities is owned by the State” 
(Article 47).
In accordance with this provision, the Land Administration Law ruled that “the 
State is to carry out control system on land use”, based upon which, “the State shall 
draw up master plans of land use and classify land use into three categories of farming, 
construction and the unused. Strict control is to be placed on the transformation of 
land use in farming to construction in order to control the total amount of land for 
construction use and exercise a special protection on cultivated land.” (Article 4). This 
means land use may only be altered with the approval of a local government on behalf 
of the State and any unauthorized change in land use is illegal.
Land use change from rural land to urbanized land will create a large difference 
in land value. Understanding this, national enabling laws developed the system that 
gave city governments a monopoly position in land transactions. A key instrument in
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this is the so called land reserve. Land reserve institutes or state-owned corporations 
set up by the government apply to banks for loans specifically to be used for land 
expropriation and the removal and relocation of residential houses and manufacturing 
firms. In practice, this mainly means the removal of farmers from their villages; the 
removal of farm land from a village that is left intact; the removal of village 
businesses from a village; or the removal of derelict state factories and related 
housing.
The process of converting this land into urban fabric and a future tax base has 
already been described. The urban planning process is clearly crucially important for a 
local government’s business model. It is the principal mechanism by which local 
government exerts monopoly power. Conferring a general urban zoning designation 
generates a huge value increase. Designating specific designations adds additional 
value. Planning and then implementing various kinds of infrastructure enhancements 
adds more. Without planning control and without ownership of the primary and 
market, all this value would, as I have argued already, be pocketed by a few direct 
beneficiaries at no cost to them, save perhaps the costs of speculation. Through 
altering land uses on land already leased from the government and increasing floor 
ratio, these land owners would reap much of the spillover benefits from the 
improvement of infrastructure. Monopolistic primary land ownership plus 
monopolistic control of development and redevelopment is a powerful institution. 
Changes in land use and floor area ratios are heavily controlled, plugging the biggest 
potential hole through which public investment created value can drain. It is because 
the government obtains most of the value created by the upgrading of infrastructure 
that such rapid, massive and capital intensive city building has been sustained while 
achieving a balanced set of urban accounts.
To illustrate this argument, consider the example of Xuanwu District, Beijing. 
Currently the District has 7.33 square kilometers of developable land, among which 
community renewal projects take up about 3.17 square kilometers and other land 
stock about 4.16 square kilometers. Ru Xiaobin (2005) at the Xuanwu Branch of
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Beijing Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources estimated that the total land price 
would be 73.3 billion yuan if the land price is calculated at 10,000 yuan per square 
meter or 58.6 billion yuan if calculated at 8,000 yuan per square meter. Of this, 
altogether 44.1 billion yuan of compensation will be needed to compensate existing 
occupiers of the land -  villagers, township residents and state owned enterprises. This 
includes 15 billion yuan for 60 thousand households (250 thousand yuan 
compensation fee for each household) and about 29.1 billion yuan for state-owned 
organizations (7,000 yuan per square meter) that need to be relocated. This leaves a 
healthy 15 to 30 billion yuan for capitalizing the construction of urban facilities. The 
renewal of the District is likely to be achieved with a balanced budget.
This business model of the modem Chinese city has been formed step by step. At 
the beginning, the land market was not open. The government transferred land to 
developers at bargain prices (usually very low) with the purpose of attracting 
investors. Government revenue did not rely on land price but the subsequent tax 
income. But the opacity of this process brought plenty of rent-seeking and corruption, 
especially in commercial and residential land assignment. The move to an open land 
market quickly transformed the process of city building. Consider the example of 
Beijing again.
Beijing implemented an open land market with public bidding, auction and listing 
in November 2001 and the annual land supply was 3,500-4,000 hectares in 2004 and 
6,500-6,600 hectares in 2005 and 2006.
Table 3. 1 Changes in the budget revenue and land leasing revenue of Xiamen
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Municipal budget revenue (million yuan) 5,185.11 6,530.90 6,427.18 7,339.07 6,822.60 10,380.56 14,390.88
Land leasing revenue (million yuan) 1,676.69 2,523.17 3,957.02 2,947.56 4,424.38 5,466.99 16,412.71
Source: Yearbook o f Xiamen Special Economic Zone
During this period, the day August 31, 2004 was a turning point in the process of 
the city’s land management and urban financing system. From this date, the central 
government required that all residential and commercial land of government must be 
sold on the open market. The compulsory requirement to establish an open land 
market with public bidding, auction and listing led to heated demand (see table 3.1 
Xiamen’s case). This was encouraged by an oversupply of cash and led to an 
explosion of land leasing revenue for city governments within the city. Land leasing 
revenue of many cities equaled or even exceeded the total value of local taxes. Before 
August 2004, only about 20-30% of Beijing’s commercial land was traded through 
public bidding, auction and listing. 70-80% was allocated administratively through an 
assignment contract. From August 31st, all rights for commercial land use projects 
had to be priced and determined through public bidding, auction and listing and 
private enterprises withdrew completely from the primary land market. Local 
government became the only developer in the primary land market. The usage, floor 
area ratio, and many planning conditions are decided by government. The owner of 
land can only inherit and transfer the rights and interests but not change them. Land 
revenue also began to roar. From November 2001 to April 2006, 215 plots of land 
measuring 1,491 hectares were traded in Beijing’s land market. The turnover totaled 
38 billion yuan. The cost of primary land development took up 25.9 billion yuan of 
this, leaving a government income of 12.1 billion yuan (Yang 2006). By 2006, there 
were 86 plots of land publicly sold in Beijing in that year, with a turnover of 27.1 
billion yuan and a land value increment of 26% which counted 5.6 billion yuan.
The city of Xiamen had a similar experience. In 2000, land lease income only
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accounted for 1.67 billion yuan, much less than its budget revenue 5.18 billion yuan. 
However in 2006, Xiamen’s local budget revenue climbed to 14.4 billion yuan and 
land leasing revenue reached 16.4 billion yuan, higher than the budget revenue so that 
the city can be said to have made a staggering surplus of 2 billion yuan. (Table 3.1)
The open market policy has had a remarkable effect nationwide. Since the 
implementation of the system of public bidding, auction and listing, China’s land 
leasing revenue has maintained fast growth in each successive year. Nationally, land 
leasing revenue was 580 billion yuan in 2005 and 768 billion yuan in 2006 and 
exceeded one trillion yuan in 2007.
This revenue accounts for the country’s rapid urban expansion and to the large 
increase in fixed asset investment over the recent years. The monopoly of the 
primary land market has turned out to be a very successful institutional design and has 
played a key role in the business models of Chinese city governments. It has tackled 
the tricky problem of revenue leakage (free riding) that is a constant headache for 
many governments and constitutes the main driving force of China’s high-speed urban 
expansion. Compared with a business model totally reliant on property tax, China’s 
version of the land-leasing approach possesses the following advantages: low 
institutional costs due to short payback period and low credit risk; no interest costs 
induced by the risk of payment term; no need to organize complex property 
evaluation and a massive tax department; no need to worry about changes in taxation 
policies during the payback period.
The success of this business model has elevated (literally in some cases) the level 
of infrastructures of many coastal cities in China close to that in developed countries. 
Beijing and Xiamen are the epitome of the modem well-organised and efficiently
26 Investment in fixed assets is the primary power that drives China’s economic growth. According to 
the proportion of investment in fixed assets to GDP of various countries in 2007 estimated by CIA, 
China came second with 44.3% after Azerbaijan (44.9%). As for other major developing countries, 
India ranked 19th with 29.2%; Brazil ranked 88th with 20.2%; Russia ranked 114th with 18.2%. 
Among developed countries, Japan stood 53rd with 23.7%; Germany stood 119th with 17.3 %; 
America stood 124th with 16.6%. The growth rate o f China’s investment in fixed assets has more than 
doubled that o f its GDP for many years. Without the support of a constant stream o f land-based income, 
it would be impossible to maintain such speed and scale. This is also the substantial difference between 
the present investment in fixed assets and the one without supporting income in command economy.
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priced Chinese city. Changes in the revenue profile of these municipal governments, 
reflects the transformation of their business model. That business model not only 
explains why municipal government investment in fixed assets is such a distinctive 
characteristic of the recent and current round of economic growth, but also helps 
explain the driving force behind China's rapid economic development.
3.6 Conclusion
To regard the government as an enterprise that manages territory opens up a new 
angle for the theoretical study of urban planning and places the study of urban 
government’s business model at the center of urban planning theory. This is extremely 
important if the academic orientation of urban planning is to return to the real world.
In this chapter, I have used as a framework a general municipal business model 
that focuses on inputs and outputs. The framework is a general one for thinking about 
the behaviour of entrepreneurs; and urban governments, I have suggested, should be 
looked upon as entrepreneurial economic agents. With regard to the input part, 
entrepreneurs need to focus on various problems such as financing, credit and risk 
brought about by fixed cost and variable cost. As for the output part, entrepreneurs 
have to figure out a charging mode capable of eliminating free riders and reducing 
income leakage. In this respect, institutions and policies are of paramount importance, 
shaping business model of the entrepreneur and keeping alive the incentive to invest 
in the discovery of new knowledge and in its commercial application. The practice of 
China’s city governments shows that fiscal and tax decentralization provides an 
incentive to local governments to act entrepreneurially. And the monopoly of the land 
market -  of primary land ownership and of the right to develop -  makes possible the 
efficient recovery of public services.
A business model analysis of city government also throws light on the origin of 
cities - an obscure but intrinsically interesting issue in urban geography and spatial 
analysis. In almost all classical geographic models, cities (or central places/central 
markets) are presumed. Their existence cannot be explained within those models. Due
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to lack of appropriate analytical tools, these models abstract from the reality of 
institutions and look for optimal location and scale of economic activity through 
various mechanical algorithms that spread activity over space.
But in practice, what really drives the formation and growth of cities is the 
business models invented by entrepreneurial city governments. Just as the value of a 
mineral resource depends on the entrepreneurial endeavors of mining and processing 
firms and individuals; so the value of land at a particular location relies on the 
business models used by entrepreneurs to profit from that location. In this sense, it 
may be deemed that it is entrepreneurs and inventors of business models for making 
profitable use of space -  at all scales including at the city-wide scale - that created 
urban value. Many studies of economic geography and spatial analysis tend to divorce 
themselves from business models and employ abstract mathematical models to 
explicate the origin and growth of cities; using doubtable assumptions to explain 
simple reality. The elegant spatial models decorated with the enigmatic maths of the 
neoclassical urban economists and regional scientists are mostly little more than 
self-entertainment among academics.64
Although geographers have little defense when confronted with economists’ 
criticisms on their failure to explain the emergence of cities, mainstream economics 
itself has traditionally failed to offer a powerful explanation of the emergence of 
enterprises. The parallel is not coincidental. Regional science was a spatial take on 
neoclassical economics and both chose to overlook the role of institutions and the 
creative activities of entrepreneurs for the sake of abstract generalizations that can be 
articulated in closed systems of equilibriating equations.
A more substantial epistemological reason for this oversight in economics is that
64 See, for example, Fujita and Thisse, 2002, Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999. Krugman (1995) 
once made insightful criticisms concerning popular spatial analytical theories, but his own “new 
economic geography” failed to make much significant advance beyond his predecessors. One 
significant reason is that the tools he adopted (such as the CES function) were still unable to 
normatively analyze institutional issues.
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enterprises are seen as a substitute for, not a component of, a price mechanism in 
economic theory. In his innovative paper Coase pointed out (1937) that Knight was 
wrong in using uncertainty to interpret enterprises. Coase suggested the alternative 
view that the distinctive character of enterprise is that it is the substitute for price 
mechanism65 (Coase, 1937, the third paragraph in the first section). This is part of 
Coase’s insightful theory of the firm. But in one sense it has led enterprise theories 
astray. Cheung (1983) argued that “it is not accurate to say an enterprise replaces the 
market; it would be better to say that one form of agreement supersedes another.” (See: 
Cheung, S. 1983, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics, 
26(1), 1-21). The distinctiveness of an enterprise rests on its possession of a business 
model to sell its own products in the market rather than being a substitute for the 
market’s price mechanism. Coase was saying that some transactions are taken out of 
the market by the formation of an enterprise. But the reason for so doing is to impose 
what might be called meta order on the market -  organizing certain transactions 
outside of the market (within the firm) in order to make greater gains when 
transacting within the market. A business model is a particular meta-order imposed on 
a sub-set of transactions.
If an economic agent66 has its own business (input-output) model and owns the 
residual rights over the resources it deploys, it is a complete enterprise whether it is a 
sole individual, a manufacturing organization or a municipal government. An 
economic agent’s choice of inputs: labor, services, taxable land, simple home-spun 
knowledge etc, determines the components of his own production function: it does not 
differentiate a producer from an enterprise. The distinct characteristic of an 
entrepreneurial enterprise is its possession of residual rights and the responsibility it 
takes for business operation, including assuming liabilities. Simplifying the idea of 
enterprise in this way, what does the idea of an optimized business model mean? 
Simply that an enterprise’s optimal set of rules and policies are those that make it
65 Or as Yang Xiaokai (1997) says: “enterprises replace intermediate good market with labor market”.
66 Or consumer equivalent
67 In Chapter 7, I generalize this conclusion into an economic criterion -  a ‘Coase Optimum’ to 
replace the ‘Pareto Optimum’ of neoclassical economics.
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capable of producing the most surplus for entrepreneurs. Note that this adds a 
Schumptarian understanding of entrepreneurism -  someone with new ideas that can 
be exploited for commercial (or social) gain but who often needs to join forces with 
others to realize those gains. Business models serve to mix the ideas of entrepreneurs 
with the resources of capitalists, owners of land and labour and so on, in such a way 
that their needs for reward are efficiently matched with the needs of consumers of 
various types. This model serves as framework for examining the advantage and 
disadvantage of alternative urban institutions.
In contrast to academic economists in their ivory towers, planners have to spend 
most of their time dealing with municipal governments. Planners will not therefore be 
able to propose useful policy suggestions if they do not properly understand municipal
iT O
government behavior . Urban institutional systems are adopted and developed in the 
context of particular geo-political contexts at particular stages of development. As 
long as we can comprehend the fundamental principles of local governmental 
behavior, we will be capable of designing workable institutions adapted to those 
specific contexts. Meanwhile, how to begin regime transformation when an old 
system of institutions is ineffective, is a serious task that planners the world over must 
face.69 Dispute at an abstract level cannot tell which theory is more powerful at 
explaining and forecasting the real world. Just like new medical equipment invented 
to give doctors a deeper understanding of symptoms, urban planning theories must 
discover new analytical tools to better understand urban problems.
68 The planners may even get into a moral conflict as to whether to “conspire” with the local 
government or to insist on their professional integrity. For instance, Zhou Yixing once doubted “could 
planners keep certain independent characteristics, stick to professional morality and persist with 
scientific planning and forecasting?” (Zhou Yixing, 2006, “Who should be Responsible for the 
Out-Of-Control Land Use?” City Planning Review, 3(11) p65. Lu Dadao even directly condemned the 
idea that “while working, planners tend to follow leaders’ will and do not have independent scientific 
spirit. As for evidently unreasonable and unfeasible dreams, some planners also chime with the others 
or even boost these unrealistic dreams.” (Lu Dadao, 2007, “China’s Urbanization Progress and Space 
Expansion”, Urban Planning Forum, 4 (5))
69 Different tax systems lead to different government behavior as I have argued. The development 
stage o f a city decides whether it should rely chiefly on land income or property tax. Even in different 
areas of the same city, these two tax systems may apply to different districts. Generally speaking, in the 
startup phase of urbanization, it is easy for a land income-dependent government to develop the 
construction of infrastructure. But when urbanization enters a stable phase, it is necessary for the 
government to transform in a timely way into a property tax-dependent government.
121
We can judge whether an urban planner is professional or not through observing 
whether his tools are analytically powerful enough to deal with routine and tricky 
urban problems. The analysis of urban business models of all kinds -  not just of 
municipal government but of other actors in land and property markets - provides 
professional tools for urban planning and enables planners to better understand 
practical problems and propose more professional suggestions to policy makers and 
decision takers.
By extending the business model analysis of city government to understand the 
spatial division of labor at city and regional level, we will find answers to questions 
about the concentration of urban infrastructure investment and the homogenization of 
industrial structure among the municipalities in China.
In the next chapter, I review some criticisms targeted at city government from the 
viewpoint of business models and extend the discussion of optimal allocation of urban 
resources - an issue closely related to optimal production. We will see that using new 
analytical tools, planners are able to achieve sharper observations and advance their 
own unique professional suggestions.
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CHAPTER 4
RETHINKING URBAN PROBLEMS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I elaborate the business model of Chinese cities developed in the 
previous chapter by demonstrating its superiority in addressing selected urban 
problems. According to the theory of Lakatos (1970), if a research paradigm intends 
to replace an old one, it should not just stick to demonstrating things: it should be able 
to explain abnormalities incomprehensible to the old paradigm and help discover new 
problems as well. Growth is an essential character of science. In the competition of 
the theories and methodological frameworks of research, those that offer greatest 
explanatory power will tend to win.
Competition between urban governments and government monopoly of the 
primary land market are the two defining characteristics of the business model of 
China’s urban governments. Since existing theories generally fail to explain the 
behavior of governments, urban scholars have often resorted to attacking observed 
governmental behaviour - like tailors blaming customers for failing to fit into their 
clothes. Notwithstanding the academic’s criticisms, governments and urban planners 
tend to carry on regardless under the compelling logic of the business model I have 
outlined. In this chapter, I respond to the criticisms coming from academic 
commentators by refraining them. In particular, I argue that in the present institutional 
environment (especially the institutions of taxation), the criticized behavior is the 
necessary behavior of governments acting as an enterprise.
4.2 Rethinking governmental behavior
In standard economics, the government’s function is to provide public goods that
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cannot be provided by the market due to malfunction. There is neither the necessity 
nor a motive for governments to compete with one another. However, the practices of 
China’s urban governments indicate that public goods, like other commodities, can be 
acquired in a competitive market as well.
Like a common commodity market, the smooth running of this mechanism 
depends essentially on two things: one is competition, the other is pricing. There must 
be certain degree of competition between local governments; and competing 
governments should be able to earn profit from the infrastructure and services they 
provide70. It will be impossible to comprehend the behavior of local governments 
without understanding this mechanism. Current problems facing the Chinese local 
governments (continous construction, large-scale farmland requisition and the 
relentless expansion of new real estate markets) actually derive not from disorderly 
competition, but from the current rules of competition: the limitations on the channels 
through which local governments can obtain revenue creates what some view as 
problems and shapes the government’s response to these problems.
Local governments are currently centering their main attention on meeting the 
needs of developers and entrepreneurs. However, this is not because the government 
is especially in favor of them. Under the current system, the local government cannot 
impose taxes directly on residents except a small amount of personal income tax; 
which makes enterprises (rather than residents) the main tax-paying customers of
70 There are large quantities o f economic writings concerning the behavior o f local government, among 
which the study of the famous American economist Tiebout is the best-known (Cao Rongxiang, Wu 
xinwang 2004). Tiebout pointed out in his pioneering article ‘A Pure Theory o f Local Expenditure’ 
(Charles M. Tiebout, 1956) that at least theoretically, competition among governments, with residents 
moving around freely (“voting by foot”) would be sufficient to make sure the services of local 
government could be priced like other commodities in the market. If this view is correct (and can 
explain more facts in reality), the enterprise nature o f government is a more powerful analytical tool 
than the government as a handler of market failures. From the view of Olson, another famous 
economist who studied the supply of public goods (Mancur Olson 1980), government is not an 
organization that obtains the collective interest through forced collective actions. Go deeper into this 
view and we can see that government is the same as the army, an enterprise or a union: they are all 
organizations that aim at lowering the costs of collective actions and acquiring potential collective 
interests. In other words, there is no essential difference between public interest and other commercial 
interest. Similarly, there is no difference between enterprises which obtain commercial interests and 
governments which obtain collective interests. This excludes government from the category of 
commonwealth-oriented organizations and puts it in he category o f profit-oriented organizations.
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public services. The local government can only indirectly provide urban residents 
with public services by creating a better investment environment for investors. The 
large number of investors brings fierce competitions among the producers of 
territories.
Many analyses of the problems of China’s rapid urbanization have stated that it is 
the possession of strong land management powers that brings about the subsequent 
urge of local government to ‘make money with land’. Large-scale occupation of 
farmland, it is often concluded, is caused by the government’s suppression of land 
price and excessive business promotion; while housing prices remain high as a result 
of collusion between local governments, banks and developers to drive up land prices. 
Naturally, people therefore call for measures such as more rigid supervision, land 
income division, restriction of land-income expenditure and cutting back land 
management powers.
However, this seemingly reasonable analysis does not probe the root of the 
problem in that it cannot explain the contradictory conduct of local governments: 
promoting business while lowering land price and selling land while driving up land 
price.
Local governments behave contradictorily in different land markets because the 
corresponding channels to realize land income in those markets vary. Local 
governments can only depend on lump-sum land income from the primary land 
market for profit. The public services that local governments provide are durative and 
continuous, whereas land income is a lump-sum deal. To sustain expenditure on 
public services, local governments had to come up with a way to turn lump-sum 
income into long-term and sustainable cash flow. And the solution is tax revenue from 
industries and commerce71. Since the demand for commerce mainly comes from 
industries (enterprises’ and employees’ demand for services), the only way to expand
71 This explains why in Xiamen, where the price o f residential real estate is much higher than that of 
shopping malls and office buildings, the government is prepared to forgo huge sums o f lump sum 
income on the coastal sites, where the land price is very high, preferring hotels and office buildings 
which can yield sustainable cash income.
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local governmental income and sustain public services is to energetically bring in 
businesses and encourage industrial development. Local tax revenue and land price 
thus become the ‘daily-bread’ of local governments. A local government gets a 
competitive edge over other local governments by discounting these two ‘prices’.
But such price reduction has a limit. Whoever is the most efficient can reduce the
noprice to its lowest . Generally speaking, cities located in advantageous geographic 
environments and with advanced management skills are capable of offering better 
infrastructures and public services. This can be shown from the comparatively high 
floor price in first-class real estate market. High profit in primary land markets 
enables local governments to provide more subsidies for industrial land, the price of 
which thus becomes more competitive. More industries will gather and bring more 
demand for primary land. The land price will be driven even higher, yielding the 
government more profit to support industries.
The nature of all taxes is ground rent. Selling and leasing (for taxes) are just 
different ways of acquiring land income. In some cases, local government attracts 
business with free land. This conduct is described by scholars and the media as 
‘imprudent and risky’. However, it is rational economic behavior aimed at turning 
lump-sum profit into regular income. The relentless business promotion by local 
government is not the ‘pursuit of short-term political achievements’, as it is often 
portrayed in the media; but a responsible long term investment in the local economy73.
An equilibrium land price in the industrial land market should not be too low, 
however. It should be neither more nor less than the price sufficient to exclude less
72 Compared with capital of great liquidity, there is more territory than capital in the current 
development stage. Therefore, the main mode of current urban competition is for territory to run after 
capital (or for governments to run after developer). If we regard developers as customers for territory, 
the government will be the supplier. The surplus o f territory causes competition in the market among 
producers. The price o f territory is decided by the most efficient city according to the cost o f the less 
efficient cities. The price o f a city (tax income and land price) lies with the cost o f the local government. 
Obviously, cities with higher land incomes can offer higher discount to industries.
73 Acquisition o f lump-sum income from land transfer has its virtues. For example, China’s urban 
infrastructure is much more advanced compared with countries with the same level o f development. 
This is because lump-sum land income has balanced lump-sum infrastructure investment. Investment in 
infrastructures is made once and for all, while recovery o f the investment is realized in the long run. In 
more normal urban fiscal models, it is hard to gather huge amount of investment at the early stage of 
economic development by way o f regular income from tax revenues.
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superior local governments from winning the competition for mobile investors. This is 
the cheapest price that enterprises should be able to enjoy. To the local government, 
industrial and commercial tax income, primary land market income and industrial 
subsidy (land price and tax reduction and exemption) are accounted as a whole. 
Together they add up to the net income of a local government. As long as industrial 
subsidies can generate more income through taxation and related commercial housing, 
it will be a reasonable economic practice to offer industrial land at a discounted price, 
even for free.
After seeing through this industrial circulation formed during the pursuit of 
long-term income, we can now understand the two completely contradictory pricing 
behaviors of the local government in industrial and commercial land markets and also 
explain why the more developed an area is, the lower its industrial land price can be 
— because low industrial land price and high commercial land price are two 
consistent ways through which the local government turns lump-sum profit into 
regular income. All the behaviors of the local government should be taken as a whole, 
and any comment on one of them as an isolated link (low industrial land price or high 
commercial land price) will come to the wrong judgment that the economic behaviors 
of the local government are irrational.
There will be winners and losers in competitions. This applies to national 
governments and local governments as well.
It’s true that the local government protects its own interest when dominance of 
the central government eases. It is also true that there are repeated constructions and 
unfair competitions in some disadvantaged places. But it is still improper to simply 
conclude that these are all vicious competitions74. In monopolistic competition model, 
second-best producers are not just ‘losers’. They crouch around the ‘winner’ and wait 
for their chances so that the winner dare not take advantage of its monopolistic status 
to lower the quality of their products and services.
74 Refer to: Economic Observer, 2006-11-2, Cumbrance o f Vicious Competitions in Yangtze River 
Delta Development Area and Qiao Xinsheng, Local Regime in Disguise o f Urban Management, 
People's Daily Online, 2004-07-15.
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From this perspective, the struggles of local governments to ‘cheapen’ services 
and offer favors are no longer ‘excessive business promotion’ or ‘vicious competition’; 
quite the opposite, it is just these seemingly fierce, even cruel competitions that has 
made China a place that appeals the most to investors all over the world. Japanese 
enterprises have strong international competitiveness not because they are protected 
by their country, but because they have experienced much crueler domestic 
competitions. All the same, the competitiveness of China’s local governments 
originates from ruthless regional competitions that have sustained China’s rapid 
economic growth.
As a matter of fact, the central government is also an indirect beneficiary of the 
competitions among local governments. To compete, local governments put 
large-scale investments into infrastructures with the income obtained from primary 
land market and offer industrial subsidies by means of cutting down on land prices. 
Accordingly, China’s industries possess unusual competitive edges in global 
competitions and this has led to rapid increase in industrial tax revenues .
Since a large portion of China’s tax revenue comes from industrial production 
and the central government gets a larger share according to the new tax distribution 
system, the finances of the central government has grown at a speed faster than that of 
GDP in recent years. This growth is also closely related to the rapid increase in local 
governments’ income from primary land markets. Low industrial land price and high 
commercial land price are two sides of a coin. The rocketing central finances are the
75 From 1990 to 2004, China’s fiscal revenue increased by 9.3% on average annually and 19.9% in 
2005. From 1999 to 2005, the per capita annual growth rate o f GDP was 9.3% on average, while during 
the same period from 1990 to 2004, the average annual growth rate o f rural residents’ net income was 
only 4.3%, and the per capita annual growth rate of townspeople’s disposable income was 7.7%. In 
2005, the per capita average net income of rural residents was 3,255 yuan, an increase of 6.2% over 
previous year; the per capita average disposable income of townspeople was 10,493 yuan, an increase 
of 9.6%. It can be seen that the growth rate o f fiscal revenue is much higher than that o f per capita GDP 
and income of rural residents and townspeople. If off-budget income and land income, is counted, the 
actual income value and growth rate o f the government is even larger and faster (see Zhou Tianyong: 
Eight Problems Facing China’s Economy in the Future, Aug. 9, 2006, China Business Times). Statistics 
from the Ministry o f Finance show that the total national fiscal revenue from January to June is 
2,611.784 billion yuan, an increase o f 30.6% over the same period of last year, taking up 59.3% of the 
budget. In 2003, China’s fiscal revenue reached a record high of 2 trillion yuan, 2.5 trillion yuan in 
2004, 3 trillion yuan in 2005 and nearly 4 trillion yuan in 2006.
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outcome of the transfer of local governments’ land income. In an attempt to cool 
down local investment and land enclosure, some central government departments are 
now suggesting that local governments should be prohibited from attracting business 
by discounting land prices and restricted in their tax-maximising strategic use of the 
primary land market76. In fact, these are unwise suggestions because they do not show 
an understanding of local governmental behavior in China’s market economy.
4.3 Designing a business model
Proper solutions require proper explanation. Explaining the business model of 
governments should help develop more targeted plans for improvement.
4.3.1 Governmental behavior
A question that arises from the discussion so far and easily comes to Chinese 
scholars’ minds is why local governments in other market-oriented countries do not 
have such a strong ‘market urge’ and ‘business fever’. Why are they able to withdraw 
from competitive fields and focus on public services? One crucial reason is that local 
governments in market-oriented developed countries have different revenue channels 
from that of China’s local governments. Their revenues come primarily from 
sustainable and regular income — property tax (real estate tax) rather than lump-sum 
land income. Property tax generally refers to a series of governmental taxes that use 
the estimated market value of a property as the tax base. These kinds of taxes mostly 
belong to local taxes in developed countries; in many developing countries the 
administrative and legal infrastructure is frequently insufficiently developed to 
support a reliable and sustainable revenue base from property tax (Chen 2005).
77Take America as example . Federal taxes are composed principally of three
76 Recently, the Ministry o f Land and Resource in China decided on the lowest prices for industrial 
land in different areas, seeking to restrict developed areas from attracting further industries through low 
land prices. But local governments were quick to think of other disguised subsidies (e.g. providing 
employees with low cost accommodation - changing land subsidy into labor subsidy). For enterprises, 
the means by which subsidies are provided are not important as long as their profits increase.
77 With regard to the taxation structure of American government, federal tax income comes mainly 
from personal income tax, social security tax and enterprise income tax, with personal income tax 
counting for about 50%, social security tax about 30%, enterprise income tax about 10%. State tax and
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direct taxes: personal income tax, company income tax and social insurance tax, 
complemented by consumption tax, inheritance and donation tax and customs tax. 
State taxes principally include sales tax, supplemented by personal income tax, 
company income tax, consumption tax, inheritance tax and other taxes. Property tax is 
the main source of local tax revenue, complemented by sales tax, personal income tax, 
other taxes and fees. A tax on fixed assets such as buildings is generally considered 
efficient since it is a form of capital that does not depreciate easily and rises quickly in 
value; is hard to conceal; with a high accumulation efficiency and low cost of taxation. 
Property tax has therefore become the primary source of tax revenue for local 
governments. Property taxes in the USA can constitute up to 76% of local revenue.
The uniformity of financial model in developed countries arises from many 
decades of experimentation and institution building. In China, local governments vary 
widely in the specific models they adopt and the services they provide. If we regard a 
city as a community, local governments in most cities in developed countries are 
equivalent to a property management company. Where there is no great need to boost 
a locally failing or lagging economy, urban governments only need to improve local 
security, the environment, water supply, electricity supply, schools, hospitals, 
transportation and so on. As they supply these services, property value within the 
community will increase accordingly. The better the services are, the higher the value 
of the properties will be. Consequently, local government will get more property taxes. 
On the contrary, degradation of services will cause the emigration of local residents 
and devaluation of property values, which will bring down governmental revenues. If 
the situation worsens, the residents will ‘fire’ the government by ‘election’ and turn to 
another ‘property management company’ who can provide better services.
China’s urban governments are more like developers and the city is a 
‘community’ to be developed. Since the government is not authorized to charge 
property management fees (property taxes), it can only get its income once and for all.
urban or county tax mainly consist o f property tax, sales tax and personal income tax, the total of which 
takes up about 75% to 80% (Zhou Tianyong “Rapid growth guarantees high employment rate but why 
does China have high unemployment rate?” 08:54, 11th, Jul. 2006, China Economic Times.
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In order to sustain community services in the future, property management fees in the 
coming 70 years have to be collected on a discounted present value basis in a lump 
sum; and then commerce and industry is built for regular rental income. At this time, 
urban government has to price its land very high (equal to a promise of 70 years of 
free after-sales services while transferring land) and transforms lump-sum income into 
long-term regular income through attracting businesses (rather than by increasing the 
values of local properties).
In this economic flow, the payment for public services provided by China’s local 
government does not come directly from residents. Therefore, it is not necessary for 
the government to ‘observe the facial expressions of property owners’ as governments 
in developed countries do. Chinese residential property owners cannot urge the 
government to improve services by voting, as tax paying residents do in developed 
countries. This causes gaps and inefficiencies in the public services delivered by some 
local governments.
Obviously, unless China’s local government can fix the prices of public services 
directly by regular property taxes as developed countries do, the function of local 
government will never be transformed from production to service orientation. At 
present, the widely-criticized behavior of Chinese local governments is still a 
reasonable business strategy given the absence of property tax.
4.3.2 Property Tax
Consider the benefits of imposing a property tax. First, it lessens local 
government’s dependence on industrial investments, easing excessive ‘investment 
urge’ and ‘business attraction thirst’. Governments with a well-founded property tax 
system do not need to place the responsibility on their industrial development arms
7Rfor acquiring regular cash flow . Diversification, horizontal division of labour and
78 The PX Project, which caused quite a disturbance in Xiamen in 2007, is a typical case of the 
influence of the lack o f property tax on governmental behavior. A lot o f top-grade property already 
exists in Haicang, the site o f this project. Property affected by the project has a total value o f several 10 
billion yuan. After the project is completed, the market value o f the property will definitely be 
increased. But since the value o f the property has nothing to do with the government and the income 
tax increase brought about by the project will be net profit, the government will surely insist on
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product variety competition are all made possible by property tax, Governments in 
different territories do not have to set up a complete set of industries to transfer the 
land income into more sustainable business-industry tax.
Developing this thought, consider the thought that in pursuit of an industrial 
tax-base, it has been risky for China’s cities to just concentrate on the development of 
one specific industry. If cities want to survive and achieve sustainable incomes they 
must generally start from the construction of industries in order to set up a complete 
industrial circulation. This has tended to force all cities to form small but 
comprehensive independent industrial chains. Every city has had to have its own 
complete set of economic sectors. With the implementation of property tax, cities can 
diversify, however. Cities like Sanya and Haikou may be able to develop professional
7Qservices and tourism , while other cities that have other comparative advantage, such 
as being near to a port or specific markets, could develop specialized industries. 
Residents could choose different locations for production and consumption while 
cities seek the most suitable development paths through horizontal division of 
industries among themselves. Local governments could make use of their comparative 
advantages and change the competitions among them from pure price competitions to 
diversified variety competition.
Second, an alternative way of gaining income would change the behavior and 
focus of governments. A regular income acquired from the increase of value of local
carrying on with PX Project. This is because the huge amount o f tax income brought by this project 
every year can sustain the long-term investment needed for regular services the government has to 
provide. The residents of the properties affected, property owners being the main part, protested 
strongly and unusually, that the project was grounded. Suppose that real estate tax based on the market 
value o f property existed. The government would then compare tax income decrease caused by the loss 
and devaluation o f property with tax increase brought about by this project. If the decrease of property 
tax (including compensations to the residents) were higher than the increase of tax income brought 
about by PX Project, the government might consider giving up the PX Project by its own cost-benefit 
evaluation. But in reality, the government will compensate the loss o f property owners and carry on 
with PX Project.
79 Actually several major cities o f Hainan Island once put forward the plan o f developing industries, 
even heavy chemical industries. For example, Sanya had once claimed it would develop a super city 
with a population of one million, production value o f 10 billion and an area o f 100 square kilometers. 
Although the booming tourism offers new economic support in recent years, the problem of equipping 
large quantities o f real estates (mostly used seasonally) with services has not yet been solved. Without a 
sustainable industrial and commercial tax income, it will be hard to sustain Hainan’s economy. 
Apparently this runs counter to the original idea o f Hainan’s planning (optimal division).
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residents’ properties would help a government move from being
development-oriented to service-oriented and encourage it to provide better public 
services for residents within its jurisdiction. In the built-up areas of cities, it is 
difficult to get a financial return from the investment of schools, roads, education, and 
fire protection without property-related tax. A service-oriented government could not 
achieve financial balance. Therefore, local government is compelled to focus its 
primary attention on the new areas where it can make money from a monopolistic 
primary land market. Without developing new urban areas, a government would not 
be able to get sufficient support for high-standard public services in the old city. Of 
course, a government may lift its industrial and commercial tax to make ends meet. 
But it would result in the increase of cost of production. The enterprises would vote
DA
with their feet and move to another city. .
Once a government can tax property, it can make use of the tax to improve public 
services (public security, fire control) and facilities (cultural and sports facilities, 
parks and greenbelts, roads and bridges, etc.), which will directly enhance the 
property value within its jurisdiction. The broader tax base would therefore increase 
governmental income, thus enabling the government to further polish public services. 
The government is able to bring into its routine agenda the many practical 
commonwealth projects that once were only performed occasionally. In order to 
increase tax income and attract residents, the competition among local governments 
will shift from attracting business to public services. It is quite possible that ‘pleasing 
residents’ would replace ‘pleasing investors’ as the new administrative goal of local
80 Yang Baojun once criticized planners in an article: “they created grand projects for the leaders so the 
leaders can brag about their political achievements, while failed to build urban public space which can 
be enjoyed by the public” (Yang Baojun: “Loss and Reborn of Urban Public Space” ((Urban Planning 
Forum)) , 11th Issue, 2006). However, few planners can explain why political achievement projects like 
“big roads, big squares” do not disappear despite repeated restrictions. As a result, these criticisms can 
do nothing to reality except boosting the moral image o f planners. Actually, it is easy to explain this 
governmental behavior: to rebuild and improve public space in the old city will certainly increase the 
value o f surrounding properties, but due to the lack o f property tax, the government only invests 
without getting return. To show off politically once in a while can truly gain temporary favorable 
comments, but it is not feasible with regard to finance. But it is quite different in the new city. Since the 
government monopolizes the primary land market, newly-constructed office buildings, big roads and 
big squares can bring along the increase in land value in surrounding areas. Whatever the investment, it 
can be balanced by land income.
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governments.
Third, property tax would allow the government to relax the limitation of the 
household registration (hukou) system, which is one of the few institutional legacies 
passed down from planned to market economy without fundamental reform. The 
reason why China is unable to abolish this system is the lack of economic means to 
identify the status of urban residents. We do not know who the real urban consumers 
are or who are qualified to enjoy the various subsidies contained in public services 
(housing, education, medical treatment, transportation, etc.). This is crucial for the 
trade of public goods. With property tax, the identity of a resident would be clear at a 
glance. As long as a resident pays property taxes in a city, it would means s/he buys 
the public goods of this city and automatically qualifies as a resident of the city (ie, 
has the right to vote). The system of Hukou would not be the required. The Hukou 
system is similar in nature to a nationality system, which allows the producers of 
public goods (governments) to identify their consumers. Without such a mechanism 
for identifying ‘paying customer’ no city would be inclined to improve the level of 
local services with a large population of so called ‘floating’ residents enjoying 
(free-riding on) urban welfare provision on the same basis as permanent residents. 
Improving services without property tax and without household registration would be 
to invite increasing numbers of ‘hitchhikers’, which would aggravate further the 
difficulties of maintaining government finance. Obviously, for the purpose of citizen 
status and identification, personal tax via property tax is a more just and efficient way 
than the household registration system. If a property tax system were in place and 
households could opt to become urban tax paying citizens, the household registration 
system can be weakened in its function and used as an auxiliary management 
instrument81.
Fourth, imposing property tax also helps prevent land and its relevant properties 
from being seized by inefficient users. At the moment, on the one hand, there is a
81 Before discussions o f the establishment o f a property tax system all suggestions o f abolishing 
household registration policy had only been armchair strategies. The cities would invent some lower 
efficient way to exclude the free-riders (Zhao Yanjing, 2003).
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substantial shortage of land and many projects are left without space to develop; on 
the other hand, many individuals and enterprises hoard and occupy lots of space in the 
form of empty plants and land. Even the residents tend to buy more houses than they 
need and simply leave the houses empty, neither living in them nor renting them out. 
The reason is that land is costless to keep after the first paying the price. Residential 
land user pay for land when they buy houses - when the price of land is relative cheap. 
The improvement of public services and infrastructure promotes a rise in land price 
but the residents don’t have to pay for the extra services. That means the more land 
they occupy, the more the share additional public goods they enjoy. After the 
implementation of property tax, all types of landlord would have to pay for the 
additional public goods. Likewise the decline of public goods would automatically 
reduce the property tax. It would be impossible for those property owners and 
enterprises that leave housing and land unused to keep enjoying the free treat of 
governmental services; rather, they have to calculate the cost of their resources and 
are forced to lease or transfer them. What is more, new investors also have to give 
thought to whether the income is sufficient to pay for the cost of property ownership. 
With the release and transfer of idle resources, speculative demand will decrease, the 
severe land shortage will be effectively eased and real estate bubbles will be at least 
dampened, if not restrained.
Property tax should be introduced together with housing system reform or even 
reform of the system of allocating land and landuse. The later the reform is initiated, 
the more people will own properties, and the greater the obstacles to the reform. To 
smooth the path of a new property tax system, at the beginning, property tax can be 
primarily aimed at corporate bodies and individuals who possess more than one home. 
Property owners who hold just one small-sized home can be reimbursed for, or 
exempted from, property tax. Or a method of progressive collection could be applied 
in cases of multi-home and unused land, i.e. based on quantity and period of 
possession, to crack down on speculative hoarding. Meanwhile, taxes should be 
reduced in the production sector to counteract the increase in enterprise cost
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contributed by property tax.
Current financial decentralization is not yet genuine financial federalism. Local
O'}
government does not have major taxes. Shared tax and transfer payment are the 
important features of current finance and taxation systems. Once there is the slightest 
sign of disturbance, the fragile financial decentralization will go backwards easily to 
‘unified revenue and expenditure’. The establishment of a property tax would 
symbolize that local government has begun to have independent financial resource 
beyond land leasing. Without property tax, which introduces a price for governmental 
services, local government will not be driven to change its role. The behaviour of 
officials depends on the rules of the game. With a shift of tax income base to property, 
government budgets will naturally reflect residents’ preferences. Currently, though the 
government is not elected by enterprises, enterprises supply the government with a 
substantial majority of its income and local governments have no choice but to reflect 
the preferences of enterprises. Once residents become the main source of tax revenue, 
whatever the preferences of officials are, local budgets will naturally reflect resident 
preferences. The greater the proportion residents’ taxes are to total local government 
revenue, the more thoroughly the wills of residents will be reflected in budgets, 
investments and services.
Like any institution, no property tax system is perfect. It might affect the 
efficiency of decision making, for example. Democratic election of local government 
is not necessary when enterprises are the main demanders of public goods. The high 
mobility of enterprises allows them vote with their feet and leads the producer 
competition. When the residents become the main contributors of the budget of a 
government, democracy becomes necessary. This is simply because the low mobility 
of residents limits the choice of consumers of public goods; and thus producer 
competition would turn to consumer competition. To reduce the opportunism of 
government and protect the security of property, consumers must participate in the
82 In 2006, the central government transferred RMB 914.3 billion from its finance to local 
governments.
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process of supplying public goods. This is a less efficient way to supply public goods 
because the democratic process is very costly. In China, in spite of the absence of 
democracy, public goods and services are much better than cities in other developing 
countries which have so-called standard democracy system, such as India, Philippines 
and Thailand.
4.3.3 The ideal input-output model
China’s economy is like a series of big economic games. To simply call off a 
game will not correct the misconducts of athletes (local governments); rather, the 
rules should be adjusted. Blind rebuke can’t settle the deep-seated problems which 
have caused the misconduct of local governments. Although it seems that many 
current problems arise from local governments, they actually have their roots in the 
central government because central government has the power to set the rules of the 
game, tax legislative power (tax type and tax base). All that local governments can do 
is to abide by the rules (and sometimes avoid or bend them) and compete in the 
games.
I do not mean to explain all local governmental behavior by means of the taxation 
system. But of all institutions, the taxation system has the most profound impact on 
local governmental behavior (the absence of property tax is only part of it). It is this 
system that has bred fierce competition among local governments and struggles 
between central and local governments. The competition and struggles are not 
necessarily negative features of the macro economy but are powerful drivers to 
promote China’s economic growth and enhance government efficiency . It is true that 
there are problems with the fiercly competitive behavior of local governments. But 
this is not caused by the competition itself; rather, the rules of competition are the root. 
Rules will lose effect without competition, and central government will be deprived of
83 When interviewed by ((On Equilibrium)) Magazine, Zhang Weiying put forward a similar opinion:
The so-called local competition chiefly refers to the competition among local governments for 
capital attraction, entrepreneurs, market share and so on. To attract resources, local government has to 
improve transportation, enhance infrastructures and increase the quality o f government services and so 
on. These activities will certainly be good for economic growth.
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an important way of exerting influence on local governmental behavior. Therefore, 
what is really needed from macro control is the regulation of competitive behaviors 
but not outright restriction of competition; i.e. we need better rules but not to call off 
the match.
Improvement of the rules is much more effective than direct restriction on local 
governmental behavior or even making central decisions for local governments. 
Problems brought about by the market economy can only be settled by 
market-oriented solutions. Implementation of a property tax can resolve the 
contradiction between lump-sum land income and regular expenditures on public 
services of local government and is able to correct governmental behavior distorted by 
taxation insufficiencies. To oppose local government taking land as the stimulant to 
economic growth does not mean preventing local government from obtaining 
reasonable profit from land. It is now very urgent to start the collection of property tax 
and gradually make it the main tax source of local government.
Yet, transformation from the development-oriented behavior based on land to the 
service-orientation based on financial taxation does not imply that Chinese local 
government can imitate other countries and totally abandon its monopoly over the 
primary land market. Although property tax is able to handle the contradiction 
between lump-sum land income and long-term services, it will bring with it a new 
contradiction between lump-sum infrastructure construction investment and long-term 
property tax return. As can be shown from the foregoing arguments, even though the 
government is widely criticized for its monopolization of primary land market, 
lump-sum land income is the chief solution to resolve the contradiction between 
lump-sum investment in infrastructures and long-term capital return. Removing its 
land monopoly will for sure weaken the motive and financial power of local 
government to construct high-level infrastructures. Unless we have developed 
financial systems and complex finance and taxation arrangement (e.g. local 
government debt securitization) (Wu 2007), the rapid progress in infrastructure, which 
is deeply admired by all developing countries, will slow down quickly. The
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competition between local governments to improve the investment environment for 
enterprises will abate accordingly. For Chinese cities whose scales of maintenance 
and expansion are extensive, the optimal business model is likely to be the 
combination of property tax and land monopoly therefore. Only with the completion 
of urbanization and the ebb of the construction wave may the property tax-based 
market value gradually replace lump-sum land transfer income and become the main 
channel for charging for urban public services.
Practices show that an important solution to the shortage of infrastructure 
investment is for local government to raise loans. But in developed countries where 
the financial system is not developed and local governmental finance and economy 
are not well-disciplined, opportunist behavior will emerge in local government. 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme pointed out in Global Report on 
Human Settlements 1996 that:
Local government access to capital markets is often restricted. Since central 
governments generally implicitly guarantee local debt at least to some extent, 
they understandably wish to restrict and control local governments ’ access to the 
treasury and to obviate the possibility o f local bankruptcy and hence demands on 
central funds.... some annalists have expressed concerns about the possibility o f  
inexperienced local authorities getting into difficulty by injudicious borrowing 
and have urged that controls should be instituted to ensure that local access to 
capital markets does not cause unwanted difficulties, (p. 182)
Warnings of the World Bank are not baseless. There were significant local 
governance finance problems, for example, in South America countries during the 
implementation of financial decentralization. Even in a highly developed country like 
America, there are many occurrences of financial imprudence. When local 
governments go bankrupt, the federal government has to bail out. For this reason, in 
China, local governments have traditionally been forbidden from raising finance in 
the capital market. Given the nature of local government, especially its bureaucratic 
nature and the prioritization of political over economic goals (which can obscure clear
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financial evaluation), the debt market is not a perfect solution to infrastructures 
investment issues. To compare with raising capital from debt markets, raising capital 
through a monopolized primary land market is less risky since developed land must 
invest upfront, which relies on the current budget rather than on the future’s would-be 
income.
If capital market financing is not part of a long term stable financing model, then 
the ideal policy should include both lump-sum land income and long-term property 
tax. It should establish corresponding input-output relations with lump-sum 
infrastructure investment and long-term public services. It should sustain lump-sum 
infrastructure investment from land income and regular expenditure on public services 
and facility maintenance from regular property tax. Urban governments may greatly 
shorten the payback period of investments and thus boost its credit. On the other hand, 
if governments invest only in infrastructure but don’t possess and sell the appreciated 
lands, they have to rely on future tax income to cover the costs. This also allows 
governments to use their own budgets to build the infrastructure rather than use the 
tax income of the next government as a mortgage to obtain the loan from debt market. 
Since loans are normally repaid by the next government, this practice would 
encourage government to take out too many loans and to be reluctant to repay them 
on time. The opportunistic behaviors of the current government to overdraft on future 
income will also decrease significantly. In this way, the government may play both 
‘developer’ and ‘property manager’ during high-speed urbanization, providing 
large-scale infrastructures and meanwhile maintaining a high-level public services.
This business model may be theoretically demonstrated by a simple 
interest-exclusive static model. Suppose the lump-sum construction cost of certain 
infrastructure is 50 yuan, its service life is 50 years and maintenance cost 1 yuan each
K4.year . The total revenue of this service must be greater than or equal to 100 yuan, 
which is the total of 50 yuan of lump-sum investment and 50 yuan of annual 
maintenance costs. If there is no land transfer fee and this revenue can only be
84 The cost here includes necessary profit.
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recovered through property tax income, at least 2 yuan of property tax has to be paid 
each year over a period of 50 years. The shortcoming of this model is that the 
lump-sum investment has to be raised at the preliminary stage of infrastructure 
construction while revenue comes in over the lifetime of the infrastructure. Given risk 
factors (ignoring interest), the cost of a loan for the investment will be greater than 50 
yuan, say 70 or 80 yuan or even higher (depending on the creditability of the 
government). The cost of risk may be relatively low for developed countries with 
mature legal systems but rather high or even impossible for developing countries with 
immature legal systems. This infrastructure will only be provided when the total 
revenue is greater than the total cost including cost of risk.
Currently, this investment is recovered by Chinese cities through lump-sum land 
income rather than property tax. Calculated in this way, the land price plus charges for 
50 years of services should be no less than 100 yuan. However, consumption capacity 
is limited at the early stage of economic development and the greatest ability to pay 
may only be, say 70 yuan. The government may avoid incurring debts in the first year 
by paying the cost of infrastructure construction, but this will increase the burden of 
consumers and also leave a 30 yuan deficit for later in the project. Future 
governments will have to sell new land to make up this deficit until urbanization is 
completed. By then there may not be enough demand for the newly-provided land and 
the financing model will no longer work.
Hence my suggestion that the combination of these two models is appropriate. 
First, the government recovers all lump-sum infrastructure investment, i.e. not less 
than 50 yuan, through monopoly of primary land market. Then it sustains 
maintenance cost through collecting not less than 1 yuan/year from a property tax. In 
this way, there will neither be a fiscal gap nor debt for future governments. Besides 
property tax, governments will continue to obtain income from primary land markets, 
causing no additional expense to consumers. Financially, this combination is just 
separating the prepaid service income of the future government from land income. As 
a result, the income of the current government from primary land market will decrease,
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but not disappear.
4.4 Rethinking governmental monopoly in the primary land market
I have argued that the monopolized primary land market is the essential part of 
the business model of Chinese urban governments that prevents leakage of public 
goods investment and acquires land income. Landlords will always pursue windfall 
spillover income from the government’s infrastructure investments by altering land 
usage. Through institutional comparison, the last part of this chapter further examines 
the different arguments underlying this unique institution, revealing how institutions 
affect efficiency85.
85 Developed economies also face the problem o f how to prevent leakage of income from public goods. 
Fred Foldvary (1994) quoted detailed North American cases in his famous work Public Goods and 
Private Communities. In the classical case of Disney Park, Foldvary tells how a private “government” 
prevented leakage o f income from public goods and services. This is exactly the same as the case of the 
monopoly of primary land market o f China (like the construction of special economic zones and urban 
development areas). (Foldvary F 1994 “Public Goods and Private Communities”. Northampton MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Company)
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4.4.1 Dispute of land appreciation86
The apportioning of income from land appreciation has long been a hot topic in 
economic studies. ‘Profit from increase in price belongs to private sectors’ and ‘profit 
from increase in price belongs to the public’ are the two contradictory views that 
currently prevail in China’s academic circles. The opinion that profit from increase in 
price belongs to private sector agents (farmers) is tabled with a view to increasing the 
income of farmers. Scholar Zhou Cheng summarized this opinion as follows:
In the attempt to add to farmers ’ income, some proposed to reasonably allocate 
the natural appreciation gained after the conversion o f agricultural land into 
non-agricultural land. Some firmly believe that one o f the basic reasons why 
farmers ’ income is poor and rises slowly is that the compensation standard for 
agricultural land requisition is too low: “the existing compensation principle 
rules that compensation should be made according to the original usage o f the 
land requisitioned... it has nothing to do with the future usage and increase in
86 At present, there are three basic arguments over the distribution of the natural appreciation gained 
after the conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land in China. One is the theoiy that 
profit from increase in price belongs to private sector agents (farmers), a traditional argument which 
claims all the natural land appreciation should be owned by farmers who have lost their land. This is 
currently represented by Cai Jiming, professor at Tsinghua University, and Zheng Zhenyuan, former 
deputy secretary o f the Department of Planning o f the State Land Administration Bureau. It is not at all 
clear what the historical roots o f such an argument might be. The second is the theory that “profit from 
increase in price belongs to the public”, an innovative opinion which claims natural land appreciation 
should entirely or basically belong to the public. This opinion was historically represented by English 
economist J. S. Mill, American economist Henry George and Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Currently Shen Shouyu, 
professor at Nanjing Agricultural University is a prominent proponent. The third, is the theory that 
“both the private sectors and the state should be taken into account”, a conciliatory view which 
advocates that after those who lost land are sufficiently compensated, with the remaining part 
transferred to the central government and used primarily in support o f rural areas across the country. 
This view was initiated and now represented by Zhou Cheng, professor at Renmin University of China. 
At present, the most powerful voice is the theory that profit from increase in price belongs to private 
sectors (farmers), with numerous advocators and publications in support. There are also many who 
support the theory that profit from increase in price belongs to the public, although without much 
enthusiasm. The latest masterpiece that vindicates this view is a book ‘Research on Land Development 
Right in China: New Perspective for Land Development and Resource Protection’, published by 
Professor Sun Hong in 2004 and explicitly advocating that land development rights should belong to 
the public. Those who support the theory that “both the private sectors and the state should be taken 
into account” are trying to perfect this argument through discussion. For instance, Zhu Qizheri, 
professor at China Agricultural University, emphasizes that: “income from land development rights 
derives from contributions to social progress made by all social members, so it should be shared by 
them all, i.e. ‘profit from increase in price should be shared by all’.” (China Land, 2006.4, see also Li 
Yarong: Basic Understanding o f Issues Concerning the Allocation of Natural Appreciation Gained after 
the Conversion of Agricultural Land into Non-agricultural Land, reprint China Economic Times, 
2007-2-1.
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price o f this plot o f land... this way o f compensation is actually ...excluding 
farmers from the distribution o f differential income o f land during 
industrialization. ” (Jiang Shengsan, Liu Shouying, 2003). “To share land 
appreciation should have been the primary means to increase farmers ’ income. 
However, since the 1990s, numerous plots o f land have been transferred, land 
price has soared, but all this is none o f the farmers’ business. ” (Zhou Qiren, 2005) 
It is estimated that “during 25 years o f industrialization and urbanization, 
industries and commerce o f the state and cities have transferred and accumulated 
a capital o f over 900 trillion yuan. ” (Zhou Tianyong, 2004) As a result, some
demanded this practice be corrected the natural appreciation gained after the
conversion o f agricultural land into non-agricultural land should be entirely 
owned by farmers...
...the basic support is the theory o f “compensating for non-agricultural 
development right o f land”. This theory holds that farmers should own complete
property rights o f agricultural land except for the rights to occupy, use, profit
from and dispose agricultural land, complete “non-agricultural development 
right” should be listed as well. This means that when agricultural land is 
converted into non-agricultural land, former owners should get the “price o f  
non-agricultural development right”, i.e. “price o f non-agricultural land”. Only 
in this way can we say that “farmers ’ land property rights are complete ”. (Huang 
Zuhui, Wang Hui, 2002) To put it another way, the natural appreciation gained 
after agricultural land transforms into non-agricultural land should all belong to 
farmers who have lost their land. Otherwise, It will be deprivation or exploitation. 
(Zhou Cheng, 2006)
The opposite is the theory that ‘profit from increase in price belongs to the 
public’. Zhou Cheng summarized this theory as follows:
The theory that “profit from increase in price belongs to the public” is a 
revolutionary and innovative theory proposed to challenge the theory (institution) 
that “profit from increase in price belongs to the private sectors (farmers)”,
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which had long been observed in feudal and capitalist societies. This theory has a 
long history. British economist J. S. Mill (1806-1873) had addressed this theory 
long ago. American economist H. George (1837-1897), chief representative o f  
this theory, pointed out in his book Progress and Poverty that: “The value o f land 
does not mean payment for production...it stands for the exchange value o f 
monopoly. It is under no conditions created by individuals who occupy land; it is 
created by social development. Therefore, the society is entitled to take it all 
over”. (George, p .347, 1995) The four Chinese characters “Zhang Jia Gui 
Gong” (which means profit from increase in price belongs to the public) were 
coined by the followers o f Mr. Sun Yat-sen to expatiate on his idea “equalization 
o f land rights ” and meant that when the price o f land rose after land owner made 
an offer, the government seized the rise through land appreciation tax. Sun 
Yat-sen held that: “the price o f land soars due to social improvement and 
industrial and commercial progress, which should be attributed to the force o f the 
public. Therefore, increase in land price as a result o f such improvement and 
progress should be owned by the public but not private sectors. ” (Sun Yat-sen, 
1866-1925, p.200, 2001) The theory that “profit from increase in price belongs to 
the public” also applies to land requisition. In the opinion o f Lin Yingyan, 
professor and economist in Taiwan, China, “the market price o f land... contains 
huge amount o f natural appreciation which should be owned by the entire society. 
To make compensations according to market price means natural appreciation is 
regarded as personal property and also compensated. This is clearly 
unreasonable. ” (Lin Yingyan, p. 174-175, 1999)
The monopoly of primary land markets in Chinese cities is deeply affected by the
o 7
idea that ‘profit from increase in price belongs to the public’ . Meanwhile, it is also
87 The idea that “profit from increase in price belongs to the public” had been practiced in China long 
before the planned economy. Scholar Wang Guolin wrote in the article Investigation into Farmers Who 
Lost Their Land that:
The idea that “profit from increase in price belongs to the public” was firstly practiced in Jiaozhou. 
After Germany captured Jiaozhou in 1898, the local government promulgated the policy o f land 
appreciation tax to curb overheated land and real estate speculation. Before the 1911 Revolution, Sun 
Yat-Sen formulated the idea that “profit from increase in price belongs to the public ”. He thought that 
natural land appreciation caused by social progress and political and economic construction should be
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an institutional heritage of the planned economy.
4.4.2 Grabbing land rent
Just as institutional economics has predicted, the constant perfection of China's 
urban infrastructure and consequent increase in land price has brought about a strong 
incentive to free ride. As land price rises, landlords expect to share the income from 
land appreciation. One way to achieve this is for collective agricultural land situated 
at the edge of cities to evade laws and regulations which prescribe that urban land in 
the country is transformed through municipalisation. Land gets transform in various 
disguised ways. At the early stage of reform and opening, such transformation was 
mainly achieved in the form of township enterprises. In the planned economy, the 
business model of urban government made it barely possible to provide urban 
infrastructures profitably. Local governments nearly went bankrupt and the seriously 
overburdened urban infrastructure couldn’t meet the demands of industrialization. 
China therefore adopted a development route to industrialization and encouraged the 
countryside to develop township enterprises on collective land. As a result, many 
villages at the edge of cities exploited market vacancy left by state-owned enterprises 
and grew their businesses rapidly on their own collective land. By the 1980s,
shared by the entire public. This idea was reflected in the Draft Constitution o f the Republic o f China 
(1936), which ruled that “increase in the value o f land not caused by labor capital shall be shared by 
the public through imposition o f land appreciation tax. ” The Constitution o f the Republic o f China 
(1947) reiterated this rule. Yongjia County o f Zhejiang Province began to levy land appreciation tax in 
1938 and collected “over 7000 yuan” in the city area within two months. The tax was paid during the 
transfer o f land ownership. In Taiwan area, transfer in the form o f  conferment was also included.
As for the proportion that should be owned by the state, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen recommended “all income 
from increase in price be owned by the state ”. Taiwan area adopted a progressive system and regulated 
in 1954 that: “for each time more than the original price o f  land, 20% more tax will be imposed. If the 
land price is four times more than the original price, the increased part shall all belong to the 
government. ” Due to increase in population, economic development, sharp rise in land price and 
serious monopoly o f land investment in the suburbs, tax rate was lifted to 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% in 
1958 and lifted again in 1976 to 40%, 50% and 63%. The policy that “profit from increase in price 
belongs to the public ” achieved remarkable effect. Appreciation tax collected in Taiwan area added up 
to 75.9 billion TWD (Taiwan dollar) from 1975 to 1981. It also effectively curbed land speculation and 
maintained order o f land market. Appreciation tax was firstly collected in the metropolis o f Taiwan 
area, but with rapid economic growth and expansion o f metropolis, price o f land outside o f the 
metropolis rose dramatically. “There is no regulation on price o f land in this area, so profit from 
increase in price has mostly been seized by private sectors. Speculators took advantage o f this 
opportunity and purchased land outside the metropolis without restraint, awaiting rise in price and 
subsequent staggering profits. ” The government o f Taiwan area took immediate measures and land 
price was stabilized within one year from 1977 to 1978. Appreciation tax was launched over the entire 
Taiwan area to rectify land market. (Wang Guolin, p62)
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township enterprises became the main power of industrial development.
In the 1990s, foreign enterprises steered clear of cities whose costs were high and 
production factors (labour as well as land) restricted by the planned system. They 
partnered directly with township enterprises to form large-scale rural industrial 
clusters in several major areas, especially around the Pearl River Delta near Hong 
Kong. In this way, rural land was turned into industrial land on a large scale. However, 
institutional reform unfolded in cities during this period. The institutional innovations 
already discussed in this chapter brought China’s urban governments into the 
development and industrialization game. The business model that sustained 
large-scale infrastructures from land appreciation conflicted dramatically with the 
interests of township enterprises. Through granting subsidies to industries and 
collecting taxes, urban governments were able to provide better infrastructure than the 
townships and provide public services at lower prices for foreign enterprises. Thus 
township enterprises lost their competitive edge completely. The demand of industries 
for rural land far from cities and offering no free ride on urban services, decreased 
greatly. This trend was strengthened by stronger urban land regulation. At the current 
time, no villages or townships in Xiamen is now able to convert rural to urban land 
through township enterprises.
The methods of rural land conversion changed accordingly in this period. Rural 
land turned into urban housing mainly in two ways: legal housing land (for private use 
only according to law) and unauthorized construction. The specific practices are as 
follows.
1. Enhancing the development intensity of original housing land by, for example, 
increasing construction height illegally and leasing the buildings to migrant 
workers.
2. Building low-cost apartments to lease to the immigrant population by 
changing the nature of original collective farmland illegally. Since they are 
usually of low construction standard and pay no taxes and situated in areas
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with large amounts of immigrant population such as industrial zones, such 
housing has low risk even if they are discovered and removed because most of 
the investment will be recovered by then.
3. Building formal urban housing on housing land or fields and selling it to urban 
residents illegally. This type of housing is often very low in price since it 
incurs no land leasing payment to the government. Those houses have no 
formal quitclaim deed and therefore cannot be transferred, mortgaged or 
inherited in the legal real estate market, so it is also called ‘small property 
right’ housing. People risk buying those houses without any protection. Once 
those houses are expropriated, they can be neither compensated for nor sold 
back to the collective.
The analysis of the previous chapter shows that the monopolized primary land 
market has been the key to China’s urban governments’ recovery of investments in 
infrastructure and related public services. The practice of developing rural land and 
township governments entering the urban market illegally is little different to the 
practice of illegal duplication of audio and video products and selling them on a black 
market. The poor public services and backward infrastructure in many developing 
countries are caused by the lack of legitimate institution to prevent leakage of income 
from government investment. To avoid this and supported by law, the government 
exerts severe control over land that enters the market illegally, from disallowing 
registration and restricting various transactions to removing housing forcibly. The 
monopoly practices of government effective in protecting the erosion of primary land 
market price by land that enters the market illegally. Large sums of land revenue yield 
quality infrastructure and public services. The price of agricultural land on the edge of 
cities differs greatly from urban land with complete infrastructures, however and 
governments meet strong resistance when assessing expropriated according to its 
agricultural use. The landless peasants do not necessarily grasp the idea that (a) it is 
the government and the urban economy that creates the big rural-urban value gap and 
(b) that the urban value premium is the city’s (and the country’s) lifeline to financial
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solvency and prosperity.
4.4.3 Academic Disputes
Recently academics have joined the dispute over the rights and wrongs of the 
government vs. farmers debate. The government is widely criticized by academics for 
monopolizing primary land markets because, they allege, neither the practices of 
market economies in developed countries nor standard economic theories are able to 
provide necessary explanation and support for this system. The land monopoly 
practiced by a few economies like Singapore and Hong Kong is most of the time 
regarded by theorists as an exception. A report published by the Development 
Research Center of the State Council (Development Research Center of the State 
Council, 2006) pointed out that:
There has always been clear distinction between China’s urban land policies and 
rural ones. Urban land and rural land are subordinate to different systems o f  
rights and managed by different agencies and rules. Besides, as the sole arbiter to 
decide on the transfer from rural land to urban land, the government has the 
exclusive right to requisition rural land and assign it to urban users, (p.l)
This is very unique by international standard no major market economy in the
world maintains absolute division between the cities and countryside in land right, 
management and market as China does. Actually the global trend is quite the 
opposite. These countries are increasingly aware that with further integration o f 
urban and rural economy, the fast growth o f cities and the flow ofpopulation and 
capital, it will be behind the time to treat land differentially. Even though different 
types o f land require different ways ofplanning and different levels o f regulations 
and economic intervention, it is still not the best way to factitiously put urban and 
rural land under two totally separated systems, (p. 9)
Their reasons are explained:
Rural land owners and users are in a disadvantageous position because they can’t 
partake o f the land appreciation incurred when it enters urban market; rural land
149
can be acquired factitiously at low prices, which has encouraged the investment 
model o f more extensive utilization and brought about inefficient urban expansion; 
to local government, land income has become an important way to obtain 
off-budget revenue and a major source to provide subsidies for development, 
which has made the local government wild about land expropriation and land 
transfer; these also create opportunities for corruption and degradation, (p.l)
The main criticism targeted at the government is: “land requisition process and 
compensation standard are deemed unfair by farmers who lose land ownership 
and use right” (Development Research Center o f the State Council, 2006, p.l);
The current practice is quite disadvantageous to rural land owners and users 
because it makes them unable to share the appreciation o f their own land in 
urban market. On the other hand, they can’t launch their own land directly into 
the market either. Meanwhile, the land compensation they get is only related to 
the value when the land is used for farming. Usually only several times the value 
o f agricultural value, the compensation is far lower than the value when it is used 
in the cities for other purposes, (p. 9)
For those owners and users, a ‘fair’ price would enable land owners to share the 
increase of land value from the conversion of agricultural usage into urban usage, or 
rural land should simply be permitted to enter urban land market directly. This report 
of the Development Research Center of the State Council and the World Bank shows 
that the economists circle hasn’t truly understood the underlying meaning of the 
monopoly of land market in China. This viewpoint focuses on the substantive income 
from land use change, but is apparently unaware of the huge financial input that 
creates that premium and the risk associated with it.
4.4.4 City built by government
To simplify, we can apply a general Coasian model to interpret the economic
o o
essence of this problem .
88 In Chapter VI, I discuss the meaning o f the Coase Theorem in pricing mechanisms in a more general
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Let’s replace the farmers in the famous Coase case of cattle-damaged neighbor’s 
grain with village collective i that produces agricultural products and replace the cattle 
rancher with urban government (urban developer) j .  To cultivate or develop land, both 
the collective and the developer need production factor L. For product A, producer i 
needs an input of C,=10 yuan and will get a return of R,=20 yuan and a net surplus of 
S,=10 yuan; for product M, the input is Q=100 yuan, the return Ry=150 yuan and net 
surplus S/=50 yuan. According to Coase Optimum, if there is no transaction cost, the 
net surplus will be S/= 50 yuan when production factor L belongs to producer j. When 
factor L belongs to producer z, producer j  pays 10 yuan to producer i for factor L and 
manufactures product M. The surplus Si of producer i remains the same at 10 yuan 
and the net surplus from product M for producer i will be S,=40 yuan. The total social 
surplus remains unchanged of 50 yuan. However, when there is transaction cost C, 
and the initial property right of the factor belongs to producer j ,  the result remains the 
same. When the right belongs to producer z, the transaction cost has to be lower than 
40 yuan. The lower Ct is, the more producer surplus and the faster expansion there 
will be. Once Ct is higher than 40 yuan, product M will yield no profit and thus the 
production factor will still be used to manufacture product A.
In the primary land market of Chinese cities, the government obtains land after it 
compensates farmers based on the income of original land usage. According to Article 
47 of the Land Administration Law o f the People’s Republic o f China (1998), “For 
requisition of land, compensation shall be given in accordance with the original use of 
the requisitioned land.”
The compensation fee for the cultivated land requisitioned includes a land 
compensation fee, subsidy for resettlement as well as compensation fee for ground 
appendages and young crops. The land compensation fee for the cultivated land 
requisitioned is set at six to ten times the average annual output value in the three 
years prior to requisition. Subsidy for resettlement after the cultivated land has been 
requisitioned is calculated on the basis of the agricultural population that requires
sense.
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resettlement. The rate of subsidy for resettlement per head of the agricultural 
population that requires resettlement is set at four to six times the average annual 
output value in the three years prior to requisition of the cultivated land. However, the 
maximum subsidy for resettlement for cultivated land requisitioned per hectare cannot 
exceed fifteen times the average annual output value in the three years prior to the 
requisition.
Additional subsidy for resettlement may be provided for those peasants who 
require resettlement and cannot maintain their original living standards on the basis of 
the land compensation fee and subsidy for resettlement. However, the total land 
compensation fee and subsidy for resettlement shall not exceed thirty times of the 
average annual output value in the three years prior to requisition of the land. These 
payments are made following these nationally-set guidelines and are subject to the 
approval of the peoples’ governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities.
Returning to the example, 10 yuan compensation corresponds to the situation that 
government absolutely monopolize the primary land market, while 50 yuan 
compensation corresponds to the situation that all the land increment income belongs 
to the landlord. Let’s assume the compensation standard set by the government totally 
offsets the agricultural loss of farmers and any compensation higher than this standard 
means the reduction of government income. If the farmers should share the 
appreciation of their confiscated land in the urban market rather than getting 
compensation related only to its previous farming value (following the 
recommendation of the Development Research Center of the State Council), then 
producer z, (i.e. the manufacturer of product A), will exact more than 10 yuan of 
surplus. Obviously, the transaction could take place when the compensation is in the 
range of 10 to 50 yuan, but the more compensation is exacted, the less income the 
government will get and the slower will be urban expansion and growth. Once the 
surplus that i exacts exceeds 50 yuan, the government will get no surplus and urban 
expansion will cease altogether. This is similar to when producers of crude oil request
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to share the market value of petroleum sales. To transform crude oil into petroleum 
costs something and if the price of crude oil is too high and the price of petroleum 
remains the same, the profit of petroleum refineries will decrease. Once profit of the 
petroleum producers reduces to zero they will quit production.
In other words, it is the optimum land-user that creates land appreciation during 
usage conversion and farmers make no contribution to the appreciation.
The market pricing of land also observes a simple supply-demand relation. When 
supply exceeds demand, the market price of land is determined by land owners - to be 
specific, the landlord who pays the lowest cost. When supply falls short of demand, 
the market price of land is determined by users with a demand for land - to be specific, 
the demander who offers the highest price. Due to the unique character of land 
location, demand for urban land typically exceeds supply and landlords tend to get 
excessive surplus (producer surplus). Therefore, for most economies, the surplus of 
urban developers is often greatly reduced due to exorbitant land prices. Consequently, 
the transformation from agricultural use to urban use will tend to progress rather 
slowly. The decentralization of land owners brings about huge negotiation costs, 
which further adds to the cost of the requisition of land for urban construction. 
Nonetheless, China’s unique system of land monopoly has reversed the 
supply-demand relation.
This has been achieved by the Land Administration Law (1998). There are three 
important clauses. First, the eighth article of the Land Administration Law (1998) 
rules that land in urban areas of cities belongs to the state, thus excluding the 
possibility of other subjects managing urban land and making the government the 
only buyer of rural land and the only seller of serviced primary urban land. The 
government needs not worry about other competitors in the primary land market.
Second, the fourth article of the Land Administration Law (1998) prescribes that 
“The state practices the system of land use control”: “ ...and classifies land as 
farmland, land for construction and unutilized land. Strict restriction shall be imposed
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on turning farmland into land for construction...”. This prevents land owners from 
profiting from changing land usages and turns the government into the sole operator 
of urban land.
Third, the second article of the Land Administration Law (1998) rules that “The 
state may, out of necessity of public interest, requisition land collectively owned in 
accordance with law”, allowing the government to forcibly requisition collective land
o n
in accordance with law .
This institution has greatly lowered the land requisition cost of the government. 
Although farmers on the outskirts of cities share part of the spillover appreciation of 
land through township enterprises and unauthorized buildings (such as so called 
inside-city villages), the regulation that strictly restricts the conversion from rural land 
to construction land has nonetheless effectively reduced the leakage of appreciation
89 There have always been two ways to define “public interests”, one loose and the other strict. Liu 
Shouying and others have blamed local government for confusing “development” with “public 
interests”, arguing that the law hadn’t bestowed local government with the right to requisition 
collective land for any kind o f construction. The newly promulgated Real Right Law (2007) again 
failed to clearly define “public interests”. According to the theories reviewed and applied in this chapter, 
with the absence of property tax, capital for public services and infrastructures comes mainly from the 
appreciation of commercial land. That being so, land assignment in the primary land market, though a 
profit-seeking activity, is still for the sake of the “public interest”. Similarly, to requisition land for 
business promotion is also for the sake of “public interest”, for industrial and commercial tax revenue 
is the financial source o f regular public services.
Recently, even developed countries that levy property tax are inclined to adopt looser explanations of 
“public interests”. On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its ruling 
concerning “Kelo v. City o f New London”, giving a new explanation of the concept “eminent domain”. 
The city of New London, Connecticut, was a small town that used to be located on a militaiy base. Due 
to disarmament, the federal government closed the military base in 1996 and dismissed 1500 
employees. The town lost its economic support and fell on hard economic times. In 1998, its 
unemployment rate reached twice that of the average rate of Connecticut and its population decreased 
to 24,000, a historical low for 80 years. The crisis posed a great challenge to the state government and 
local officials. To revitalize economy, the government made a plan to develop the area which was the 
former naval base. In January 1998, the state government approved the issuing of bonds to finance 
New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private non-profit entity, to carry out urban 
planning activities. The city approved the layout for 90 acres o f land to be used by NLDC for the 
construction of a commercial park. In February 1998, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Limited, a 
pharmaceutical plant with a total investment of 300 million dollars, was established. This plan made 
land requisition necessary and so involved some private land owners. The lead plaintiff in this case, Ms. 
Susette Kelo, lived in a house and was not willing to move out. Although the government offered a 
compensation fee o f 1.6 million dollars, she still hung out a board which read “This house is not for 
sale” on her gate and afterwards sued the city in the Connecticut courts, arguing that the planning target 
of the government was not public use. Finally the case was heard at the Supreme Court o f the United 
States, which in a 5-4 decision vindicated the ruling o f the Supreme Court of Connecticut and 
determined that the land requisition plan of New London complied with the purpose o f “public use” 
specified by law and the application of “paid requisition” by the government o f Connecticut and New 
London also complied with law (see Zhang Xiaomei, American-style “Housing Removal”: Legal 
Conflict in the Dilemma o f Urban Development, China Real Estate Business, 2006-8-14.)
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income caused by free riding land owners. The accumulation of the surplus of urban 
government has not only sustained high-levels of infrastructure and services but also 
equipped China’s export products with extraordinary asymmetric advantage through 
an effective industrial subsidy. It could well be said that this very institutional 
innovation has made China’s urbanization a vital driving wheel of China’s economy 
and even of the world economy (Stiglitz, 2000)90.
4.4.5 Cities built by private sector
Now let’s examine the second situation and assume the rancher in Coase’s 
cattle-damaged neighbor’s grain fable may also raise cattle. In other words, former 
land owners may also give up agricultural production and turn to non-agricultural 
production. Would the government’s monopoly of the primary land market be 
necessary then? This has also been suggested by the Development Research Center of 
the State Council as a way of letting rural land enter urban market. In their opinion, it 
is unrealistic and unreasonable to assume that rural land owners can only manufacture 
agricultural products. The history of urban development in many countries indicates 
that cities may undoubtedly be provided by private or non-governmental corporations. 
This raises another question: whether the government possesses a unique advantage in 
terms of its ability to organize urban construction and management.
According to the theoretical perspective developed in this thesis, when a 
corporation starts to manage a city, it has already taken on the properties of a 
government. The real question is which form of government is more efficient.
Let’s adopt the previous model again and assume the producer of product A is 
entitled to produce product M. Now the question changes from which is the optimum 
property right structure? to who can create the maximum social surplus? Take again, a 
simplified Coase Model and suppose that producers i and j  produce the same product 
M with factor L. The production cost of i is C,=90 yuan, income R,=120 yuan and net 
surplus S/=30 yuan while that of j  is C/=100 yuan, R/=150 yuan and S7=50
90 According to Stiglitz, China’s urbanization is one of the two driving forces of today’s world 
economy. The other is the so-called American “new economy” represented by high technology.
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respectively. According to Coase Optimality, factor L should be owned by j  and now 
the maximum social surplus is So=50 yuan, higher than the 30 yuan when i owns L. 
When there is no transaction cost, the total surplus will be 50 yuan if B owns the 
initial property right of L . If i owns the right, j  offers i 30 yuan to acquire the property 
right of L and f s  surplus S, will decrease to 20 yuan, but the total social surplus will 
remain 50 yuan.
However, when there are transaction costs C, and the owner of the initial property 
right is not the optimal user y, the value of C,, through which the institution is 
executed, becomes extremely important. In reality, seeing the huge income from land 
use change, the village collective will often refuse to accept compensation based on 
the standard of agricultural land and strive to share the surplus of land appreciation by 
one means or other. The higher is the potential income of land, the fiercer will be the 
resistance of the village collective. In order to get the land right, the government has 
to pay additional transaction cost including the cost of demolishing unauthorized 
buildings, preventing farmers from transferring land without permission and 
executing land requisition forcibly. When such transaction costs reach a certain level 
(for instance, when Ct in the previous example exceeds 20 yuan), it will be a 
second-best choice to let agricultural land into the market at a lower efficiency.
We may rank the efficiency of different property rights through a simple 
comparison as follows.
1. When there is no transaction cost Ct, as long as S/>S/ (the government is the 
more efficient land user) whether rural land is allowed into the urban market 
or not, the optimal property right arrangement will be that government j  
compensates village collective i according to the opportunity cost of 
agricultural land to acquire the right to develop. Factor L creates S0 =50 yuan, 
the maximum social net surplus. The only difference is the proportion of 
social surplus retained by the government and village collective. If the use of 
farmland cannot be changed, the government only needs to compensate 10 
yuan and will get a net income of 40 yuan. The economic effects are a weak
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private economy, small income gap, fast urban expansion and a high-level of 
infrastructures and public services. If the use of farmland can be changed, the 
‘fair compensation’ fee will rise to 30 yuan and the surplus of the government 
will decrease dramatically to 20 yuan. The economic effects are an overnight 
‘windfall’ enrichment of village collectives and farmers at good locations, a 
developed private economy, big gap between the rich and the poor, slow 
urbanization and low infrastructure level.
2. When there is transaction cost C, and C,<10 yuan in the example, the optimal 
property right arrangement will still be that the government acquires land 
surplus after compensation. In this case, the total social surplus SG is less than 
50 yuan and greater than 40 yuan. It does not matter whether the government 
has the right to monopolize primary land market (or whether it is allowed to 
change the usage of village collective land) or not. The economic effect will 
be the same as that of the arrangement without transaction cost. Social wealth 
will remain unchanged, but will be redistributed among different groups. The 
essence of the monopoly of the primary land market will now be that the 
economy chooses between strong private enterprise/big income gap and 
strong public service/small rich-poor gap.
3. If C, is greater than 10 yuan, the optimal property right arrangement will be 
that the village collective owns the land and the government gives up its 
monopoly of the primary land market and allows free land use conversion. 
Now the social net surplus SG will be S,=30 yuan, which is created by the 
village collective through maximum utilization of factor L; if the government 
maintains its monopoly of the primary land market, there will be two 
outcomes. First, when C, is less than 40 yuan and greater than 10 yuan, the 
government pays the village collective 10 yuan for compensation and then 
gets the property right of land. The social net surplus SGwill be less than 30 
yuan without government monopoly of the primary land market but greater 
than Sf=10 yuan, which is created by the village collective when land use is
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not changed. Second, if C, is greater than 40 yuan and the village collective is 
not allowed to change land use (the government monopolizes primary land 
market), the optimal property right arrangement will be that the village 
collective utilizes land according to its original usage. The social net surplus 
S0 will now be S, 10 yuan, which is created by the village collective through 
maximum (agricultural) land utilization;
4. The worst property right arrangement is that when S/-C/,<S/f (Q>40 yuan) and 
the government requisitions land forcibly. In this case, the total social surplus 
will always be negative, whatever the form of property right transfer.
When there is no transaction cost, a monopolized primary land market only 
changes the distribution of total social surplus between the two parties without 
changing the amount of the surplus. But when there are transaction costs (which of 
course there always are), total social surplus will depend on whether primary land 
market is monopolized by the government or supplied in the market by the current 
landlord.
4.4.6 Transaction costs from compensation bargaining
In practice, transaction costs are to a large extent caused by the lack of monopoly 
of primary land market. Without government monopoly of the primary land market, 
the usage of rural land will change freely and the location values of land will exhibit 
great variation. Discovering a price, in itself, would imply huge transaction cost. 
Figure 4.1 indicates that it is impossible to set up a uniform land expropriation 
standard since only one location is exactly equal to market value. The actual land 
value will either be higher or lower than a single land requisition standard. As a result, 
landlords at good locations will consider the price too low while landlords at poor 
locations will insist on the same compensation standard with other landlords91. Wide 
disputes over ‘fair’ compensation will arise accordingly.
91 Although most of the media coverage is about land disputes caused by dissatisfaction with low 
compensation price o f land requisition and housing removal, there are many farmers in reality looking 
forward to land requisition and housing removal. The former are mostly landlords nearby cities, while 
the latter are generally farmers in remote areas.
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Currently, dissatisfaction with ‘fair price’ is caused by the fact that a great amount 
of unauthorized construction around the cities has weakened the governments 
monopoly of the primary land market. At the early stage of reform and opening when 
the institution that urban land belonged to the state was strictly implemented, the 
transaction cost of land requisition was actually much lower than today. If rural land 
cannot be used for non-agricultural use, ‘fair compensation’ will unequivocally be the 
opportunity cost of agricultural income and the pricing of land requisition is 
simplified as ‘fair compensation’ price is of the same order for all locations.
price
Value o f location
Value o f compensation
Marketplace
Countryside
<
Insufficient compensation Overcompensation
Figure 4. 1 Difficulty in determining ‘fair’ compensation without governmental 
monopoly of the primary land market
4.4.7 Transaction cost from property tax
The taxation system itself determines the business model of urban government, as 
I have already argued. Once collective land is permitted to enter the urban land market 
freely, public services have to be supported by tax revenues since there are no 
monopoly profits to substitute. Most industrial taxes collected by China’s local 
governments are turned in to the central government and the lack of property tax 
means a huge gap in public services. Apparently the Development Research Center of 
the State Council has realized this point, so they have suggested changing the income
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channel for local government alongside their proposal to abandon a monopolized 
primary land market:
Local finance generally depends on the transaction cost o f land realized mainly 
through land reserve agencies. This practice is unsustainable. It has formed an ill 
mechanism and caused extensiveness and ineffectiveness o f land use. It has 
become the pressing demand o f the moment to try out levying property tax based 
on market value as an optional source o f local finance. With the decrease in land 
transfer income, property tax will replace the current mode and become a 
long-term and sustainable income source o f local finance, (p. 4)
But this brings about anther problem: the collection cost of property tax. The 
assessment, proclamation, collection and supervision of property tax requires 
substantive manpower and material resources that create heavy transaction costs. 
Since property tax is targeted at households rather than organizations, the efficiency 
of collection will vary greatly and the problem of tax evasion is likely to exceed that 
of resisting land requisition and housing removal. To ensure social stability, the 
government will have to exempt certain groups of people from taxation or offer 
rebates. This will definitely lead to leakage of land income. As a result, in developing 
countries with incomplete legal systems, most of the tax sources come from 
organizations that engender low collection costs (business tax, value-added tax, 
enterprise income tax) but not individuals (property tax, personal income tax). 
According to the analysis of this thesis, to impose tax directly on residents with low 
mobility will unavoidably deprive the government of certain power and result in 
increase in democracy and decrease in government efficiency. Once the subsequent 
transaction cost exceeds the cost caused by the landlords’ resistance to land 
requisition and housing removal, the entry of rural land into the urban market will 
probably become a less efficient arrangement than the monopoly of primary land 
market.
The collection of property tax develops with the gradual perfection of legal 
systems improvement of collection efficiency. It cannot be assumed that a modem tax
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system can quickly be established in China as an alternative to the monopoly primary 
land market. When there are no such economic tools in practice, we can only use what 
is available. At the early stage of urbanization when an economy is underdeveloped 
and legal and tax systems are immature, a monopoly primary land market is likely to 
be a more efficient arrangement than the free entry of rural land into an urban market.
A good land monopoly system (like Singapore) may not only lessen dependence 
on tax collection that engenders higher transaction cost, but also realize fair 
distribution of social wealth, especially new wealth from urbanization, across a wider 
range of the population. The reason that landlords are willing to transform land from 
agricultural usage into non-agricultural usage is that the latter is able to yield more 
income due to change in social production mode and relevant input into 
infrastructures. Location has hence overweighed land fertility and become the primary 
element to determine land price. Rather than being created by the investment of the 
landlord, the increase in the value of land at a certain location is mostly the income 
spillover or leakage engendered by change in the usage of nearby land (infrastructures 
such as airports, expressways and parks). If the landlord is permitted to change land 
usage at will, he will be able to get the wealth leakage of other investors for free. This 
kind of free ride is essentially the same as plagiarism and piracy targeted to evade 
patent or copyright system. Due to the uneven distribution of such wealth in space 
(Figure 4.1), the wealth ‘stolen’ by landlords at different locations will vary. Generally 
speaking, this distribution complies with Thunen-Alonso land price curve: landlords 
close to cities can expediently enjoy the location of urban infrastructures and receive 
more spillover wealth; as distance increases, spillover wealth decreases gradually. 
Allowing land into the market freely will bring huge amount of wealth to landlords 
close to cities for free. The villages-in-city commonly seen in Chinese cities are 
typical phenomena of enjoying this kind of socially-generated income for free. The 
wealth of landlords close to cities grows much faster than that of farmers in remote 
areas and even that of most original urban residents. A primary land market 
monopolized by the government makes it possible to avoid land income leakage and
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to redistribute the massive land appreciation premium to a wider range of people. The 
practices of the local government of Singapore and China suggest that the government 
may redistribute new wealth in a bigger spatial scale through low-rent housing or 
agricultural subsidies so as to realize the equilibrium growth of overall social welfare. 
This in return will reduce other social transaction cost arising from uneven 
distribution of social wealth.
Most of the studies of neo-classical economics focus on profit maximization, but 
lack normative analytical theories and tools concerning distribution mechanism. The 
studies of urban land systems indicate that different systems will profoundly impact 
the total amount of wealth that can be distributed across society and change the 
distribution of that social wealth. The selection of a certain system signifies the 
selection of a corresponding distribution model.
4.5 Will government be more efficient?
The recommendation of the Development Research Center of the State Council to 
annul the government's control over and monopoly of land usage and allow rural land 
to enter urban land market freely - is based upon two presumptions. Firstly, 
requisition of rural land engenders huge transaction costs; secondly, the government is 
not the most efficient land user. As mentioned before, the transaction cost in the first 
presumption results from the rent-seeking due to incomplete execution of the 
constitutional regulation that urban land belongs to the state. Due to historical reasons, 
village collectives close to developed coastal cities have already begun to share the 
leakage of land income through township enterprises and unauthorized buildings. This 
has brought about loopholes in land use control. The government’s monopoly of the 
primary land market thus finds itself trying to take the already acquired benefit away 
from those landlords and the fierce resistance of vested interests inevitably results in 
huge transaction costs. Direct entry of rural land into urban market may reduce the 
transaction costs of land requisition and housing removal but would give rise to a 
series of other more expensive transaction cost related to the collection of property tax
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and the uneven distribution of social wealth. Therefore, the transaction costs of 
requisitioning rural land is not induced by land monopoly but by the half-enacted land 
use control.
The key lies with the second presumption, in which the government is less 
efficient at changing land usage compared with former land users. The Development 
Research Center of the State Council suggested that:
Factitious acquisition o f rural land at low prices has fomented investment in more 
extensive land utilization. By stressing outward urban expansion rather than more 
effective utilization o f the existing urban space, it has stimulated ineffective 
utilization o f land (this practice is strengthened by the current urban land system). 
New demand for land for real estate and other commercial developments around 
cities is to a certain extent created artificially, because there is nothing against it 
to bring cheap and ready rural land under control. Other conditions unchanged, 
this mode makes it difficult to design and carry out measures to protect rural land.
(p.9)
This criticism itself is reasonable. The key question is whether the government or 
the village collective is ‘more’ inefficient. My argument so far has been based upon 
the assumption that the government can create more surplus than the village collective. 
If this conclusion does not stand or the situation is the opposite - the village collective 
can build and manage cities better than the government -  then a city developed 
incrementally by village-led redevelopment should be allowed. The principle is that 
the factor of production should be in the hands of the optimal user. In principle, as 
long as the use of rural land is allowed to be changed freely, land will naturally yield 
the maximum income. Theoretically speaking, there are two limitations that make it 
impossible for the village collective to become a more efficient provider of cities than 
the government. One limitation is institutional. The village collective has no power of 
tax collection and thus is unable to support long-term and large-scale infrastructure 
and public services (like schools, airports and power plants). As argued already, 
lump-sum input and staged payback is one method of providing urban infrastructures.
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Without credible preliminary tax revenue, it will be impossible to raise large-scale 
loans through credit systems like banks. Some may argue for granting the power of 
tax collection to the village collective. This question does not affect our discussion: if 
granted the power of taxation, the village collective will turn into a government. As 
discussed before, tax collection also induces cost. The various expenses once imposed 
on China’s countryside (such as food levies) were actually disguised taxes. They were 
withdrawn by the central government due to fierce resistance. The shortage of sources 
of funds has kept public services in the countryside at a fairly low level for a long 
time, forming a sharp contrast with the rapidly maturing infrastructures and public 
services of cities.
4.5.1 Spatial transaction cost
The other limitation is spatial and is often ignored by economists unfamiliar with 
spatial cost. The so called Nanhai Pattern advocated by Jiang, and Liu (2003a, b), 
Zhou (2004) and the State Land Policy Reform Group of the Development Research 
Center of the State Council (2006) included several elements. First, joint-stock land 
centralization: convert the land contracting management rights of farmers into stocks 
and let the economic organization of the village collective centralize the land and 
carry out district planning, management and operation within the framework of a 
farmland protection district, economic development district and a commercial district. 
Farmers receive dividends in accordance with their stocks. Second, the entry of 
collective construction land into the market. According to the Measures o f 
Guangdong Province for the Circulation o f the Right to Use Collective Construction 
Land, collective construction land may be assigned, leased, transferred, subleased and 
mortgaged. Land may be transferred in profit-oriented projects, including commerce, 
tourism and entertainment, following the procedures and methods of open-market 
transaction of state-owned land, realized through bidding, auctioning and listing in the 
land market. Since the property right of rural land is inherently discrete, the Nanhai 
Pattern will inevitably lead to decentralized urban construction, the level of 
decentralization being determined by the size of area covered by collective joint-stock
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centralization. The Nanhai model is the typical pattern of village-led decentralized 
development that emerged at the early stages of Guandong’s development. In this 
model every collective could act a small government.
The biggest difference between the owner of collective land and the government 
is that the spatial range of the former is usually very small. This constrains the scale 
of development since bigger infrastructure will require cooperation from nearby land 
owners. Due to spatial restriction, dispersed owners of collective land can only build 
public service systems like roads, water supply, waste water and rubbish treatment 
within their own scope of property rights. In developed areas like the Pearl River 
Delta, hundreds of waterworks may appear within a single county. Due to the expense 
of treatment cost, waste water is often directly discharged into the natural 
environment without any treatment. The ‘blue-green algae’ outbreaks in Taihu Lake in 
the Yangtze River Delta in recent years are has resulted from random discharges of 
waste water by dispersed township enterprises. The increasing deterioration of the 
environment can often be attributed to lack of coordinated approach to urban facilities 
design and management. Infrastructure costs are mostly functions of size/length. The 
longer a network infrastructure and the higher the capacity, the larger is the 
investment. Roads, bridges, pipelines, post and communications, fire control and 
regional security are all alike. According to the so-called Nanhai Pattern, 
decentralized property rights will inevitably develop into discrete urban spatial 
distributions of public goods and services (Figure 4.2). For scale economy, this model 
is obviously less efficient than a government-dominant model which centralizes land 
requisition and limits the transformation of rural land into urban land. Once a 
decentralized urban model takes shape, the long-term operation cost will lower the 
competitiveness of a city in the long run.
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Figure 4.2 Spatial Distribution of Different Development Models92
Practice shows that the organization level and land utilization efficiency of the 
two models will differ greatly, even if they both develop to cover all rural areas and 
form unified metropolises. The crucial issue is in determining the scale at which any 
particular item of urban infrastructure is most efficiently developed.
The question is most clearly posed in Shenzhen, where there were two 
completely different urbanization models at the very commencement of China’s 
fastest developing Special Economic Zone (SEZ): government-dominant and village 
collective-dominant. Inside the SEZ (four districts including Futian, Shangbu, 
Nanshan and Yantian), the urban government expropriated all the land once and for all. 
With little appreciable leakage of investments in infrastructure, the area inside the 
SEZ turned from a small town with a population of about 15,000 into a super city 
with a population o f millions within a short period o f 20 years. By the end of 2000, 
the permanent population inside the SEZ reached 2,053,000. Outside the SEZ (Bao’an, 
Longgang), based upon the decentralized village collective economy and helped by 
spillover benefits from the urban services and infrastructures o f Hong Kong and
92 These two models would provoke the old but still hot argument about the optimal size of a city. According to 
club theory the smaller club may meet special utility better than that big one. And fiscal federalism also implies the 
independent small jurisdiction may stir up more competition among governments. It is also clear that the different 
types of infrastructure have different scale economy dynamics and therefore different efficient sizes of provision 
area/jurisdiction. In the appendix I frame a general model to deal with the optimal quantity-variety issue. This 
model suggests the expansion of a city would go with the bifurcation of sub-communities so to reduce the utility 
loss. At this point of the thesis, however, I would rather leave this argument open. It needs more evidences as well 
as more pages to explain.
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Shenzhen SEZ, massive industrial clusters came into existence. These admitted 
millions of additional population at extremely low cost. The population outside the 
SEZ came to exceed that inside the zone, reaching 2,276,400 by the year 2000.
In order to contend for foreign investment, the villages kept improving public 
services and infrastructure within their jurisdictions, but the general and strategic level 
of public infrastructure was much lower than that inside the SEZ, for most of the land 
income went to the village collectives and farmers in the form of rent (factory 
buildings, low-rent apartments). In 2000, the green area per capita was 5.8 square 
meters inside the SEZ and just 1.3 square meters outside the SEZ; the number of beds 
in hospitals reached 2.4 per thousand population inside the SEZ and only 0.8 outside 
the SEZ; the annual water consumption per capita was 123.9 cubic meters inside the 
SEZ and 76.3 outside the SEZ. There is even more evident difference in the output 
efficiency of these two models. In 2000, the GDP of per-square-kilometer of 
construction land was 940 million yuan inside the SEZ, but only 110 million yuan in 
Bao’an District and 130 million yuan in Longgang District. Even though there are 
many incomparable elements , twenty years of practice is adequate to prove that 
government-dominant development model (monopoly of primary land market) is 
more efficient than the village collective-dominant model (free change in rural land 
usage). I have to admit this argument is to some extent based on intuition more than 
on reliable evidence. And also I do mean to imply that I want to prove that bigger 
jurisdictions are more efficient than smaller ones. At least it seems unsafe to assume 
arbitrarily that the village collective landlords are able to better protect farmland and 
create more output.
93 For example, the lower GDP/sq meter may simply reflect the distance effect: more productive activities are 
better able to bid for more central locations.
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Figure 4. 3 Scale-time relation of developmental models
In China and East Asia more widely, the coexistence of and competition between 
the two models are quite common, but to different degrees. Examples are Xiamen vs. 
Quanzhou, Suzhou vs. Dongguan, Qingdao vs. Wenzhou and Singapore vs. Taiwan. 
There may be both government-dominant development areas and village 
collective-dominant township enterprises within one city. For instance, the Songshan 
Lake Science and Technology Park of Dongguan City is government-dominant. 
Grounded on the original state-owned land, the Xinzu Science and Technology Park 
and Neihu Science and Technology Park in Taiwan were also initiated by the 
government. In terms o f practical effects, the model in which landlords enjoy large 
shares o f land appreciation benefit has low earlier transaction cost and incurs little 
social obstruction during development. Former landlords can get rich quick and the 
non-governmental economy can develop fast. However, the income flowing to the 
government is relatively low and the level o f pubic service facilities correspondingly 
low. Enterprises are likely to move out of areas developed in this way when they 
develop to the stage that require high-levels of public services. On the contrary, the 
model in which government monopolizes the primary land market has high earlier 
transaction cost and encounters fierce resistance during land requisition and housing 
removal. Nonetheless, the succeeding regular costs are relatively lower and the level 
of public services (including infrastructures) is comparably higher. This model has an
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evident competitive edge while attracting high-end enterprises that request high-level 
services and high quality urban environments. (Figure 4.3)
4.5.2 Transaction cost of credit
The large-scale entry of rural land into urban markets in the Pearl River Delta and 
the decentralized urbanization of Xiaolan Town, Zhongshan City and Nanhai City are 
grounded upon unique institutional causes with credit as the primary factor and it will 
be improper to apply them to all areas. Like all developing countries, the lack of 
credit is the main reason that China finds it difficult to foster a fine division of labour 
and long contracts as developed countries do. In Chinese culture, blood tie is the 
social relation that stores the most credit. With blood ties in the center, social credit 
radiates outward via blood kin, countrymen, schoolmates, comrades in arms and so on 
to form the character o f structure o f grade94 devised by the famous sociologist Fei 
Xiaotong. The only exception is government, where there is a relatively 
impersonalized organization formulated by the powerful tradition of planned economy. 
Government is viewed as the most creditable organization among modem institutions 
in China. No private organizations can be as ‘long-lived’ and capable as government. 
Thus it is understandable that government-related organizations (including enterprises) 
have absorbed most of the capital in economy. Even though the government is 
repeatedly blamed by economists for excessive monopoly of resources, it is playing 
an increasingly important role in China’s economy.
The Pearl River Delta became an exception due to its relation with Hong Kong. 
The complete legal system of Hong Kong ensures the credibility of non-blood 
transactions (without any blood relationship) and long-period agreements. As a result, 
non-blood foreign enterprises preferred to do business in Hong Kong, although they 
knew the manufacturers are actually located in the mainland95. There is close blood tie
94 In the opinion of Fei Xiaotong, the base structure of Chinese society “centers on ‘oneself and 
spreads out like a piece o f stone cast into water. The relation with others...is like ripples, radiating out 
one circle after another. The farther the ripple, the thinner it is and the more indifferent ‘oneself will 
be.” (Earthbound China, 1937, p.27). In China’s grass-roots society, both blood ties and geo-ties are 
confined within the character o f structure of grade encircled by these ripples.
95 In 1991, 80% o f Hong Kong people spoke Cantonese (Zhu, 1991).
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between Hong Kong and the mainland, especially among Pearl River Delta 
communities, so the transactions between them became sufficiently creditable. From 
1986 to 1991, 60% of the foreign investment of China came from Hong Kong 
(Redding 1995), 40% of which landed in Guangdong (the World Bank 1997). This 
unique credit system backed the unusual development model of Guangdong. In the 
most part of China, however, there is no such legal environment, so the government 
has to act as the major credit provider at the stage of economic start-up. During this 
stage, the government will be more efficient than former collective landlords if it 
owns the key factors (especially land).
4.5.3 Governmental monopoly of the primary land market
I have argued in various ways that the government’s monopoly of the primary 
land market is not as inefficient and unfair as widely deemed by current academic and 
popular debates. Rather, it is an option for low transaction cost during the stage when 
China’s legal and credit systems are immature and when there is no property tax. This 
institution has effectively avoided the difficulty of determining compensation 
standards; maintained fair opportunities for farmers both close to and far from cities; 
and evaded the huge institutional cost of property tax. It has thus contributed to the 
provision of high-level intensive infrastructures. It is also extremely important that the 
government’s control over the primary land market has to a large extent, lessened the 
free riding problem in respect to the provision of public goods and services. It has 
enabled China’s urban governments to get large-scale and long-period investments 
within a short time and hence unfolded an amazing urbanization course at an 
unprecedented speed and scale.
Rather than an incidental economic outcome, China’s rapid economic growth has 
profound institutional explanations. Government’s monopoly of the primary land 
market, a unique institutional legacy of the planned economy, has given rise to the 
special competitive edge of the business model of Chinese cities. Many developing 
countries exercise the system of private land ownership rather than a state land 
monopoly, but few of them are able to achieve the extensive successes of China’s
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urban governments. In recent years, India has also made attempts to develop SEZ. 
However, it encountered strong resistance during this process, because of the huge 
transaction costs needed to forge a truly competitive edge96.
The Indian government planned to open up a SEZ, introduce a large Indian 
company and build a petrochemical plant at Nandigram of West Bengal, but 
encountered strong opposition from the local residents during land requisition. It was 
estimated that over a 3 month period in 2007, about 40,000 Indian farmers who lost 
their land due to this SEZ plan dug and broke roads and set up road-blocks to prevent 
government officials from entering Nandigram. Local police attempted to restore 
order by entering this area with force and came into conflict with the villagers. The 
police used tear gas and rubber bullets and 14 civilians were killed and dozens of 
people injured during the conflict. This incident led to a strike that spread over the 
state of West Bengal. On March 18, 2007, the government of West Bengal decided 
that the SEZ originally planned to be build in Nandigram would be relocated.
According to some commentators, those farmers were not against the SEZ in 
principle. What they wanted was to share the income of land appreciation. They were 
reported to have either refused to sell their land and attempted to make higher offers 
or requested to negotiate face-to-face with foreign investors. (Xinhuanet 2007)
The experience of Singapore shows that even where there is a relatively complete 
legal system and an advanced economy, strict control over land usage is still an 
effective way to provide a high-level of public services. The two institutions, namely 
monopoly of primary land market and free entry of rural land into urban market, 
should be viewed specifically. The monopoly of the primary land market may only
96 The Indian government was recently compelled to lay aside parts o f its SEZ plan. The Indian 
government had originally planned to open up about 600 SEZs and attract foreign investors through tax 
reduction and exemption and the provision of modem infrastructures. It hoped that these SEZs that 
closely follow China’s model would become the mainstay o f India’s manufacturing industry and create 
employment for thousands o f farmers left out by India’s economic prosperity. By the end of last year, 
India has authorized 237 SEZ plans. However, the farmers o f India seemed unwilling to accept the 
“good will” o f the government. Since January this year, a series o f violent protests took place due to 
farmers’ refusal to transfer their land. The most serious protest occurred in Nandigram of West Bengal. 
Plans for sixty-three authorized SEZs had to be suspended. (Xinhuanet, 2007-03-20, 07:48)
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show an effect when transaction costs are low enough. This wasn’t the case in India 
where property rights are very decentralized. In Singapore, the widespread land rights 
of the state have been preserved since the country’s foundation. When the 
transaction costs of government action are high, a government can only opt for the 
second-best institution that loosens rural land conversion and allows landlords close 
to cities to free ride and obtain windfall land premiums.
4.6 Conclusion
Coase pointed out as early as 1988 that:
Without some knowledge o f  what would be achieved with alternative institutional 
arrangements, it is impossible to choose sensibly among them. We therefore need 
a theoretical system capable o f analyzing the effects o f changes in these 
arrangements. To do this it is not necessary to abandon standard economic theory, 
but it does mean incorporating transaction cost into the analysis, since so much 
that happens in economic system is designed either to reduce transaction cost or 
to make possible what their existence prevents. No doubt other factors should also 
be added. But it is not easy to improve the analysis without more knowledge than 
we now possess about how economic activities are actually carried out. (p30)
The proposition that urban government is an enterprise that manages territory 
provides a theoretical foundation for the introduction of institutional analysis into 
urban planning. According to Olson, the market will not supply public goods 
automatically. Traditional economics has failed to fully explain the rapid economic 
growth of China over the last 30 years97. However, if seen from the perspective of 
institutional economics, China’s economic growth is not mysterious at all. The key is 
that the urban governments of coastal cities of China have discovered a low-cost and 
efficient business model to reduce the transaction cost engendered by free riders and 
to provide collective products on a large scale even in the absence of a mature
97 Steven N. S. Cheung recalled that as early as 1979, at the early stage o f reform and opening, Milton 
Friedman had made a prediction that: “The man who can explain China’s economy should be awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics”.
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municipal fiscal system. The main task of entrepreneurs is to originate a business 
model through institutional design so as to supply this potential benefit in a profitable 
way. China’s land institutions have played a key role in the efficient allocation of 
factors. Collective action (in consumption and production) have huge potential 
benefits and these have been organized via a state monopoly of the primary land 
market . The institutional structures governing land have been a key to the fast 
development of Chinese cities.
A basic premise of this chapter is an old one in economics: that land appreciation 
should belong to its creator, whether the creator is the former landlord or new 
developer. Currently in China, land appreciation is caused by infrastructures and 
public goods supplied by the government, so with the absence of property tax, 
government’s monopoly of primary land markets is a reasonable and justifiable 
institutional arrangement. However, it needs to be stressed that the arguments of this 
chapter in defense of this monopoly are chiefly targeted at the “mainstream 
viewpoint” that denies a role for such monopoly and advocates that landlords should 
own all income from land appreciation. In empirical studies in the following chapter, I 
explore a development of this position. I argue that the optimal land allocation mode 
is neither to allocate all land appreciation to farmers - in this case the government will 
lose its motive to invest in infrastructures; nor to allocate to the state -  for the 
transaction cost of acquiring land would be progressively high in a rapidly maturing 
economy. The allocation of land income should be something in between. To ensure 
that transactions are successfully carried through, both the government and farmers 
should obtain positive profit.
Under this condition, allocation partial to landlords will lead to poor public 
services but a powerful private economy; allocation in favor of government will bring 
about outstanding public services but an underdeveloped private economy. As a firm 
that manages territory, the government owns incomplete land property rights, as is the 
same with the landlords. Who should possess a majority of the bundle of property 
rights may lie not with the so-called principle of fairness advocated by some
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economists, but with the competitiveness of both models. In essence, the two options 
are a trade-off of interests. If there are only limited resources, we can either use them 
to consolidate a large ship for higher collective safety, or distribute one swimming 
ring to each crew for higher personal safety. Different choices are not only affected by 
cultural traditions and national characters, but also determined by the relation between 
the ‘ship’ and ‘crew’(owner or employee). No matter which model is deemed better or 
worse, market competition will surely eliminate the least efficient model.
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CHAPTER 5
INPUT-OUTPUT MODE OF URBAN GOVERNMENT
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters I have proposed an enterprise framework of territorial 
management to understand Chinese local governments, their business models and the 
driving force behind China’s economic growth. In my analysis, land leasing revenue 
is an integral part of the business model. The combination of lump-sum land leasing 
revenue and long-term regular taxation forms a unique capital circulation system in 
Chinese cities.
In this chapter I take the city of Xiamen as a case study, to illustrate details of the 
financing of public service provision. In the first half of the chapter, I focus on how 
land leasing revenue works as a profit model in Xiamen’s capital circulation. In the 
second half I use case studies to further illustrate the processes of urbanization 
dominated by municipal government entrepreneurialism and to evidence the claims 
made in previous chapters. From these cases, I conclude that institutional design is 
decisive to economic development. As long as competition exists between 
governments, governments will be driven to improve their service provision whatever 
monopoly privilege they have.
5.2 Financial Structure of a Chinese Local Government
To analyze Xiamen’s financial structure in accordance with my proposition, I first 
divided local revenue and expenditure into two categories, lump-sum/fixed and 
regular/variable. Also, in order to keep data consistence from different sources, 
officially available data are used from 2000 to 2006.
Xiamen’s budgetary revenue and expenditure showed an increasing budget deficit,
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growing at an annual rate of 42.8% between 2000 to 2004. From 2005 to 2006, 
however, Xiames’s budget deficit had started to decreased and local budgetary 
revenue experienced a substantial increase. Land leasing revenue went up greatly in 
this period (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1).
On the basis of a division into fixed and variable cost, I have classified local 
expenditure into four groups: (1) regular operating expenditure, including operating 
expenses of government departments such as public transportation, culture, sports, 
broadcasting, education, health care, sanitation, science, government administration, 
public security, procurement, court of justice, subsidies and so on; (2) regular 
construction expenditure, including expenditures for urban maintenance, science and 
technology promotion, environmental protection and support for rural production; (3) 
significant construction expenditure, including expenditure on capital construction, 
additional appropriation for enterprises and debts; and (4) other expenditure, 
including expenditure on various funds and other construction (See Table 5.2). 
So-called funds are those taxes that have an appointed use and are managed by the governments.
Table 5. 1 Xiamen’s local revenue and expenditure (unit: million yuan)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Local budgetary 
revenue 5,185.11 6,530.90 6,427.18 7,339.07 6,822.60 10,380.56 14,390.88
Local budgetary 
expenditure 5,896.36 7,430.95 8,218.43 9,025.10 10,158.90 12,723.91 15,912.53
Local budgetary 
balance -711.25 -900.05 -1,791.25 -1,686.03 -3,336.30 -2,343.35 -1,521.65
Land leasing revenue 1,676.69 2,523.17 3,957.02 2,947.56 4,424.38 5,466.99 16,412.71
Budgetary balance + 
land leasing revenue 965.44 1,623.12 2,165.77 1,261.53 1,088.09 3,123.64 14,891.06
Source: Yearbook o f  Xiamen Special Economic Zone
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Figure 5. 1 Local finance o f Xiamen Municipality
Note: This set of data shows that Xiamen’s budget is in deficit when excluding land leasing revenue. 
Note that after 2005 the surplus goes up dramatically due to a big increase in land leasing revenue. 
Since 2004, all commercial land must be leased via inviting bids, auction and listing. A heated real 
estate market and the opening up of land market expanded primary land leasing revenues sharply.
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Table 5. 2 Classification of Xiamen’s expenditures (unit: million yuan)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
total expenditures 5,896.36 7,430.95 8,218.43 90,25.10 10,158.90 12,723.91 15,912.53
subtotal 3,022.74 4,717.56 5,234.46 5,723.82 6,193.14 7,282.54 9,071.21
public
transportation 192.43 233.25 317.96 336.65 450.98 538.73 672.59
culture, sports and 
broadcasting 238.84 255.21 256.21 264.13 286.54 365.29 511.00
education 776.14 949.27 939.92 1,107.53 1,147.94 1,306.51 1,638.56
Health care and 
sanitation 244.86 264.84 296.25 336.59 389.68 457.68 622.94
Regular
operating
expenditures
Science 29.35 38.57 40.75 44.65 51.20 51.45 59.35
other departments 193.75 363.37 340.15 390.29 518.64 623.36 768.35
Government
administration 282.31 349.19 411.30 506.86 609.87 722.38 899.70
public security 
agency, 
procuratorial 
agency and court 
of justice
294.85 358.29 450.86 595.86 641.82 754.55 971.37
Subsidies 67.06 58.58 45.41 59.55 35.06 40.16 89.78
Others 703.15 1,125.18 1,270.69 1,218.41 1,098.12 1,238.16 1,377.70
Subtotal 602.05 642.99 605.13 542.25 524.81 662.35 912.33
Urban
maintenance 176.01 276.13 211.29 247.29 230.85 278.93 436.73
Regular
constructive
expenditures
innovation, 
science and 
technology 
promotion
237.13 181.20 192.67 226.26 277.26 352.71 422.93
environmental
protection 68.70 16.70 30.71 52.67
supporting rural 
production 188.91 185.66 201.17
Subtotal 1,368.61 1,375.00 1,643.17 2,093.14 2,788.02 3,850.21 4,590.91
Significant
capital
construction 757.48 663.76 1,042.74 791.01 957.90 1,290.36 1,719.13
construction
expenditures
additional 
appropriation for 
enterprises
458.98 644.23 565.60 894.64 1,295.84 1,547.34 1,600.92
debt expenditures 152.15 67.01 34.83 407.49 534.28 1,012.51 1,270.86
Other construction expenditure 40 10.71 366.62 434.03
expenditure for funds 360.73 372.41 309.71 562.19 904.05
Source: Adapted from Yearbook o f  Xiamen Special Economic Zone
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Figure 5. 2 Regular and lump-sum finance of Xiamen Municipal Government 
Source: Adapted from Yearbook o f Xiamen Special Economic Zone
Note: This group o f  data evidences the proposition that the investment scale o f  fixed assets (significant 
projects) o f  local government is determined by the amount o f  land leasing revenue. The lump-sum land 
leasing revenue generally equals the lump-sum fixed cost.
This classification shows that from 2000 to 2004 Xiamen’s budgetary revenue 
only roughly covered regular expenditure for department operation and construction 
(variable cost), while the expenditure of significant construction (fixed cost) must be 
balanced with land leasing revenue. The significant construction expenditure includes 
expenditure for capital construction and additional rural land appropriation for 
enterprises. The former includes roads, parks, cultural and sports centers and so on, 
and the latter includes land expropriation for construction of industrial parks. Land 
leasing revenue is mainly used for the construction and renewal o f the fixed assets of 
urbanization and industrialization. This amounts to turning land leasing revenue into 
subsidies for industrialization and thereby converting lump-sum land leasing revenue 
into regular budgetary revenue from business tax. With subsidised industrialization 
the tax base broadened. Thus from 2005 to 2006, Xiamen’s tax revenue increased to 
cover part of capital investment (Figure 5.2)
The data reveal additional information about how the Xiamen government
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subsidizes industrialization using land leasing revenue.
Table 5. 3 Land use composition of Xiamen’s leased land by area
Area (square meter) Composition
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 7,365,279 8,652,614 7,042,737 9,185,908 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Industrial use 5,804,111 6,818,740 5,744,207 6,272,092 78.8% 78.8% 81.6% 68.3%
Infrastructures and 
public buildings 298,891 282,666 419,199 558,720 4.1% 3.3% 6.0% 6.1%
Residential and 
commercial use 1,262,277 1,524,021 879,331 2,350,086 17.1% 17.6% 12.5% 25.6%
Others - 27,187 - 5,010 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
Source: data issued on the website of Xiamen Municipal Land, Resources & Housing Administrative 
Bureau
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Figure 5. 3 Land use composition of Xiamen’s leased land by area
Source: data issued on the website of Xiamen Municipal Land, Resources & Housing Administrative 
Bureau
Firstly, data on land use and price reveals the subsidization. Of the lots of land 
leased in recent years, 70-80% are used for manufacturing, mining and warehouses. 
By contrast, residential and commercial uses only take up 15% to 25% (Table 5.3,
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Figure 5.3). But with regard to land value, the situation is quite the opposite. The 
value of industrial land accounts for only 20% of the total value while residential and 
commercial land uses take account for about 80% (Table 5.4, Figure 5.4). During the 
period 2003 to 2006, the price of residential and commercial land averaged at 5,331 
yuan per square meter, yet the price of industrial land was as cheap as 198 yuan per 
square meter. This was even lower than the developmental cost including land 
expropriation and infrastructure. In the case of Tong’an Industrial Park - a new 
industrial area launched in 2005 in a Xiamen suburb -  expropriation costs were 108 
yuan per square meter on average and infrastructure investment about 443 yuan per 
square meter (Figure 5.5). The difference between the development cost and price of 
industrial land is the subsidy of the government aimed at attracting the investment. 
Normally, local governments would not use their regular tax income to cover the 
subsidy. They would divide the land into two parts: the residential-business land, 
which can make profit from the open market, and the industrial land, which would be 
sold to the enterprises at subsidized price. To make ends meet, local government 
would take the income from open market to cover the ullage of the development cost 
of industrial land.
Table 5. 4 Land use composition of Xiamen’s leased land by Price
Transaction value (million yuan) Composition
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 2,947.56 4,424.38 5,466.99 13,974.50 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Industrial use 629.10 936.97 1,032.42 1,735.64 21.3% 21.2% 18.9% 12.4%
Land use for infrastructures 
and public building 66.77 61.32 80.08 134.67 2.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.0%
Residential and 
commercial use 2,251.69 3,425.72 4,354.49 12,043.69 76.4% 77.4% 79.7% 86.2%
Others - 0.38 - 60.50 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%
Source: data issued on the website o f Xiamen Municipal Land, Resources & Housing Administrative 
Bureau
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Figure 5. 4 Land use composition of Xiamen’s leased land by price
Source: data issued on the website of Xiamen Municipal Land, Resources & Housing Administrative
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Figure 5. 5 Land value comparison of leasing price, developmental cost and expropriation 
compensation in Xiamen (2003-2006)
Source: data issued on the website of Xiamen Municipal Land, Resources & Housing Administrative 
Bureau
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Why does the government have to subsidize industrialization? The answer is in 
the financial switch from lump-sum land leasing revenue to regular tax revenue. The 
financial structure of Xiamen clearly reveals the financial switch. Before 2005, 
although there was land leasing revenue, Xiamen’s finance relied mainly on budgetary 
revenue, which made up 60-70% of total revenue (Table 5.1). The structure of 
Xiamen’s budgetary revenue can be classified in the following way: (1) business tax 
and corporate income tax; (2) agricultural taxes; (3) administrative fees, including 
administrative charges, penalty and confiscatory income, and special project income; 
(4) net income of state-owned enterprises; (5) fund income; and (6) others. In this 
classification, business tax and corporate income tax are one of the most important 
revenue sources, accounting for 80% of total budgetary revenues (Table 5.5, Figure 
5.6), equaling half of overall local revenues.
Table 5. 5 Classification of Xiamen’s Local Revenue (unit: million yuan)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total local revenue 4,187.58 5,185.11 6,530.90 6,427.18 7,339.07 6,822.60
Business tax and 
corporate 
income tax
Subtotal 3,435.52 4,488.34 4,231.48 4,748.02 5,981.08 5,360.28
# Business tax 2,901.55 3,620.93 4,231.48 4,748.37 5,067.46 4,177.54
Corporate income tax 533.97 867.41 -0.35 913.62 1,182.74
Agricultural taxes 185.84 182.41 236.72 293.40 373.07 469.00
Administrative
fees
Subtotal 397.75 311.83 347.22 318.37 623.54 496.67
Administrative
charges 272.02 181.34 102.02 71.10 265.48 204.93
Penalty and 
confiscatory income 115.34 93.06 169.65 136.92
Special project 
income 125.73 130.49 129.86 154.21 188.41 154.82
Net income of
state-owned
enterprise
Subtotal 3.11 17.15 15.59 22.09 17.99 116.99
Profit 5.09 17.15 1559 22.09 1799 11,699
Subsidies -1.98
Others 41.67 18.92 1,527.63 860.15 18.88 58.59
Fund income 123.69 166.46 172.26 185.15 324.51 321.07
Source: Yearbook o f  Xiamen Special Economic Zone
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Figure 5. 6 Local Revenue Structure o f Xiamen Municipal Government
Source: Yearbook o f Xiamen Special Economic Zone
If there were a lack of business and corporate income tax, there would be a huge 
gap in regular expenditure and from this we can infer that direct land leasing income 
is not the ultimate purpose of the government. The government aims at transforming 
this income into long-term sustainable income.
Next let us shift our attention of finance from the city level to project level and 
look at how urban government manages the financing of particular projects. These 
examples further reveal the business nature of city government. Case studies are 
Tong’an Industrial Park, Xiamen Software Park, Xiang’an New Town and Xiamen 
Culture & Art Center.
5.3 Project financing of Xiamen Municipal Government
5.3.1 Project financing
First a world of explanation about the development process in Xiamen. 
State-owned enterprises often play a role o f developmental agents for governments. 
The personnel and finance of these enterprises are under government’s control, but in
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the market they run like common enterprises. The Xiamen Land Development 
Company is subordinate to the governmental land department: Xiamen Municipal 
Land, Resources and Housing Administrative Bureau. The company expropriates and 
reserves land on behalf of the municipal government. It also acts like a project 
manager to carry out government’s construction projects of infrastructures and public 
service. In addition, some other state-owned enterprises serve as construction agents. 
Through open bidding in the market, the construction agents further subcontract 
individual projects. Construction investment must be audited by governmental 
financial departments. Land development companies will auction the urbanized land 
in open market. All incomes will be managed by governmental financial departments.
Through this process, the government sets up its input-output system based on 
primary land market. This system primarily operates for new construction of urban 
infrastructure. Once the construction is completed, the government will take over the 
maintenance. Payment of the maintenance will come from tax revenue. In Xiamen, 
each significant construction project (such as those discussed later in this section) has 
its own headquarters to organize finance from land value extraction. After the project 
is completed, the accounts will be closed and the project will be handed over to newly 
established management committee for routine maintenance and management.
In implementing development projects in this way, the Xiamen Municipal 
Government has sought “Four Balances” of urban management in recent years. The 
so-called Four Balances refer to ‘on-the-spot balance, tense balance, proactive 
balance and comprehensive balance’. ‘On-the-spot balance’ means to carefully 
calculate the input and return of each construction project in advance, to make sure 
that the project is financially sustainable and that the investment will not eventually 
become a drain on the government’s variable budgetary expenditure nor cause debt 
pressure. ‘Proactive balance’ asks project managers to actively manage the financing 
process. For instance, usually a significant construction project needs loans from 
China Development Bank. However, sometimes the project has been launched but the 
loans are not ready yet. To keep the project on schedule, the municipal government
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has then to find short term finance from commercial banks or from its budgetary 
expenditure and get reimbursed later. ‘Tense balance’ means to complete the project 
and pay back the loans as early as possible since interest causes project costs to 
increase. Finally, ‘comprehensive balance’ seeks a balance in the overall portfolio and 
allows profits from one project to help with the start-up of another project.
The concept of Four Balances was first proposed by Mr. He Lifeng, the party 
chief of Xiamen. After He Lifeng became the top leader of Xiamen in 2005, he 
initiated a series o f industrial park developments and built up three steps: designating 
a developmental areas, setting up an independent headquarters, and opening up an 
independent account within the general municipal finance system. The headquarters is 
similar to the development corporation of a new town in the UK, but it is a temporary 
organization whose power comes from a collection of official departments rather than 
a separate legal authority. All designated project areas must create their own financing 
mechanism and must demonstrate that once built and occupied, they make no draw at 
all on the governmental budgetary expenditure. Extraction of land values thus 
becomes a necessary financing mechanism.
The standard steps are as follows. 1) To divide the land into three parts: 
residential and commercial land, which government can make money from; industrial 
land, to be leased to the enterprises at discount price; and land for infrastructure such 
as roads, pipelines, power stations, schools and so on. 2) To build the standard 
workshops and sell them to enterprises, which can create demand of residential and 
commercial land and create a local property boom in surrounding areas. 3) Residential 
and commercial land is preserved in advance and leased later when the industrial park 
is completed and land values have risen. Thus the income from residential and 
commercial land leasing can make up the loss from low valued industrial land and 
infrastructure. 4) If the investment and return can be financially balanced, tax income 
in the future will be a ‘free lunch’.
This practice is actually a combination of the two economic circulations 
mentioned in the previous chapters. The following examples show typical practices of
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on-the-spot balance and comprehensive balance.
5.3.2 Tong’an Industrial Park
The area of Tong’an Industrial Park is 1,199.81 hectares, of which industrial land 
occupies 691.51 hectares. The expected population is about 120 to 140 thousand 
persons. On-the-spot financial balance was created by three mechanisms: (1) leasing 
the industrial land at the price of 225 yuan per square meter; (2) leasing the 
developable land reserve to the expropriated village at the price of its preparation cost, 
600 yuan per square meter; (3) leasing the commercial land via inviting tenders, 
auction and listing with base price from 900 to 1200 yuan per square meter. Finally, 
the total cost of the project was estimated at 2,594 million yuan and the total income 
from land leasing was 2,675 million yuan, giving a surplus of 81 million yuan (Table 
5.6, Figure 5.7-5.10)
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Tong’an Industrial Park
Xiamen
Figure 5. 7 Location o f Tong’an Industrial Park 
Source: Xiamen Urban Planning Bureau
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Figure 5. 8 Map o f status quo o f land use 
Source: Xiamen Urban Planning Bureau
Figure 5. 9 Map of land use planning 
Source: Xiamen Urban Planning Bureau
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Table 5. 6 financing plan o f Tong’an Industrial Park
Area o f leased land 
(hectare)
Unit price 
(yuan/square meter)
Amount 
(million yuan)
Developmental
cost
Total cost 2,594.13
# Land expropriation 1,352.61
Infrastructures and 
facilities 905.91
Other cost related to 
construction 85.97
Land leasing 
income
Total income 2,675.39
# Inner industrial land 421.29 225 947.90
Base price for leasing 
inner commercial land 124.36 900
1,119.24
Developmental land 
reserve for the 
expropriated village
31.25 600 187.50
Outer commercial land 
leasing A 1 8.31
1219 101.31
Outer commercial land 
leasing A2 13.52 1219
164.78
Outer commercial land 
leasing A3 18.03
858 154.66
Project budget balance 81.26
* The financing plan changes according to development conditions. The data quoted here is an 
estimated value at a certain phase o f the project but not the final result.
Source: Xiamen Municipal Government.
190
3*5983
19989
Figure 5. 10 Standard Factories o f Tong’an Industrial Park 
Source: author’s own photograph
The municipal government’s role in this project is to ‘produce’ and ‘sell’ the 
primary land ‘product’, leaving further development, operation and marketing to the 
executive committee o f the industrial park. An input-output chain is formed between 
the government and the committee. The output o f the government is the input o f the 
committee. The government makes a finance plan to return its own investment. As for 
the industrial park, its finance plan generates capital from investors, sales o f factory 
and office buildings, management fees and so on.
Tong’an Industrial Park is a ‘primary land product’ o f the municipal government. 
By contrast, Xiamen Software Park can be seen a ‘secondary land product’, as 
explained in the following.
5.3.3 Xiamen Software Park and Xiangan New Town
Xiamen Software Park is located in the east o f Xiamen Island. Its area is 106.3 
hectares. The total floor area is 1,636.4 thousand square meters. The project was 
launched on the sixth o f September 2005 and completed in September 2007. While 
industrial parks occupy large areas of land for mass production, what software parks 
aggregate is brain power, such as producer services, consumer services, banks, R&D 
and venture capital. This requires a mixed o f activities o f work, living, consumption,
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entertainment and innovation. Xiamen Software Park’s land use is therefore denser 
and more diversified than the industrial park. Its main spatial products are complexes 
of R&D buildings, apartments, hotels, clubs, shopping centers, restaurants and cafes 
and quality open space. On this basis, the finance plan of Xiamen Software Park rests 
on the one hand on the sale of R&D buildings, hotel apartments, residential 
apartments, ground-floor shops and underground garages; and on the other, the 
leasing of hotels, cultural and sports centers, clubs, public buildings, supermarkets 
and cafeterias. Sales income is estimated 4,779 million yuan. After deducting total 
investment cost 3,809 million yuan and sales tax 465 million yuan, the nei profit is 
505 million yuan.
The development o f Xiang’an New Town includes infrastructure, culture and 
sports centers, commercial plazas, relocation communities for land expropriated 
farmers, affordable housing, an administration centre and so on. Commercial land 
leasing is the main source of financing in this project. The base prices o f residential 
land and commercial land are 700 and 2,500 yuan per square meter respectively. Floor 
areas o f residential land and commercial land are planned at 1,760 and 610 thousand 
square meters respectively. Land leasing income is estimated 2,756 million yuan. 
After deducting the total developmental cost 1,413 million yuan, the net profit is 
1,343 million yuan.
The common features o f the three projects described are: (1) the land for 
development is obtained from rural land expropriation; (2) the finance plans rely on 
residential and commercial land leasing; (3) the returns cover the investments.
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Figure 5.11 Planning Map o f Xiamen Software Park 
Source: Xiamen Urban Planning Bureau
5.3.4 Xiamen Culture & Art Center
Differing from the ‘on-the-spot balance’ o f the above projects, Xiamen Culture & 
Art Center was completed on an old industrial location and was an investment 
requiring municipal budgetary expenditure. The characteristics o f this project are: (1) 
project land was not obtained from rural land expropriation but from the relocation of 
the state-owned Xiagong Group. The municipal government negotiated a 
compensation paid to the Xiagong Group, which paid for use rights of this lot of 
state-owned land; (2) on-the-spot balance is not applicable to this project because 
most o f the land is used for large-scale public buildings such as Cultural & Art Center, 
Worker’s Gymnasium, and a Planning Exhibition Hall. The small proportion o f land 
reserved for commercial leasing cannot balance the investment (Table 5.7).
The project is not directly self funding and needs to be supported by budgetary 
transfer from the earnings o f other projects. That is not to say that it is not 
cost-recovering in a broader sense. Actually it will help appreciate the value o f nearby 
land as well as in Xiamen Island as a whole. Logically, investment returns o f  
government’s non-profit projects can be realized through the increase o f  property
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values influenced by the spill-over effect of the project. This could, in principle, be 
recovered via property tax but that is not currently an option in Xiamen. Therefore, 
finance plan for such projects usually rely on the proceeds from the city’s monopoly 
over the primary land market: the value gap between rural land expropriation and 
urbanized land leasing.
If the Xiamen Culture & Art Center project had been developed on rural land, 
there would have been adjacent rural land from which considerable value could be 
captured. However, being developed on re-used industrial land, the location was 
surrounded by developed communities and the increase of land value caused by the 
project is shared by surrounding property owners for free. Compared to the customary 
manner of project financing, this reflects a huge financial gap for the government and 
the gap had to be filled from the city’s recurrent budget. Regular revenue from the 
Centre is limited and just enough to sustain routine administrative expenditure. The 
project shows that as urban development gradually shifts from primary to secondary 
land markets, the financial model that has sustained such rapid urban growth in recent 
years will come under stress and the requirement for a property tax system will 
become more and more urgent.
Table 5. 7 Financing plans of the example projects
Cost (100 million yuan) Income (100 million yuan) surplus (100
items Amount Items Amount million yuan)
Total 26.77
Industrial land 
leasing 9.48
Tong’an
Industrial Total cost 25.94
Inner commercial 
land leasing 11.19 0.81
Park development land 
reserve leasing 1.88
Outer residential 
and commercial 
land leasing
4.21
Xiamen
Software
Total cost 42.74 Total income 47.79 + X 5.05 + X
Development cost 38.09 Sales income 47.79
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Park Sales taxes 4.65 Entrusted lease X
Xiang’an 
New Town Total cost 14.13 land leasing 27.56 13.43
Total cost 14.85
Compensation to 
removal o f  Xiagong 
Group
6.68
Xiamen 
Culture &
Culture & Art 
Center 4.5 land leasing 4 -10.85
Art Center Workers
Gymnasium 2.02
Sports center 1.20
Planning Exhibition 
Hall 0.45
Source: Xiamen Municipal Government
5.3.5 Relations of input and output
Apart from illustrating the process of land finance, these examples also show how 
financing methods influence government’s economic behavior. They illustrate how 
China’s local governments can erect large-scale infrastructure rapidly and acquire 
global competitiveness through subsidizing manufacturing industries. It also explains 
why China’s local development prefers to start from peripheral locations where land 
value is easer to extract using government’s monopoly in the primary land market. 
The alternative -  redeveloping the inner cities - is less attractive because land 
expropriation is much more expensive and there is less chance of recovering land 
uplift from neighbouring sites. Without the margin of land appreciation, as an 
enterprise, Chinese local governments have no significant source o f income.
Without the ability to recover costs from land appreciation, and in the absence of 
property tax, investment in non-profit public facilities become ‘charity deeds’ that can 
only be performed once in a while. Apart from charitable agencies with regular 
streams o f income from altruistic givers, no enterprise can stand on the foundation of 
charity deeds that incur costs but no financial yield. Even from the viewpoint of 
morality, it seems unfair to benefit a small group of residents using the revenue 
contributed by all tax payers.
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5.4 C hanges o f la n d  use
Now let us probe further into the mechanism for exacting incremental value 
through the primary land market.
5.4.1 Land expropriation
Under Chinese law, only government is authorized to assign land use rights. Land 
use conversion is either directly designated by government or done through a process 
of application and approval. This enables the government to monopolize the supply of 
converted urban land and extract land value. For cities that have gone through rapid 
urbanization, the conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land is the 
major source of municipal revenue, which comes from the huge margin between the 
commercial land leasing price and the compensation 'price' for land expropriation. 
Indeed, what is termed compensation in Chinese urban development is equivalent to 
price in a free land market, only it is set by the government and set at agricultural 
levels. Price in a free market is, in fact, also compensation: it is the value that an 
owner of a resource is willing to be compensated (by a buyer) in order to give up his 
or her rights over that resource. The land expropriation compensation in China is, 
however, is set by the buyer not the seller.
As I have already argued, the justification for government setting the price is that 
government creates the value. In this respect it is worth noting that conversion of land 
use is not simply a matter o f assignment. The leased lot o f commercial land is never 
the full extent o f rural land expropriated. In fact, the commercial land for lease is 
generally just a small part o f the development. In the case of Tong’an Industrial Park, 
the area of the leased commercial land is 3.69 hectares, accounting for 13.2% of the 
total area, 27.89 hectares. In the case of Xiang’an New Town, the area o f the leased 
commercial land is 98.5 hectares, 38.7% of the total area, 18,595 hectares. Where then 
is the rest o f the land? The rest is used for the infrastructure and public services 
required to serve the smaller piece of commercial land. In other words, without 
investment in the rest, there will not be such high price attached to the commercial
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land lease. That is to say, land use conversion alone cannot create high value. It 
requires related investment. The appreciation of land value is obtained at cost.
Take the projects already described as an example. After deducting investment 
costs, the municipal government earned respectively 81 million and 1,343 million 
yuan from the projects o f Tong’an Industrial Park and Xiang’an New Town. Who 
deserves this income, the government or the expropriated villagers? Here is a similar 
question: after an oil company processes crude oil into chemical products, gasoline or 
plastics, there will be surplus. Then who should possess the surplus, the oil company 
or the herdsmen that used to feed camels in this very piece of desert? It depends on 
whether the former land owners (villagers) are fairly compensated in the first round of 
land transaction (before investment). If the compensation is fair, the surplus after 
development should belong to the developmental corporations as their operational 
profits (here it’s the government). If, for some reason, it is decided that it is not fair, 
the former land owners should have a right o f residual sharing (shareholding) o f the 
development.
What the city o f Xiamen has done is to provide complete compensation for 
villagers in the first round of land transaction, rather than residual profit sharing. This 
is because residual sharing poses a risk in the case that the development fails. Besides, 
the transaction cost o f residual sharing will be high in the case where the former 
owners are many and dispersed. As I have already mentioned, the aims of 
government and villagers are different. Villagers expect maximum income from their 
land, while the government has to take a long-term income into consideration. As a 
result, the government will use lump-sum land income to subsidize industrialization to 
yield long-term income, taxes, which will be used to support the long-term operating 
expenses of the city. The long-term tax income does not accrue to the villagers and 
there is thus a fundamental divergence of motivation. Therefore, the best way is not 
residual sharing, but to buy out land rights with complete compensation in land 
expropriation. The choice o f model -  sharing or buy-out -  is an economic question of 
assigning property rights to the party most capable o f maximizing land surplus.
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According to the Coase Theorem, market transactions will automatically result in 
‘maximum value of production factors in substitute uses’. Generalizing this principle 
to the concept of ‘maximizing the total surplus of the whole society’, a new pricing 
basis is defined, which I choose to call the Coase Optimum.
When the transaction cost is zero, the result o f Coase equilibrium is that the 
highest bidder who can create the maximum social surplus acquires the property 
rights. Under this mechanism, profit is the sole criterion which judges who can 
maximize social surplus and obtain the property rights o f factors.
Further discussion of this problem is elaborated in Chapter IV.
5.4.2 De facto effect
The allocation to the state of residual rights over land is variously practiced 
around the world. These practices achieve different macro economic effects. 
Transaction costs of private development seems low in fast developing economies in 
East Asia such as in the development of the township enterprises of Dongguan and 
Nanhai in the Pearl River Delta as well as South Jiangsu and South Fujian. Taiwan 
typically experienced this mode of privately dominant development too. On the 
contrary, a government-dominant model has to have a very powerful government at 
the expense of legitimacy as being criticized on the ground of morality. But it has 
permitted a late economic take-off based on a high-level of infrastructure and public 
services. Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Pearl River Delta and Singapore in 
Southeast Asia represent this mode par excellence, in which the government buys out 
land ownership, forbids unauthorized private sector land use conversion and does not 
share land development surplus with the former owners.
As for the macro effect, the private-led mode has a lower threshold of capital 
accumulation for the local private sector, and therefore medium and small sized 
private enterprises are well developed but at an expense of bad public services and 
infrastructure as well as low efficiency and high cost in the long run due to a less 
coordinated spatial arrangement of enterprises, homes and infrastructure. The
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government-led mode relies mainly on foreign investment and state-owned 
enterprises with less developed local private enterprises, but it is able to provide 
advanced public services and infrastructure based on rational planning leading to low 
operation cost and high spatial-economic efficiency in the long run. The former model 
has a lower threshold and develops faster at the start-up phase. But when the local 
enterprises develop into a certain scale and demand better infrastructures, it is not 
capable o f meeting the demand. At that stage enterprises will start moving to other 
areas, usually those that have developed under a government-led mode, to satisfy their 
demand. This partly accounts for the shift o f enterprises from Taiwan to Coastal 
mainland Chinese cities. The government mode therefore shows its advantages in 
industrial restructuring. Within mainland China, a comparison of the inner districts of 
Shenzhen such as Futian, Shangbu and Nanshan and outer districts such as Baoan and 
Longgang illustrates the differences o f the two developmental modes clearly.
With regard to fairness, areas of Chinese cities developing with a 
private-dominant mode are mostly located in the urban fringes, benefiting from 
spill-over effects of nearby urban infrastructure, as already argued in the case of 
Baoan and Hong Kong. A large part of the land value does not come from land 
owners’ own efforts but from the external effect o f urban development contributed by 
all tax payers. Therefore, for the land owners, the increase of land value is mostly 
reaping without sowing. However, the government-dominant mode is able to 
completely compensate expropriated villagers and allocate the land value across a 
broader area to incorporate distant villages. This inevitably involves depriving former 
land owners o f potential profit, which is originally generalized from public investment. 
O f course, in a government-led model, governments may misuse their power and 
accumulate land and value in a way that is not wholly oriented to growing social 
wealth and welfare -  i.e. governments (decision makers and public officers) are 
susceptible to rent seeking behavior. A really impartial model would be to neither 
assign use right o f land to the government nor to collective landlords, but to authorize 
the government to take all the land value and then to make a second allocation to all
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villagers whether they live close to or far away from the urbanized area. Expressing a 
solution in these terms highlights that the issue is really one of land reform.
I do not mean to argue further whether government’s monopoly over the primary 
land market is morally right or not. My interest is to take Xiamen as an example to 
explain why China’s urban governments can provide better infrastructure and promote 
more rapid economic growth than non-govemment-dominant local economies. 
According to the Coase Theorem, the lump-sum compensation ‘price’ set by 
governments, which is similar to a Kaldor Improvement, is reasonable because 
surplus of the former owners does not decrease while the total surplus of the whole 
society increases.
5 .4J  Compensation for sunk capital
But it should be noted that the monetary level o f compensation has brought some 
problems. Due to lack o f non-agricultural skills and alternative investment channels, 
villagers have been known to use the monetary compensation for consumption 
expenditure (and even gambling). When the money is used up, they find themselves 
in extreme poverty. The problem is caused by ignoring the land nature -  a means of 
production rather than a means of financing one-off consumer goods. Villagers are 
compensated for land expropriation once and for all, but their consumption demand 
will be regular in the long run. It is rather like compensating a hunter with equivalent 
rabbits for expropriating his gun. The rabbits and gun might seem equal in market 
value, but are totally differ in nature. For villagers, what they lose along with their 
land is the knowledge they have learnt from farming, which corresponds to the fixed 
cost o f labour. Once they change their jobs, this fixed investment is lost, whereas new 
skill learning requires another huge investment. This is especially so for elder 
villagers, since they have a limited number o f working years top go and investing in 
new skill learning and getting a slow return may well not seem practical. Therefore, 
loss o f land for them inevitably means loss o f productivity and income.
To resolve this problem, beginning in 2005, Xiamen Municipality put forward the
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so-called Three Ones as a compensation model. Any villager involved in land 
expropriation shall be compensated with one apartment for the family to live in as 
well as one apartment and one shop for leasing. The one for the villager’s own 
residence is equivalent to their expropriated houses (if the land expropriation does not 
include villager’s houses, this part of compensation will not be included). The other 
apartments are purchased by the village collectives at the price of construction cost, 
using part of the monetary compensation, with the floor area limited to 30 square 
meters per person. In order to prevent realizing by individual villagers, the for-lease 
apartments and shops can only be owned by the village collectives and the individual 
villagers are only shareholders of the rental income, not the capital value of the 
apartments, which remains in the ownership of the collective and is inalienable. In 
this way, the income source of the villagers now shifts from farming to real estate. 
The discounted future income of old assets is turned into real estate that produces 
long-term income. Since the villagers do not need to learn new skills in real estate, 
they can make the transformation from agricultural peasant to citizens smoothly.
In this way, the expropriated villagers’ one-off future income is turned into 
long-term assets. The market value of these assets is roughly equal to the ultimate 
surplus of the government. For a villager, the loss o f land means loss of two things: 
the one is the means of livelihood—the old house, and the other is the means of 
production—the farmland. The compensation normally consists two parts: one house 
for the loss o f means of livelihood and the money, which equals to the sum of income 
for thirty years from the farmland. The problem is that the money does not equal the 
value of farmland. Money compensation is lump-sum income but farmland can 
generalize long-term income. The capital of labor is the skill of planting. Once he 
loses his land, he has lost the capital of his labor - he becomes useless, with little other 
useable skills. In other words, the villager has lost a hunting gun but the compensation 
is a rabbit. The idea o f the “three ones” approach to compensation is to substitute the 
lost hunting gun for another hunting gun. Note that the villagers do not get the all 
“three ones” free. They have to pay the last two “ones” at cost price. The economic
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logic of the “three ones” is to help the villagers transfer their capital of labor from one 
form into another form - they don’t plant crops but “plant” buildings. This is different 
from a logic that demands that they have a share o f the uplift value of land directly 
(which 1 have argued against so far in the thesis).
To clarify: I have up to this point argued that villagers have no automatic or moral 
right to benefit from land value uplift. The Xiamen ‘three ones’ compensation model 
gives villagers a share in that uplift, however. This may be justified in a number of 
ways. For example, on either fairness or efficiency grounds, it could be reasoned that 
where the state generates land value returns on a land conversion project, it is the 
dispossessed villagers, who have had not just their land but the productivity of their 
knowledge and skill capital removed, who should have first call on the social 
expenditure of those land value profits. This is another way of saying that the 
conventional compensation package is insufficient where dispossessed villagers 
cannot find alternative jobs.
Consider again the example of Tong’an Industrial Park. The ‘Three Ones’ 
component o f this project includes development land assigned to the village 
collectives at a price of 600 yuan per square meter. As the base price (the cost price) 
o f the piece o f land in the land market is 900 yuan per square meter, the village 
collectives could acquire a potential net land income of 94 million yuan, higher than 
the surplus, 81 million yuan that Xiamen municipal government gains in this project 
(Table 5.7). This can be viewed as the compensation of risk of transformation since 
the shops and apartments cannot find enough consumers before the plants are fully 
occupied. This may take three of four years. What is more important, the value of 
these assets will not stagnate at the level of 900 yuan per square meter but will 
increase in accordance with improvements in urban facilities and surrounding land 
productivity. I show how land value is distributed between the government and village 
collectives in detail in the next chapter.
5.4.4 Secret of rapid growth
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If we regard the government as a developer, this would be more like a joint 
development project between the developer (government) and village collectives. The 
land was not offered by the villagers for free; rather, the developer made an ‘advance 
payment’ (monetary compensation for land expropriation) to the villagers, which took 
up 31.3% of the total investment (Table 5.8). On the other hand, the developer’s 
‘advance payment’ is a one-off transaction of property rights to gain the residual 
claim.
Table 5. 8 Cost structure o f two projects o f Xiamen Municipal Government
Expenses for land expropriation Construction expenses for 
buildings and 
infrastructure
Compensation for 
land expropriation
Administrative fees and fees o f  
basic farmland protection
Xiang’an 
New To wan
28.8% 7.8% 63.4%
Tong’an
Industrial
Park
31.3% 20.9% 47.9%
Source: Xiamen Municipal Government.
Monopolization of primary land market is the secret to the fast growth of China’s 
economy. Xiamen’s examples have evidenced this argument, developed in previous 
chapters. The shape of the institutions that govern development, especially the land 
value surplus sharing system, determines the efficiency of economic growth. One of 
the challenges for designers o f systems of urban governance and planning is designing 
mechanisms that can minimize government’s income leakage. The level of urban 
infrastructure is decided by how much of the profit from investment can be retained 
how much is leaked to free riding landlords. The problem is similar to the question of 
whether inventions can be protected and inventors can obtain most o f the profit -  a 
necessary requirement for technological progress. The monopolization o f the primary 
land market is a protection o f governmental investment.
Even more importantly, monopolization o f the primary land market bestows the 
government with exclusive power to assign land uses, thus avoiding the difficulties of
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collective action. The projects mentioned above were all finished within two years or 
so from the date at which they were planned. This is fast even for Chinese cities. Were 
there no monopoly o f the primary land market, it would be impossible even to 
accomplish land expropriation within such a short period, never mind project 
completion. Objectively speaking, governmental control over land use may be the 
greatest political heritage passed downed from China’s unsuccessful command 
economy of the last century.
5.5 Conclusion
Like common enterprises, the business model of a government helps determines 
its successes and failures. The core issue in institution design for local government’s 
business is how to overcome the contradiction between lump-sum input 
(infrastructures investment) and long-term output (tax income) and the contradiction 
between lump-sum income (land leasing income) and long-term expenditures (daily 
public services).
The chapter has taken Xiamen Municipal Government as an example to analyze 
how the municipal government has overcome the two pairs of contradictions in the 
absence of property taxation institutions. In Xiamen’s case, the municipal government 
switched the lump-sum revenue from the primary land market to subsidize industrial 
investment and gained a continuous cash flow from business taxes. Following the 
argument in previous chapters, this process contains two independent competitions: (1) 
producer competition among urban governments for industrial investors; and (2) 
consumer competition among real estate developers for urbanized land developed by 
the government in the secondary land market. This framework explains many 
phenomena which were once puzzling.
The chapter has also evidenced other hypotheses developed in the previous 
chapters: (1) government is not a counter party to the market but an integral part of 
the market; (2) municipal governments in China are enterprises that seek to maximize 
profit through organizing productive factors; (3) like an enterprise, the behavior and
204
performance of a government is constrained by its input-output mode {business 
model); (4) like an enterprise, the production function of a government consists of 
‘fixed cost’ and ‘variable cost’. The fundamental issue tackled by a local 
government’s s ‘business model’ is how to handle the relationship between lump-sum 
input-output (infrastructure investment and land leasing revenue) and regular 
long-term input-output (tax revenue and expenditures o f public services).
It needs to be pointed out that the example of Xiamen Municipal Government 
used in this chapter is just one of various governmental business models operative in 
China. Forms and modes of enterprises may differ greatly, so do the scope and ways 
of interpreting government’s mandatory power. In the market for public services, 
there coexist unitary-owned companies with unlimited liabilities (feudal kingdoms); 
listed companies whose property rights are shared by the masses (modem democratic 
countries); companies whose property rights are possessed by special groups of 
people (republicanism like Ancient Greece and Roman); and companies controlled by 
professional groups (political parties, the groups shifting in turns if only one party, or 
competing with one another if more than one party). According to these different 
analogical models, residents o f a city ‘enterprise’ play different roles -  as customers 
or as shareholders or perhaps as passive recipients of altruism.
The behavioral modes o f local governments will evolve according to their own 
development paths and external conditions. Competition among different regimes 
leads to new and more competitive systems and business models. In the market for 
governance ideas, new and better models -  those yielding higher social net worth and 
able to distribute this more efficiently and fairly, will gradually replace less successful 
systems. There is no perfect regime (though when politicians promote their regimes, 
they always attempt to make their customers believe theirs is the best). A specific 
governmental mode fits its specific cultural tradition and development stage. And 
market competition -  in this case, competition between governments in search of 
footloose people, firms and investment capital - is the final judgment of the merits and 
demerits o f the different modes of operation.
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CHAPTER 6
CHANGES IN PROPERTY RIGHTS TO RURAL LAND
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I develop the arguments already made by examining evidence at a 
different scale and level o f detail. I take a piece o f land reserve in the Huli District, 
Xiamen City, to illustrate the nature of de facto  land uses in peripheral villages and 
the transaction cost involved in changing land use and property rights. The empirical 
study reveals that improvements in urban infrastructure and services leads to land 
value increase and consequently generate strong claims for land use rezoning.
I have outlined the general institutional structure and dynamics governing land 
requisition in previous chapters but many details have been omitted or abstracted in 
order to portray the rather chaotic situation currently pertaining. The behavior of 
different actors is caricatured in order to establish a theoretical position broadly 
representing reality. As a result, the stories depicted in those chapters are more like an 
exaggerated animation rather than photographing. Even though too many details may 
affect the clarity o f the story line, in this chapter I will lay out more of the details to 
illustrate aspects of the reality that may have been distorted in the previously 
arguments.
I therefore do not rehearse the theoretical arguments in this chapter but just 
describe the story. I adopt first-hand data from Xiamen, where I currently work, 
instead o f citing other’s opinions and field work. O f course my opinions are inevitably 
influence data collection and analysis - all observations are what we intend to 
observe -  but I attempt to distinguish deductive conclusions from reflection on factual 
matters.
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6.2 Collective landlords
The collectively owned rural land system is a distinctive feature of the Chinese 
land economy. The system of collectives is a very important part of the study of 
urbanization of rural land. Collectives, the very basic unit in Chinese villages, are a 
heritage of collectivization in the era of command economy and are still very well 
organized. Although the power of today’s collectives in resource control has 
weakened compared to the communes in past periods, they still hold the right to 
allocate the biggest input to wealth: village land. This is a micro governance 
institutional that has set up a path-dependent process of urbanization affecting all 
cities in China. In order to clearly describe this process of rural land, the following 
discussion starts from a piece of land reserve in Huli District, Xiamen.
Q O
The reserved land has a total area o f 80 hectares . It is located in Wuyuan Bay 
Area, a new CBD of Xiamen, where land once reached a floor price o f over ten 
thousand yuan per square meter when the land price was sky-high in 2007. Wuyuan 
Bay Area used to be an agricultural area with a location close to industrial parks. 
Therefore, its land value had exceeded agricultural use by sharing the spillover from 
industrialization even before the CBD plan was launched. By law, rural collective 
land cannot enter urban land market. The only legal way for rural land to turn into 
non-agricultural use is to turn it into sites for dwellings or township enterprises. But 
these two types of land use are limited to collective needs only with certain restriction 
in transaction. However, due to the huge potential benefits to be made, the conversion 
of rural collective land far exceeds the collective’s own needs. (See Figure 6.1)
98 799,402 square meters
2 0 7
• S i mi ng District
District border
The reserved land
Figure 6. 1 Location o f the land reserve o f  Huli District, Xiamen
Source: Huahui Environment Planning and Design Consulting Co. Ltd. (2007)
The will to share the surplus value that leaked from urban public goods was the 
driving force for the rapid development o f China’s rural township enterprises in the 
1980s. Obviously the areas where township enterprises boomed were in the outer 
sphere o f cities. At that time, there was no land transaction system. The only way to 
acquire land for grass-roots village projects was to go through the township 
enterprises system. When it came to the 1990s, the great amount o f  foreign direct 
investment further stimulated the land use change o f rural land nearby Xiamen.
The reserved land is located in the fast developing Xiamen Special Economic 
Zone. It is characterized by illegal land uses. Land use is classified into agricultural 
land, dwelling land and industrial land for township enterprises. From an air-photo
208
and a field survey, legal industrial land is marked blue in Figure 6.2, but it is obvious 
that the illegal industrial uses recognized by the factory buildings is scatters 
everywhere on the agricultural land.
industrial
Dwelling
land
Illegal
industri
Land
Figure 6. 2 Building distribution on the Land reserve
Source: Huahui Environment Planning and Design Consulting Co. Ltd. (2007)
The buildings in the land reserve included factories with a total floor area o f 300 
thousand square meters and dwellings with a total floor area o f 174.5 thousand square 
meters. There were 268 households in the village, giving an average floor area per 
household o f 650 square meters. According to Xiamen’s rural dwelling ordinance,
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each dwelling site should not be bigger than 80 square meters. This means that the 
village dwellings are, on average, an estimated eight stories high. There has quite 
obviously been a large amount of illegal construction of both factories and dwellings.
By further examining the actual users of those illegal buildings, I have 
established that those buildings, whether factories or dwellings, are not for private use 
but for lease. Rent of factories and dwellings has replaced development of enterprises 
and farming to become the main income source for the village collective and 
households. The lease economy of the village is estimated as follows.
Table 6. 1 The Lease Economy of the Huli Land Reserve
Houses for 
lease
Factories 
for lese
Average rural 
household 
income in 
Xiamen
Per capita disposable 
income o f  urban 
residents in Xiamen
Number o f  households 
(household)
268 33.5
Total floor area 
(ten thousand square meters)
17.45 30
Rent
(yuan per square meter per 
month)
10 10- 15
Per household rental income (ten 
thousand yuan per month)
0.35 - 0.62 8 .9 6 - 13.4
Per capita rental income 
(ten thousand yuan per year)
1 - 2 2 7 -4 0 0.56 1.44
Source: Huahui Environment Planning and Design Consulting Co. Ltd. (2007)
1. Rental income from dwellings, considering the privately used floor area of a 
household was about 185 square meters", the remaining floor area must be for 
lease. Since the rent of a room with 15-20 square meters is 150-200 yuan per 
month100, then the rental income from the residential lease is estimated at 
42-74 thousand yuan a year per household. This is approximately 10-20
99 Xiamen Statistics Net (http://www.stats-xm.gov.cn/): the housing floor space o f Xiamen’s farmers 
was 46.36 square meters in 2005. According to the 2005 Yearbook o f  Xiamen Special Economic Zone, 
there were on average 3.98 people in each farmer household. 46.36 multiplied by 3.98 equals to 184.5 
square meters, which was the average housing floor space per farmer household in Xiamen.
Based on the quotations on the leasing market o f  rural residences nearby Torch Park in 2006.
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thousand yuan per capita101. This per capita income level was much higher 
than the average rural household income of 5,647 yuan102, in Xiamen’s 
villages, and close to the per capita disposable income, 14,443 yuan, of 
Xiamen’s urban residents.
2. Rental income from factories. The factory buildings were estimated to be 
owned by 10-15% of the households in the village103. Taking the mid point, 
12.5%, to calculate, each factory owner had a floor area of 9,000 square 
meters, with rent of 10-15 yuan per square meter per month104. The rental 
income from factories was thus estimated to be 1,070-1,610 thousand yuan per 
year per owner (Table 6.1)
The high income from the illegal lease economy of Huli land reserve is not an 
exception to the rural development in Xiamen. According to surveys conducted by 
Wu et al. (2006), the monthly rental income of Caitang Village in Huli also reached 
over ten thousand yuan per household. Strictly speaking, the farmers in Xiamen Island 
are no longer genuine farmers; rather, they have turned into collective landlords who 
live mainly on real estate.
6.3 P riv a te  land  leasing
The lease of illegal factories and dwellings is not totally forbidden by the law. 
Most of the leasehold relations were established with incomplete private contracts that 
are protected to a degree by civil law, thus reducing the risks of the transaction. 
Although the villagers did in fact invest in and manage township enterprises at the 
beginning of the township enterprise period, they soon realized that they were short of 
everything important to make an enterprise successful: namely technology, capital, 
managerial skills and market network. At that point, the villagers established a 
cooperation with entrepreneurs who owned the professionally productive factors that
101 Supposing on average there are 3.98 people in each rural household o f  Xiamen. (2005Yearbook of 
Xiamen Special Economic Zone)
102 Statistics o f 2004. (2005Yearbook of Xiamen Special Economic Zone)
103 Empirical value given by interviewees.
104 Based on a study by the research group o f Huahui Corporation.
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the villagers lacked. The villagers were only responsible for land supply and had 
nothing to do with the operation and management o f the enterprises. The 
entrepreneurs included outside investors as well as capable persons inside the 
village105. Land was the only and biggest resource o f the collective, with which it 
could bring to a joint venture with the outside investors. In most cases, the so-called 
joint development arrangement was more like a land/property lease. The collectives 
did not share in the profit o f the enterprises, receiving a certain fraction, but extracted 
land rent. In other words, the collectives neither owned residual rights nor bore any 
share o f the risks o f the enterprise operation. What they did was just to transfer 
property rights o f their land to those who could maximize the utility o f the land.
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Figure 6. 3 Case I o f private land lease in the name o f joint development
105 Since land is owned collectively, the rent and use of land by residents in the village doesn't count as 
“private use”. Such rent and use may only occur after a contract is entered into between the renter and 
the village collective.
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Figure 6. 5 Case III of private land lease in the name of joint development
The contents of the private contracts were more like a typical lease document. 
Generally in the articles, the document agrees that the collective landlord is
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responsible for provision of land or factories and the tenants are responsible for and 
have complete rights in respect of financing, construction of infrastructures, factories 
and equipments and business operation. These are matters deemed in the document to 
be irrelevant to the collective landlords. Second, the period of joint development 
usually lasts for 20 to 40 years. Land rent, split into an administrative fee  and 
dividend or rent is paid once upfront, annually or half-yearly. In the case of 
at-once-payment, the joint development is more like an outright transaction of the 
villagers’ land use right. In the case of annual payment, it is actually a lease relation 
rather than a joint development and the two parties typically make a deal in respect to 
a schedule of rent increases -  leasehold contract renegotiation. Finally, upon the 
expiration of the joint development, the real estate invested by the tenants shall be 
unconditionally transferred back to the collective landlords, while moveable 
properties such as equipment belonging to the investors remains with the investors. 
Also, in a new round of land leasing, existing or former tenants have a priority right. 
(See Figure 6.3-6.5)
The joint development has turned the collectives into de facto landlords. Yet, this 
is just the first step. Ways of extracting land rent are much more complicated as the 
following shows.
1. The tenants were not necessary the owners of the enterprises. It happened 
quite often that the tenants built factories and leased them to others. I.e., the 
tenants extracted land rent by being a ‘secondary landlord’.
2. The secondary landlord phenomenon may be more complicated by 
multilayering. By law, all of village’s land is owned by the collective. Village 
households do not own land but only the use-right by contract with the 
collectives. From the point of view of ownership, village households are 
secondary landlords therefore. As industrialization demands larger plots of 
land, the collectives may legally take back some pieces of land originally 
allocated to villagers to create a bigger parcel for a township enterprise. But 
most village industrialization in Xiamen was not realized through genuine
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township enterprises but through land leasing to foreign investors. When 
demand for industrial land is high but the quota of industrial land is limited, 
pieces of contract land may be collected by individuals through contract 
transfer or through lease. In the case where contract land has been gathered by 
an individual through lease, the tenant becomes a tertiary landlord who 
(strictly speaking) illegally builds factories for lease.
3. Except for the lease market of factories fostered by foreign investments, rural 
industrialization also induces a big lease market of dwellings for large 
numbers of migrant workers and results in the illegal excess construction of 
dwellings. For instance, Caitang Village had a residential population of 1,391 
persons but its number of migrant workers reached over 1.2 thousand persons 
in 1993 and 50 thousand persons in 2006, with an average annual growth rate 
of 33.2%. Zhongzhai Village has 27 thousand migrant workers, 7 times the 
local population of 3,800 persons. The huge demand for dwellings for migrant 
workers has lead to a wave of what in Chinese is called ‘house planting heat’. 
Villagers build houses on the remainder of their previously undeveloped 
dwelling site allocation and redevelop or simply heightened their own houses 
to maximize space for lease. In this way, villages become very dense.
4. The large number o f migrant workers creates a demand for consumer services 
and this gives rise to a lease market for commercial buildings. The collectives 
then also build mix-used buildings for lease.
The multilayered lease economy has changed peasants’ identity in Xiamen -  as in 
many coastal Chinses cities. Peasants are no longer, as the Chinese say, 
back-to-the-sky-and-face-to-the-mud. They have been transformed into calculative 
investors in the real estate market. Those who own factories have developed the skills 
of gathering money for land lease, construction, calculating turnover rate, taking risks 
and legal responsibilities as well as utilizing their social networks and organizing 
resource allocation to ensure adequate profit. They have become urban entrepreneurs 
but remain peasants in name.
215
Compared to industrial leasing, residential leasing is easier for villagers and 
therefore more popular. The construction cost of a rural apartment in Xiamen in 2007 
is estimated at 500 thousand yuan with payback period of 4 years. This means 
dwelling leasing is an investment with small input, low risk and high return. Thus, 
with buoyant housing demand from migrant workers, dwelling leasing has spread to 
almost every household and has become the main income source for villagers in 
peri-urban villages in Xiamen. Rural industrialization leads to a land lease economy 
in which industrial real estate and residential real estate have establish a symbiotic 
relation. One of the productive factors for industrialization -  land - was cheaply 
supplied via factory leasing; and housing needs of another productive factor, migrant 
workers, was satisfied by dwelling leasing.
6.4 Games of grabbing property rights of rural land
The most significant distinctiveness of China’s land system is the separation 
between collective-owned rural land and state-owned urban land. Both in the past 
command economy and today’s market economy, almost all urban infrastructures and 
public services are supplied by government. Thus, the increased value from rural land 
to urban land is supposedly generated by government. Because the land value increase 
can only be achieved through land use change, this implies that the benefit leakage of 
public goods can be managed through the control of land use change. This statement 
is similar to Sun Yat-Sen’s proposal for withdrawing the appreciation of land value to 
the public.106 The land system constitutes the legal ground for the government’s 
monopoly of primary land market. However, as I have shown, this monopoly power is 
curtailed in practice due to the huge incentives for rural collectives and individuals 
within and outside them to find ways of taking a cut in the rural-urban land value 
difference. The scope for playing or avoiding the system can be appreciated by 
considering the detailed provisions of the law that seeks to curtail the land rights of
106 If the urban government is not regarded as an enterprise, it will be hard to understand “profit from 
increase in price belongs to the public”. The deceased famous economist Yang Xiaokai once criticized 
this view. Such criticism largely represents the opinion o f  mainstream economics.
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rural collectives.
The reduced bundle o f property rights attached to rural land is based on the Land 
Administration Law o f  the People’s Republic o f  China and Law o f the People’s 
Republic o f  China on Land Contract in Rural Areas. These state that:
1. “Land in the rural areas and suburban areas, except otherwise provided for by the State,
shall be collectively owned by peasants including land for building houses, land and hills
107allowed to be retained by peasants.” . “ Land contract in rural areas shall take the form
o f  household contract within the collective econom ic organizations in the countryside”,
“After the land in rural areas is contracted, the nature o f  ownership o f  the land shall
remain unchanged. The contracted land may not be purchased or sold.” 108 or 
100mortgaged . “ Land collectively owned by peasant shall be contracted out to members 
o f  the collective econom ic organizations.”110. “Land collectively owned by peasants may 
be contracted out to units or individuals who are not belonging to the corresponding 
collectives for farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries operations.”111. Only 
the use right of barren land in rural areas can be mortgaged112. All the above 
rights are restricted by land use. “A strict control is to place on the turning o f  land for 
farm use to that for construction use”, Land in rural areas may only be used for 
agriculture and its use right shall not be leased, transferred or rented for
1 1 Tnon-agricultural use
2. Ownership of house sites belongs to the collectives. Use right of house sites 
belongs to rural villagers and may not be mortgaged114. Houses on house sites
107 Article 8 o f  the Land Administration Law.
108 Article 4 o f  the Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas.
109 Article 184 o f  the Real Right Law o f  People’s Republic o f China.
110 Article 14 o f  the Land Administration Law.
111 Article 15, Chapter II o f  the Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas.
112 The State Land Administration Bureau, No. 134 [1995] o f  the State Land Administration 
BureauCadastre Division (Notice o f  the State Land Administration Bureau on Issuing the Provisions on 
Use Right Mortgage and Registration o f Collective Land in Rural Areas)
113 Article 14, 15, 63 o f the Land Administration Law; Article 2, 8 o f  the Law on Land Contract in 
Rural Areas.
114 Among use rights o f collective land in rural areas, only the use right o f barren land and the 
collective land o f township enterprises can be put under mortgage (The State Land Administration 
Bureau, No. 134 [1995] o f the State Land Administration Bureau Cadastre Division (Notice o f  the State 
Land Administration Bureau on Issuing the Provisions on Use Right Mortgage and Registration o f
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can be sold or leased, but application for another house site by a rural villager 
who has sold or leased his/her house shall not be approved115. The local 
government shall set up regulatory criteria for house sites. New construction 
and reconstruction of houses on house sites should go through certain approval 
procedures116.
3. To develop industries, enterprises have to obtain state-owned industrial land 
from the state. Only township enterprises can be permitted to use 
collective-owned land - through a special approval process117. Township 
enterprises are collectively-owned and may absorb investments via shares if 
the enterprise remains under collective ownership, or may jointly operate with 
other enterprises through contract or lease118. The collective may use land use 
right as shares when setting up a joint venture with other individuals or
119organizations . “The land use rights o f  peasant collectives shall not be leased, 
transferred or rented for non-agricultural construction, except in the case o f  legal transfer 
o f  the land that conforms to the general plan for the utilization o f  land and legally
120 rp| •
obtained by enterprises due to bankruptcy or acquisition.” . The use right of
collective-owned industrial land and ownership of township factories may be 
1^1mortgaged
To sum up, the legal property rights of collective-owned land and buildings are as 
follows. First of all, the ownership of rural land belongs to the collectives while the
Collective Land in Rural Areas))
115 Article 62 o f the Land Administration Law hasn’t specified the subjects to which farmers’
residences are transferred. Article 162 o f the Draft o f  Real Right Law: a farmer’s residence may be
transferred to farmer households that meet the conditions o f the allocation o f right to use house sites 
within the same collective; the right to use a house site is transferred along with the transfer o f  right to 
use land. Township residents are prohibited from purchasing house sites in the countryside.
116 Article 62 o f the Land Administration Law, Article 11 o f the Measures o f Fujian Province for Land 
for Construction o f Villagers’ Residences in Rural Areas
117 Article 43, 60 o f the Land Administration Law.
1,8 Article 2, 6, 18 o f the Regulations o f the People’s Republic o f  China on Enterprises under
Collective Ownership in Rural Areas
119 Article 60 o f  the Land Administration Law.
120 Article 63 o f the Land Administration Law.
121 The State Land Administration Bureau, No. 134 [1995] o f the State Land Administration Bureau 
Cadastre Division (Notice o f  the State Land Administration Bureau on Issuing the Provisions on Use 
Right Mortgage and Registration o f  Collective Land in Rural Areas)
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use right belongs to individuals or the collectives. Second, The use right of rural land 
is strictly restricted by land use control. Permits are needed for change of land use. 
Third, under the system of land use control, a holder of the right to the contracted 
management of rural land, use rights of house sites and township industrial land and 
ownership of rural houses and township factories have rights of usufruct and transfer. 
Accordingly, the unauthorized use of land and excessive construction are “illegal” 
practices and not protected by law.
Illegal, in this sense, does not mean to seize benefits through means against the 
Criminal Law such as dupery and theft. It is simply land abuse - against the law of the 
state’s land-use control. Looking back on the course of development of use right 
governing rural land, there has always been a game between the rural collectives and 
the state.
The ownership of and right to use land in rural areas were first defined by the 
Law o f  Land Administration in 1986, but the hidden rules that existed before the law 
were not abandoned at once. They still affect the attitude of land use in rural areas. 
The earliest document that touched on rural land rights was the Draft Revisions fo r the 
Working Regulations Regarding Rural People’s Communes issued in 1962 (referred to
as Sixty Articles). It ruled that rural land belonged to the production brigade and
10')should be used by the production teams and granted the production teams 
autonomy in using land . The production brigade and production team later on 
transformed to village and villagers’ groups after reforms and opening. Therefore, the 
Sixty Articles left an institutional base for villages as the basic unit o f rural land 
ownership and helped develop a cultural expectation that villagers’ groups govern 
land use.
The reforms starting from the late 1970s stimulated economic development and a
122 Article 17 o f the Draft Revisions for the Working Regulations Regarding Rural People’s 
Communes
123 Article 29 o f the Draft Revisions for the Working Regulations Regarding Rural People’s 
Communes: “The production teams have certain independency in team management...under conditions 
that don’t hinder water and soil conservation or damage forests, grassland and pastures, the production 
teams have the right to reclaim barren land, manage barren mountains and make full use o f all land that 
can be utilized...”
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large demand for industrial land. Based on the habitual practice o f self-ruled land use 
by villages, phenomena like disorderly acquisition of farmland for non-agricultural 
use, abusing land, incomplete approval process for land use change, excess expansion 
of house sites as well as unproved trade and leasing of land sprung up like 
mushrooms124. In order to protect farmland and regulate land use, the state began to 
formulate regulations on land use successively such as Regulations on Land for  
Housing Construction in Towns and Villages and Principles for the Planning o f  Towns 
and Villages (Trial) in 1982, Notice o f  the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council on Reinforcing Land Administration and Preventing Disorderly Acquisition o f  
Farmland and the Land Administration Law and Law o f  Land Administration in 1986 
and established State Land Administration Bureau (later on reorganized into Ministry 
of Land and Resources). The new regulation system authorizes urban government to 
supply industrial and commercial land125 and to reduce rural land acquisition in rural 
industrialization126 but it did not work well. Subsequently, the state issued the Notice 
o f  the State Council on Approving and Transmitting the Request o f  State Land 
Administration Bureau fo r  Reinforcing the Management o f  Rural House Sites in 1990 
and established an approval system for house construction. As economic development 
raised tension between land supply and demand, the state issued Opinions on 
Reinforcing the Management o f  Rural House Sites (No. 234 [2004] of Ministry of 
Land and Resources) in 2004 commanding the local governments to exert strict 
control over developmental land and concentrate villagers’ house building in towns so 
as to promote a more intensive land use.
The evolution of these policies reveals a game: the state has been trying to limit
124 Notice o f the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Reinforcing Land Management and 
Preventing Disorderly Acquisition o f  Farmland (March, 1986): "Many leaders and masses in rural areas 
stick to the wrong concept that collective land can be used freely. Some developed township enterprises 
without land planning. Some didn’t go through approval procedures and some occupied land as they 
wished; certain leaders disregarded law and discipline and replaced law with their own powers. They 
approved land uses at will and even used land approved by themselves; some violated the Constitution 
to purchase, sell, lease and transfer land without authorization."
125 Article 43 o f  the Land Administration Law: Any unit or individual that need land for construction 
purposes shall apply for the use o f  land owned by the State in accordance with law.
26 In the early 21st century, the urban government’s monopolistic right to requisition rural land for 
non-agricultural construction was again blamed for disorderly acquisition o f  farmland.
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the rights to use land in rural areas that can catch the spillover value of public
127goods ; whereas the rural areas close to cities have been striving to change land use 
by various means to maximize their land value. When agriculture fails in yielding the 
maximum economic benefit, it is very hard to stop the grass-roots acquisition of 
farmland for non-agricultural purposes in the rural areas that offer so many 
developmental opportunities.
In these rounds o f games over rural land use, the state has focused on the 
protection of farmland and employed relatively loose measures with regard to the 
floor areas of factories and houses, so the excess construction of floor areas in 
factories and houses has become a safer mean for property expansion. The higher the 
land value and the non-agricultural income a location affords, the more severe the 
land abuse. The reason is quite simple: these locations have more spillover benefit of 
public goods and services from neighbouring urban land.
6.5 Bargaining for compensation
I have discussed at length the question of whether the compensation for land 
expropriation should be set at agricultural or potential non-agricultural value. 
According to the argument I developed in Chapter IV, whichever - government or 
villagers - obtains the productive factor should be able to maximize social surplus. Or 
put the other way, the rights should be given to the party that can maximize social 
surplus (with allowances for fairness claims). However in this process, transaction 
costs are critical128. The Xiamen practice shows that the compensation standard set by 
the municipal government has been rising fast as the villagers have become more 
capable of bargaining. Thanks to land prices soaring, the government’s income has 
experienced no significant reduction due to the compensation inflation. Yet, the higher
127 The direct aim is to protect limited farmland.
128 Another important field not mentioned in this paper is the allocation process. How the government 
distributes its surplus is also an important factor in the argument over which property rights assignment 
complies more with social justice - the government acquiring land ownership or the collective 
landlords. The methods and channels o f distribution o f  the government owned betterment premium is 
an even more complicated issue than compensation (Zhao Yanjing, Wu Weike (2007) Residences 
Supply Mode and Social Properties Distribution, Urban Studies, 2007.5.
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compensation has far exceeded the opportunity costs o f farming and we have clearly 
moved into a new regime -  one in which the betterment premium is shared to a degree 
with the farmers in addition to a reasonable compensation payment. Even the land and 
buildings with illegal structures developed on them and which are not supposed to 
enter the consideration in a compensation claim end up being compensated in 
disguised and indirect ways.
The compensation for land expropriation in Xiamen is measured as follows.
1. The separation of ownerships o f land and buildings leads to separated terms of 
land compensation and compensation fo r  attached buildings respectively. 
Land compensation is assigned only between the state and the collectives 
when the state expropriates collectively-owned land. The right to use land is 
separately contracted to households by the collective as I have already noted, 
and thus the land compensation fee will afterwards be distributed between the 
collective and households according to their intra-collective land contracts. 
These contracts vary between being full legal documents and administrative 
agreements. According to the Law of the People's Republic o f China on Land 
Contract in Rural Areas, all collective land should be allotted to the members 
of the collective. The term of the contract is 30 years. During this period, the 
contract is protected by the Law of Land Contract. The compensation from the 
government should be allotted by contract when land is expropriated by 
government (theoretically). But in practice, the rights of members may not 
equally protected. For example, a woman who married a man of another 
collective will lose the right to obtain compensation. But in her husband’s 
village, she will not be treated as a formal member of the collective (according 
to local custom). Thus, her right in both collectives may disappear when she 
get married. The difference between laws and customs therefore causes lot of 
disputes.
2. The attached buildings on the farmland are owned by individuals. 
Compensation for them is meant to compensate for the loss o f use value
caused by land expropriation. The compensation fee is measured by the 
estimated cost to reconstruct them with same structure and materials.
3. As the land value for the villages comes from rent rather than use, rent loss 
caused by land expropriation is not considered a justifiable compensation 
claim.
Compared to the standard compensation of the state, the evolution of Xiamen’s 
compensation standards reflects a process in which collective landlords have captured 
some of the value created by the city’s investment in urban public goods. After a 
series of negotiations, trial and error, and policy revision, the current compensation 
includes direct compensation for legal property rights and indirect compensation for 
illegal property rights as well. The following section further elaborates the details of 
the Xiamen case.
6.5.1 Land compensation
Land compensation can be practiced in two ways. On the one hand, it is basically 
a certain multiple of the production value of farmland. The compensation fees for 
other agricultural land such as woodland, aquafarms, fish ponds, vegetable plots, salt 
fields, etc. are made according to certain adjustments to the basic farmland 
compensation standard. On the other hand, a municipal government can formulate a
17Q •comprehensive compensation for a certain area by taking into consideration land 
use, production value, location, grade of agricultural land, per capita farmland 
quantity, local land supply and demand balance, local economic performance and 
local social security needs and provision. Within an area subject to a comprehensive 
compensation order, all plots o f land will be compensated at the same standard. 
Xiamen takes this second approach to compensation.
With the rapid economic development o f Xiamen, land values have become 
increasingly differentiated by location and with the negotiating power o f collectives
129 Ministry o f  Land and Resources [2004] No. 238, Circular o f the Ministry o f  Land and Resources on 
Issuing the Directive Opinions on Improving Land Requisition Compensation and Resettlement 
Systems
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increasing and the expectation shifting gradually in favour of giving some part of the 
betterment premium to villagers, location has naturally featured in compensation 
considerations. Since 1999, comprehensive compensation in Xiamen has been ranked 
into four groups based on district location. In 1999, the gap between the first and 
second groups was only 10% of the compensation standard of the first group. But in 
2005, the gaps between the first group and the second, third and fourth groups 
enlarged to 27%, 50% and 55% respectively. The enlarging gap reveals the 
importance of location in land evaluation and also evidences the shift towards a 
compensation-plus-betterment package and a de facto  reallocation of land property 
rights towards collectives.
Land use classified by sectors is the second factor to be considered in the 
compensation formula. The ranking decreases from industrial land, house site to 
agricultural land. In Xiamen Island, for example, compensations for the above three 
use-types of land are respectively 300, 200 and 180 yuan per square meter130.
In the category of agricultural land-use, Xiamen got rid of setting different 
compensation standards for different types of agricultural uses in 2005. Agricultural 
land is basically classified into farmland, woodland, orchards, fish ponds and unused 
land. In 1999, the municipal state of Xiamen ranked farmland (arable land) as being 
eligible for the highest agricultural compensation followed by fish ponds, orchards, 
wooden land and unused land respectively, even though fish ponds and orchards may 
create higher production value. This rather odd weighting may reflect the general 
1990s national policy of protecting arable land via discouraging non-farmland with 
lower compensation. The ranking was not so much driven by an opportunity-cost 
compensation logic as by national agricultural and land use policy priorities. 
However, since 2005, this method of compensation based on agricultural output has 
been replaced by the comprehensive compensation in which different types of 
agricultural land use do not matter. This step in the evolution of compensation
130 120,000 yuan per mu: compensation fee 110,000 yuan per mu plus reward for timely handover 
10,000 yuan per mu.
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institutions in the local state was a benchmark, establishing the principle that the local 
state has recognized the market price of land as a relevant compensation consideration. 
It also reveals that the local state partially acknowledges the claim of the collective 
landlords for sharing the spillover benefit from public goods.
More profoundly, it is also an admission that the local state as a firm, can no 
longer, in a buoyant market land economy, apply the pure model of land-revenue 
based municipal finance that I have elaborated in earlier chapters. The price of 
retaining its monopoly over the primary land market and using this as a business 
strategy, is sharing some of the revenue thus generated with the rural collectives who 
supply the land. This will be seen as natural justice by some. From the point of view 
of the logic o f free-riding and land value creation, it is perhaps, not so much natural 
justice as pragmatic necessity and a reflection of rising transaction costs. As the value 
of the contested land subject to expropriation gets larger, so will the demand for a 
share of the value increment rise and with it the strength of the claims and 
sophistication of the negotiating games. At some point the political and organizational 
costs o f resisting such claims might make it more cost effective for the municipal 
‘firm’ to share some of its profits from land development from the suppliers of land.
6.5.2 Compensation for house removal
Xiamen’s approach to compensating for house removal has shifted from cash 
compensation to apartment relocation via the exchange of property rights. One of the 
reasons of the shift is that the market price of real estate has been rising too fast for 
the expropriated villagers to buy apartments using the monetary compensation. 
Besides, from past experience, farmers were generally not capable of investment and 
financing. Evidence suggests that for some, if not many farmers, much of their cash 
compensation (estimated in 2007 to be 280 thousand yuan per household, measured 
by 1,500 yuan per square meter for an average floor area o f 185 square meters per 
household) was spent up on gambling. When a farmer had lost everything, he would 
again turn to the government for relief and become a social problem. This issue was
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an important influence in changing to apartment relocation by the exchange of 
property rights. The bundle of property rights over the compensation apartments is 
more complete than the rural houses, so the compensation apartments have higher 
market value and this, in a sense is an additional windfall compensation for the 
relocated farmers.
Either by cash compensation or apartment relocation, compensation involves 
evaluation and property rights identification. Since illegal abuse is so common, the 
local state has had to set a standard for legal houses recognition -  the assignment of 
de facto  property rights over illegally built houses. Yet, this has been achieved by a 
bargaining process. The villagers blamed the local state for suspending the approval 
process of house building since 1994131 and thus defended their excess house 
building. In fact, the suspension only affected the building of new houses132. Local 
need for new houses usually comes from an increase in households; however the 
amount of house rebuilding has far surpassed this type of need because there was a 
much bigger market demand for migrant workers’ housing. The local state’s 
suspension of the approval process could not suppress the amount and speed of the 
excess rebuilding geared at migrant workers -  much of it being the illegal 
development in the city’s peripheral villages133. Although the property rights of the 
excess rebuilding is not protected by law, the huge amount has still created bargaining 
power in the negotiation of compensation for land expropriation and house removal. 
Finally, partly in order to reduce resistance to land expropriation, the area of legal
131 Xiamen Academy o f Urban Planning and Design (2005), Research on Measures fo r  Boosting the 
Urbanization o f  Rural Areas on Xiamen Island, consigned by Xiamen Planning Bureau
132 In the island, which has been planned as city area, the approval o f  new private housing has been 
suspended. But the land and houses have not been expropriated immediately During this period, which 
is about 10 years, construction has not stopped but has occurred by lots o f illegal construction, which 
can only obtain a little compensation when the illegal structures are expropriated. This becomes an 
obstacle to expropriation.
133 Since there is nearly no formal accommodation for migrate labors, the demand for illegal housing is 
huge and it causes more non-approved apartments. Since most o f  them are located in the villages near 
to the city and the local government tends to avoid trying to remove these villages to reduce the cost o f  
expropriation, it results in many “inner-city-villages”.
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housing eligible for compensation has been raised from 30 to 50 square meters per 
capita. Even so, the resistance to expropriation is still high.
Thus, not only has the compensation allowable for standard of legal houses been 
raised, but so has that for the houses with incomplete approval documents. Since the 
incompletely approved houses have to be recognized case by case and it is hard to 
apply a general standard, the local state sets a ceiling for the total area of the legal 
houses plus incompletely approved ones. In 2003, the ceiling was set at 60 square 
meters per capita including the legal o f 30 square meters per capita. In 2005, the 
ceiling was raised to 130 while the standard of the legal rose to 50 as well in Xiamen 
Island. The legal houses are compensated by equally evaluated cash or apartments, 
while the incompletely approved houses are redeemed by removal subsidies, which is 
an indirect method of compensation.
The methods of valuing removed houses have evolved according to compensation 
policies. In 2003, when cash compensation was advocated, the evaluation of houses 
was based on the residual value of the houses considering location, construction cost 
and residual years. In 2005, when the combination of cash compensation and 
apartment relocation was launched, the valuation became based on referencing the 
average value of nearby houses, no longer considering the residual value and original 
construction cost. In other words, a shift from residual valuation to comparator case 
valuation. Later, in 2006, when apartment relocation was emphasized more strongly, 
the value of the removed houses was no longer important. Instead, the area of legal 
and incompletely approved housing became the key important metric in determining 
the value of the property rights exchange.
Overall, in the current compensation regime in Xiamen, negotiated compensation 
of rural land exchange is more common than coercive removal. The history of policy 
revision reveals that the villagers’ bargaining power has been getting higher. Yet, the 
indirect acknowledgement o f villagers’ rights over incompletely approved houses may 
well lead to more illegal building. Anticipating this, in 2001 the local state set a 
deadline for the acknowledgement of illegal housing. Houses built after the deadline
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will not get any recognition in compensation deals. Again, because of the villager’s 
bargaining power, the deadline was put off from March 23rd, 2001 to December 1st, 
2002.
Figure 6. 6 excessively built houses in inside-city villages
Note: The site and lower stories o f the building have legal property rights. Yet the 
upper stories are illegally and excessively built.
Source: author’s photo
6.5.3 Compensation for factory removal
Compensation for factory removal has created another lesson for the local state. 
In 1999, the state decided to consider factories as one kind of ‘attached buildings’ on 
the piece o f expropriated land. A factory ‘structure’ was compensated according to its 
residual depreciated value. In the case where a factory’s approval documents were not 
complete, the compensation would be reduced according to the degree of 
incompleteness. But again, the local state faced a dilemma: compensation for 
incompletely approved buildings might encourage more illegal construction. The
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amount o f such structures was already so huge to give collectives a strong bargaining 
position. The local state announced in 2005 a set o f rules to deal with the confusion 
and ambiguities such as excess floor area of legal factories, illegal factories, and 
incompletely approved factories. Also, a deadline was defined to recognize 
incompletely approved factories. Those built before the date would be recognized and 
subsidized on removal.
Except for compensation for residual value and removal subsidy, factory removal 
will certainly affect the production of an enterprise. The local state therefore offered 
compensation for the economic loss of an enterprise to encourage the enterprises to 
remove.
The compensation refers to a selective recognition of opportunity cost. 
Calculation of the details determines the range of property rights. Therefore, what, 
whether and how to compensate have become the points of negotiation. The 
opportunity cost of land use in the rural area of Xiamen Island includes agricultural 
production, manufacturing production, rental income, and potential benefit of real 
estate development if rural land was allowed to be transferred and developed into 
urban land by the private sector. Among these, rental income is the most important 
opportunity cost. But the compensation by current laws selectively excludes rental 
cost and only recognizes the opportunity cost of the original uses.
The evolution of compensation revolves around the gap of land value between 
non-agricultural use and agricultural use in rural area. The closer to cities is the 
location and the better the local economy develops, the greater the gap obviously is. 
As the economy grows, the land value determined by agricultural use will remain 
much more stable than non-agricultural value, although the former might rise in line 
with rising food demand and farm land scarcity. As the land value o f non-agricultural 
development rises rapidly, the gap rises and compensation for agricultural land will 
gradually shift from being based on agricultural output to being partially based on 
non-agricultural opportunity cost. The shift is aimed at clarifying ambiguities in 
property rights over illegal or incompletely approved buildings (often the lower floors
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are approved but upper ones not -  see Figure 6.6). In accommodating this shift, the 
local state has had to set up new forms of property rights ambiguity, however, as 
implied in the gross compensation allowances that cover the combined legal and legal 
housing areas. The deadlines for registering illegal housing and factories attempted to 
clarify property rights but due to the bargaining power o f villagers, even this did not 
fully resolve the issue due to slippage o f the deadline.
6.5.4 Gap between compensation and opportunity cost
How far exactly the gap between the compensation and the current market 
opportunity cost is reflects how great the bargaining power the villagers is. The issue 
is the distribution of local gains from general urban development. To consider this 
further, I examine the details o f the land reserve case in Huli District. I divide the data 
into the lump-sum and the long-term regular income and value. The calculation 
assumptions are as follows.
1. Basic information: (1) the number of households is 268 and the population is 
estimated at 878 persons; (2) the total area of the land reserve is 799,402 
square, meters including farmland and house sites o f 770,667 square meters 
and industrial land o f 28,735 square meters; (3) the total floor area o f houses is 
174,500 square meters, including a legal part o f 43,906 square meters, an 
incompletely approved part o f 70,250 square meters and an illegal part of 
130,594 square meters 134 that will not be compensated; (4) the total area of 
the factories is 300,000 square meters, including a legal part of 28,735 square 
meters and an incompletely approved part of 271,265 square meters; (5) the 
total area o f the relocation apartments is estimated o f 26,344 square meters135;
134 Since 1994, there has been no planning permissions issued for private housing construction. To reduce the 
resistance of expropriation, in 2003, according to the No. 101 document of Xiamen government, the government 
admitted that every villager could have up to 30 square meters of legal housing, for which s/he could enjoy 
completed compensation, and up to 60 square meters of incompletely approved housing, which is illegal but 
eligible for partial compensation. But the illegal part of most houses is much higher than this level. In 2005, the 
No. 176 document of Xiamen government uplifted the standard of legal floor area to 50 square meters per villager 
and the incompletely approved floor area to 130 square meters in the Xiamen Island (Siming and Huli district); to 
100 square meters in Jimei and Haicang district, and 80 square meters in Tong’an and Xiangan distrct. The part 
that is larger than this standard would not get any compensation.
135 In this case, which is in Huli District, the families whose legal floor area is less than 50 square meters per 
capita would be compensated with a 50 square meters relocation apartment. The families whose legal floor area is
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(6) urban commercial real estate (land allocated in the compensation deal for 
the village to ensure a future long-term income for the collective and villagers) 
based on per capita floor area o f 30 square meters, has a total floor area of 
26,344 square meters, 90% o f this being for apartment leasing and 10% for 
shop leasing (Table 6.2).
Table 6. 2 Basic information of Huli land reserve
Item Quantity Note
Household A. Number of households (household) 268
B. Population (person) 878 3.28 persons per 
household of Xiazhong 
village
Land area (m2) C. Total area 799,402
D. Farmland (including house sites) 770,667
E. Industrial land 28,735 C -D
Floor area of 
houses (m2)
F. Total area 174,500
G Legal area recognized by 50 m2 per 
villager
43,906 B*50
H. Incompletely approved area recognized 
by 80 m2 per villager
70,250 B*80
I. Illegal area with no compensation 130,594 F - G - H
Floor area of 
factories (m2)
J. Total area 300,000
K. Legal area 28,735 Exfloor area ratio of 
100%
L. Incompletely approved area 271,265 J -K
Floor area of 
relocation 
apartments 
(m2)
M. Total area 30,000
Urban 
commercial 
real estate (m2)
N. Total floor area 26,344 Bx30 m2 per villager
O. Apartment for lease 23,709 Supposedly 90% of 
total area
P. Shop for lease 2,634 10% of total area
Source: Huli District Government 2007
2. Lump-sum compensation the local state has to pay: (1) land compensation for
less than 50 square meters but real area larger than 50 square meters can obtain a 50 square meters relocation 
apartment. The legal floor area larger than 50 square meters would get equal areas of relocation apartment. Once 
the floor area of an apartment does not equal the floor area of the old house, the owner may choose cash for 
compensation. This compensation does not include a series conditions or compensation for decoration. The 
compensation for an incompletely approved house, which accounts for depreciation, is normally in cash.
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farmland and industrial land; (2) construction cost o f relocation apartments; (3) 
compensation for removal o f legal houses; (4) subsidization for removal of 
incompletely approved houses; (5) compensation for removal o f legal factories; 
(6) subsidization for removal o f incompletely approved factories; and (7) 
compensation for economic loss o f enterprises caused by factory removal 
(Table 6.3).
Table 6. 3 lump-sum expenditure of the local state for land expropriation
Item
Unit price 
(yuan/m2)
Total
(10,000
yuan)
Note
Land compensation
Farmland a. 180 13,872 Q = D*a
Industrial Land b. 300 862 R = E*b
Compensation & subsidization 
for house removal
Compensation for legal houses c. 280 1,229 S = G*c
subsidies for incompletely 
approved houses
d. 560 3,934 T = H*d
compensation & subsidization 
for factory removal
Compensation for legal factories e. 420 1,207 U = K*e
Subsidies for incompletely 
approved factories
f. 90 2,441 V = L*f
relocation apartment Cost of construction g. 2,800 8,400 W=Mxg
3. Lump-sum expenditure the collective has to pay: (1) Payment o f social 
insurance for villagers over 45 years old; (2) construction cost o f the urban 
commercial real estate (summarized inTable 6.4).
4. Lump-sum income o f the village: (1) land compensation, supposedly 30% of 
which is kept by the collective and 70% is distributed to households according 
to their land contracts; (2) compensation for house removal; (3) compensation 
and subsidies for factory removal to the 10% of households (the standard 
workshops are owned by about 10% households of the village); (4) implicit 
subsidy, reflecting the value gap between market value and construction cost 
o f relocation apartments. Since the old house o f a villager cannot be sold on 
market, its value is merely its cost o f construction. Whereas the relocation 
apartment can be sold in the market. The market value of a house is much 
higher than the villager’s house. The gap between market value and cost of
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construction could be seen as a kind of compensation. Suppose that the value 
of a relocation apartment increases at the rate o f a commercial housing loan 
and the value o f an old village housing increases at the rate o f a deposit, then 
the subsidy would be equal to lump-sum income once it is discounted 
(summarized inTable 6.4)
Table 6. 4 lump-sum income and expense for the village
Total Collective Household Note
Income
(10,000
yuan)
Land compensation 14,734 4,420 38.5 • Total: Q+R
• 30% for the collective; 70% 
distributed evenly to the 
households
Compensation for 
house removal
5,163 19.3 • Total: S+T, distributed 
evenly to the households
Subsidy for factory 
removal
3,648 136.1 • Total: U+V, distributed 
evenly to the 10% of total 
households.
Implicit subsidies for 
relocation apartments 
(beginning from 
2007)
9,600 35.8 • Difference of market value 
(6,000 yuan/ m2) and 
construction cost (2,800 
yuan/m2)
• Increasing rate (3.8%) = 
Xiamen's interest rate of 
commercial housing loan 
(6.32%) in 2006 - RMB 
deposit rate (2.52%)
• Distributed evenly among the 
households.
Expense
(10,000
yuan)
Payment of social 
insurance for 
villagers over 45 
years old
308 308 • Paid by the collective for 
individuals
Construction cost of 
the urban 
commercial real 
estate
3,359 3,359 • N*1275 yuan/m2.
• Use right of the piece of land 
is allocated from the local 
state.
• The collective is responsible 
for the construction.
5. Future long-tem regular income for the village: (1) old-age pension from a 
social insurance program for villagers as part of the compensation package for 
villagers aged over 45 when their lands are expropriated; and all villagers 
whose land are expropriated receiving the Hukou o f Xiamen (and enjoying the 
various welfare safety nets enjoyed by other citizens); (2) the “three ones” 
policy allowing the village to buy commercial real estate and apartments at 
subsidised price (30 square meters per capita). The rental income from the
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commercial real estate including apartment leasing and shop leasing generates 
long-term income for the collective. Normally the rental income will increase 
with the development o f the city. According to 2003-2004 Xiamen Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), the rental income from the commercial real estate including 
apartment leasing and shop leasing grew at a rate o f 2% and 4% respectively. 
To govern the collective income, a shareholding system is supposed to be built, 
with shares distributed according to the original rental income structure from 
house leasing and factory leasing. Since the situation is different from village 
to village, to simplify the calculation, I presume that 20% of the income is to 
be kept in the collective and 80% is shared by the villagers, and the share 
income is supposed to be distributed according to the existing rental wealth of 
which 25% is shared by all households and 75% by former factory landlords 
(summarized in Table 6.5).
6. Opportunity cost o f the village: (1) agricultural production value; (2) rental 
income of house leasing by all households; (3) rental income of factory leasing 
by 10% of households (summarized in Table 6.5).
Table 6. 5 future long-term income and Opportunity Cost o f the village
Income in the beginning year 2007 
(10,000 yuan)
Note
Total Common
household
Household 
of former 
factory 
landlords
Opportunity
cost
Agricultural
production
value
266.6 0.99 • Calculated by 3,311 
yuan/mu, Xiamen’s 
average production value 
in 2004, at increasing rate 
of 4.48%, Xiamen’s 
average annual growth 
rate from 2000-2004
• Distributed evenly among 
common tenant farmer 
households.
Rent of 
houses
1,529 5.59 5.59 • 10 yuan/m  ^at annual 
growth rate o f 2% 
according to 2003-2004 
Xiamen CPI (Consumer 
Price Index)
• Distributed evenly among 
all the households
Rent of 4,590 167.91 • 12.5 yuan/m2 at annual
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factories growth rate of 2%
• Owned by 10% of the 
households
Compensation Old age 
pensions
46.42 0.17 0.17 * Based on the estimated 
population over 45 years 
old
• Distributed evenly among 
the households.
Apartment 
rent from the 
urban
commercial 
real estate
455.22 0.38 10.19 • Calculated by 16yuan/mz 
at annual growth rate of 
2%
• Supposedly 20% of the 
income is kept in the 
collective and 80% is 
shared to the villagers 
according to the existing 
rental wealth of which 
25% is shared by all 
households and 75% by 
the former factory 
landlords.
Shop rent 635.25 0.52 14.15 • Calculated by 200 
yuan/m2 at annual 
growth rate of 4% 
according to 2003-2004 
Xiamen CPI
I have measured the gap between compensation and the opportunity cost for 30 
years as follows.
1. For the entire village as a whole, the relation between the lump-sum 
compensation and the opportunity cost is as follows (summarized in Figure
6.7)
(1) The land compensation equals 30 years o f agricultural output.
(2) The compensation and subsidies for house removal equals 3 and a half 
years of the original rental income of house leasing.
(3) The compensation and subsidies for factory removal equals only 10 
months o f the original rental income o f factory leasing136.
136 It is 10 months because the government does not encourage the convesion of cultivated land into 
non-agriculture use and thinks that the workshop owners have earned enough tax-free income during 
this time. The compensation is based on agriculture opportunity cost rather than non-agriculture income. 
That explains why the main resistance to expropriation comes from the 10% of villagers who are 
workshop owners, why the resistance from apartment landlords is less than workshop owners and why 
the expropriation of fields is relatively easy.
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2. For the entire village as a whole, the relation between long-term regular 
compensation and the opportunity cost is as follows (summarized in Figure
6.7).
(1) The old age pension organized by the state as part of the compensation 
package is a social security provision, but the allowance is just too small 
compared to the original rental income achieved by the landlords.
(2) Initially, the future rental income from the urban commercial real estate 
granted to villagers as part of the compensation package was set at about 
70% of the original rental income from house leasing. Because the 
growth rate of shop rents is higher than apartments, however, this rental 
income is expected to grow to equal the original rental income from 
house leasing in the long run. Besides, the improvement of the liquidity 
may uplift the market value of urban estate.
(3) Since the former factory landlords can make much more income from 
renting estate than from compensation, the opportunity cost of rental 
income from workshop leasing can only be compensated by a small 
amount. The reason why those owners can make such a lot of money is 
the overspill value of the urban infrastructure. Moreover, the owners pay 
no tax for any public services, and this encourages them to take extra 
advantages of the formal industrial estate market.
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Compensaion vs. Opportunity Cost for the Whole Village 
in Huli Land Reserve
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Figure 6.7 Compensation vs. opportunity cost for the whole village in Huli land 
Reserve
3. For the common landlord households (summarized in Figure 6.8)
(1) The lump-sum compensation equals the sum of agricultural production 
value and rental income from house leasing for eight years.
(2) For villagers who rely on rental income from apartments, the share o f 
collective urban commercial real estate only makes up about 20% of 
their original rental income. Again, the reason that those landlords can 
earn big money is due to the windfall o f free-riding on urban 
infrastructure and public service investment. That is why only peasants 
who happen to live nearby urban areas can become workshop landlords.
-5,000
After expropriation, most part o f the windfall is taken away.
Compensaion vs. Opportunity Cost for Common Households 
in Huli Land Reserve
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Figure 6.8 Compensation vs. opportunity cost for the common households in Huli 
land reserve
4. For the former factory landlords (summarized in Figure 6.9):
(1) Since the factory landlords normal rent apartments as well as workshop, 
they have income from both house leasing and factory leasing. The 
lump-sum compensation only equals one-year total rental income from 
house leasing and factory leasing. That means if  they can extend their
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estate for only one year, the income will exceed the sum of  
compensation. That is why the factory landlords try their best to resist 
the expropriation.
(2) Dividends from the urban commercial real estate they share equal 
15-20% o f their original rental income.
Compensation vs. Opportunity Cost for Factory Renters 
in Huli Land Reserve
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Figure 6.9 Comparison vs. opportunity cost for former factory landlords in Huli 
land reserve
The reckoning above shows that the gap between compensation and existing 
benefits means a decrease in regular income. For the common households whose
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income is mainly from house leasing, the lump-sum compensation equals the sum of 
eight years of agricultural output and rental income. Besides, they get relocation 
apartments with complete property rights in the urban area and will benefit from value 
increase of their new real estate rights. However, for the factory landlords, the sum of 
the compensation and subsides for land expropriation and factory removal and 
dividends from the urban commercial real estate is much less than existing rental 
income. This is why land expropriation continues to meet strong resistance.
6.6 Urban developmental land reserved for villages
6.6.1 Initial of urban developmental land reserved for villages
The case of Huli land reserve shows how Xiamen has improved upon China’s 
general mechanism of compensation for land expropriation, which is to make up 
regular land income with lump-sum compensation. The general approach has been for 
villagers to have their means of production requisitioned and receive compensation by 
living materials. As I have already noted, this is like compensating rabbits for hunting 
rifles. Xiamen, like many other coastal cities, now compensates villagers with urban 
land as a future income source. Xiamen’s model is called urban developmental land 
reserved fo r villages, three ones or golden brim and silver fillings. The 
‘developmental land reserved for villages’ refers to the assignment of the piece of 
urban commercial land to the villages that will be expropriated. These village-owned 
commercial areas become incorporated into urban area sooner or later. In the outer 
sphere of Xiamen, the procedure follows the ‘three ones’, already described, i.e. one 
relocation apartment for private use in case of house removal, one apartment for lease 
and one shop for lease. Among these, the apartments and shops represent 
developmental land and is the ‘golden brim, silver filling’ and this takes a spatial form. 
In order to accelerate development of industrial parks, the local state expropriates 
farmland, bypassing village centers, and locates the ‘three ones’ (the ‘golden brim’) 
around the edge of village centers to provide apartment leasing for migrant workers, 
and improves the built environment of village centers, which are know as the ‘silver
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fillings’.
The commercial development land in the compensation package may be 
developed in various ways. The per capita quota of developmental land is designated 
with a rule of 15 square meters of land or 30 square meters of floor area. Usually, the 
local state will assign use rights over this urban land to district governments and 
constructs mix-used buildings of apartments, office buildings and stores. Then the 
collectives purchase the real estate at a price equal to direct construction costs (the 
land price is free), using money from the compensation of collective land (the 
compensation of removed houses and factories goes to households and landlords). 
The property rights of the real estate is urbanized and the development is not limited 
to private or communal use and can be leased out on the market for profit. Sale of 
these assets is not allowed, however. In order to manage the real estate as a whole and 
ensure a long-term stable income for villagers, the shareholding system is set up to 
allocate shares and dividends to the villagers. What the local state implicitly gives the 
villagers is the market value of the land lease. They can realize this value by letting 
but they cannot sell their rights as landlords. In practice, this might be another 
introduction of ambiguous property rights since the village could rent to an operator 
who then sub-lets. So long as the terms of the 1st and 2nd tier let are sufficiently 
flexible and secure, this may amount to an open market system. The villagers remain 
landlords and owner of the initial ‘lease’ from the state (or land grant might be more 
accurate). Thereafter, there is nothing in principle, stopping a relatively free market 
emerging in sub leases.
Unlike cash compensation, the rental value of a village’s new urban real estate 
will increase along with economic growth. Therefore, this method of compensation 
turns the lump-sum cash compensation (rabbits) into long-term regular income 
(hunting rifles) and helps the villagers better integrate in the urban economy.
To illustrate this further, consider some ongoing examples. Tong’an Industrial 
park that involves six administrative villages (including 31 natural villages) had 
constructed 97 mix-used buildings with a total floor area of 338.5 thousand square
241
meters before April, 2008. Among them, 69 buildings of 235 thousand square meters 
have been assigned to the villages. Up to now, four natural villages and one 
administrative village have completed share distribution of 128.5 thousand square 
meters by 4,672 shares. For villages whose per capita floor area of buildings exceeds 
30 square meters, their shares are made up of dividing the floor area by 30 square 
meters. Each villager will be distributed one share and the residual shares are 
purchased by the collectives. On the other hand, for villages whose per capita floor 
area is less than 30 square meters, their shares will be established by dividing the floor 
area evenly. Overall, there are 1,487 households with a population of 4,509 persons 
participating in the shareholding system. The highest value of all the villages is 38.7 
thousand yuan per share and lowest is 29.8 thousand yuan, which varies from village 
to village.
Among them, Houzhaqianpu Village obtains per capita annual income of 5 
thousand yuan, equaling the per capita income in rural areas in Tong’an District in 
2006. Wulv Village, locating in the center of the industrial park, contains four natural 
villages, 960 households, 3,100 villagers and ten thousand migrant workers. As most 
villages distributed all the land compensation to the villagers and raised a mortgage to 
finance construction, Wulv Village distributed 30% of land compensation to the 
villagers and kept 70% for construction of developmental land. The village also 
unified the rent at 40 yuan per square meter per month for shops and 11 yuan per
1^7square meter per month for apartments . It is estimated that the rent ratio could
137 Why did they not set a “market rent”? We can we know what is the market rent? How it is made? According 
to the pricing mechanism in the appendix of this thesis, the market price is determined by consumer competition 
when the demand exceeds supply; and is determined by producer competition when supply exceeds demand. At 
the beginning, a new industrial park does not have enough workers. The new plants need at least 2-3 years to build, 
decorate, fix machines and train the workers. During this stage, the demand for shops and apartments, which need 
only 1 year to build, is less than the supply. The market price should be determined by producer competition - 
many shops and apartment pursued by few consumers. Even if the consumers are able to afford higher prices, the 
market rent would drop to a very low level. Since the “three ones” can be built within the original territoiy of the 
village, the surrounding area of a group of workshops normally coalesces into one single village. It allows the 
collective to monopolize the market of shops and apartments. Therefore the collective simply gives a price and 
forces the enterprises to accept it.
There is also an interesting twist here in respect of the inter-government competition. In Xiamen, there is a 
special institutional arrangement called Exclave Economy. This institution allows the district governments (Siming 
and Huli) in downtown areas to build industrial parks in remote districts such as Tong’an or Xiangan and to levy a 
tax on these. The remote district governments, which are usually poorer than downtown district governments and 
therefore lack budget to grant subsidy to attract investment, give the tax levy to the downtown districts but make 
money from the surrounding shops and businesses. When the enterprises complain the price of apartments is too 
high, the downtown district governments propose to build their own apartment and supply to the enterprises in the
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reach 70% before the end of April, 2008. This increases villagers’ annual income by 5 
thousand yuan, much more than the former agricultural output. Also, it will increase 
furthermore when enterprises enter the industrial park.
Land expropriation in this way turns villagers’ regular income from agricultural 
output to a lump-sum income of cash compensation, which further turns to regular 
income from urban commercial real estate for lease to migrant workers through the 
policy of urban developmental land reserved for villages. The latter process used to be 
practiced informally in ‘inside-city villages’ where individuals constructed illegal 
buildings on collective-owned land. Those illegal buildings are not protected by law 
and face punishment like coercive removal, penalty and seizing. The policy of urban 
developmental land reserved for villages legitimises this process by urbanizing rural 
land through expropriation and sharing developmental benefit through 
collective-owned urban real estate. This process has built up a symbiotic relationship 
between the expropriated villages and industrialization - the faster developing the 
industrialization is and the more migrant workers arrive, the more the rental income 
and the higher the value of the real estate will be. It has had some affect in 
incentivising villages to negotiate land-expropriation deals with the government. The 
resistance that remains is generally a result of attempts by villagers to hold out for 
even more favourable deals. Once the principle o f allocating villagers a degree of 
rights over unearned land value is established, then hold-outs and negotiation costs 
are likely to get more problematic, since there can always be argument and counter 
argument about the level o f land profit sharing. In some ways, the more absolutist 
argument developed in previous chapters -  villagers have no logical right to land 
value they did not create -  might be thought to be an easier position for a government 
to hold. However, as I have shown, it was not, in fact, easy to hold. The accelerating 
land value gap eventually led to institutional evolution that broke this absolutist
park. This proposal provokes outcry immediately from both villagers and local district governments. The disputes 
have been presented to the municipal government of Xiamen. The final result is that downtown districts have 
stopped building their own apartments and meanwhile the collectives have limited the price of apartments. This 
story demonstrates that: 1) government is a profit-seeker like any enterprise in the market; 2) the market rent is an 
equilibrium result between consumer competition and producer competition. It is decided by either producer or 
consumer not by the so-called (fictional and invisible) Walasian Auctioneer; and 3) the nature of price control is to 
allot surplus among villagers, producers and governments.
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p o s it io n .
Location matters to pricing. The six villages that have started the policy have 
leased out 16.7 thousand square meters o f floor area for stores and 76.6 for apartments 
at average rents o f 41 and 11 yuan per square meter per month respectively. Wulv 
Village, located closest to the industrial park, has developed very well since 2007, 
when the development was completed. On the other hand, in the villages farther away, 
tenants rescinded the lease. The rescinded leases have reached total floor area of 12.6 
thousand square meters. This makes the point that the villages' developmental land 
must be developed in a way that keeps pace with urbanization. There is a vacuum 
period in which the villages have lost farmland but in which demand has not yet 
grown to maturity. This is a difficult stage of urbanization for this model o f 
compensation and land readjustment. The length of time within the vacuum period 
determines how smoothly the rural economy turns to urban economy (Figures 
6.10-6.13 illustrate various stages in the process). This is similar to the quandary 
faced by planners in advanced market economy cities, who have to make a decision 
about phasing-in services such as schools and shops. There is often a period in which 
residents move in to an area not yet serviced with a high school or a major 
supermarket. Successful planning can secure early commitments by educational 
authorities and supermarket firms but generally service providers like to see the 
demand in place first. The quandary faced by Chinese planners and village authorities 
organizing commercial land in villages is one of balancing books. In keeping with my 
general thesis o f the city as a firm, the commercial land needs to be designed, serviced, 
scheduled and marketed in a realistic way to generate income streams for the 
relocated villagers. This is a bit like the parent company setting up subsidiary firms 
with viable businesses to be self sustaining and thus releasing some o f the latter’s 
assets to be used by the parent firm to grow the wider business.
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Figure 6. 10 Wulv Village before development 
Source: author’s photo
Figure 6. 11 The urban developmental land (golden brim)— collective owned shops 
and apartments— in Wulv Village 
Source: author’s photo
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Figure 6. 12 Golden brim and silver filling in Wulv Village 
Source: Xiamen Urban Planning Bureau
Figure 6. 13 Wutu street in Wulv Village
The main street is 800 meters long. Buildings on both sides have a total floor area of 120 thousand 
square meters, including stores of 20 thousand square meters. Rents from stores and apartments are 
respectively 60 and 11 yuan per square meter per month. This will bring the village an annual income 
of more than 10 million yuan. But because the enterprises have not started producing yet, the stores 
complain about the lack of demand.
Source: author’s photo
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6.6.2 Path dependence
The process of ‘urban developmental land reserved for villages’ shows path 
dependence in its evolution from so called Township enterprises - the prototype of 
village industrial land. ‘Township enterprise land’ was generated at a time when there 
was a lack of land market in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Because township 
enterprises were usually located randomly by investors or collectives, rural 
industrialization by the township enterprise system lead to a very disorderly 
development, quite unrelated to the spatial economics of the industrial market, labour 
market or land market. Xiamen Municipal government thus initiated the policy of 
‘reserving village industrial land’ in 1991 to regulate the township enterprise land by 
planning in advance and concentrating management. The policy was stated as follows.
1. Objects: village industrial land needed to be comprehensively planned, 
reserved in advance and developed aggregately in order to accelerate rural 
industrialization.
2. Quota: each village was assigned a certain area of industrial land based on 15 
square meters per villager
3. Planning procedures: location and scale were invested and recommended by 
planning department of the local state, applied by township governments, 
reviewed by district government and approved by urban government.
4. Property rights: the industrial land was reserved only at the planning level. Its 
agricultural land use was not reassigned until there was an industrial project 
approved to locate on it.
5. Land use control: the industrial land was mainly for township enterprises and 
foreign enterprises. It could not change to residential use. Collectives could 
build factories for lease but were not allowed to sell the land.
The policy focused on industrial land-use regulation and forbade residential use. 
Thus, villages near cities shared urbanization through the township enterprise system
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and house leasing. They attracted foreign enterprises in the name of township 
enterprises by cheap land leasing and provided housing and local consumer services 
for mass migrant workers by houses leasing. This gave collectives and villagers early 
experience in being de facto landlords.
Fourteen years later in 2005, the local state in Xiamen declared that it would 
continue the original policy of ‘reserving village industrial land’ and transformed it 
into ‘reserving urban developmental land for villages’ (called ‘village developmental 
land’) as a way of compensating expropriated villages. Since the land market in China 
has now been established, the village developmental land can, in principle, be 
incorporated into the urban real estate rental market and the market can help 
determine appropriate spatial pattern of industrialization and commercialisation. This 
is one big difference to the previous incarnation of the policy, in which the village 
industrial investment decisions were not subject to market discipline. The other 
difference is in the allocation of rights and responsibilities to competent parties. In the 
new system, the industrialization part - development of industrial parks, construction 
of factories, attraction of investors and factory leasing management - is handled by the 
local state, while the urbanization part is shared by the expropriated villages by 
assigning the village developmental land for residential and commercial uses to 
provide housing and local consumer services for migrant workers.
Comparison of township enterprise land, village industrial land and village 
developmental land reveals different definitions of property rights. First of all, both 
township enterprise land and village industrial land are owned by collectives and are 
prohibited from trading in the land market, while village developmental land is 
state-owned urban land with a more complete bundle of property rights in leasing, 
transferring, mortgaging and inheriting and a higher market value as well. Both 
township enterprise land and village industrial land are limited to industrial use 
serving industrialization, while village developmental land is for residential and 
commercial uses serving urbanization. Township enterprise land and village industrial 
land are not specifically related to land expropriation, while village developmental
24 8
land only applies to expropriated villages. Finally, township enterprise land is not 
limited by quotas, while both village industrial land and developmental land is. At the 
very beginning, the township enterprises were few and small. There was not a special 
limit to the size of industry land. When township enterprises began to boom, to 
preserve the cultivated land, in 1991 Xiamen government required that all township 
enterprises must be located in planned areas, (usually they were nearby their villages) 
and that the total area of planned industry areas should not be larger than 15 square 
meters per capita. In 2005, Xiamen government launched several state-run industrial 
parks. Since then the government stopped approving township enterprises altogether. 
All factories must be in industrial parks. Instead, villages were allowed to buy 
apartments and shops on the development land (golden brim) nearby the industrial 
parks and at discounted price. The nature of development land is not collective but 
state-owned, which means the land can be sold or mortgaged on the market.
Yet, the quota has been transformed to a concept of ‘developmental right’. At the 
beginning, in order to allocate industrial land to villages evenly, the local state set a 
per capita quota of 15 square meters. But this is very hard to operate because 
locational conditions determine a varied floor area ratio. Therefore the quota was 
transformed into that total floor area on the development land, limited to 30 square 
meters per capita. This criterion has extended to the system of village developmental 
land but in that context has been claimed as a permanent ‘developmental right’ in 
compensation bargaining. Originally, in land expropriation, the village industrial land 
was supposed to be expropriated too by law. However, villagers in Xiamen Island 
took the quota from the earlier village industrial land grant system and claimed to 
keep it for new land-use at higher market value as a compromise in the compensation 
bargaining game. Finally, considering the accelerating pace of industrialization and 
urbanization, the local government agreed to return this ‘developmental right’ back to 
the expropriated villages and to formalize it as urban land. This proved an enlightened 
extension of the business model of the Chinese city ‘firm’ and has avoided the need to 
extensively apply more coercive approach to securing rural land for urbanization and
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in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n .
6.7 C onclusion
I have shown in this chapter how local government’s monopoly of primary land 
market actually works. In the real world, increase of land value caused by 
urbanization would neither totally belong to the public as Sun Yat-Sen advocated one 
hundred years ago, nor to collective landlords as suggested by today’s mainstream 
economists in China. It is an in-between changing practice - the society will follow an 
institutional path with the least transaction costs (following the general thesis of 
Douglass North), to constantly adjust the distribution between the state and the 
villages.
The market role of the state has been revealed in many different ways in the 
course of my discussion in this chapter. It is an enterprise characterized by territorial 
management. The bargaining for land value between the local state and villagers is no 
different in principle from any cost-reducing strategy of a common enterprise for 
profit maximization. Like any successful business, the economic success of the 
Chinese local state is based on its business model, which is distinguished by state 
monopoly of the primary land market in the context of a lack of property tax. Whether 
the business model based on property tax or the one based on monopoly of primary 
land market is better is determined by transaction costs in specific institutional 
conditions.
The execution of monopoly is obviously not that thorough in practice and there is 
considerable income leakage from public goods. Yet, compared to other economies, 
the leakage in China is low and the returns efficiency is high. As the institutional 
environment changes, the profit model of urban government may turn to a 
property-tax-based model. Nonetheless, at least at present, the practices show that the 
monopoly of primary land market is still a successful profit model that fits the current 
institutional environment. This chapter has shown that the monopoly model is not a 
monolithic one. It is susceptible to pressure to change. I have shown how the Xiamen
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government has shifted its position and pragmatically now shares a portion of 
development profit with the rural collective suppliers of urbanization land. This has 
lowered the transaction costs of development as the redistribution from general local 
state to ‘micro local state’ (village) has ‘bought o f f  those who would otherwise resist. 
But it is not really about ‘buying ofF. It is about finding an efficient model of 
business to keep urban growth going and to address concerns about the distribution of 
proceeds from that growth. In the course of this institutional evolution, several 
governance boundaries have been crossed. There is a new sense of partnership 
between village collective and urban government with a more efficient allocation of 
rights and responsibilities than there was under the earlier township enterprise policy. 
There is also a new tier of collective governance -  share-holding structures creating 
privately-governed territorial enterprises. Villages are now organized not only into 
collectives but also as share-holding firms. This is a truly remarkable phase of urban 
institutional evolution. Not just for China but for the world, since many of the models 
of urban governance and property rights that I have described in this and previous 
chapters have not been experimented with at such a scale (or indeed at all) elsewhere.
Transaction costs and institutional design are clearly extremely important to 
urban management. Thanks to the spontaneous and diverse experiments of the local 
states in China, good institutions are being continuously created and then spread, 
through competition, among cities. This therefore generates endless power for the 
rapid growth of Chinese cities. This would be impossible in the age of the command 
economy in which there was no appetite for or enabling structures for institutional 
experiment and design. Neither, it should be noted with some irony, would such 
institutional diversification be likely in many advanced democratic countries. 
Decentralization and competition are the institutional preconditions of these 
innovative stories and one of the unlikely legacies of the command economy era in 
China has been an intense degree of inter-territory competition and a high degree of 
local autonomy. That autonomy is inextricably linked with the land-expropriation and 
leasing business model that I have documented in such detail.
251
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND EXTENSION
7.1 In tro d u c tio n
Urban planning has long been troubled by its failure in comprehending the 
various parties to the planning process and their behavior. A planner is like a designer 
contracted by a proprietor — he tries to discover the demand of consumers but 
sometimes, if not often, ignores the demand of his client. He has no idea of the 
proprietor’s motive or blurs the contractual relation with the proprietor, deeming that 
the proprietor should be obliged to produce according to his design. Furthermore, 
when he proclaims himself judge between proprietor and the public (i.e. consumers) 
or even as the representative of the public interest to superintend and restrict the 
proprietor, his career and profession is at risk. This is not a sustainable or tenable 
position -  unless of course the proprietor for one reason of another eventually accepts 
the contractor’s self-appointed role (but that is another story).
Municipal planners are not self-employed. Their chief client is the government138. 
A basic assumption underlying mainstream western planning theories is that the 
ultimate client of urban planning is the public. Because of this assumption, urban 
planning is transformed from a practical subject into an academic and theoretic game. 
Perhaps this game will not last -  more and more western universities are canceling 
courses in urban planning because of a lack of social demand for their graduates. At 
the same time, there are other subjects coming up in the wings to supply the skills that 
clients really want -  in the UK, for example, landscape architects developing an
138 We adopt the broad definition o f government: “organizer o f collective actions” to include 
large-scale developers. However, due to the absence o f taxation power, the government acted by 
developers can only be momentary (before the transfer o f developed land) and incomplete (impose 
property management fee). Only enterprises that possess complete residual rights o f  territories can be 
counted as genuine governments.
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reputation for being good master planners and surveyors having the property, financial 
and management skills to dominate the newly emergent regeneration profession. The 
reason is quite simple: planners can neither devise products that cater to all 
preferences of the public (because such products don’t exist at all) nor locate actual 
demand for such products. This is similar to an engineer who insists that he is 
working for consumers rather than entrepreneurs - he will not be able to sell his ideas, 
no matter how much he knows about public interests. Of course, it may be said that in 
a democracy, the public is the client. But this is to miss the point o f government as a 
collective action mechanism. Government is the client when it comes to decisions that 
have been deemed over time to be best handled collectively by a political system. Or 
in other words, and following the arguments developed earlier in the thesis, a 
democratic government is like the executive part of a people-owned firm139.
In China, since urban planning still focuses on engineering and aesthetics. The 
academic virus that sets up this antipathy towards the urban proprietor has not been 
spread widely. Urban planning is still a hot subject that universities seek to offer. 
Nonetheless, although Chinese planners provide more of a direct technical service to 
their governments than western planners arguably do140, they face another theoretical 
dilemma that faced western urban planning in the 1970s. This dilemma derives from 
the architectural tradition and, in China, the practices of the planned economy. It is the 
presumption that a city is like a building and has a sole owner, urban government.
With this mindset, there is need neither to consider the political economy of a
139 Government is simply a company that supply public goods. A so-called democracy is a 
client-owned company. Democracy or autocracy is only a matter o f ownership o f the company. 
Different types o f government are like the different kinds o f company. People test different political 
system through competition in the market for public services. The market chooses the winner. As I 
argue further in the appendix, the variety o f demand will lead to variety o f political system.
140 Nowadays, the virus o f  certain strands o f western theory is penetrating China’s planning circles via 
Chinese “theorists’” blind imitation. They tend to encourage a disbelief in government and set up 
planners to supervise or even reform government behavior. Although most o f these theorists work in 
universities and research units rather than practical fields, their influence has the danger o f turning 
young planners into dreamers. They no longer concentrate on their professional skills to serve property 
owners; rather, they are indulged in introspection about their own moral stands. Those who are bright 
enough attempt to gain academic vanity by occupying the moral high ground.
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mixed market environment nor to consider the transaction costs of urban planning 
and management. The optimal city is artistically and technically defined. In practice, 
however, the ownership of a city is distributed among numerous interested parties and 
a city government cannot freely organize a city’s functions and facilities merely based 
on technical rationality. The existence of transaction cost hinders the accomplishment 
of the ‘optimal’ planning outcome.
A world of people with various interests is the major watershed between the 
profession of urban planning and the profession of architecture design and 
engineering design. A key concept in Chinese urban planning that is derived from 
architecture is to regard a city as a building. Yet, a city is always owned jointly by 
numerous proprietors, except during its early stages. Urban planners differ from 
architects in their aim of organizing collective action and realizing public interests. In 
other words, urban planning should be able to devise new professional skills to guide 
the city towards “technical optimization” in a world with transaction costs. This 
contrasts with traditional planning skills -  engineering and aesthetic technologies -  
that merely seek to actualize the maximization of urban interests defined in terms of a 
2 and 3D representation of what is really a far more complex and dynamic puzzle. It 
is clear that traditional urban planning can’t offer the professional as set o f analytical 
tools for institutional design. And this is what really useful urban planning requires: 
physical design + institutional design. Urban planning therefore has to draw support 
from the mainstream social sciences -  such as institutionalist theories form economic 
- to extend the field of urban planning knowledge and professional competence.
The purpose of this thesis has been to reveal the actual process of the provision of 
a city, using the case o f China as an example. The city is the biggest of all public 
goods demanded by society. In searching for knowledge that is strong enough to guide 
my own role in overseeing the supply of cities in China over two decades, I have 
found myself looking for the theoretical tools of institutional design in contemporary 
economic theory. And with this I have discovered a redefinition of the government’s 
market role that gives both explanatory power in urban analysis and a basis for
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practical institutional design. A focus on institutional design broadens the domain of 
urban planning and can help planners achieve their goal o f ‘ideal cities’.
Within the framework I have elaborated in the thesis, planners do not serve the 
consumers (the public) directly; rather, they serve the public indirectly via the 
government. And the government that they serve is best viewed as a territorial 
enterprise. Planners therefore have to comprehend the business model of government 
(and, where needed, as in the case of rural-urban land conversion discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, even help the government design new business models). Their 
professional skills can be and should be an indispensable part of a government’s 
business model. This is particularly true in China, where land is such a fundamental 
part of that model.
It is not novel to apply economic theories to the study of urban problems. But 
most existing studies merely either seek to verify economic propositions with urban 
planning practices or interpret urban phenomena with economic tools. Few studies are 
dedicated to reforming economic theories so that they can be adapted to the practical 
demand of urban planning. Subsequently, urban planning is a passive consumer of 
economics and has hardly made any contribution to economic theories. The seminal 
contributions to land matters were made by the classical economists (Ricardo, von 
Thunen) and then by the neo-classical economists who developed those classical ideas 
(Alonso, Isard). There is a small body of writers working in the New Institutional 
Economic domain who are arguably developing sufficiently robust applied theories to 
feed back into main stream institutional economic and more general political 
economic theory [William Fischell on property rights and zoning, Anthony 
Downs(1957) on zoning and voting, Webster and Lai (2003) on property rights, 
transaction costs and spontaneous urban order]. In this thesis, I have not simply 
copied existing economic formulae; but rather tried to figure out why standard 
economics has failed to explain urban phenomena and tried to creatively apply 
economic ideas to make sense of urban planning -  of its general agenda and selected 
specific challenges. In the appendix I have gone further. I have set out a refinement of
255
economic theory -  a revision of price theory -  that better explains price formation and 
therefore better guides policy in the urban domain (and also overcomes what I view to 
be a major problem with conventional main stream economic models).
It is crucial for planners to understand the essence of their professional role by 
acknowledging the market role of government and understanding the actual processes 
by which the biggest public goods, the city and all its interconnected patterns of 
consumption, is provided. Contemporary economic theories suggest that to regard the 
government as a self-interested operator rather than a non-profit commonwealth 
organization whose purpose is to resolve ‘market failure’ 141, is a better basis for 
interpreting motive and behavior of governments. This analytical framework also 
helps transform urban planning from an engineering and technical oriented profession 
into an interest-coordinating one. It does this by assuming the city to be a territorial 
organization with multiple property rights rather than single property rights.
The position that I have taken and developed in the thesis is that the government 
is a firm that manages territory. It is a self-interested organization rather than an 
altruistic one. The thesis has been developed in the context of China, in which local 
authorities quite clearly have operated with cut throat competitiveness for the last 15 
to 20 years. The thesis would also repay consideration in the context of the less or 
more orderly competition that takes place between cities in all countries.
The thesis challenges the view of urban planning as a tool of government in its 
mission to regulate ‘market failure’. In places, it goes further and challenges the very 
idea of market failure. The government is neither a looker-on (referee) nor an 
alternative to the market but a market participant.
The institutional environment within which a collective endeavour operates 
defines the possible business models of a firm. The choice of business model in turn 
determines the behavior o f a firm. Only with the understanding of the government’s 
business model can planners make their professional skills an indispensable element
141 This is entirely different from the assumption o f traditional economics that took the government as 
the “referee” of, rather than participant in, market competition.
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of this model. Within this new framework, ‘institutional design’ in urban planning is 
invested with the same significance as engineering design and aesthetic design. 
Planning theorists have to search for appropriate theoretical tools for institutional 
design and thence to search for creative institutional solutions to ensure the 
appropriate implementation (and evolution) of their physical designs and visions. If 
planners fail in the search, urban planning will be driven out of the competition for 
serving government and become completely marginalized.
This chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this thesis and then puts 
forward possible applications of the theories and methods introduced and elaborated 
in the thesis. |I endeavour to show that the improved analytical tools can not only back 
up the basic discussions and assertions made in this thesis, but also apply more widely 
to other economic problems after being generalized in the Appendix.
7.2 Explanation of the behaviors of local governments
7.2.1 Rethinking market role of government
The answer to the question of what is the role of local government in relation to 
the market actually involves several essential issues concerning various aspects of 
urban studies. The most important one is the emergence of cities and the provision of 
public goods. The different answers to the question of how local public goods are 
produced determine to a great extent the understanding of the market role of urban 
planning.
Firstly, starting with the question of how to provide public goods efficiently, this 
thesis examines the dilemma of traditional theories. From the point of view of 
traditional economic theories, government is a redundant part in the perfect market 
system. The highest state is for the market to run freely without the intervention of 
government. But the reason for the existence of government in reality is that there is a 
type of product, namely collective consumption goods, that the market cannot provide 
and price. The reason is that they are non-excludable and have infinite economies of
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scale. Only government can provide such goods it is alleged. Therefore, the market 
role of government is quite obvious under this framework: except for public goods, 
the less the government intervenes with economy, the better. The market is able to 
handle all market problems on its own except public goods (which would include 
certain regulations). According to this viewpoint, in most economic and urban 
planning theory, government is assumed to be an impersonal and altruistic 
organization which stays neutral in market competition and various institutions, 
including the various institutions of democracy, are designed to hinder the 
government departing from this role.
Following certain themes in institutional economics, I have suggested that urban 
government in China (and urban government more generally, though I have not 
developed or evidenced the argument beyond China) should be seen as a 
self-interested organizer of collective action142. Just like a common enterprise, the 
government can develop either spontaneously or forcibly; it can be both 
private-owned (autocracy) and public-owned (democracy). But in contrast to other 
organizers of collective action, the government is backed by complete or partial 
territory ownership while organizing collective action. Among other qualities, this 
gives it certain intrinsic monopoly powers that it can use in its operations. But those 
monopoly powers are constrained by competition from other local governments. I 
return to this later in this conclusion.
This hypothesis unambiguously identifies the main actors of urban activities. The 
government is the supplier of public goods while the residents and enterprises are the 
consumers. Having established this, it becomes possible to introduce an analytical 
model of supply-demand, the most fundamental model in economics. Meanwhile, the
142 Many spatial economic models are grounded on Thunen-Alonso. This type o f  model is often 
criticized for their arbitrarily assumption o f a central market and lack o f explanation o f  its emergence. 
Other spatial models focus on suitable location o f market centers but do not explain who should build 
them or how. Even the classical models o f Christaller and Loche do not unambiguously identify 
themselves as either descriptions o f  what is or what should be. They lie ambiguously between being 
positive models and normative planning models. The idea developed in this thesis that urban 
governments are territorial enterprises who build cities to maximize profit complies with the empirical 
studies o f  the origin o f cities (e.g. Munford, Lewis, 1961).
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government is brought within the nexus of rationally behaving agencies -  it is a profit 
maximizer -  and the government, like other urban agencies becomes an economic 
object that can be analyzed normatively.
The explanation of the role o f government also gives us clues in better 
understanding the differences between settlements at different scales: between 
villages and cities. It helps explain the birth of a city; a goal that many economic and 
geographic theories fail to achieve. In traditional theories, the urban is mostly defined 
by its population size and its type of industry. From the view of my thesis, the 
essential character of a city is its institutional composition. If a firm supplies public 
services in a certain territory, this territory can be defined as a city. The firm is the 
government and the government the firm. Otherwise, the territory is defined as rural 
area or village, no matter how great the populations is. The level of urbanization not 
only depends on the percentage of urban population but also the level of public 
services. This institutional composition of a city could be viewed as the prototype of a 
city, which sets a benchmark in urban analysis like DNA in biology.
7.2.2 Rethinking the business model of government
Another academic contribution of this thesis has been to analyse the business 
model of China’s “city enterprise” and to try an understand motivation, knowledge 
and operating behaviour that has stimulated such high speed development in Chinese 
cities. The proposition that government is a self-interested subject, or more strictly, an 
institution manipulated by self-interested subjects, leads to some fundamental changes 
in the way urban planning is viewed. According to this paradigm, urban economic 
growth is no longer determined by allocating spatial factors optimally, but by devising 
a business model that can realize potential profit through market means. The core 
technology of urban planning is the designing of optimal business models applied to 
the management of land in pursuit of a government’s objective. In China, I have 
shown that this consists o f two aspects: input and output. Let’s first summarise the 
profit mechanism design.
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Public goods are, by definition, non-excludable. Free-rides therefore render the 
provision of some if not many public goods by private entrepreneurs difficult. This is 
similar to inventions prior to the creation of a patent system. In such a circumstance, 
technical inventions rely totally on private secrecy, a highly costly approach, to ensure 
the interests of inventors. Research and invention in a modem sense was not an 
important industry o f the modem economy until the advent o f patent systems that 
eliminated the possibility o f patent infringement. This meant that the costs of research 
and development could be recovered through specific business channels. The 
provision of public goods likewise rests with the invention of an institution that keeps 
the benefits from spilling over and leaking due to free-riders. The quality and quantity 
of the provision of public goods lies to a large extent with the efficiency of the 
institutions that recover the costs o f their supply.
The fast economic growth of China’s cities can be attributed to a set of profit 
modes developed by China’s urban governments that suit their own business 
objectives. With the aid o f a series o f taxation reforms, urban government transformed 
from a government under a planned economy into a self-interested market subject.
During this process, urban governments never lost their monopolization of the 
primary urban land supply system. All changes in land use must be approved by urban 
governments. Particularly, when farm land is changed into non-farm land under an 
urban development plan. In this case, the government will firstly expropriate the farm 
land and then transfer it into the open urban leasehold land market. This institution 
enables the government to obtain huge returns from its investment in urban 
infrastructures and related management services and incentivizes urban governments 
to construct abundant high-quality services and facilities. This they have done at an 
unprecedented speed. Although there are unsuccessful and inefficient investments, the 
highly efficient recovery o f costs has greatly lowered the risk o f long-term and 
large-scale investments in infrastructure and largely accounts for the scale and pace of 
urban and industrial growth.
The impact of the evolution of taxation systems on China’s local government has
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been widely and thoroughly examined by Chinese scholars. However, there has 
been little acknowledgement or systematic study of the obverse: the contribution to 
local government performance of residual institutions of the planned economy. I 
have set out to show at some length in the thesis, therefore, how the monopolization 
of the primary urban land market has contributed to economic growth. In fact, almost 
all significant academic commentary on this issue is negative concerning this issue. 
Chinese academics seem almost unanimously to believe that restricting farm land 
from converting into urban land market freely has the effect of depriving farmers of 
their chances to progress. Governmental expropriation is seen as an institution that 
loots the wealth of farmers (Liu 2000, 2003; Zhou 2005; Zhou 2006, etc.). 
Accordingly it is argued that it should be the target of land reform. With this 
preoccupation, few people have realized the significance of the monopoly for 
reducing the free-riding and infrastructure investment leakage problem. Small and fast 
developing economies in Asia such as Singapore and Hong Kong have adopted this 
institution for some time to great effect with respect to both the efficiency of urban 
development and fairness. This thesis has attempted to show that without this legacy 
institution from the planned economy, the development of Chinese cities would have 
been little different from those in other developing countries.
Next, let’s summarise the thesis’ ideas about input mechanism design. Rather than 
the Cobb-Douglas production function of new classical economics, I adopt the 
tradition o f Smith-Marx and define fixed cost, variable cost and surplus (profit) as the 
production function o f the (city) firm. This is used intuitively in the main body of the 
thesis and developed into a formal model in the appendix. I have suggested that the 
business model design should first pay attention to the asynchrony of lump-sum 
infrastructure input and long-term output. I examine the behavior o f an urban 
government that lacks property tax but monopolizes the primary land market. From 
what is observed, 1 develop the argument that the primary source of China’s export 
competitiveness is the large-scale subsidies granted to industries by turning lump-sum 
land income into long-term tax revenue. This explains the true power of China’s fast
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economic growth in recent years. Investments in fixed assets and export-led growth 
are the two macroscopic outcomes o f this institution.
In a conventional market economy, the fixed costs and variable costs of urban 
construction may come from two different mechanisms. First, development projects 
can be undertaken by non-government corporations and then sold to residents for a 
lump. Second, the government collects real estate taxes (supplemented by transfers 
from taxation collected at higher levels o f government) and provides public services. 
In China, however, due to the absence of property tax, the government has to regain 
its fixed cost and variable cost as a lump sum. Afterwards, it has to provide long-term 
and durable services with the lump-sum income. One of the solutions to solving this 
mismatch problem is to transform part of the lump-sum income from land lease into a 
continuous cash flow of tax revenue.
Following its profit-seeking instincts, urban governments in China have joined 
two independent sectors into a complete financing cycle. Thus they obtain lump-sum 
capital for infrastructure through land leasing in the primary land market and transfer 
part of the leased land to industrial enterprises which will yield regular taxes. The 
industrial land is leased at a competitive price that is below the cost of converting it 
from agricultural uses. The clustering of industries results in increasing and 
self-sustaining demand for commercial real estate and the urban government has thus 
set up an independent industrial-urban growth machine in which two different 
markets interact and perform different functions. Analysis of this business model 
clarifies why China’s local governments pay so much attention to land development 
and give somewhat lesser priority to urban services. Without property tax, local 
governments will not operate principally as service providers. Property tax closes a 
circle that doesn’t exist in the political economy of Chinese cities. It makes the 
government a direct servant o f the people who pay the tax. This is a story in the 
evolution of the Chinese city business model that is yet to be told.
7.3 Extension to planning theory
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7.3.1 Functions of urban planning
The theory presented in this thesis can help planners locate their professional 
coordinates. In a paper o f mine published six years ago (Zhao 2002), I pointed out 
that planners should rethink their market roles from the perspective of city 
management.
In the structural framework o f  an “urban enterprise”, urban planning and 
planners take on brand-new roles and functions. Planning is no longer the 
representative o f  unclear “public interests” or the embodiment o f  abstract 
national interests. Planning itself will inevitably be marketized (no matter how 
unwillingly planners abandon their traditional roles or how disgusted they are at 
the stink o f  money). It should be the primary task o f  planners to maximize the 
interests o f  their clients to the extent permitted by law (complying with national 
and public interests). A planner acts more like a political strategist during the 
Warring States Period o f  China — through canvassing, he “sells ” his expertise to 
the cities that acknowledge its value. He is not the coordinator or interceder o f  
different cities’ interest. His aim is to assist the city that “employs” him to 
defeat the rivals. This is the new professional ethics that planners must abide by. 
Planners should equip themselves in terms o f  both theory and methodology for  
the unfolding urban competition. The existing planning tools should also be 
improved or upgraded.
This statement was widely reprehended by Chinese planners (Chen 2004, Lin, 
Yan, Chen, and Liu 2003). Zhang TingWei (Zhang 2003), a professor of Illinois 
University directed his criticism at my statement in an article (pp 6-14):
Flying the flag  o f  modern western economics, some scholars boost the 
improvement o f  urban competitiveness and operation ability to a height that 
surmounts everything and even indicate that planning shouldn t represent 
“unclear public interests ” and is no longer “the embodiment o f  abstract national 
interests”. They believe it should be the “new professional ethics” o f
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“marketized” planners to help their “employers ” pursue interest maximization 
without paying attention to others ’ interests (like a football match)
These attacks indicate that this issue has not gone away and is likely to do so. It is 
noticeable from the history of modem planning theory that planners have a tendency 
to substitute self-fabricated roles for their real roles. It is, perhaps an inevitable 
consequence o f the intellectualization of the profession once it became a university 
subject. Contemporary urban planning theory seems far from ready to change its 
paradigm even though it is under pressure from the huge gap that exists between 
theory and practice.
The misunderstanding of the government’s role has helped trap planners in their 
misunderstanding of their own role. Facing a discrepancy between the role that 
government plays in reality and the role that planning theory assumes government 
should play, the theoretic circles of urban planning become like “collective angry 
youth”. They wish to correct the deviations of government but they are not, in fact 
strong enough -  their intellectual foundation is not robust enough. Unless this changes, 
as I have said, planning as it currently stands will become progressively marginalized 
by competition from other subjects and lose its voice in its traditional domain.
Mr. Zhang Tingwei also took note of this point. When talking about urban 
competitiveness. He suggests that:
Urban planning has done fa r less studies in this aspect than o f  the 
aforementioned process o f  globalization. Porter from Harvard Business School is 
one o f  the key researchers on the issue o f  urban competitiveness. His basic idea is 
to enhance the vigor o f  the market and accordingly urban competitiveness 
through lessening governmental intervention and strengthening the cooperation 
between the government and market. He argued that with regard to economic 
development, private capital should be in the center o f  the stage while the 
government should act more like a “marketer ”, whose main function is to create 
favorable investment environment for the market (Porter, 1997). P orter’s opinion
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represents to a large extent the mainstream opinion in economic circles, and 
particularly wins the recognition o f  the World Bank (the International Urban 
Competitiveness Workshop held by the World Bank in 2002 has invited Porter to 
give a keynote speech). It is fairly interesting that in America the main force o f  
studying urban competitiveness is not planning professors but economic 
professors; Porter him self is a professor o f  business management. Economists 
have always been interested in economic activities, especially the issues 
concerning production efficiency rather than the issues involving the spatial 
carriers o f  economic activities such as urban land uses and urban resources 
allocation. On the other hand, fo r  planners, urban spatial layout, land use and 
fa ir allocation o f  urban resources are unquestionably the focus o f  attention. 
Therefore, the planning circles usually carry out the studies o f  urban economy 
under a broader topic “urban economic development planning” and haven’t 
specifically emphasized the issues related to urban competitiveness.
Mr. Zhang Tingwei pointed out accurately the reason why planning is 
marginalized. It is due to the fact that “the planning circle and economic circle have 
different concerns, which actually reflects the subtle difference between the basic 
belief ofplanners and that o f  economists ”.143
His diagnosis is right but not his prescription. Actually, the urban planning 
profession only has a chance of moving back to the center of academic stage by 
correctly understanding planning’s real role in a competitive world. The intellectual 
basis of studying planning should be redirected to the fields that can serve this role
143 Nevertheless, Zhang’s comments on the disputes and arguments in economic theoretic circles are 
not so correct. Zhang deemed that: “As for basic views, there are sharp contests between “neo 
liberalism" which worships economic efficiency and constitution and “anti-neo liberalism" which 
advocates social equity. This contest exists in both economic and political fields. With regard to 
economic issues, ‘‘neo liberalism" thinks that the market should be completely released from the 
confinement o f the government and run freely and cities should operate as enterprises to improve their 
competitiveness. The opposite opinion is that the government should not adhere to the market at all, not 
to mention converge with it.” (Zhang Tingwei, 2003)
This shows that the mainstream o f  the theoretic circles o f planning is still deeply stuck in the mental 
morass that follows from the idea that the government is the contradiction o f  the market. This too 
simple dichotomy is couched moral judgments. And it is this strongly ideological/normative position 
that is the reason why many planning theories cannot ponder real questions rationally but are absorbed 
in morally labeling their opponents.
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better. By cultivating more pertinent expertise, planners can gain more discourse 
rights during academic competition.
To regard urban government as an enterprise that operates territory helps us 
understand governmental behavior. Typical o f mainstream academic planning 
commentary, Zhang Tingwei criticizes the many mistakes committed by local 
governments in his paper:
To “attracting foreign capital ”, some cities invested blindly in infrastructures 
without considering the necessity. They built big docks, big airports and roads 80-100 
meters wide, which have resulted in the increase in public debts and idle investments, 
but some projects bearing on the lives o f  ordinary residents like public toilets, water 
and waste utilities are left unattended fo r  a long period o f  time. Some cities are 
extremely enthusiastic about “decorating their images ”, endowing western classical 
architecture with power and elegance and assume that this has to be done to “be in 
line with international practices ” and to show the success o f  a city. (Zhang 2003)
His criticism of mistakes made is undoubtedly justified in part. But as with 
enterprises, these mistakes are like the inevitable consequences of entrepreneurs 
attempting new products and new profit models. As an enterprise cannot avoid errors 
of this or that kind, urban government should also be permitted to make mistakes. 
Indeed, as Hayek, Schumpeter and Popper all tell us, mistakes are necessary for 
innovation and progress. Criticizing the mistakes of urban government is not going to 
get us anywhere.
What is more important is that planners have the knowledge and intellectual 
creativity to recommend better business models, safer risk aversion mechanisms and 
less costly ‘stop-loss’ plans. They should be the source of innovative urban solutions 
for their urban government clients. Economists do not expect entrepreneurs to operate 
without making an error o f judgment about the demand their products are designed to 
fulfill. From one point o f view, it is because o f the risk of possible mistakes in 
operating the urban enterprise that urban planners have a justification for their
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professional status. Their business should be to propose sophisticated workable 
solutions that yield win-win outcomes and raise the social product of the urban 
economy. Their focus on land and infrastructure gives them a powerful lever to be 
proactive and to lead in the invention of new solutions for the spatial economy. All too 
often, however, planners’ anti-market stance prevents them from seeing those 
solutions never mind leading in bringing them about.144
A more accurate orientation of planning can also help with our understanding of 
key concepts of urban dynamics. It has always been a key issue of urban planning to 
decide on the optimal ratio of different kinds o f land and land development intensity. 
From the perspective of operating an urban enterprise we will have a more profound 
understanding of the essence and ramifications o f such urban performance parameters. 
All urban land can be divided into profitable land and non-profitable land: non-profit 
areas are land from which a government cannot easily obtain direct income, such as 
untolled roads and bridges, pipelines, public schools open parks and so on. Profitable 
area is the land from which the urban government can earn profit from property rights 
transfer to users who develop or operate housing, commerce, hotels and so on. 
According to the principle o f income maximization, it is obvious that the greater the 
quantity o f profitable land in an urban plan, the better it will be for urban government. 
But a low ratio o f non-profit area will affect land value and deflate the value of
144 Much o f  my work in recent years is aimed at demonstrating the feasibility o f this idea. In 2000, I 
took part in the concept planning o f  Guangzhou’s strategic development and proposed an urban 
development strategy from the perspective o f urban and regional competition. This not only exerted 
influence on governmental decision-making but is still being quoted by similar studies and more 
widely in planning. (Wu Fulong, Ma Runchao, Zhang Jingxiang, 2007) From the perspective o f urban 
competition, I advanced suggestions about the structural adjustment o f  Beijing by using the Olympics 
site selection and relocating the national administrative center. This is one o f  the few planning topics 
still being heatedly discussed in non-planning magazines. In order to meet the government’s demand 
for economic cities, I called for making customized “action planning” for the government o f Xiamen 
- to analyze the input and output o f the strategy proposed by the government according to the 
requirements o f  “four great balances” and to achieve self-balance o f urban development through land 
operation without financial budgeting. This approach has reversed the passive situation in which the 
government only approves but doesn’t plan and turned urban planning from the “driven wheel” into the 
“driving wheel” o f  the basic functions o f the government. During the past three years, the planning 
bureau in Xiamen has devised and implemented many projects. These projects are playing an 
increasingly important role in the economic growth o f  the city. Practice shows that if  planners are able 
to match what they feel like doing with what society expects, they can add much more significance to 
their jobs. As for those who seek through their professional position to impose their own value 
orientation on society, they end up dissatisfied, underused, and professionally marginalized.
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profitable land to the city. Therefore, the optimal ratio o f profitable to non-profitable 
is set in terms o f cost effectiveness: we should look for the lowest expenditure on 
non-profit land yielding the highest land income145. Put another way, land use 
planning becomes a constrained maximization problem: we seek to maximize urban 
revenue (land value) subject to the rising hidden cost of non-profit land. An optimal 
land use balance is at the point when the (opportunity) cost o f non profit land starts 
rising faster than the profit made from profit land- ie when the net profit is greatest.
A similar thing may be said of the Floor-area Ratio (FAR) performance parameter. 
Current planning theories cannot explain at all what the optimal land usage and 
Floor-area Ratio is. Values are simply plucked form the air, borrowed from other cities 
or derived from the imaginations of urban designers. Almost all director generals of 
urban planning bureaus are clear that these two indices are the key to urban planning 
management. If they are placed in the framework of urban management, their 
economic significance will become quite explicit: the optimal FAR and land usage is 
determined by the maximization of urban investment input-output (or the net value of 
urban land). Infrastructure can usually only support limited demand. If the demand 
defined by FAR and land usage overruns this limit, the service quality and running 
efficiency of cities will degrade, which will subsequently weaken the city’s overall 
competitiveness. It will also have a negative impact on land value. The overcrowded 
roads and primary schools, for example, will devalue the land in surrounding areas. 
Whereas, if the demand is lower than the load limit o f infrastructures, urban facilities 
will not operate under full load, which is a waste o f investment and a loss of potential 
income.
Sustainable land use intensity is a function o f the sustaining infrastructures (like 
primary and middle schools, transportation etc). If it is too low, the urban government 
will lose part o f its land income; if it is too high, public services cannot reach the 
expected standard. Land development intensity is determined by the weakest
,45It is surely far more complicated in reality than as analyzed. For instance, non-profit areas such as 
wastewater treatment plants may charge in indirect ways and industries in many Chinese cities receive 
subsidies and yield long-term taxation.
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provision of various items of infrastructure. Consequently, task is one of optimal 
matching. The optimal FAR should be consistent with the land development intensity 
at which all infrastructure is efficiently utilized. In terms of city management, the 
optimal FAR is not immutable: 1) FAR can be adjusted on neighbouring plots -  the 
decrease in development intensity o f one plot can be complemented by increase in 
development intensity o f neighboring plots within the same radius o f infrastructure 
services; 2) improvement of bottleneck facilities, such as the upgrading of 
transportation infrastructures can allow for more intensive land development; 3) 
increase in per capita floor area can accordingly raise the intensity o f FAR. Because 
population is the direct function and FAR is only a second-order correlate of 
infrastructure demand, it is impossible to give a fixed optimal FAR for a certain plot. 
If this inference is correct, it may overthrow the theoretical foundation of zoning. In 
other words, the optimal FAR should be acquired through an analytical process rather 
than a fixed figure. This requires an explicit economic objective to planning.
In the institutional context o f a government monopoly over the supply of primary 
land, regulations on land usage and FAR are primary policies to cut down on 
free-riders and prevent government’s income from leaking or transferring. Any 
change in land usage or increase in FAR should be approved by the government and 
charged the corresponding difference in land price. In other words, FAR variations 
should be and can be priced by their marginal impact on the value of land to the urban 
enterprise146. FAR and difference in land prices induced by different land usages 
contain huge economic benefits and thereby are major tools by which planners’ 
capture rent. China’s urban planning authorities are entitled to excessive discretionary 
rights in setting FARs and land prices and have naturally become seriously corrupted 
during the country’s high-speed economic development. Learning from this, the 
auction and list mechanism o f commercial land transaction in the primary land market 
has been one of the most successful institutional designs in the planning field in recent
146 Imaging that the city is a walled community and all public space and facilities are allotted by floor area. If a 
dweller enlarges her floor area, then this is equivalent to taking more share of the public goods. A private firm 
organizing this community will balance the marginal gains from selling an extra square meter of private space with 
the marginal loss to all other private spaces from reducing the public domain by one square meter.
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years. It has not only maximized the surplus of land market under a Coase-Vickrey 
style competition but also reduced rent-seeking during the planning process. This is 
also why the land income of urban government has risen so dramatically in recent
147years
7.3.2 Governmental competition
Another application of the theoretical ideas developed in this thesis concerns the 
relation between competition among governments and governmental democracy.
In traditional theoretical analysis, governmental competitiveness is by no means 
institutionally related to governmental democracy. In the opinion of institutional 
economists (Olson, 1993, Barzel, 2002), only democracy -  where government 
surrenders partial ownership -  can rein-in the opportunistic behavior o f governments. 
But the incompleteness of the bundle of property rights assigned in the democratic 
process has led to the decline in the capacity of collective action, which has become a 
chronic disease for most democratic governments.
Various forms of public participation and democratic decision-making have the 
effect of intensifying the democratic malaise, raising governmental transaction costs 
to impossible levels and hindering government from making timely and effective 
decisions. The intrinsic economic handicap that democracy brings might even 
explains why democratic countries stand in such deep-rooted dread of centralized 
market economies (if democracy were really the key to these countries’ economic 
success, given the self-interested nature o f national governments, they would never 
have the motive to hand over their secret to their opponents, let alone compel their 
opponents to adopt their secret weapon). Democratic governments are deeply 
concerned about the high efficiency of centralized, autocratic governments that have 
broken the rules o f the game. If a government can be a successful centralized one, it
147 In 2000, Xiamen’s actual income from land transfer was less than 200 million yuan. However, its 
land income from January 2007 to October 2007 reached over 25 billion yuan while its total financial 
tax income was just 30 billion yuan during the same period. This policy has also generated marked 
effects across the country. Since its implementation, national land revenue kept soaring up in 
successive years, reaching 580 billion yuan in 2005. Income from land transfer mounted up to 767.689 
billion yuan in 2006 and is expected to exceed 1000 billion yuan in 2007.
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will have an asymmetrical competitive advantage over other governments.
According to the framework suggested in this thesis, when there is only consumer 
competition and producers are monopolistic in the market, producers may acquire 
maximal benefit through manipulating market rules (such as mechanism design and 
conditions of auction) whereas such opportunistic behavior will vanish once there is 
producer competition. This suggests the idea of transforming consumer competition 
into producer competition through institutional design. Once the competition turns to 
producer competition, governments will improve the supply o f public goods 
automatically but via democratic systems. Since there is no need to pay for the cost 
of democracy, the opportunistic behavior of centralized governments will be 
eliminated without loss o f efficiency. To put it in another way, we can safely maintain 
the centralization of government through introducing producer competition.
The following ideas flow forms this notion. Firstly, by opening markets and 
breaking protectionist policies, factors should be able to flow among different 
governments (voting by foot). Secondly, the transfer budget of local governments 
should be limited to encourage them to seek innovative ways of financing their own 
‘businesses’. Thirdly, through proper allocation of rights and obligations, 
governments should be able to devise their own profit model. Fourthly, there should 
be laws and regulations constraining all parties which force losers in competition to 
accept the results.
To realize these points, the dimensions of the government should be small enough 
(which does not mean the smaller the better) to provide diversified options to factors 
(people, capital). This allows consumers have more choices within their trade radius 
(the shorter the trade radius is, the smaller the territory should be). More options mean 
lower costs o f flows and fiercer competitions among governments (in China the 
competition take place among counties and cities; in Europe the competition may 
occur among countries). Then it becomes less possible for the government to alter the 
rules afterwards to exploit consumers -  reducing consumer utility losses. In an ideal 
Tiebout’s world, democracy is totally redundant since competition will automatically
271
maximize consumer surplus. However, because such an ideal world does not exist and 
government monopoly is possible, in the fields where it is difficult for factors to flow 
freely, democracy is still a (bitter) necessity.
Singapore and China are vivid examples of states that have maintained a high 
capacity for collective action and accomplishing economic success through Tiebout 
competition148. A society that can monitor its citizens’ consumption of gum and carry 
out family planning is unquestionably a highly centralized society. As judged by 
traditional economics, highly centralized society is incapable of protecting private 
property rights and such a society is doomed to fail in its economic development. 
However, both countries are making rapid progress. One reason is that in the context 
o f centralization, competition enables private property rights to receive sufficient 
protection. This is, in fact, the story of the original decentralization of property rights 
from the state to the people in the emergence of Europe’s nation states in the middle 
ages. According to the analysis o f economic historians following the tradition of 
Douglass North, strong centralized states (monarchies) gradually gave away feudal 
property rights to merchants as a result of competition from other reforming states to 
which the merchants could easily move.
The cramped area and non-autarkic economy forced the early Singapore 
government to opt for opening up, which inevitably exposed its own economy to 
competitions from its neighbors or other economies around the world. Labor force 
and capital can move in and out o f the country freely at any time. To bring in capital, 
the government of Singapore has to rack its brains to create the best investment 
environment while the powerful capacity of collective action bestowed by 
centralization has enabled the government to do almost everything that it deems 
necessary to enhance its competitiveness. This is unimaginable in truly democratic 
countries. Once the single party and the monopoly regime lead by a few elites have 
achieved primary success and won the trust of the public, they can use much more
148 In the case of Singapore, a single state city, the competition comes from neighbouring states and competitor 
locations for footloose industry and commerce (such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, Taiwan, Penang, Kuala Lumpur 
and so on).
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far-sighted vision than is typically possible with the temporarily elected governments 
of democratic countries.149
China’s economy has gone through identical experiences to Singapore. Its 
economic growth owes to the policy of reform and opening up in 1979. Current 
studies on China mostly concentrate on ‘reform’ with little acknowledgement of the 
impact o f the ‘opening up’ on China’s economic growth. Actually it was the ‘opening 
up’ that led China to participate in international economic competition. From then on, 
the success or failure of the policies of the Chinese government has not been in its 
own hands but will be judged by the market and will be based on the outcome of 
competition.
After opening up economically, China implemented financial taxation 
decentralization. Subsequently its local governments became economic agents with 
their own self interests and violent competition arose among local governments. Since 
local governments just formally report to the residents but actually obtain their power 
from higher levels o f government, they are able to avoid regional political separation 
caused by decentralization. Through a series of institutional innovations and 
government monopolization of the primary land market supply, numerous 
‘competitive machines’ exhibiting unusual capacity of collective action -  urban 
governments - were created. This has led to China’s rapid economic growth over the 
last twenty years.
Centralization and democracy are a pair in contradiction. Based on the 
proposition that the government is the operator o f the city, whether an urban 
government adopts the mode of ‘monopoly and democracy’ or the mode of 
‘competition and centralization’ is just a matter which can be better relied upon to 
maximize profit. From this point of view, we can clearly define four quadrants of 
institutional choice. Two quadrants are efficient and the other two not so: 
‘monopolization and centralization’ and ‘competition and democracy’ are
149 This forms a sharp contrast with the democracy o f  Taiwan
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theoretically insufficient150.
Com petition
Inefficient com bination o f  
institutions
Efficient com bination  
o f  institutions
A utocracy
D em ocracy
E fficient com bination  
o f  institutions
Inefficient com bination o f  
institutions
M onopoly
Figure 7. 1 Quadrants o f institutional choice
It has been theoretically demonstrated (by Arrow) that if each member in a group 
has a special preference then it is impossible to meet the collective preferences o f all 
the members. It is hard impossible for democracy to produce optimal decisions 
automatically -  by some clever voting rule or other - and it finds it difficult to 
organize collective action (according to Olson’s theory, the bigger the group is, the 
harder it will be to organize collective action). So Arrow and Olson deal tough blows 
to democracy. The incompleteness o f the bundle o f property rights conferred onto 
elected governments will inevitably limit the ability o f  a government to organize 
collective action. On the other hand, excessively powerful centralization will pose a 
threat to private property rights (and any collective action will bring different levels of 
profits or losses to individuals). Tiebout competition confines governmental power by 
giving individuals the right and possibility o f exiting form the collective, which seems 
to be more efficient than deleting part o f the bundle o f property rights o f the
150 Thirty years ago, China and India may have be seen as the practical representatives o f  these two 
modes.
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g o v e rn m e n t  u n d e r  c e r ta in  c irc u m s ta n c e s .
Needless to say, however, governments compete with one another at a cost. The 
‘loss of interests’ caused by mutually forcing down prices under competition becomes 
the major argument against this mechanism. In fact, the advantages and disadvantages 
of local governmental competition are issues o f great controversy in the academic 
circles of China. The price mechanism suggested in this thesis is able to reveal the 
economic significance of these types of competition at a more general level. Such a 
theory also tells us that if we opt for the benefits of a mechanism, we have to accept 
its drawbacks. There is no perfect market mechanism that can realize the 
maximization of both producer surplus and consumer surplus at the same time. If we 
have government monopolization, the costs of firms will increase and consumer 
surplus of the residents will decrease; if we have governmental competition, income 
of the government will reduce and the surplus of firms and residents will be 
maximized. What we can do is to choose one mechanism that is suitable for the 
current system of property rights and devise an optimal business model within its 
framework.
7.3.3 Public participation
Public participation has always been a hot issue in planning. This is due to a 
tradition in the history of Western urban planning in which solutions have been sought 
to various social problems. In the early stages of the development o f planning theory, 
the sense of mission to save society imbued by utopianism ranging from Howard 
(1898) to Le Corbusier (1924), has profoundly influenced the academic genes of 
planning theory. Over nearly half a century, several ideological trends have responded 
ardently to planning’s ambition to be a kind of general urban problem solving 
profession. Among them are Amstein’s ‘ladder of citizen participation’ (Amstein 
1969), the new Marxism of David Harvey (1973), the “advocacy planning” of 
Davidoff (1965), the ideas about Planning in the Face o f  Power from Forester (1989) 
and the “collaborative planning” of Patsey Healey (2006). These all reflect the sense 
of mission that the planning community continues to hold on to. This also makes
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public participation much more popular in planning circles than in other related 
subjects like economic management, health management, education and so on. 
Almost all planners instinctively look upon public participation as a non-negotiable 
academic totem.
This derives partially from the deep-rooted doubt in the planning tradition about 
capital. Zhang Tingwei’s opinion (2003) represents well, the mainstream of the 
planning industry:
Most o f  the process o f  globalization is deliberately covered up: trade agreements 
are negotiated secretly; the mergence o f  enterprises is the outcome o f  backdoor 
transaction; there is a confidential account book inside the enterprise and completely 
different from the one open to the government. None o f  these is to be exposed to the 
public. Therefore, as has been indicated by Brecher, multinational corporations wish 
to marginalize public participation so that they can monopolize economic 
decision-making. They desire fo r  the elimination o f  all forms o f  public control and 
supervision so that their decision-making and transaction could develop out o f  the 
sight o f  the public (Brecher, 1994). Multinational corporations often ally themselves 
with political, economic and academic elites o f  local cities to reach their goal o f  
monopolizing decision-making. They can take advantage o f  their allies to restrict or 
oppose public participation -  political elites can utilize their power, economic elites 
can make use o f  their resources and academic elites can mould public opinion to deny 
the significance ofpublic participation. In America, it is a group o f  elites from various 
fields and closely related to multinational corporations (such as the base camp o f  the 
right wing ‘corporation fu n d )  that argue against the substantive participation o f  the 
public with their common excuse that 'public participation will affect efficiency ’. 
(Zhang Tingwei, 2003)
I could have used any number of similar quotes from western planners but choose 
to continue to mine the paper from a Chinese academic based in the USA, since it is a 
rich source of illustrative material and is broadly representative. Zhang has accurately 
defined the purpose o f public participation -  to oversee the unrestrained opportunistic
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behaviors of the government. His suspicions about multinational firms are right in 
most cases. However, he has not really comprehended the economic essence of public 
participation and thereby cannot point out the proper counter argument or solution to 
the problem that ‘public participation undermines efficiency’.
Zhang places the hope o f public participation in the ‘education’ o f the public:
We as planners should guard against consciously or unconsciously taking the 
opposite side with the public. We understand that public participation is crucial in 
terms o f  urban control while the ability o f  public participation is the key to the 
success or failure o f  it. Work o f  planning concerns not only the construction o f  
“places ” but also that o f  “people ” With regard to people, the central job is to 
train the ability o f  public participation. The public need education and to be 
informed o f  all the information so as to participate in planning. (Zhang 2003 
pp6-14)
Others (following Healey and the communicative planners) focus not so much on 
educating the public to participate more effectively but on methods of facilitation -  
better mechanisms o f participation. However, the development of economics has 
already refuted this approach in theory151. We know from Arrow's theorem that even 
though the public is informed of all information and thereafter conducts itself 
rationally under the rule o f democratic law, voting will not present us with a definitive 
conclusion. Neither need it provide us with a rational outcome, (where ‘rational’ 
means best by and reasonable set o f criteria).
In a widely cited article, I quoted such an example o f public participation:
The selection o f  the planning scheme o f  Zhangzhou central district is a typical 
failure o f  public participation. Before official appraisal, the government had 
openly exhibited a range o f  schemes. The scheme chosen by the public was the 
same as that chosen by the experts. However, this scheme was the most infeasible
151 For the best theoretical exploration of the limits of public participation in the face of Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, see the work of Norwegian planning academic Tore Sega ‘Communicative Planners as Naifve Mandarins 
of the Neoliberal State?’, European Journal of Spatial Development, Dec 2005, pp.1-9.)
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one. How did it come out so? Because none o f  these people (the public and 
experts) will directly pay the bill fo r the construction o f this new district, they 
both chose the most “luxurious ” scheme without prior consultation. (Zhao 2002)
With the same case, Zhang Tingwei arrived at a totally contrary conclusion:
The public need education and to be informed o f  all the information so as to 
participate in planning. I  once read a domestic article that presented an opposing 
view on public participation, arguing that the public had chosen the most 
luxurious scheme during the collection o f  the planning scheme o f  Zhangzhou 
central district, which was the most infeasible one. (Note: refer to Zhao Yanjing: 
“From Urban Administration towards Urban Management”, City Planning 
Review, Vol.26 No. 11, 2002. Mr. Zhao suggested that Zhangzhou’s case “was a 
typical failure o f  public participation”, while I  think this judgment is unfair.) In 
my opinion, this example just bears out that at present public participation at 
home is not sufficient but not useless. To invite genuine public participation, all 
the information should be opened up to the public rather than just show them the 
drawings ( “planning exhibition”) and ask them to pick a “most eye-catching” 
scheme. Only with the information o f  the total cost, total housing removal and 
total engineering quantities o f  each scheme in detail and with some basic 
economic knowledge will the public be able to make correct decisions and help or 
even rectify possible errors o f  the government during decision-making. This is 
genuine public participation. I f  there is only “planning exhibition”, public 
participation will ju st be a formality and what has happened with, (zhang Tingwei, 
2003, pp6-14)
This reflects a typical misunderstanding of the government’s role among planners. 
China’s urban government is the developer of a city, and this distinguishes it from the 
urban governments in western countries that are more like a ‘property management 
company’ employed by the citizens. The public of China neither contribute taxes 
directly to urban government nor have a say in the uses of governmental income. In 
other words, the government in China is not the ‘employee’ of the public. As a result,
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it aims at excelling other urban governments in competition for footloose capital and 
labour rather than maximizing public welfare directly through service provision. Its 
performance is measured by bringing in more factors (including residents). An urban 
government in China improves its services under the pressure of urban competition. It 
is similar to a TV station that tries to improve the quality of its program and attracts 
more audience so as to raise its ads revenue. If the audiences are asked to vote, they 
will undoubtedly vote for the ‘most entertaining program’ rather than the ‘most 
economical program’.
Since the cost o f public services delivered by China’s urban governments are not 
from the public directly, the people will naturally demand the services with the best 
quality. The reason is quite simple: the public have no motivation to save money for 
the government. They have no ownership stake in the financial business of local 
governments. In Zhangzhou’s case, the difference in the cost among various planning 
schemes was so obvious that the people could easily appreciate it from a glimpse at 
the scheme’s various scales without checking the precise cost figures. And indeed, the 
planning bureau announced the total investment amounts of each schemes and sent 
staff to explain the projects. However, the people did not care at all. No matter how 
much information is in the open, the public just choose the ‘best’ but not the ‘most 
economic’.
The reason why an urban government in China is willing to spend more money 
on a scheme is to win in the urban competition against other urban governments, 
rather than to meet the needs of the public. For ‘competition and centralization’ 
oriented governments, public participation is, in essence, a political show.
Taking an extreme but plausible position on all this, the primary purpose of 
public participation, and even urban democracy itself, is not to get a ‘collective 
preference’, but to compensate consumers for the loss of freedom to exit. Public 
participation is only necessary under certain conditions: when exit is not possible.
Planning academics like Zhang Tingwei may argue that this means we have to
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transform our urban governments in China from ‘developer’ to ‘property management 
company’. In fact, since the housing system reform in 1998, especially the 
implementation of the 2007 Real Right Law, the public are becoming more and more 
democratically conscious and the government has been quick to surrender rights that 
were taken for granted before. The urban government is, in fact, increasingly 
becoming like a property management company. Therefore, we can expect that as 
more and more residents possess properties in a city, particularly when property tax 
becomes the primary income of the local government, there will be more and more 
genuine public participation and electoral democracy. But it is still unclear whether 
this will mean that public interests are better accommodated.
Public participation can lessen uncertainty about private property rights at the 
cost of losing the ability to organize collective actions. It is similar to idea that 
deceleration may increase driving safety but will lower efficiency. Perhaps a better 
alternative is to devise a better braking system (competition). The market is the final 
judge of the advantages and disadvantages of an institution. For now it seems we can 
conclude that ‘monopoly + centralization’ and ‘competition + democracy’ are out; 
‘monopoly + democracy’ and ‘competition + centralization’ are contending with each 
other, with no outcome so far.
According to the price theory proposed in this thesis, during consumer 
competition, consumers (such as residents) cannot back out of transaction as they 
wish (for instance, after they have purchased estate). When government’s behavior is 
likely to harm their interests, public participation becomes necessary. If consumers 
can exit at any time (like tourists and visitors), public participation will be redundant. 
Therefore, there is a potential solution to the dilemma o f restricting urban 
government’s behavior and improving its efficiency, i.e. breaking monopoly and 
encouraging competition among urban government.
It is not the planners’ duty to select political institutions. Yet, they have to be clear 
about the type of the government they are serving. Since different types of 
governments have different ‘rational’ behaviors, their optimal planning paths and
280
standards are different accordingly. For a ‘democratic’ government, the best site for a 
large-scale public service facility (such as park) is the location most preferred by 
residents -  for example, in the old city with the densest population. For a 
‘competitive’ government, the perfect site would be a location that can generate 
maximal appreciation income, for example, a new district with the most reserved land. 
The former will win the most votes, while the latter obtain the most profit. Apparently, 
both choices comply with public interests in a broad sense -  either the interests of 
present residents or future residents, but the income approaches are entirely different.
7.4 Conclusion
One of Coases (1998) taunts was that the mainstream economics is just like 
studying the circulation of blood without a body. He noted that Adam Smith also 
pointed out that we should be concerned with the flow of real goods and services over 
time and with what determines their variety and magnitude. As it is, economists study 
how supply and demand determine prices, but not the factors that determine what 
goods and services are traded on markets and therefore are priced. It is a view 
disdainful of what happens in the real world, but it is one to which economists have 
become accustomed, and they live in their world without discomfort.
It is the same with urban planning. Theorists indulge themselves in defining 
behavior in the real world with a fabricated facsimile o f government. Once we admit, 
however, the idea that government may have the nature of a self-interested firm, we 
can use institutional analysis to broaden the scope of explanation of urban planning 
theories and view the many urban phenomena that can’t be interpreted by traditional 
theories in a brand new light.
Planning is a series o f choices.
To make choices, the most important thing is to decide on the benchmark: the 
fundamental criterion or the objective function. This will involve some fundamental 
questions about urban planning: including what is the essence of the city? What is the
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value of cities? How did and do cities come into existence? Profit maximization 
arising from self-centred motivation provides a remarkably powerful model and 
analytical benchmark in the study of Chinese cities. On this basis, most behavior of 
the participants of urban activities (the government in particular) can be explained. 
Through structuring studies of urban planning by the use of axiomatic methods, we 
can build up a framework, in which all concepts are mutually supportive, and finally 
shape a set o f academic languages that may be shared by all planners. This is possible, 
although perhaps not very likely.
A choice without a value orientation is a blind choice. The tasks of planners 
mainly fall into two categories: firstly to design a city -  determine various functions 
of the city and the combination of facilities; secondly to maintain a city -  grant 
administrative approvals to the change of land use and facilities in an established city. 
Both tasks are constrained by and enslaved to the business model adopted by a city. 
Different business models determine the roles of urban governments and, in turn, the 
roles of planners. Whatever the type of planning, planners have to assess the value of 
numerous possibilities and opt for the ‘optimal’ schemes.
As with athletic competitions, the sifting scheme is extremely crucial. Economics
1 Ocan provide the fundamental analytical tools for planning. From the perspective of 
economics, density, Floor-area Ratio and land use can be explained and justified by 
economic reasoning. Aesthetics and engineering technologies (choices) can also be 
regarded as a part of the business model and included into the input -  output analysis.
Of course, it is perilous to try to explain all urban problems with economic tools. 
Urban problems are like Mount Everest and different subjects may arrive at different 
conclusions by observing from different angles. The scenery observed from one angle 
cannot represent that observed from other angles. Yet it has to be admitted that due to 
the different levels of sophistication of the analytical tools of different subjects, the 
theoretical altitudes mounted will vary. Of all the social sciences, economics far
152 Refer to Zhao Yanjing (2007): Revising the Price Theory on the Basis o f Coase Theorem. In this 
article, I proposed an evaluation benchmark that replaced Pareto Optimum with maximization o f  
aggregate social surplus.
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exceeds others in structure and theoretical maturity, and this has enabled economics to 
transcend traditional academic limits and enter other fields. Rather than stick to 
traditional academic domains and exclude the intrusion of economics, we should 
reform unsatisfactory parts o f economic tools and, by “navigating with a borrowed 
ship”, subject the concerns of urban planning further to the fields beyond its 
traditional domains.
This goal is not baseless. Economics has long neglected spatial aspects of the 
economy and has been justly criticized as being a subject that can only survive in the 
‘wonderland of no spatial dimensions’ (Walter Isard, 1956). Actually, many problems 
that cannot be explained by traditional economics will be better comprehended if the 
spatial factor is taken into consideration.153 For instance, traditional economics 
believed that public goods could not be priced in the market. But, as I have shown, if 
we regard territory as a manageable product, public goods will become a common 
product that can be priced in the market through intra-jurisdictional competition and 
the government will become ‘an enterprise that manages territory’ accordingly.
It needs to be stressed that even though the introduction of economics can greatly 
broaden the base of planning, a subject (in China) chiefly composed of architectural 
aesthetics and engineering, economics cannot replace these and other subjects. On the 
contrary, it should be integrated with other subjects (see for example Webster 2007), 
which will widen the language of planning and consolidate a more robust analytical 
framework for urban planning. If planners can effectively combine their core subjects 
together in unified analytical frameworks, they will possess unique professional 
advantages in resolving urban problems. This thesis is fully aware of the difficulty of 
this task -  due to the faultiness of both planning theories and economic theories. It is 
still an unreachable dream now to transform urban planning from an empirical 
pre-science into a scientific system that can be analyzed, falsified, simulated and
153 I m yself once explained the problem o f “high increase, low employment” in China by enlisting the 
factor o f  territory. Refer to: Zhao Yanjing: “Increase in Chance to Work and Policy o f Space” (2006) 
Urban Studies, 2006.2, “How High Increase and Low Employment Comes into existence”, and “The 
Regret o f  High Threshold o f  Urban Planning”, Liaowang News Weekly, 2006.8.
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which is able to predict new phenomena. Notwithstanding this, it is worth the 
adventure to try to build urban planning on sturdier logical foundations.
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APPENDIX 1
PRICE THEORY OF PUBLIC GOODS
“current 1economics crisis ’ is the failure o f  basic assumptions, 
paradigms and ‘systems rather than the failure o f  this or that theory ”
In Towards the Next Economics, Drucker (1985: 17)
8.1 In tro d u c tio n
There is a sense in which I could have omitted this appendix. To have constructed 
a systematic argument that Chinese urban governments act as profit maximizing 
territorial enterprises and to have elaborated the argument in several ways, illustrated 
it and explored how it works in practice, would probably be a sufficient contribution 
to the study of contemporary Chinese urban planning and development. But it would 
not have satisfied the author. Intellectually it would be incomplete. The reason lies in 
the starting point o f this study, which was a dissatisfaction with the underling corpus 
of theory guiding urban planning discourses and interventions. There were two 
aspects o f that dissatisfaction. One was the apparent impotence of many conventional 
planning theories and the shallowness and irrelevance of their prescriptions. The other 
was a more profound unhappiness with the nature of the intellectual tools applied to 
urban analysis, including the tools of neoclassical economics. For most part of the 
thesis I have addressed these challenges by eschewing neo-classical economics-based 
analyses and loosely adopting a property rights and transaction costs theoretic 
framework for the applied policy analysis that I have engaged in. However, it will be 
recalled from my earlier theoretical discussions that I do not view institutional 
economic analysis as wholly unproblematic -  notably where it rests on neo-classical
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assumptions about pricing.
In this appendix, I pick up a theoretical challenge posed in earlier chapters and 
develop an alternative price theory to that which underlies both neoclassical and some 
of the new institutional economics too. I first tried starting the thesis with this chapter. 
Then 1 moved it to just before the concluding chapter. But in both places it became 
too unwieldy to both illustrate a new and speculative theory and to have a focused 
discussion of the planning and property rights issues that I have addressed in the 
thesis. So I chose to free-up the bulk of the discussion in the thesis from the 
complication of a radical (and risky) new theoretical endeavour and rely on more 
conventional analytical categories and ideas and to open these up in detail in an 
appendix.
The justification for this appendix, therefore, is to explore an alternative theory of 
price that overcomes some shortcomings of established theory. I have published some 
of these ideas in Chinese, but the theory has not yet been published in English nor 
formally subjected to the scrutiny of independent international economists. However, 
I have discussed it widely with economist friends and colleagues and it has been read 
by economists at Cardiff University and by Professor Bin Yu, a former economics 
professor at University College Los Angeles. The latter commented (unpublished 
personal communication) that the chapter does what he had first attempted to do two 
decades ago but did not persist with because of the radical nature of the task. It is in 
this spirit that I offer this work as an appendix to my thesis. It is an intellectual work 
in progress and it is speculative. It no doubt has gaps and deficiencies but it is a 
venture worth taking. Where else can one develop new intellectual ideas if  not in a 
PhD thesis?
The aim of this appendix is to explore new theoretical tools for the study of 
public goods and of government’s role in the economy. I do this by establishing an 
alternative foundation for micro-economic analysis -  an alternative price theory. The 
new theory illustrates that so-called ‘market failure’ need not be in our model of the 
real world -  even as it is not, in fact, in the real world, but that it is an artifact of the
286
neoclassical economic modeling paradigm. What needs to be amended is not the role 
of government in the real world but the theory in our mind. I strive to prove that the 
behaviors of government and public goods could be analyzed as normal firms and 
private goods and need not to build a new branch of theory.
8.2 T ieb o u t’s m odel o f local ex p en d itu re
Public goods have long been viewed as a kind of special goods which can not be 
supplied through market system. As pointed out by Charles Tiebout (1956: 417)
“a good which should be produced, but fo r which there is no feasible method o f  
charging the consumer ”(417) ”
Samuelson indicates that, due to selfish interest, the consumer will give false 
signals for public goods, pretending to have less interest in a given collective 
consumption activity than he really has, and to enjoy the goods while avoiding 
payment o f a contribution to its cost. Since no decentralized pricing system can serve 
to determine optimally these levels of collective consumption, he suggests other kinds 
of ‘voting or signaling’ would have to take the place of price (Samuelson 1954: 388). 
A natural deduction is that public goods have to be provided in a special way (via a 
voting system), and the provider, government, of public goods is a special non-market 
role in the economy.
However, in his study of Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow (1951) 
proved that no voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a 
community-wide ranking while also meeting a certain set of reasonable criteria with 
three or more discrete options to choose from.
Furthermore, Tiebout (1956, p 416-7) found that “many goods that appear to lack 
the attributes of public goods may probably be considered public if consumption is 
defined to include external economies”. Therefore, from the point of view of 
economics, a government provider of public goods is no different in principle from 
any other provider who finds a mechanism for supplying a collectively consumed
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good or service to a group of consumers. There is no de facto reason, therefore, to 
preclude government suppliers from an analysis o f the market system.
An important breakthrough in the studies of collective consumptions within the 
neo-classical framework was Tiebout’s paper A Pure Theory o f  Local Expenditure 
(Tiebout 1956). In this paper, he indicates that there is a major difference between 
central and local provision of public goods. Whereas Samuelson’s analysis might be 
valid for central expenditure, it does not necessary to apply to local expenditure. At 
central level, the preferences of consumer-voter are given, and the government tries to 
adjust to the pattern of these preferences. At local level, if consumers are fully mobile 
and there are a large number of communities in which they may choose to live, 
Tiebout shows that local governments will provide so-called ‘public goods’ in a 
market-like way, as with any other private goods.
'On the production side it is assumed that communities are forced to keep 
production cost at a minimum either through the efficiency o f  city manager or 
through competition from other communities. Given this, on the demand side, ... 
just as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private marketplace to buy 
his goods, the prices o f  which are set, we place him in the position o f  walking to a 
community where the prices (taxes) o f  community services are set. Both trips 
take the consumer to market. There is no way in which the consumer can avoid 
revealing his preferences in a spatial economy. Spatial mobility provides the 
local public goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip. ” (p.
416-424)
This is a remarkably profound statement, often lost in the derivative Tieboutian 
literature: as long as the spatial factor is included in economic analysis, there is no 
difference in nature between private goods and public goods. As providers of 
private goods, local governments, when allowed to by higher governing institutions, 
will find themselves following market rules to provide public goods. Against 
Samuelson’s view that it is impossible to find ‘market type’ solutions for optimal 
public goods expenditures, even if the solution ‘exists’, Tiebout argues that
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“ The appropriate local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, 
are adopted by the consumer-voters ... The solution, like a general equilibrium 
solution fo r a private spatial economy, is the best that can be obtained given 
preferences and resources endowments.
...local government represents a sector where the allocation o f  public goods (as a 
reflection o f  the preferences o f  population) need not take a back seat to the 
private sector. ” (p. 424)
Half a century has passed since Tiebout published his study. Mainstream 
economics still treats government public goods supplying agencies as having a special 
role in the economy: one that lies outside of the market154. This is because mainstream 
economics lacks a framework to generalise Tiebout’s idea.
Tiebout correctly points out that, if people can choose a community in which to 
live, local public services will be priced in a similar way to private goods, and a 
market solution should emerge. However, he does not provide a fully satisfactory 
account of this solution because he assumes diminishing returns to scale. It turns out 
that mainstream economics also does not give a fully satisfactory account of the 
market solution for private goods for the same reason, as I shall explain.
The analysis o f the optimal community size by Tiebout is based on the 
assumption of diminishing return:
“For every pattern o f  community services ..., there is an optimal community size. 
This optimum is defined in terms o f  the number o f  residents fo r which this bundle 
o f  services can be produced at the lowest average cost. This, o f  course, is 
closely analogous to the low point o f  a f ir m ’s average cost curve. Such a cost 
function implies that some factor or resource is fixed. I f  this is not so, there 
would be no logical reason to limit community size, given the preference
154 I do not consider the regulatory role of government in my argument. But it is clear that government does have a 
special role in supplying regulatory frameworks to govern markets -  as the recent melt-down of unregulated 
financial markets in the UK and the USA illustrate. However, it may be noted that the market also provides its own 
regulatory institutions and that it would be profitable to extend the arguments of this appendix into a study of 
regulations.
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patterns. ” (p. 419)
In other words, a community cannot reach equilibrium if there is not a minimum 
on the average cost curve. If there are increasing returns (i.e. diminishing average 
costs with unlimited increasing community size), the equilibrium will be that all 
people live in one (the best) community155.
Obviously, this conflicts with Tiebout’s original assumption that each locality has 
a revenue and expenditure pattern that reflects the desires of its residents. That is, all 
communities are different in revenue and expenditure patterns not only in community 
size only. Residents express their preference for a bundle of public goods and allocate 
themselves to supplier by voting with their feet:
“Given these revenue and expenditure patterns, the consumer-voter moves to that 
community whose local government best satisfies his set o f  preferences. The 
greater the number o f  communities and the greater the variance among them, the 
closure the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position. ” (p. 
418)
According to this assumption, how many optimal communities should there be? 
The answer is as many as preferences. If each resident’s preferences are unique, 
“there is no reason why the number of communities will not be equal to the 
population, since each voter can find the one that exactly fits his preferences.” 
Tiebout admits:
“Unless some sociological variable is introduced, this may reduce the solution to 
the problem o f  allocating public goods to the trite one o f  making each person his 
own municipal government. Hence this is not even a first approximation o f  
reality. ” (p. 421)
In the decades since his paper was published, there have been numerous studies 
based on Tiebout’s model. However, none of these studies really surpass Tiebout’s 
idea. What Tiebout strives to prove is as long as residents can make their choice
155 In fact, club theory is established on the same basis.
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among different communities freely, 1) there is no difference in nature between 
so-called ‘public goods’ and private goods; 2) local governments can provide their 
services like the providers of private goods. But like his followers, Tiebout did not 
explain how the optimal price-quantity-variety is determined156. The insight of 
Tiebout that government can supply public goods in something that acts like a 
competitive market therefore cannot crystalise into a general theory and replace 
Samuelson’s paradigm of public goods (in which Samuelson simply declares the 
failure of market and uses government arbitrarily to substitute the market 
mechanism).
8.3 R eth ink ing  o f P ric ing  System
In the perfect competition framework, there is no explicit pricing mechanism, 
since all economic agents respond to everything simultaneously and price is 
predetermined by the invisible Walras auctioneer. With a given price, consumers make 
decisions among different products, and producers make decision among different 
factors. The real pricing mechanism is replaced by the fictitious Walras auctioneer. 
Within this framework, there will always be optimal resource allocation for 
consumers and producers - for a given price. Neoclassical economics explains how 
the resource is allocated under the determined price. But it does not provide an 
explanation of how the price is achieved. Although the assumption and prerequisite of
1 ^ 7this paradigm are self-consistent, they are far from the real world . Establishing a 
new price theory has to start from understanding consumers’ and producers’ 
behaviour.
8.3.1 Consumer equilibrium—the pricing system when demand exceeds supply
In a situation of underproduction, competition happens among consumers and
156 It cannot even answer the simple question of, when a resident has two alternatives, should he 
choose the one that meets his preferences but is at higher cost or should he choose the one that is at the 
lowest cost but does not meet his preference.
157 For example, Isard comments that the modem economics is in wonderland o f  no spatial 
dimensions.
291
determines the equilibrium price. Based on this, 1 propose a realistic demand theory. 
To simplify the demand analysis, I introduce two new concepts. First, consider a 
consumer in terms of economic person rather than natural person. A natural person’s 
preference at each consumption event is different even for the same product, since her 
utility is diminishing with more units consumed. Next, count each consumption 
event as an independent economic person. For example, when a natural person 
consumes the same type of product several times (say, five loaves of bread), he is 
regarded in the model as several economic person (say, five economic person). The 
budget of each economic person is the maximum amount that the natural person 
allocates to the consumption from his/her total income. Of course, this amount 
depends on the consumer’s preference for that particular consumption. When we 
consider economic person, we do not have to be concerned with the intensity of 
preference, but only its sign (positive or negative) . The motivation of introducing 
this concept is to simplify the issue of utility comparison and summation among 
different agents in economics. With this concept, we do not need to know the 
preference of every natural person. As long as we know the number of economic 
person, we can estimate the size of the market for a given product.
For a given product, the consumers’ preference (utility) density can be sorted 
from high to low. According to the utilities of different products, consumers can be 
categorized into two sets: a positive utility set o f consumers who needs this product 
and a negative utility set of those who do not need this product. Then assume that 
consumers (remember we are talking about consumption events or consumer persons) 
have limited budgets, and their budgets can be sorted from high to low. For a given 
price, consumers can be categorized into two sets: a positive budget set of consumers 
who can afford this price and a negative budget set o f those who cannot afford this 
price. Effective demand is the intersection of the positive utility set and the positive
158 This is because o f  the concept o f equivalence, which represents one consumption. If you like 
something very much and you also like a second one, they are equivalent in consumption terms. It is 
similar to the concept o f person-time. I may not care about who he/she is but the time (input), which 
equals the quantity. In this way I can avoid comparing and aggregating the utility o f different people.
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budget set. Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount they would like to 
pay and the amount they actually pay.
This gives rise to a novel consumption function. This function consists of 
consumer preference, consumer budget and consumer surplus. According to this 
function, whether or not a consumer buys a product depends on preference and budget. 
The consumption will be realised only when they are both positive. Consumer 
behaviour follows the rule of maximising consumer surplus. In other words, 
consumers tend to get a preferable product at minim cost.
In a consumer competition market (demand exceeds supply), the transfer price of 
every factor is equal to its auction price in the open market. In other words, a bidder 
in the open market is equivalent to a consumer in the consumer competition market.
There is an implicit assumption in the special sense of Coase-Vickrey pricing: the 
amount of an existing factor can only satisfy the needs o f one bidder (a so called 
‘diamond good’ -  an extremely scarce factor). To relax this assumption and apply it to 
more general situations, we assume that the factor can satisfy the needs o f more than 
one bidder. In line with the Coase equilibrium, the market price is taken to be the 
price given by the nth bidder: the final factor demander in the market. At the same 
time, this price exactly makes the surplus of the (n+1)^ bidder less than zero159. If the 
amount of this factor is unlimited with constant quality (so called ‘water goods’), i.e. 
n approaches infinity, then the market price approaches what is suggested by the
thperfect competition model. In other words, all competitors except the n bidder are 
price takers.
Here subjective cost (preference) and objective cost (budget) independently affect 
the size of market in different ways. When the market for a product is constrained by 
budget, the producer can exert an influence on the budget of consumers through
159 At this price, the surpluses o f  all bidders are different. O f those, the surplus o f  the best bidder is 
the highest. Because space is defined as a set o f continuous but different locations, location can be 
seen as “diamond” rather than “water”. Therefore, spatial analysis is mainly based on Coase-Vickrey 
pricing and not perfect competition. This is a reason why spatial analysis can never really satisfactory 
be conducted under the neo-classical economic paradigm.
293
changing the price (which is negatively correlated with budget), and then affect the 
market size indirectly. The preference of consumers is independent of the change of 
price, and preference can only indirectly affect product price through constraining the 
size of certain types of products.
Cost budget
Market size
Revenue curv e 
Slop equals pnce
Prefeiw icf surplus
Total cost
Preference curve
Preference
Figure 8-1. The effective  dem and and market size confined by budget bound
This figure illustrates how  incom e and preference affect the quantity o f  demand as w ell as the 
price. The sm aller definition area, budget or preference, w ould confine the market size. In this 
case, the definition area o f  budget is narrower than that for preference. The size o f  market is 
decided by the budget. The preference is unrelated. The econom ic m eaning o f  surplus o f  
preference is that there is not enough incom e to m eet the want o f  this product. That is to say, the 
effective  demand is the intersection o f  tw o definition areas. The econom ic m eaning is that the 
effective  dem and must satisfy  the positive preference and budget sim ultaneously.
Thus, we come to a brief conclusion about consumer competition: 1) when 
demand exceeds supply, the competition occurs among consumers; 2) a consumption 
function of a economic person consist of two factors - the budget (income) and the 
preference (utility); 3) the effective demand is the demand that has positive budget 
and positive preference; 4) the quantity of demand is the intersection of the set of 
positive preference and positive budget; 5) the price is determined by the marginal 
consumer - the last payer of a good who has positive preference and budget; 6) the 
price equals the highest price that the second marginal consumer would like to pay, or 
the price that the marginal consumer bids, letting the second marginal consumer’s
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budget equal zero even though his/her preference is positive; 7) producers affect the 
price through changing the quantity o f supply and therefore the marginal economic 
person. The producers enjoy producer’s surplus.
8 .3 .2  Producer equilibrium— the pricing system when supply exceeds demand
A key improvement of producer theory would made by replacing perfect 
competition by an expanded Schumpeter Competition to explain the behaviour of 
producers. Schumpeter describes the incomplete competition between the best 
producer and the second best producer. I augment this concept in two ways: 1) 
competition between more than two producers who have different production 
functions; 2) competition between different Hayek producers who compete with each 
other for market shares. In this section, I focus on the first way - producers who have 
different production functions compete to supply the same product on market.
The neoclassical analysis is essentially a theory of market coordination and does 
not require an explicit theory of the producer. A production function serves this 
purpose by linking two sides of the equation (inputs and outputs) together, and 
producers are assumed identical and to have the same Cobb-Douglas style production 
function. However, as indicated by Foss (1996, p .l),
“By ‘competence ’, we understand a typical idiosyncratic knowledge capital that 
allows its holder to perform activities -  in particular, to solve problems -  in certain 
ways, and typically do this more efficiently than others. ” (1996, p .l)
In the real world, the producers are heterogeneous in nature and do things with 
varying degrees of efficiency. Unlike the so called Cobb-Douglas production function, 
I assume that total cost consists of fixed cost and variable cost. I also assume every 
producer has different production function—the way of production, the style of 
management, the location of transportation and even the individuality of 
entrepreneurs, is different from each other. All rational producers only work for 
positive profit and seek to maximize profit. Define the cost of production factors as 
the producer cost. Fixed cost means the cost of one-off input; and variable cost is a
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function of output. The product of price and quantity defines the revenue o f producers. 
If there is no price discrimination, the price o f all each product is the same (this means 
that the slope of revenue curve is a constant). The balance between cost and revenue 
is defined as the producer profit. Producers face three possible production functions: 
diminishing return, constant return and increasing return160.
When supply exceeds demand, the competition occurs only among producers. In 
the cases of constant and increasing returns, Schumpeter competition can only happen 
between the most efficient producer and the second most efficient producer, and the 
market price is set by the best producer. Due to scale economies, the market is at 
equilibrium when the best producer reaches maximum output, which will mean he/she 
has captured the whole market. To achieve this, the best producer has to exclude all 
other competitors from the market. According to the Schumpeter pricing criterion, the 
best price is when the profit of the second best producer is zero, and he (and other 
weaker producers) retreat from the market. As a consequence, the best producer has 
all market shares, and price-quantity is in equilibrium161.
Figure 8.2 shows the Schumpeter competition with constant returns. The slope of 
the revenue curve gives the market equilibrium price, and is determined by the best 
producer. It can also be seen that, in the cases of constant returns and increasing 
returns, the market equilibrium result must be a monopoly, i.e. there is only one 
producer . But in this scenario, monopoly is not inefficient but the most efficient.
160 The three possible functions are caused by three possible shapes o f variable cost curves— convex, 
straight and concave. For example, we can express diminishing returns, constant returns and increasing 
returns with functions o f  g(Q) = c + bQ, g(Q) = c + b logQ and g(Q) = c + exp(bQ) respectively, where 
c is fixed cost and Q is quantity.
161 Because o f technology or resource monopoly, it is possible that there is only one ‘natural 
monopolist’ in the market. Even in such circumstances, the producer cannot arbitrarily price. Higher 
prices would lead to two results: 1) to reduce the consumer's budget; 2) producer increasing profits. In 
the first case, the size o f the market will reduce. Because o f the existence o f fixed costs, the average 
cost will increase, which erodes the producers’ surplus and leads to further prices rises. Certainly 
there will be a price at which the sum o f the effective consumers’ budget equals the average costs - 
higher than this price, consumers will withdraw from the market. In the second case, when the 
producers increase profits, the market will be split off by the new Hayek products, and dilute the profits 
o f the original products.
162 Monopoly here is different from the traditional sense o f ‘industry monopoly’. It is the monopolies 
o f Hayek's products. As Hayek products have alternatives -  close substitutes ( ‘otherness’ 
competition), a producer cannot price arbitrarily. He must compete with adjacent Hayek products for 
the market, so as to obtain the greatest degree o f scale economies. This means that even a monopoly
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Only when the best producer maximizes his output can society generate the biggest 
surplus at the lowest cost163.
Y Budget
i i f ( Q > p Q
* Cost of the second best producer 
\g ( .Q )  = c + bQ
Value 
And cost
profit
Fixed 
second 
producer, C
cost of the 
best Cost of the best producer 
Kh(0m n + mQ
Fixed cost of the best 
producer, n
Market scale Q Quantity
Figure 8. 2. Producer competition: pricing with constant return
Compared with constant/increasing return, diminishing return is a little more
producer o f  a product cannot price freely, and excess monopoly profits are not sustainable. The extent 
o f  such monopolistic competition is even more intense than that o f  the perfect competition.
163 The competition among monopolistic local governments in China, is a good case to illustrate 
producer competition. In the land market, the investor who can offer high-income employment or 
contribute high tax is rare. Local governments are producers o f  locations. To attract good investors 
(consumers o f  location), local governments lower their tax and supply better infrastructure. The most 
efficient local government is able to afford the highest subsidy. In China, local government 
m onopolises the primary land market. According to traditional theory, the monopolist would not have a 
m otive to improve its efficiency. But with producer competition, local government has to compete with 
its neighbouring local governments. In China, local governments often compete for good investors 
through lowering the price o f  land and offering tax incentives. The better the consumer is, the better 
conditions local government is w illing to offer. The investors vote with their feet. Once the public 
service gets worse or other city gets better, they move away from the city and thus force the local 
government to improve its efficiency.
Note that this conclusion does not imply that m onopoly dose not need to be controlled. 
M onopoly is not the same as monopolistic competition. M onopoly is, due to various reasons (e.g. an 
unparalleled resources, no substitute products or designated franchise), the state o f  the absence o f  the 
second-best competitors (or producers o f  Hayek products) in the market. In monopolistic competition, 
the second-best producers (or producers o f  Hayek products) play a crucial role in pricing. Therefore, 
the most important issue for breaking up monopolies and protecting monopolistic competition is not to 
restrict the best (optimal) producers, but to reduce market barriers and support (or even create) 
second-best producers (or producers o f  substitute Hayek products).
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complicated. The optimal output size of the best producer can be more, less, or 
equivalent to the effective demand. When it is more than effective demand, the 
equilibrium consequence is the same as with constant/increasing return. In other 
words, there is only one best producer. However, if the market size is big enough to 
accommodate more than one producer, we have to augment Schumpeter competition. 
The best producer cannot have the entire market share, but stops producing at its 
optimal output. Meanwhile, the second, third, and more producers join in the 
production process until the nth producer satisfies all effective demand. Therefore, the 
market price is determined by the competition between the nth producer and the (n-l)th 
producer. According to the hypothesis that a producer must obtain positive profit, the 
optimal price would make the profit of the nth producer equal to zero. When the 
market demand is big enough to allow n to approach infinity, the situation tends to 
one described by perfect competition in neoclassical economics - all producers simply 
take the price but only the marginal one producer is the price-makers. That is to say, 
perfect competition is merely an extreme example of Schumpeter Competition.
8.3 .3  Conversion between two equilibriums
I have discussed the pricing mechanisms of consumer competition and producer 
competition. Now let us further discuss the competition between consumers and 
producers for pricing power, which is incarnated by the way of competition. To 
contest for pricing right consumers would strive to make producers compete each 
other and the producers would strive to lead on the competition occur among 
consumers. Many organizations, such as OPEC, and institutions, such as antitrust Acts, 
are designed to control the right of pricing „
The breaking point o f oversupply and underproduction is the critical point that 
decides which side will control the right to price. When the quantity of the product 
reaches the critical point, the mode of competition would shift immediately from 
consumer competition to producer competition, or contrarily, from producer 
competition to consumer competition. This suggests that the equilibrium of supply
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and demand is not stable. The equilibrium jumps from one type to another. 
Accordingly, the curve o f price change will not be continuous. The equilibrium price 
will jump up or down from one equilibrium to another equilibrium.
When the market reaches producer equilibrium, all consumers will maximize 
their consumer surplus. As the degree of oversupply gets higher, price cuts will be 
fiercer and there will be more consumer surplus. In short, consumers benefit from 
producer competition. With scale economies, the most efficient producer can exclude 
other producers by price cuts. However, once the producer arrives at monopoly status, 
he will restrain his production to within consumers’ demand to force consumer 
compete and thus obtain maximum surplus.
Similarly when the market reaches the consumer equilibrium, the producer would 
enjoy the producer surplus. Then the consequent question is whether producer 
equilibrium and consumer equilibrium is more efficient? To answer this question, we 
must introduce a new norm—maximised consumer’s utility. This norm suggests that 
maximised surplus does not the purpose of economy. The final aim of economy is to 
make the most of satisfaction of the preference of consumers. In other words, the 
optimal way of competition does not depend on which one can create (or save) more 
surplus, nor which party is disadvantaged (by number). Rather, it is determined by 
which equilibrium is more efficient in achieving the maximization of consumer utility. 
This norm leads to the demand for new product—the variety of product. Let’s further 
analyse the relationship between variety, price and scale.
8.4 Emergence of a new product—the utility function
8.3.1 Hayek product
In his book, Individualism and Economic Order, Hayek (1949) says:
... we [have] to deal with a continuous range o f  close substitutes, every unit 
somewhat different from  the other but without any marked break in the continuous 
range. The result o f  the analysis o f  competition in such a situation might in many
respects be more relevant to the conditions o f  real life than those o f  the analysis o f  
competition in a single industry producing a homogeneous commodity sharply 
differentiated from all others. Or, i f  the case where no two commodities are 
exactly alike be thought to be too extreme, we might at least turn to the case 
where no two producers produce exactly the same commodity, as is the rule not 
only with all personal services but also in the markets o f  many manufactured 
commodities, such as the markets for books or musical instruments, (p. 99)
Assume, following Hayek, that for each product there is a continuous range of 
close but different substitutes164 and name those substitutes as Hayek products. The 
gap between similar products is the degree of difference (substitutionability) between 
them.
When there are Hayek products, the monopoly market price will not only be 
limited by the sub-optimal producer, but also be limited by existence of the producers 
of substitutes. Coase (1937) notes the importance of product diversity:
“It has sometimes been assumed that a firm is limited in size under perfect 
competition i f  its cost curve slopes upward, while under imperfect competition, it 
is limited in size because it will not pay to produce more than the output at which 
marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. But it is clear that a firm may 
produce more than one product and, therefore, there appears to be no prima facie 
reason why this upward slope o f  cost curve in the case o f  prefect competition or 
the fact that marginal cost will not always be below marginal revenue in the case 
o f imperfect competition should limit the size o f  the firm. Mrs Robinson makes 
the simplifying assumption that only one product is being produced. But it is 
clearly important to investigate how the number o f  products produced by a firm  is 
determined, while no theory which assumes that only one product is in fact 
produced can have very great practical significance, (p. 12)
With a Thunen-style figure, Coase (1937) explains that the boundary of a firm
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(product) can be limited by another firm (product):
Imagine an entrepreneur who starts controlling exchange transactions from x. 
Now has he extends his activities in the same product (B), the cost o f  organising 
increases until at some point it becomes equal to that o f  a dissimilar product 
which is nearer. As the firm  expands, it will therefore from this point include 
more than one product (A and C). (p. 13 )
The method used by Coase to deal with this issue is the same as that used by 
Tiebout to deal with optimal community size, i.e. assuming the cost the curve of a 
firm (community) is convex. If this assumption is relaxed by allowing unlimited 
economies of scale, the equilibrium of price-size will not exist. Obviously, Coase 
himself noticed this problem. He indicates that “this treatment of the problem is 
obviously incomplete, but it is necessary to show that merely proving that the cost 
curve turns up does not give a limitation to the size of the firm.” (Coase 1937: 49)
Sraffa (1926) gives the most insightful description of the relationship between 
various monopolists under incomplete competition:
“ When each o f  the firms producing a commodity is in such a position, the general 
market fo r the commodity is subdivided into a series o f  distinct markets. Any 
firm  which endeavours to extend beyond its own market by invading those o f  its 
competitors must incur heavy marketing expenses in order to surmount the 
barriers by which they are surrounded; but, on the other hand, within its own 
market and under the protection o f  its own barrier each enjoys a privileged 
position whereby it obtains advantages which -  i f  not in extent, at least in their 
nature -  are equal to those enjoyed by the ordinary monopolist. ” (p. 8)
As with Coase, however, Sraffa does not explain why there are different products 
and does not describe how the market size-price of each product is determined and 
what the optimal variety is. What he indicates is that there is a cost for producers who 
switch from one product to another. Is it possible to explain product diversity from the 
viewpoint of consumption rather than production? Obviously, it will be more difficult,
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since it is very easy to reach Tiebout’s conclusion that everyone wants to be his own 
producer, due to the diversity of preference.
8.3 .2  Utility function
To solve the problem, Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) propose the 
Constant Elasticity o f Substitution (CES) function. The function simply assumes that 
diversity increases as market size expands. The relationship between price and 
quantity in Marshall’s price theory is replaced by the relationship between variety and 
quantity in this function. However, as Marshall’s theory, which cannot explain the 
pricing mechanism, the CES function cannot explain the dynamics of new product 
emergence.
If we re-consider this issue with an augmented Schumpeter competition, the 
dynamics by which new products emerge and the competition of product variety 
become clearly articulated.
Consider the new norm: maximization o f  consumer utility. As mentioned above, 
the consumption function in my model is composed of utility, budget and surplus. 
Satisfaction of each consumer is the ultimate purpose of production. Yet for a single 
product, the utility of each consumer and the degree of satisfaction varies. Assuming 
that no two consumers have exactly the same preference, one single product can only 
completely satisfy one consumer. Other consumers’ utilities will suffer utility loss 
even though their utility may be positive.
Take the market for shoes as an example. Everybody’s feet are different and 
everyone regards their feet in different ways, yet shoes are produced in a limited 
variety of ways because of scale economies. Assuming that everyone’s feet are 
different and therefore everyone has a unique preference for shoe size (not to mention 
style and quality), only one pair of feet will exactly fit one particular manufactured 
size of shoe and other consumers’ feet will be less comfortably accommodated. Of 
course it will be good if sizes of shoes produced could be as diverse as the 
preferences/needs of consumers. But this would tend to mean producing special shoes
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for each person165 166 and as Tiebout said: This is not even a first approximation o f  
reality (Tiebout, 1956:421) since producers generally have to be concerned with scale 
economies. This reveals that price is not the only concern o f consumers. There must 
be an equilibrium between maximizing consumer’s utility and producer’s surplus.
As shown in the case of the shoes, producers prefer specialization while 
consumers prefer diversity. For producers with increasing (or constant) returns, larger 
scale production means lower average costs. For producers, mass production is more 
efficient than specialised production. Consumers, however, prefer more choice for a 
given price for the more diversity o f products, the less their utility loss167.
Utility
Utility loss
Variety/quantity Product A Variety/quantity
165 It is something like what Tiebout suggested: if each resident’s preferences are unique, “there is no reason why 
the number of communities will not be equal to the population, since each voter can find the one that exactly fits 
his preferences.”(795<5:42/,)
166 Of course markets do develop for bespoke (tailor-made) clothing -  precisely because of the mismatch I am 
referring to here.
167 This model shows that a decrease in firm size due to specialisation and the bifurcation o f  a market 
are two different processes. On the production side, specialisation leads to local econom ies o f  scale, 
which results in the reduction o f  product cost and, indirectly, the reduction o f  product price. On the 
consumption side, utility maximisation leads to bifurcation o f  the market, which results in the reduction 
o f  consumers’ utility loss.
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Utility
U tility loss
Variety/quantity Va riety/q u a n ti tyProduct C Product A Product B
Figure 8. 3. C onsum ers’ utility loss vs. diversity
N ote: The Figure indicates the relation between utility loss and variety. Clearly the more 
variety, the less utility loss.
8.3.3 Budget and utility—two constrains
The decision o f a consumer (economic person) depends on two conditions: firstly, 
he has enough budgets (negatively correlated with the price of producer); secondly, 
the product has positive utility. Consequently, there are two types o f consumer surplus: 
utility surplus and budget surplus. For a consumer, there can only be one type of  
surplus: 1) budget surplus: he cannot find the product he wants, although his budget is 
sufficient; 2) preference surplus: he wants the good but does not have sufficient 
budget. Clearly these two types o f efficiencies are negatively correlated, and cannot 
be satisfied at the same time. When there is budget surplus, the definition area of 
market is confined by utility bounds. The preference o f marginal consumer (economic 
person) is zero— he has sufficient budget but does not like the good. When there is 
preference surplus, the definition area o f market in confined by budget bounds. The 
budget o f marginal consumer (economic person) is zero— he like the good but cannot 
afford it.
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Cost/budget
Budget curve
Consumer surplus
Market size
Revenue curve 
Slop equals price
Quantity
Budget bound
Preference curve
Preference Marginal utility curve Utility bound
Figure 8.4. The effective demand and market size confined by utility bound
Note: The utility bound replaces the budget bound to confine the market size. This w ould  
cause the accum ulation o f  consum er surplus.
When a producer reduces price, the market size will expand due to the increase of 
effective demand from consumers who are restricted by their budgets. On the other 
hand, it will have no effect on the consumers who are restricted by the utility o f the 
product. They will select the products that can best meet their preferences. In other 
words, when the market size is restricted by consumers’ budget (i.e. there are enough 
preferences, but there is not enough budget), the boundary o f the market will be 
determined by the last affordable consumer agent. When the market size is restricted 
by consumer’s preference (i.e. there is enough budget, but there are not positive 
preferences to the product), the boundary o f the market will be determined by the 
number o f economic person whose preference are large than zero. When the effective 
demand sets o f two different products overlap each other, there must be a Buridan 
consumer168, who can afford both products and whose preference is indifferent
168 This concept is modified from the philosophical story o f  Buridan's donkey (or ass, dog, etc), who, 
when faced with two equally appealing bales o f  hay (or barley and oats, or carrots) could not make up 
its mind which to eat and so died o f  starvation. The paradox is named after the 14th century French 
philosopher Jean Buridan.
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between them.
8.3.4 General equilibrium
Only when the utility bounds confine the market size would a new product 
emerge. When the market size is constrained by the utility o f consumers, the 
increase o f income or the decrease o f product price will not lead to the enlargement of 
market size, but the growth o f budget surplus. Once the consumer surplus reaches a 
certain point, the old market bifurcates -- the alternative Hayek product(s) will be 
produced to reduce the loss o f consumer utility.
Old B udftt c en t
Old Cociv.cwr ijrphii
Product? cos:
Figure 8.5 The birth o f new product
Note: This illustrates the bifurcation o f a market and the birth o f a new product. The 
accumulation o f budget allows producer to invent the new product and thus to reduce the 
utility loss o f consumers.
The concept of equilibrium is given a new meaning by introducing the 
time-space concept. In this new framework, equilibrium can exist in the short run 
only. With the change o f time or space, surplus will change accordingly (accumulation 
or wastage) and the equilibrium will be destroyed. Therefore, in the long run, there is
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no Walrasian stable equilibrium; neither for any product nor for the entire market.
Within this framework, the dynamics of product diversity and market size-price 
mechanism can be described clearly. Product diversity is driven by consumers’ 
preference. The equilibrium product diversity is that associated with the minimum of 
utility loss and maximum of budget of the consumers. It is worth to note that the 
process of market bifurcation is reversible. When economy shirks the two markets of 
Hayek products may merge into one. Once there is not enough surplus to contain new 
product, the market reaches its equilibrium.
Let us conclude the discussion in this section. Product variety is the trade off 
between consumption preference for diversity and production preference for economy 
of scale. Social surplus (budget and profit) determines the equilibrium of product 
variety-quantity-price. According to this mechanism, we have the following 
conclusions:
1. Because of the existence of Hayek products, there is no product whose price and 
market size can be determined independently.
2. No combination of any of the two elements alone (variety and price, quantity 
and price, or quantity and variety) can reach equilibrium.
3. Since the accumulation of surplus is not constant, any economy must vary over 
time (expanding or contracting).
8.5 Conclusions
Staring at the innovation of Tiebout and also his unresolved problem, this 
Appendix finds that the reason why public goods cannot be analysed within the 
neoclassical framework is the perfect competition paradigm. To incorporate public 
goods and private goods within a consistent framework, this Appendix proposes a 
new price theory, based on the logic embedded in the thought of Schumpeter, Coase, 
Vickrey and Hayek. I have proposed a price theory that is able to explain some 
inherent conflicts within neoclassical theory and greatly reduces the unrealistic
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assumptions required by conventional price theory.
First of all, it resolves the problem o f increasing returns and scale economies. 
Economists acquainted with neoclassicism are all aware that increasing returns and 
scale economies are incompatible with conventional price theory. This incompatibility 
hinders price theory from explaining many economic phenomena. This is especially 
true when it comes to spatial issues as Fujita, Krugman and Venables point out in their 
masterly work, The Spatial Economy (2002):
The basic problem with doing theoretical work in economic geography has 
always been that any sensible story about regional and urban-development hinges 
crucially on the role o f increasing returns. Suppose that we really lived in the 
constant-returns world that much economic theory still assumes. Then it would be 
hard to understand why the economy is not characterized by “backyard 
capitalism”, in which each household or small group produces most items for 
itself... Unfortunately, increasing returns have always posed difficulties for 
economic theorists. Except under very special circumstances they lead to a 
breakdown ofperfect competition; even if  this problem can somehow be finessed, 
they pose problems for the existence and uniqueness o f equilibria (pp. 2-3)
In order to overcome the technical obstacle to economic modeling, spatial 
economy theorists have adopted the CES functions developed by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). This attempts to deal with the troublesome problem of 
increasing returns to scale in a very technical and mathematical fix. However, even 
these authors are not satisfied with the CES function because it is based on a very 
unpractical assumption that market scale affects neither the price nor the scale of a 
single market and that all market scale effects are functionally related to products and 
their varieties. In the new theory that emerges from CES assumptions, price leaves the 
scene and the famous relation between scale and price in Marshall Price Theory is 
replaced by a relation between scale and variety. In other words, the factor of price is 
sacrificed in economic analysis in order to solve the problem of increasing returns.
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In contrast, the pricing theory framework proposed in the appendix to this thesis 
can resolve the relation o f price, quantity and variety synchronously. It can therefore 
be applied to the analysis o f pricing both in traditional competitive markets and, 
crucially for urban studies, in monopolistic markets. Competition (at the margin) 
between optimal and second-best products, as well as competition between 
close-substitute products, takes the place of perfect competition. Or more precisely, 
perfect competition becomes a special case. These types of competition also help 
bring into a uniform framework, unmanageable problems (unmanageable under the 
paradigm of neoclassical economics) such as spatial analysis and the provision of 
public goods.
The proposed model also resolves the problem of perfect competition, which is 
not compatible with monopolistic competition - the main form o f spatial competition 
and public good supply. Since the formation of neoclassical price theory, people have 
not stopped criticizing perfect competition. Hayek wrote in the fifth chapter “The 
Meaning of Competition” in Individualism and Economic Order that:
“According to the generally accepted view, perfect competition presupposes:
1. A homogeneous commodity offered and demanded by a large number of  
relatively small sellers or buyers, none o f whom expects to exercise by his 
action a perceptible influence on price.
2. Free entry into the market and absence o f other restrains on the movement o f  
prices and resources.
3. Complete knowledge o f  the relevant factors on the part o f all participants in the 
market. ” (p. 95)
Hayek then suggested that:
“The peculiar nature o f  the assumptions from which the theory o f  competitive
equilibrium starts stands out very clearly if  we ask which o f the activities that are
commonly designated by the verb “to compete ” would still be possible if  those
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conditions were all satisfied. Perhaps it is worth recalling that, according to Dr. 
Johnson, competition is “the action o f  endeavouring to gain what another 
endeavours to gain at the same time ”. Now, how many o f the devices adopted in 
ordinary life to that end would still be open to a seller in a market in which 
so-called “perfect competition” prevails? I  believe that the answer is exactly 
none. Advertising, undercutting, and improving ( “differentiating”) the goods or 
services produced are all excluded by definition —“perfect” competition means 
indeed the absence o f all competitive activities. ” (p. 96)
Nearly a century has elapsed and the neoclassical paradigm has not collapsed, 
although masters of economics like Sraffa, Hayek and Young have falsified the price 
theory of neoclassicism and there more and more ‘abnormalities’ are included in the 
lexicon of economic ideas. On the contrary, the mainstream paradigm constantly sets 
up various branches (game theory, information theory, development economics, 
institutional economics) to deal with these abnormalities through a series of 
“adjustment, adaptation and assimilation” (Kuhn 1962). The effect has been to keep 
neoclassical price theory alive. One important reason is that all these criticisms have 
failed to give birth to a more explanatory paradigm that parallels and potentially 
competes with the neoclassical.
Through introducing the idea of Coase-Vickrey competition (consumer 
competition), Schumpeter competition (producer competition) and Hayek competition 
( variety competition), this thesis generalizes the pricing theory of monopolistic 
competition and makes perfect competition a special case of monopolistic competition. 
It thereby resolves the incompatibility of neoclassical price theory with monopolistic 
competition and includes all competition models in one uniform analysis framework.
Another contribution of the proposed model is to clarify an important question 
concerning the structure of competitive markets -  who is it who sets price? In the 
Marshallian paradigm, the primary issue concerning equilibrium is supply and 
demand, which makes people think that competition will surely exist simultaneously 
among consumers and producers. This blurs the essential question of whether it is
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consumers or producers who decide the price. In order to avoid this question, 
neoclassical economics regards pricing as an abstract and impersonal process -  in the 
fictitious Walras auction, nobody can determine the price of the market; rather, it is 
already fixed and what the producers and consumers need to do is to select different 
production factors or different consumption combinations on the basis of this fixed 
price. Therefore, the neoclassical price theory doesn’t qualify as a genuine “price” 
theory; it is at most an optimal allocation theory. Within the proposed price theory 
framework, market subjects are no longer the price receivers but the price makers -  it 
ensures that the price of the market is determined by somebody.
In brief, the new price mechanism differentiates two states: (1) supply that 
exceeds demand and (2) demand that exceeds supply. When supply exceeds demand, 
there is among producers and the price is determined by Schumpeter competition. 
When demand exceeds supply, there is competition among consumers and the price is 
determined by Coase-Vickrey competition. If consumers can choose among various 
substitute goods, market competition arises between the producers of these substitute 
goods and the price lies with Hayek competitions if producers can choose among 
various consumption demands, competition arising among various consumers and 
producers will turn to the most profitable products until the profit (surplus) of the 
marginal producer is equal to that of the producer of another product.169 Whatever the 
competition is, the optimal criterion is what I have denoted the Coase Optimum -
1 70surplus maximization.
This market structure is of ultimate importance to the selection of political 
systems (including the nature of governance in cities). When supply falls short of 
demand and consumers cannot choose freely among different producers or products,
169 We can regard the equilibrium o f scale and price determined by competition among producers or 
consumers for the same product, as partial equilibrium; and regard the equilibrium based on 
competition among the producers o f different products as general equilibrium. After introducing 
currency -  the universal equivalent - all products can be seen as kindred products. In this way, 
without additional assumptions, partial equilibrium and general equilibrium can be examined within a 
uniform framework containing price -  scale -  variety.
170 But not utility maximization. After the concept o f the economic person  is brought in, the intensity 
of consumers’ preferences is no longer important. All utility is measured with one unit —  only the 
value counts —  positive or negative —  whatever the intensity is.
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democracy is needed to limit the opportunistic behaviors of producers. Whereas, 
when supply exceeds demand and consumers may choose liberally among a range of 
producers or products, democracy becomes redundant. The autocracy does not affect 
the Hayek Competition if the taxpayers can move freely among many monopolistic 
public goods suppliers. In the In reality, competition among local governments for 
taxpayers (enterprises, individuals), is also a form of Hayek competition. Tiebout’s 
model is actually the abstraction of Hayek competition to the urban public goods 
problem.171
Within the neoclassical framework, there are no transaction costs and the market 
is therefore able to run smoothly without any institutions (apart from the all pervasive 
perfectly competitive market with its invisible Walrasian auctioneer). But in the 
proposed price mechanism -  as with other theories in the new institutional economic 
mould - institutions become an analyzable and significant economic factor. The core 
of institution design is to create business models that consist of variable cost and fixed 
cost and can maximize profit through the combination of production factors. The 
business model itself is a fixed cost (capital asset) -  its repeated applications will also 
produce economic surplus.
Within the analytical framework proposed in this appendix, we can see that there 
is no difference in nature between the pricing of public goods and private goods. The 
pricing mechanism o f  public goods and private goods can be explained within the same 
framework (following the genius o f  Tiebout several decades ago):
“ The solution, like a general equilibrium solution for a private spatial
economy, is the best that can be obtained given preferences and resource 
endowments. ”
And
“ local government represents a sector where the allocation o f public goods
171 The analysis o f  market structure can also be used to explain the vertical integration o f enterprises 
—  this is an institutional compensation to prevent the opportunistic behavior o f the other party when 
one party loses flexibility and can’t quit the transaction at will.
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(as a reflection o f  the preferences o f the population) need not take a back seat to the 
private sector. ” (Tiebout, 1956:424)
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Appendix 2
Rethinking of Coase Theorem and Auction theory
9.1 P arad igm  change?
Since perfect competition became a pillar of mainstream economics, insightful 
economists, such as Sraffa, Schumpeter, Hayek, Dixit and Stiglitz, have never stopped 
reconsidering the micro-foundation of economics. An important breakthrough came 
from the work of Ronald Coase (1959, 1960). After the effort of a generation of 
economists, Coase’ theory has now been developed as one of the foundations of the 
New-institutional economics (is . However, there are reasons to believe that even this 
magnificent success -  culminating in a Nobel prize -  may fall short of what he might 
have originally been seeking. From Coase’ point of view the methodology he 
developed was a challenge to the foundation of economics, rather than merely a 
complement to mainstream economics. At a fundamental level, Coase’ transaction 
cost paradigm and the perfect competition paradigm are not, in fact, consistent in 
nature.
Although few economists admit this point, Coase himself is very clear about it. In 
his Nobel Prize Lecture, Coase started with this:
“In my long life I  have known some great economists but I  have never counted 
myself among their number nor walked in their company (p.713) ”
This meaningful prologue has naturally been regarded as modesty. However, it 
might also be interpreted as Coase demarcating a line between himself and the 
mainstream economists. His seminal paper, “The Problem of Social Cost”, had been 
highly regarded at that time: indeed it was one of the two papers for which he
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received the Nobel Prize. Nevertheless, Coase said:
“I  will not say much here about its influence on legal scholarship which has been 
immense but will mainly consider its influence on economics, which has not been 
immense, although I  believe that in time it will b e .{p .l\l)”
Obviously, Coase was not unclear about the influence of his paper, but assessed 
that its influence on economics should be greater. Coase’s extraordinary confidence 
comes from his deep understanding of his idea. In this well know speech, Coase 
boldly asserted:
“It is my view that the approach used in that article will ultimately transform the 
structure o f microeconomics... [T]hey will, as I  believe, bring about a complete 
change in the structure o f  economic theory, at least in what is called price theory or 
microeconomics. ”
Coase himself realized :
“I  am very much aware that many economists whom I  respect and admire will not 
agree with the opinions I  have expressed and some may even be offended by 
them(p. 719) ”,
because what he has been challenging is not only so-called ‘high theory’ but also 
the very basis of neo-classical economics.
Since then, however, the ideas of Coase have been gradually quoted by 
neo-classical economists and have finally become something of a decorative addition 
or extension to the neo-classical economics framework. Mainstream economists cite 
the Coase theorem much more than they understand it, as Oliver Willimson has 
critically noted. It is plain that the revolution in micro-economics has not yet occurred 
as Coase foretold. Partly, this must be due to the fact that mainstream economists 
are, Coase’ own words “extremely conservative in their methods, (and) have not been 
inclined to attempt it.” More importantly, however, although Coase exposes the 
weaknesses of Arthur Pigou’s market-failure logic, he does not provide a new
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paradigm explicitly that can replace the price theory of mainstream economics.
9.2 Coase T heorem
In his seminal papers of The Federal Communications Commission and The 
Problem of Social Cost, Coase (1959, 1960) put forward what was subsequently 
dubbed the Coase Theorem, by Stigler (1972). The Coase Theorem can be 
interpreted as follows. When transaction costs are zero, parties to an externality 
problem will settle their conflict through contracting property rights over the 
externality and the production activity that causes it. These rights would be assigned 
to those who can use them most productively. Many scholars emphasize one 
implication of Coase Theorem: that market can achieve optimality automatically 
without government intervention172. Others point to the more substantial message of 
Coase: that when transaction costs are not zero, then the distribution of property rights 
is crucial in determining a solution. However, I suggest that a more revolutionary 
contribution of the Coase theorem lies in its criticism of the analytical framework of
1 7 ^the perfectly competitive mainstream economics model .
To clarify the misunderstanding of the Coase Theorem, in his paper Notes on the 
Problem o f Social Cost, Coase refers to the example used in The Federal 
Communications Commission about a newly discovered cave:
“ Whether the cave is used fo r storing bank records, as a natural gas reservoir, or 
for growing mushrooms depends, not on the law o f  property, but on whether the 
bank, the natural gas corporation, or the mushroom concern will pay the most in 
order to be able to use the cave. ”
In making this argument, Coase gives an explanation of economic surplus that is 
very different from the neo-classical economics explanation, based as it is on utility 
theory and perfect competition. In Coase’s world, when different bidders bid to use
3 In the New Palgrave, Cooter defines the Coase theorem as: “The initial allocation o f legal entitlement 
does not matter from an efficiency perspective so long as the transaction costs o f exchange are nil.”
173 Cheung (2000) also thinks that, in future, economics theorists will treat the transaction cost 
paradigm as a revolution against neoclassical marginalism.
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the same resource, their efficiencies are different. As a result, the most efficient 
bidder acquires the property right of the scarce resource by paying the most. This 
contrasts with the neo-classical idea that bidders simply take the market price and 
decide how much of the goods they would like to buy according to their marginal 
substitution rate, which varies from one consumer to another consumer. In other 
words, the price in a Coasian world is made by the bidders but in neo-classical 
economics, no one makes the price - all players are price-takers.
9.3 Coase optim um
The Coase theorem is a great challenge to mainstream economics. There have 
been numerous studies that attempt to incorporate the Coase theorem into the 
neo-classical framework. In his article, The Public Use o f Private Interest. Schultze 
(1977) argues that zero transaction costs do not guarantee efficiency but that only 
clear-cut property rights can achieve the highest efficiency through perfect 
competition. Cooter (1982) alternatively asserts that zero transaction costs plus 
perfect competition can achieve the efficient allocation of resource. However, I 
suggest that the Coase approach is fundamentally in conflict with the idea of perfect 
competition, basing this on Coase (1988) Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, where 
he says:
“Stigler states the Coase Theorem in the following words: ‘... under perfect 
competition private and social cost will be equal. ’ Since, with zero transaction 
costs, as Stigler also points out, monopolies would be induced to ‘act like 
competitors, ’ it is perhaps enough to say that, with zero transaction cost, private 
and social costs will be equal. It will be observed that Stigler’s statement o f  the 
Coase Theorem differs from the way I  expressed the same thought in my article. 
There I  spoke o f  the value o f  production being maximized. There is, however, no 
inconsistency. Social cost represents the greatest value that factors o f  
production would yield in an alternative use” (p. 158)
According to the Coase paradigm, producers are always pursuing maximum
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benefit. This results in an equilibrium in which the most productive producer acquires
the property right of a resource, and thus are social benefits maximized. Coase here 
puts forward an analytical criterion completely different from the neo-classical Pareto 
optimality, which is the maximum social benefit. Elsewhere I have named it the 
Coase Optimum (Zhao 2003). Within this framework, neither the assumption of 
perfect competition nor the idea of subjective cost is required: the Coase equilibrium 
can be achieved through comparing the net surplus of different demander174. Optimal 
solutions in the neo-classical framework also result from comparisons of net surplus -  
for example, land users in Alonso’s bid rent economy, bidding away their surplus 
(following Racardian and von Thunen ideas of value) as land rent. But this 
mechanism requires the perfect competition/perfect knowledge/ zero transaction costs 
assumption.
174 The Alonso’s model is good case to contrast the difference between the neo-classical and Coase.
1) In Alonso, the so-called rent curves are not curves o f different rent but the curves o f cost o f transportation 
actually. The only decision bidders have to make is the quantity o f land - according to their indifferent curves. That 
is to say, the bidding in Alonso’s model is pseudo-bidding - without bidding, the curves would still be the same. 
The curves are decided by the “market” not the bidders. All bidders simply take the equilibrium curves. The curves 
indicate the lower limit o f the rent but not the curves o f rent. If the cost curves are simply presumed to be the rent 
curves, as Alonso assumed, it must be presumed immediately that no bidder obtains rent from this. Otherwise, the 
curve would rise until the surplus turns to zero.
2) In Coase’s model, bidders do not care about the cost curves. What they care about is where they can maximize 
their net surplus - the turnover minus the costs (including cost o f transportation). Even if we presume that the 
profit curves of different land uses are Thunen-Alonso style, the rent curve of land would follow the curves o f the 
second-best bidder. See the figure in which the rent curve has already taken the cost o f transportation into 
consideration.
Surplus/Rent Surplus/Rent
BusinessBusiness
ResidenceResidence
IndustryIndustry
CountrysideCountryside Central placeCentral place
Thunen-Alonso rent curve Coase-Vickrey rent curve
figure 9.1 Thunen-Alonso rent vs. Coase-Vickrey rent
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Take the famous farmer and cattle-rancher case in Coase’s 1960 paper as an 
example. Assume a farmer and a cattle-rancher operate on neighboring properties. 
Without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the 
cattle-rancher's herd increases the total damage to the farmer's crops. According to the 
neo-classical paradigm, or Pigou’s approach, as Coase noted, it would be desirable to 
make the cattle-rancher liable for the damage caused to the farmer, or alternatively, to 
place a tax. From Pigou’s point of view, both meat market and crop market are at 
equilibrium with a given set of prices. The damage to crops is an externality of the 
cattle-rancher's herd, which is equivalent to a third product arising from the two 
markets. It becomes a missing market (Arrow’s term) and a natural solution is to place 
tax or penalty on the cattle raising business to bring the third market into equilibrium 
as well. The so called market failure will be corrected when the tax enters the cattle 
farmer’s production function.
From Coase’ point of view, however, this ‘natural solution’ is questionable. In the 
framework of Coase, landed property can either be owned by the rancher or farmer. 
Who should own the land depends on who can yield more net surpluses. Presume the 
rancher can gain net profit 100 yuan, whereas the farmer can create 50 yuan. If the 
original property of the land is in the hands of rancher, the land remains in the hands 
of rancher. The social surplus is 100 yuan. If the original property belongs to farmer, 
the rancher could pay the farmer 50 yuan, which equals the surplus of the farmer, to 
gain the right to raise cattle. The aggregate social surplus is still 100 yuan. Regardless 
of the original property status, the final result will be that the one who can create more 
net surplus should get the property right of land if the transaction cost is zero. The 
aggregate social surplus also equals 100 yuan. Likewise, if we use an illustration of an 
industrial plant that generates pollution and the polluted residents replace the rancher 
and farmer, the result is the same.
Where there is no liability for damage, the allocation of resources will be the 
same as in the case where there is liability for damage. Therefore,
“It is necessary to know whether the damaging-business is liable or not for
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damage caused since without the establishment o f  this initial delimitation o f  rights 
there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate 
result (which maximizes the value o f production) is independent o f  the legal position i f  
the pricing system is assumed to work without cost. ” (Coase, 1988, p. 104)
According to the Coase theorem therefore,
“[but] i f  the private cost is equal to social cost, it follows that producers will only 
engage in an activity i f  the value ofproduct o f  the factors employed is greater than the 
value which they yield in their best alternative use. That is to say, with zero 
transaction costs, the value o f  production would be maximized. ” (Coase, 1988, p. 158)
Transactions between producers and consumers will automatically lead to 
maximum value of the factor. The factor would transfer to its best user. If we extend 
this principle to ‘maximum social surplus’175, we can achieve a new price criterion,
11 f tthe Coase optimum . Comparing this with the old neo-classical criterion, the Pareto 
Optimality, it is not necessary to consider the marginal rate of substitution, the 
marginal rate of technical substitution or marginal rate of transformation when market 
allocates resources. The only important thing is the maximizing o f  social surplus. In Pigou’s 
framework, the surpluses are not important or even a useless concept. The cost is the core o f  
Pigou’s theory. The only thing that Pigovian economist wants to do is to make the private cost o f  a 
damaging-business equal to the social cost, in order to meet the preconditions o f  perfect 
competition. Pigou’s method o f  achieving this was to impose a tax on the damaging-business. 
Contrast this with Coase, who said:
175 In “Notes on the Problem o f Social Cost”, Coase has a quite tangled but very important discussion. He said: 
“Rent consists of the difference between what a factor ofproduction earns in a given activity and what it could 
earn in the best alternative activity. The factors engaged in an activity would be willing, if need be, to pay an 
amount of money up to slightly less than the sum of their rents to allow their employment in that activity to 
continue, because, even after taking this payment into account, they would be better off than if they had to move to 
their best alternative......
since the rents represent the increase in the value ofproduction (and therefore of incomes) from undertaking a 
particular activity rather than the best alternative, it follows that the value ofproduction, as measured on the 
market, is maximized when rent is maximized". In this paper, Coase’s did not directly compare the surplus of 
different uses o f the factor. Instead he uses “the sum of the rents o f both the farmers and the ranchers (as defined) 
minus the value o f the
crops destroyed by the cattle” to measure the sum of the surplus. To simplify the thought, I compare the surpluses 
o f alternative uses to find out who is the best user o f the factor. This seems much clearer than Coase’s original 
argument. Even if  this is not the correct explanation of Coase, I would stand on this.
To a great extent, this criterion is equivalent to Kaldor-Hicks Criterion.
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The problem which we fa ce  in dealing with actions which have harmful effects is not simply 
one o f  restraining those responsible fo r  them. What has to be decided is whether the gain from  
preventing the harm is greater than the loss which w ould be suffered elsewhere as a result o f  
stopping the action which produced the harm. (Coase, 1988, p. 132)
In other words, the solutions of Pigou may be right or not. What we need is a 
criterion by which to judge them. And Coase Optimality gives the criterion
9.4 Auction theory
After analyzing the English auction, Dutch auction, First Price Sealed Bid auction, 
and the so called Vickrey auction, Vickrey (1961) found that whichever auction 
approach is adopted, the result is the same: the highest bidder wins and he or she pays 
the amount bid by the next highest bidder. In other words, the optimal bidding 
strategy of the highest bidder is to just keep the next highest bidder out177. 
Economists now regard the Vickrey auction as pioneer idea in information economics, 
and its main contribution is to provide a solution to how to design contracts to deal 
with incentive and regulation issues under the circumstances of information 
asymmetry or incompleteness. But the Vickrey auction is also a kind of price theory. 
In the perfect competition model, price is determined by the invisible Walras 
auctioneer; and consumer and producer allocate resources and maximize their utilities 
according to the given price. Nobody can decide or manipulate the market price. 
But the pricing mechanism of Vickrey is different. He disregards the neo-classical 
assumption of a fictitious Walras auctioneer and argues that price in the factor market 
is decided by the highest bidder who considers the efficiency of the next highest 
bidder. In other words, under the assumption of profit maximization, the strategy of a 
rational bidder is to evict the second highest bidder at the lowest cost. Therefore,
177 Kleperer translates Vickery’s conclusion as a ‘Revenue Equivalence Theorem’, in terms of 
neo-classical language: Assume each o f a given number o f risk-neutral potential buyers o f an object has 
a privately known signal independently drawn from a common, strictly increasing distribution. Then 
any auction mechanism in which (i) the object always goes to the buyer with the highest signal, and (ii) 
any bidder with the lowest-feasible signal expects zero surplus, yields the same expected revenue (and 
results in each bidder making the same expected payment as a function o f her signal). (Paul Klemperer 
2004, p. 17)
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Vickrey auction is equivalent to transaction process assumed by the Coase Theorem in 
factor market178.
At this point, it will be worth briefly reviewing the progress of auction theory in 
the context of consumer competition.
Auction theory is one of the most significant developments of modem economics 
but for a long time it is not taken as the mainstream of economics for it is 
incompatible with neo-classical price theory. Although Vickery won the Nobel prize 
for his contribution to auction theory and later on many celebrated economists (e.g. 
Milgrom, 1979, 1987, 1989, Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Maskin and Riley, 2000, 
Riley and Samuelson, 1981, Myerson, 1979, Wilson, 1967, 1969, 1998, Riley 1980, 
1988, 1989, McAfee and McMillan, 1986) conducted thorough studies on auction 
theories and methods, the mainstream economics textbooks for undergraduates hardly 
contain any introduction to auction theory. 179 Paul Klemperer (2004) complained 
that:
Although this work was a remarkable achievement, there seemed to be little 
relationship to traditional price theory, which made the subject a difficult one for  
many economists, (p. 17)......
[But] some people still see auction theory as a rather specialized field, distinct 
from the main body o f  economic theory, and as an endeavor for management 
scientists and operations researchers rather than as a part o f  mainstream economics. 
(P- 76)
Economists have always been striving to bring auction theory into the 
mainstream economics and it seems they are fairly close to this goal. Bulow and 
Roberts (1989) demonstrated that: optimal auction is “essentially equivalent to the 
analysis of standard monopoly third-degree price discrimination. The auctions
178 The Coasian story o f “cattle-raiser and farmer” can be seen as two bidders in a Vickrey factor (land) 
market.
179An example which could explain the problem is that, Myerson’s creative work “ Optimal Auction Design ” 
was published in operational research journal <(Mathematics of Operations Research)), rather than any economics 
journal. This paper helped Myerson won the Nobel economic prize.
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problem can therefore be understood by applying the usual logic o f marginal revenue 
versus marginal cost.” (Bulow and Roberts, 1989) However, the pricing activities 
presented during auction are in essential conflict with perfect competition, where 
nobody is able to determine market price, as well as the concept of general 
equilibrium. The mainstream economics has excluded most price maker economic 
phenomena from the general theoretical framework. Like game theory and the theory 
of monopolistic competition, auction theory has been unable to stride into the gate of 
the mainstream economics and thereby has to make a fresh start together with the 
theories which are based on pricing activities, such as game theory, to reorganize their 
own system.
But in the new analytical framework proposed in this framework, auction theory 
is not on the edge of price theory but rather at the core of this mansion, which is the 
fundamental form of all consumer competitions. Coase-Vickery pricing theory is the 
rule to be abided by consumer competitions. The theory of consumer competition 
grounded on auction theory may provide explanation to almost all behaviours of 
consumer competition such as oligopolistic pricing, queues, lobbying contests, 
tournaments and rationing. Besides, the new framework includes pricing tools like 
game theory that have long been incompatible with pricing rules and makes them the 
organic components of the new theory.
9.5 Conclusion
According to a Coase-Vickrey pricing mechanism, the final equilibrium is: (1) the 
highest bidder acquires the property right of the factor; (2) the price is determined 
when the surplus of the next highest bidder is zero; (3) the base price is higher than 
the revenue that the original owner of the factor can benefit from it. When the 
transaction cost is zero, the result of Coase equilibrium is that the highest bidder -  the 
one who can create the maximum social surplus - acquires the property rights. Under 
this mechanism, profit is the sole criterion that determines who can maximize social
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surplus and obtain the property rights of factors180.
Since last half century, the transaction cost theory has won glorious success 
(Chueng, 1991). It can be found in almost all branches of social science. But it has 
been failed to replace the neo-classical paradigm and thus become the mainstream of 
economic analysis. The main reason is that the transaction cost and auction theory are 
not whole comparing with neoclassical paradigm. Coase-Vickrey pricing system only 
solves the pricing mechanism when demand exceeds supply. The pricing system for 
demand falls short of supply is still out of rang. That is the cause why new 
institutional economics fail to frame its own pricing theory and drive the neoclassical 
paradigm out the analysis completely. The Coase theorem needs more sound ground 
of pricing theory to stand on.
180 As Coase said, “(rent) is the difference between what a factor o f production earns in a given activity 
and what it could earn in the best alternative activity.” (p. 165)
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